CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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ISIS INVESTMENTS LIMITED |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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(5) OSCATELLO INVESTMENTS LIMITED (6) KAUPTHING BANK hf (7) ELFAR ADALSTEINSSON (as a representative party) |
Defendants |
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And between: |
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(1) OSCATELLO INVESTMENTS LIMITED (2) KAUPTHING BANK hf |
Part 20 Claimants |
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- and - |
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(1) ISIS INVESTMENTS LIMITED (6) ELFAR ADALSTEINSSON (as a representative party) |
Part 20 Defendants |
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William Trower QC and David Allison (instructed by Weil, Gotschal Manges) for Oscatello Investments Limited
Alan Steinfeld QC (instructed by Weil, Gotshal & Manges) for Kaupthing Bank hf
Charles Samek QC and David Lascelles (instructed by Logos Legal Services) for Elfar Adalsteinsson
Hearing date: 21st and 22nd March 2012
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Floyd :
"(i) On any view this was an improvident transaction by which Isis sold an interest of which it had already disposed. There was also no justification for prioritising Oscatello over other creditors.
(ii) Oscatello does not appear to have actually ever paid £44.05 million under Clause 6. This seems to have a purely circular payment by and to Kaupthing which could never have benefited Isis.
(iii) The Framework Agreement appears to have been concluded by the directors under pressure from Kaupthing without any real thought being given to the discharge of their fiduciary responsibilities. Kaupthing itself acted as if it was a director of Isis.
(iv) There is a serious indication that by agreeing to pay the VER under Clause 6, Isis was making an unlawful distribution of capital to or for the benefit of its shareholder, Kaupthing and/or one of its ultimate shareholders, Mr Tchenguiz."
i) There was no genuine consideration moving to Isis. The expressed payment of £44.05 million was never made, and Kaupthing simply made circular book entries. The promise of payment was a sham.
ii) Clause 6 was an agreement procured by Kaupthing for Isis to make an unlawful return of capital to Kaupthing/TDT.
iii) The sale of the VER was made in breach of fiduciary duty and with no true authority.
iv) The effect of clause 6 when coupled with the obligation of Oscatello to pre-pay the Kaupthing overdraft was such that the purported sale of the VER was a sale by Isis to Kaupthing. Such a sale is unenforceable unless Oscatello or Kaupthing gave full and frank disclosure of all material facts.
v) Clause 6 was tainted by illegality as it formed part of an unlawful conspiracy on the part of Kaupthing, Mr Tchenguiz and others to defraud the markets by giving a false picture of the true indebtedness of Kaupthing's largest borrower.
vi) Clause 6 is unenforceable as it amounts to an equitable charge which is unregistered and therefore unenforceable under IOM company law.
"It is common ground that an amendment should not be allowed unless the claim, as amended, has a real prospect of success. It would obviously be pointless to allow an amendment only to have the amended claim dismissed summarily on the ground that it has no real prospect of success. The notes to the White Book state at paragraph 17.3.6:
"Given the purpose of the statement of truth verifying an amendment, a party will not be permitted to raise by amendment an allegation which is not supported by any evidence and is therefore pure speculation or invention."
The authority cited in support of that note is Clarke v Marlborough Fine Art (London) Ltd [2002] EWHC 11. In fact, that particular decision did not concern amendments to pleadings at all. It concerned the admissibility of so-called expert evidence. However, an earlier decision in the same case reported at [2002] 1 WLR 1731 did concern amendments to pleadings, but it does not say precisely what is said in the notes to the White Book. Much of the discussion was taken up with the consideration of pleading inconsistent or alternative cases. Patten J. held that it would be wrong to permit an amendment to allow inconsistent cases to be pleaded unless they were clearly pleaded as alternatives. What Patten J. said about the evidential basis for an amendment was:
"It is therefore necessary for me to consider the defendant's second main ground of opposition to this application which is that the amendment has no proper or sufficient evidential basis and should be refused on that ground. For these purposes Mr. Briggs and Mr. Lyndon-Stanford submit that I should apply the same test as if this were an application for summary judgment under CPR Part 24 or an application to strike out under CPR r.3.4. That seems to be right, but it requires me to be satisfied on the basis of the material before the court that the claim has no real prospect of success."
Likewise in Walker v Stones [2001] QB 902, 946 Sir Christopher Slade approved the following statement by Stuart-Smith LJ in Taylor v Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd (unreported) 21 July 1999:
"it is not sufficient to look and see whether the pleading technically discloses a cause of action. Particularly in the light of the new Civil Procedure Rules 1998, the court should look to see what will happen at trial. If the case is so weak that it has no reasonable prospect of success, it should be stopped before great expense is incurred."
Accordingly, in considering whether to permit an amendment I am entitled and bound to consider whether the amendment is supported by any evidence, and that the relevant test is whether the amendment has a real prospect of success. However, the test of real prospect of success is a threshold test. Rix LJ said in Fincken:
"Ms Gloster submits that it is enough that these amendments have some prospect of success. That may be a suitable test where an amendment comes at a reasonably early stage of proceedings. After all, if any pleading whether by amendment or not, cannot meet the test of some real prospect of success, it is in danger of being struck out. In my judgment, however, the proper rule or guideline calls for a sliding scale: the later the amendment, the more it may require to commend it."
The Compromise Agreement
"By these proceedings (and in further proceedings referred to below [the current action]) the claimant seeks a declaration that it is beneficially entitled to the Money in Court, and that no part of it is payable to Oscatello, whether under Clause 6 or at all."
"the TDT Defendants (including Oscatello) are in material breach of numerous central provisions of the Framework Agreement, the proper performance of which was an essential condition of the operation of Clause 6."
"A declaration … that by reason of the breaches of the Framework Agreement by the First to Fifth Defendants (or any of them) the Claimant is under no obligation (whether in contract or otherwise) to pay any sums by way of the "Violet Economic Return" under Clause 6 of the Framework Agreement to the Fifth Defendant and that the Money in Court should accordingly be paid to the Claimant as sole the beneficial owner thereof". (emphasis supplied)
"all those causes of action, claims, counterclaims, rights of set off, contribution or indemnity which arise out of or in connection with the facts and matters pleaded by and against the Parties in the BVI Proceedings, the First English proceedings and the Somerfield claim in the Icelandic Proceedings. For the avoidance of doubt, the parties may subsequently refer to the same facts and matters pleaded in [the above proceedings] in any other suit, but the causes of action contained in those proceedings are hereby released and no Party may seek relief on the same or any similar basis or seek to reopen those claims in any other way."
"I share their reluctance to infer that a party intended to give up something which neither he, nor the other party, knew or could know that he had."
Position of the seventh defendant
Conclusion