CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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ADRIAN NICHOLAS MORRIS And ADRIAN MICHAEL DAVIES MARIA JOZICA DAVIES ADRIENNE MARIA CATHERINE MAMBER EDWIN LAURENCE DAVIES CLIVE VERNON DAVIES |
Claimant |
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Mark Simeon Jones (instructed by Osmond & Osmond ) for the First to Third Defendants
Hearing dates: 29 June-1 July 2011
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Crown Copyright ©
MR CHARLES HOLLANDER QC (SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE):
The parties
Issues in the action
The preliminary issue
Events subsequent to Owen's death
" to deceive, to commit what may be criminal offences and to defy common norms of human behaviour in furtherance of undisclosed aims which may or may not relate to their subjective perceptions of what the deceased might have wanted is significant in determining the credibility of those giving evidence"
Credibility and assessment of witnesses
The Belgian proceedings
Domicile: relevance
i) The deceased died domiciled in Belgium both in the Belgian sense of habitual residence and in the English sense of habitual residence with the intention of remaining in Belgium permanently or indefinitelyii) Accordingly, succession to the deceased's moveables is governed by Belgian law
iii) The will is null and void as a matter of Belgian law
Domicile: the law
(i) A person is, in general, domiciled in the country in which he is considered byEnglish law to have his permanent home. A person may sometimes be
domiciled in a country although he does not have his permanent home in it
(Dicey, pages 122 to126).
(ii) No person can be without a domicile (Dicey, page 126).
(iii) No person can at the same time for the same purpose have more than one
domicile (Dicey, pages 126 to128).
(iv) An existing domicile is presumed to continue until it is proved that a new
domicile has been acquired (Dicey, pages 128 to 129).
(v) Every person receives at birth a domicile of origin (Dicey, pages 130 to 133).
(vi) Every independent person can acquire a domicile of choice by the combination
of residence and an intention of permanent or indefinite residence, but not
otherwise (Dicey, pages 133 to138).
(vii) Any circumstance that is evidence of a person's residence, or of his intention to
reside permanently or indefinitely in a country, must be considered in
determining whether he has acquired a domicile of choice (Dicey, pages 138
to143).
(viii) In determining whether a person intends to reside permanently or indefinitely,
the court may have regard to the motive for which residence was taken up, the
fact that residence was not freely chosen, and the fact that residence was
precarious (Dicey, pages 144 to151).
(ix) A person abandons a domicile of choice in a country by ceasing to reside there
and by ceasing to intend to reside there permanently, or indefinitely, and not
otherwise (Dicey, pages 151 to153).
(x) When a domicile of choice is abandoned, a new domicile of choice may be
acquired, but, if it is not acquired, the domicile of origin revives (Dicey, pages
151 to 153).
i) Residence in Belgiumii) An intention of permanent or indefinite residence.
"Residence in a country for the purposes of the law of domicile is physical presence in that country as an inhabitant of it."
"Domicil of origin, or, as it is sometimes called, perhaps less accurately, "domicil of birth", differs from domicil of choice mainly in this-that its character is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off."
" …the court must look back at the whole of the deceased's life, at what he had done with his life, at what life had done to him and at what were his inferred intentions in order to decide whether he had acquired a domicile of choice in England by the date of his death. Soren Kierkegaard's aphorism that "Life must be lived forwards but can only be understood backwards" resonates in the biographical data of domicile disputes. "
"the deputy judge underestimated the enduring strength of Andreas's Cypriotdomicile of origin. This led him to focus too much attention on how specific
Andreas's plans were after 1995 to return to live permanently in Cyprus and too
little attention on whether Andreas intended to live permanently or indefinitely in
England. The emphasis of the judgment is, with respect, wrong. Although
Andreas's intentions regarding both Cyprus and England are closely interrelated,
the adhesiveness of the domicile of origin, the incidence of the burden of proof
and the level of the standard of proof all require the person contending for a
domicile of choice to establish a clear case that Andreas intended to live
permanently or indefinitely in England. For example, in paragraph 91 quoted
above the deputy judge observed that, if Andreas had continued with a string of
short term girl friends, "he might eventually have decided to sell up and go and
live permanently in Cyprus." In my judgment, the question is not so much
whether Andreas intended eventually to return to live permanently in Cyprus, but
whether it had been shown that, by the date of his death, he had formed the
intention to live permanently in England. The crucial point is that Andreas had a
domicile of origin in Cyprus until it was proved that he intended to reside
permanently or indefinitely in England. "
"In considering whether Ramadan had at some stage an intention to reside
permanently and indefinitely in England, long residence in England is of course a starting point. It is furthermore important that the residence in England was the home of his family. That was true during his marriage to Souheyla and was true once he was in a relationship with Diane. It is common sense that the longer the residence and the more it is home, the more likely the inference that there is the intention to reside permanently and indefinitely. But at any stage when it might be proper to make that inference, it is important to place in the balance any continued connections with Cyprus so as to be able to be clear whether his intention has become one of settling finally in England, abandoning Cyprus. One must further be satisfied that the situation is not one in which Ramadan has simply not finally made up his mind because, as Scarman J said in Fuld , in such a situation the domicile of origin is retained."
