CHANCERY DIVISION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
B e f o r e :
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the Chancery Division)
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(1) Nigel Woolley | ||
(2) Timesource Limited | Claimants | |
- and - | ||
(1) Ultimate Products Limited | ||
(2) Henley's Clothing Limited | Defendants |
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Thomas Moody-Stuart (instructed by Kuit Steinart Levy LLP) for the Defendants
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Crown Copyright ©
INTRODUCTION
THE PARTIES
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
THE CONFUSION EVIDENCE
When you send your supplier integration lines through are you adding your own 'brand' on there i.e. henleys [sic]? I don't want a brand attaching to your lines, and certainly not henley as my customers will be confused.
Please with immediate effect do not attach this brand if you have done previously.
APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES OF LAW
Although your Lordships were referred in the course of the argument to a large number of reported cases, this is not a branch of the law in which reference to other cases is of any real assistance except analogically. It has been observed more than once that the questions which arise are, in general, questions of fact. Neither the appellants nor the respondents contend that the principles of law are in any doubt. The law of passing off can be summarised in one short general proposition – no man may pass off his goods as those of another. More specifically, it may be expressed in terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed. These are three in number. First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying "get-up" (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff's goods or services. Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff. Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff's identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff. For example, if the public is accustomed to rely upon a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the brand name. Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a quia timet action that he is likely to suffer, damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation that the source of the defendant's goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.
There may, of course, be cases of so doubtful a nature that a Judge cannot properly come to a conclusion without evidence directed to the point; but there can be no doubt that in a passing-off action the question whether the matter complained of is calculated to deceive, in other words, whether it amounts to a misrepresentation is a matter for the Judge, who, looking at the documents and evidence before him, comes to his own conclusion, and, to use the words of Lord Macnaughten in Payton & Co. Ltd. v Snelling, Lampard & Co. Ltd. (17 R.P.C. 635) "must not surrender his own independent judgment to any witness whatever".
The proper approach to the question was not in dispute. The judge must first consider the evidence adduced and use his own common sense and his own opinion as to the likelihood of deception. It is an overall "jury" assessment involving a combination of all these factors, see "GE" Trade Mark [1973] RPC 297 at page 321. Ultimately the question is one for the court, not for the witnesses.
This is not to say that evidence as to deception is irrelevant. For example, if in a given case there is evidence of actual deception this could be a powerful indicator. Similarly, an absence of evidence of deception may reinforce a court's overall impression that there is no misrepresentation. Nevertheless, I agree with Mr Malynicz that an absence of hard evidence of members of the public actually being misled on specific occasions is certainly not fatal to a claim in passing off.
CLAIMANTS' SUBMISSIONS
(1) This was a classic case where there was likely to be deflection of potential customers for HENLEY watches. Those seeking a HENLEY watch because of the brand's reputation might well buy a HENLEYS watch out of, say, the Argos catalogue in the erroneous belief that it came from the same source. He submitted that when the names, the styles and pricing of the watches and the sales outlets are taken into account diversion of custom was inevitable.
(2) Secondly, it is said that the presence of HENLEYS watches on the market is leading to a loss of trade for Timesource. Thus, Argos would not want to stock HENLEY watches since it sold the HENLEYS range. Although JD Williams was prepared to stock both brands, the history of it requiring Timesource to sell its watches unbranded and even removing the HENLEY branding showed the adverse impact on Timesource's business.
(3) Third, it was submitted that the Claimants had now lost income in the shape of the 5% royalty which had previously been paid under the licence.
(4) Finally, Mr Malynicz suggested that this was a case of increasing dilution of the value of the exclusivity attaching to HENLEY.
DEFENDANTS' SUBMISSIONS
DISCUSSION
GOODWILL
MISREPRESENTATION
DAMAGE
CONCLUSION