CHANCERY DIVISION
BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
Claimants Defendant |
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B e f o r e :
(sitting as a Judge of the High Court)
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(1) AVERIL MACDONALD (2) DEBORAH BANNIGAN |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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ALICE MARION FROST (sued as executrix of the estate of Joseph Henry Frost, deceased) |
Defendant |
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Clifford Darton (instructed by CMHT Commercial) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 27th, 28th, 29th April and 1st May 2009
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Crown Copyright ©
Miss Geraldine Andrews QC:
INTRODUCTION
PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL
"I would prefer to say (while conscious that it is a thoroughly question-begging formulation) that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurance must be clear enough. What amounts to sufficient clarity, in a case of this sort, is hugely dependent on context."
Lord Neuberger, who agreed, sounded the following note of caution in paragraph 85:
"it would be quite wrong to be unrealistically rigorous when applying the "clear and unambiguous" test. The court should not search for ambiguity or uncertainty, but should assess the question of clarity and certainty practically and sensibly, as well as contextually. Again this point is underlined by the authorities, namely those cases I have referred to in para 78 above, which support the proposition that, at least normally, it is sufficient for the person invoking the estoppel to establish that he reasonably understood the statement or action to be an assurance on which he could rely."
"it would represent a regrettable and substantial emasculation of the beneficial principle of proprietary estoppel if it were artificially fettered so as to require the precise extent of the property the subject of the alleged estoppel to be strictly defined in every case."
Thus the identification of the property must be sufficient to give the promise the clear and unequivocal character required to found this species of estoppel, but it need not be defined with precision.
"the property the subject of the equity could be conceptually identified from the moment the equity came into existence, but its precise extent fell to be determined when the equity crystallised, namely on Peter's death".
However, in paragraph 102, he went on to acknowledge that there may be cases where the facts justify a different conclusion, either because the promise had a different meaning at the time it was made, or because intervening events justify giving it a different effect or even no effect. Lord Walker, likewise, drew a distinction in paragraph 63 between the situation in Thorner and the cases of Layton v Martin [1986] 2 FLR 227, where the deceased made an unspecific promise of "financial security" and Re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498, where the promise related to the deceased's estate.
"it is clear that in other cases of constructive trust, such as those arising from mutual Wills, the trust can bind the whole of B's estate."
He added that he saw no reason in principle or authority why the doctrine of proprietary estoppel should not apply so as to raise an equity against B in favour of A extending to the whole of B's estate.
THE BACKGROUND TO THE CLAIM
a. Deborah sold her previous house for £26,000, and purchased the Shop for £20,000;
b. the £20,000 was paid to Averil. On 5th December 1986 Joe's then solicitor, David Drury, forwarded to Averil four cheques which the covering letter stated were gifts he had agreed to make out of the proceeds of sale of the shop. These comprised a gift on her marriage of £5,000, exempt gifts for £3,000 and £3,250 for the tax years 1986 and 1987 respectively, and a plain gift for £8,750. This accords with Averil's evidence that her father had taken tax advice about how the payments should be characterised.
c. Averil used £12,000 of the money to reduce her mortgage.
d. Deborah and Averil each started to make payments of £100 per month to their parents and continued that arrangement regardless of their personal circumstances, until Joe died.
e. Joe made a new Will on 6th January 1987. Its terms remain unknown. Clare did not change her Will.
THE ALLEGED ASSURANCES
The inherent probabilities and the objective facts
What Joe said to others about the arrangement
"Mr Frost's children owe him money as he had loaned monies to them but there is nothing in writing and Mrs Frost does not wish to pursue for monies owing. Mr Frost had made gifts to his children but Mrs Frost does not know the dates and accurate amounts but confirms that the gifts and loans do not come over and above the inheritance tax threshold."
"We did have a discussion after he'd written his Will to leave Marion the property about the possibility that someone could challenge that if there had been a previous promise. It was around the time of the marriage. When he said he had excluded Averil and Deborah from his Will we discussed what would happen. I raised a concern with him. The gist was that there could be a challenge to what he had done, I said I had seen other people challenge Wills on grounds of previous Wills."
Roger said Joe's response was that it had all been done through a solicitor, that he was of sound mind and that all was in order. He had said nothing about any previous promise he had made to his daughters. In answer to further questions from counsel, Roger said that he did not think he had used the word "promise" when speaking to Joe, but that it was a word he was using now to give the gist of the nature of his concerns.
What Averil and Deborah said to others about the arrangement with their parents
The evidence of Averil and Deborah
CONCLUSION