LEEDS DISTRICT REGISTRY
1 Oxford Row Leeds LS1 3BG |
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B e f o r e :
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Oxford Fleet Management Limited |
Claimant |
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Mr Douglas Watson Brown Karen Tracey Clothier |
1st Defendant 2nd Defendant |
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Defendants, Litigants-in-person
Judgment date: 24th March 2014
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Tel: 01303 230038 +
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Crown Copyright ©
His Honour Judge Saffman:
Introduction
a. A duty to act in good faith and in the best interests of the Company.
b. A duty not to act for a purpose collateral to the purposes conferred by the Company's Articles.
c. A duty to exercise powers only for the purpose to which they are conferred and
d. A duty not to act so as to place oneself in a position in which personal interests do or might conflict with the interests of the Company.
It is contended that the payments now reclaimed were paid in breach of those duties.
Background
"Neither Hugh Reid, (who was his contact at Volvo) nor his colleagues were able to furnish him with any operational information."
Conclusion as to the facts as regards Mr Brown
Consequence of such findings of fact
"1) The de facto director must presume to act as if he were a director.
2) He must be or have been in point of fact part of the corporate governing structure and participate in directing the affairs of the Company in relation to the acts or conduct complained of.
3) He must be either the sole person directing the affairs of the Company or a substantial or prominent influence and force in so doing as regards to the matters complained of, influence is not otherwise likely to be sufficient.
4) An indicia as to whether a person has undertaken function other indication, it is whether the person concerned has undertaken functions or acts such as to suggest that his remit to act in relation to the management of the Company is the same as if he were a de jure director.
5) The functions he performs and the action to which the complaint must be such as could only be undertaken by a director, not one which could properly be performed by a manager or other employee below board level.
6) It is relevant whether the person was held out as a director or claimed or purported to act as such, but that is not a necessary requirement and even that may not be sufficient.
7) His role may relate to part of the affairs of the Company only as long as it is that part that is complained about.
8) Lack of accountability to others may be an indicator as also may be the fact of involvement in major decisions.
9) The power to intervene to prevent some acts on behalf of the Company may suffice.
10) The person concerned must be someone who is more than a mere agent, employee or advisor."
"On this basis I believe that the Company should continue."
a. First, Mr Brown specifically approved and authorised the Company making substantial payments to Miss Clothier and to St Edwards School. That is clear from the fax of 14th December (193) to which I have already referred on numerous occasions, Mr Brown was invited to approve and did approve the payment for £375,000 to Miss Clothier. Further, after his resignation as a director he remained on the bank mandate. The documents in connection with this are in bundle C at 304 to 316.
b. After his resignation not only did he remain the only person entitled to sign cheques by himself without a co signatory but that that was specifically reconfirmed when the bank mandates were updated following Mr Jones' appointment as a director.
c. Mr Brown continued to receive the same salary of £200,000 a year as when he was a de jure director.
d. He was copied into emails regarding important meetings and clearly participated in them as indicated for example by the document of 15th December at page 194 of the bundle.
e. He was privy to cash forecasts and financial information in relation to the Company.
f. The draft shareholder's report 22nd September 2006, I have already referred to it. I think it was actually dated August, but I could be wrong, which talks about options available to directors and shareholders. Mr Lewis points out that at that time there was only one de jure director, Mr Jones yet the report refers to "directors"
g. In addition, there is the juxtaposition between Mr Brown's resignation and other events. In September or October 2006 a firm of accountants, PKF, had written to HMRC for approval for the share buyback which I have already mentioned. It is acknowledged by Mr Brown that in the context of the share buyback there was a tax advantage in his not being a director and he resigned a month or two before this letter was sent, but it has to be recognised less than a month or so after he was advised that resignation was important from the tax point of view. He was reappointed on the 7th February 2007 only 20 days after a summary from PKF of HMRC's treatment of the buyback (at page 218), although I acknowledge that PKF had been told about how HMRC were going to treat the buyback for tax purposes in November, (see page 188).
h. He was expected to approve the share buyout by the Company, I emphasise a share buyout by the Company, and that he did so.
i. The fact that he felt able to at least attempt to veto a bonus payment to the Managing Director, albeit unsuccessfully.
j. Additionally, it seems to me that the resignation of Mr Jones itself is instructive. This morning it was Mr Brown's evidence that he fell out with Glynn Jones:
"I did not like his management style. The view was that we should replace him and bring in Nicholas Riley."
This in itself suggests a deal of influence in his management of the Company, because one of the reasons Mr Jones went was because Mr Brown did not like his management style. Additionally, Mr Brown resumes his directorship very shortly afterwards and only 6 months from having first resigned a as director.
k. Finally, there is the fact that OFM actually paid Mr Brown approaching £1,000,000 either directly or indirectly in about a three month period from September 2006 if one includes the money to St Edwards School. It is a significant sum in the context of this Company. Even Mr Brown accepts that it took away a buffer from the Company. It seems to me likely that a de jure director under those circumstances would not normally have made such a payment even at a time when the Company had not actually signed a contract with Excel and the fact that it did so is indicative of Mr Brown having influence and power in relation to the Company commensurate with the sort of influence and power one would expect of a de jure director.
Miss Clothier
The evidence suggests that that was not followed up by Mr Brown and that Capital Law were not further instructed.
"Where it can be shown that all shareholders who have a right to attend and vote at a general meeting of the Company assent to some matter which a general meeting of the Company could carry into effect, that assent is as binding as a resolution in general meeting would be."
"The shareholders should have, whether formally or informally, mandated or ratified the act in question. It is not enough that they probably would have ratified if they had known or thought about it before the liquidation removed their power to do so."
"The company cannot without the leave of the Court or the adoption of a special procedure return its capital to its shareholders."
This is particularly apposite because a buyback by the Company of its own shares is akin to that.
"It follows that the transaction which amounts to an authorised return of capital is ultra vires and cannot be validated by a shareholder ratification or approval. Whether or not the transaction is a distribution to shareholders does not depend exclusively on what the parties choose to call it, the Court looks at the substance rather than the outward appearance."
"It has been said that the interests of creditors can intrude and the application of the Duomatic principle can accordingly be barred even when a company may not strictly be insolvent"
"Where a company is insolvent or of doubtful solvency or on the verge of insolvency and it is the creditors' money which is at risk the directors, when carrying out their duty to the company, must consider the interests of the creditors as paramount and take those into account when exercising their discretion."
"When a company whether technically insolvent or not is in financial difficulties to the extent that its creditors are at risk, the duties which the directors owe to the company are extended so as to encompass the interests of the company's creditors as a whole."