"There is a strong line of case law, binding on this court, that the domicile of origin is tenacious. Thus, for example, Lord Macnaghten in Winans v Attorney-General [1904] AC 287 at 290 held that the character of domicile of origin "is more enduring, its hold stronger, and less easily shaken off" than domicile of choice. Lord Macnaghten added at 291 that a change of domicile is a serious matter because the change may involve "far reaching consequences in regard to succession and distribution and other things which depend on domicile." At 292, he held that the question was whether it had "with perfect clearness and satisfaction" been shown that the testator had "a fixed and settled purpose" or "a determination" or "a fixed and deliberate intention" to abandon his American domicile and settle in England."
"It seems to me that as a general proposition the acquisition of any new domicile should in general always be treated as a serious allegation because of its serious consequences. None of the authorities cited to us preclude that approach, and such an approach ensures logical consistency between two situations where the policy interest to be protected is (as demonstrated above) the same. However, what evidence is required in a particular case will depend on the application of common sense to the particular circumstances. In this case, Mr Henwood had an aversion to England because of childhood memories. If his domicile of origin arose at all in this case, it arose only because of the default rule. In those circumstances, it is not improbable that he would wish to acquire a domicile of choice elsewhere and accordingly there is no reason why the court should approach a case that he has done so with undue scepticism. There were of course other reasons why certain evidence adduced by Mr Henwood, namely that he had created, was to be approached with caution. But that was a wholly separate matter."
"Inevitably, any test of chief residence is circular. It cannot simply be a reference to the main home in terms of size or amenities. Nor can it be a reference to the home in which the subject spends the most time. The court has to look at the quality of the residence in order to decide in which country the subject has an intention to reside permanently. Provided that task is carried out, the chief residence in the sense that term is used in this context has in fact been identified."
Owen Davies
The Hovel
Owen 2006-2008
"I am British and my house is about 8km south of Stratford-upon-Avon, which makes it about 20km north from the annual Rudge rally site.
However, I work at Renault just outside Paris near Versaille, so I am there during the week.
To complicate things further, my missus is from Vlaanderen, so we are back at Oudenaarde at the weekends.
Moving stuff between France, Belgium and the UK is therefore no problem."
The will
"I need to make provision for the cats' well being.
I have got a will, but I need to update it.
As it stands, I believe it all goes to N."
Contentions of the parties
The Claimant's case
The Family Defendants' case
Discussion
i) Owen retained property throughout in England, albeit much at least of that reason was to ensure that he retained a foothold in the English property market. His attitudes remained British: he never developed any affection for Belgium or Belgian culture. He seems to have retained an almost jingoistic Britishness. He never learned Flemish. He retained a UK passport and driving licence. He never purchased property in Belgium and his assets in Belgium consisted of one Belgian bank account with not much in it. His friends were English and his holidays were spent in England.ii) He made it clear to Natalie that he wanted to send any children they had to boarding school in England. He told the Claimant that he intended to retire to England, although that seems to have been expressly rather vaguely. He made plans to get married in England.
iii) The Hovel did provide some element of permanence in Belgium. But Owen was not happy in his job and was, in the short or medium term, looking towards a move. He would, I find, have moved to wherever a job took him, whether the US, or continental Europe, or the UK. If it did not remain convenient to spend weekends in Belgium, he would not have continued to do so.
iv) It is also relevant to have in mind the circumstances of the purchase of the Hovel. This was, very deliberately, Natalie's property. Whatever common decisions were made about refurbishment works, it is striking that this was not treated by Natalie and Owen as their joint property in the way a couple committed to the future together (as were Owen and Natalie) might have expected. It suggests, at least, that Owen was not willing to commit to a future in Belgium.
v) The Hooligans (the cats) were resident in Belgium. They would have provided a draw towards Belgium, as Owen was devoted to them. But Owen was accustomed to separation from his cats- he left cats when he left Back Lane, he had cats in Michelet and when he had looked for employment abroad in 2006 he must have contemplated leaving the Hooligans in safe hands in Belgium.
vi) It was suggested that the Hovel would become a family home in the future. But Natalie's evidence was that it had become clear to her in the course of her 18 months without work in 2005/6 that she did not wish to stay at home, with or without children, even though Owen would have been happy for her to do so and there was not a financial need for her to work. Her evidence was that Owen would have continued to look for jobs abroad and would have expected her to follow him.
vii) In 2001 Owen wrote letters stating that he was going to live in Belgium for "an indefinite period." This meant, in my judgment, no more than that he did not know when he was coming back.
viii) Whilst care must be taken with declarations and comments in documents or emails, because they often need to be seen in context and often serve a particular purpose on the part of the maker, those to which I have referred in this judgment are consistent with Owen retaining his domicile of origin.
Residence
Belgian law residence
Conclusion