CHANCERY DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE VAT AND DUTIES TRIBUNAL
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
CALLTEL TELECOM LIMITED OPTO TELELINKS (EUROPE) LIMITED |
Appellants |
|
- and - |
||
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HER MAJESTY'S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS |
Respondents |
____________________
Mr Mark Cunningham QC Mr Philip Moser and Ms Fiona Banks (instructed by The Solicitor for HM Revenue and Customs) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: March 17th, 18th, 20th and 23rd 2009
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Floyd:
"51. In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that traders who take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected with fraud, be it the fraudulent evasion of VAT or other fraud, must be able to rely on the legality of those transactions without the risk of losing their right to deduct the input VAT (see, to that effect, Case C-384/04 Federation of Technological Industries and Others [2006] ECR I-0000, paragraph 33).
52. It follows that, where a recipient of a supply of goods is a taxable person who did not and could not know that the transaction concerned was connected with a fraud committed by the seller, Article 17 of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a rule of national law under which the fact that the contract of sale is void, by reason of a civil law provision which renders that contract incurably void as contrary to public policy for unlawful basis of the contract attributable to the seller, causes that taxable person to lose the right to deduct the VAT he has paid. It is irrelevant in this respect whether the fact that the contract is void is due to fraudulent evasion of VAT or to other fraud.
53. By contrast, the objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of 'supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such' and 'economic activity' are not met where tax is evaded by the taxable person himself (see Halifax and Others, paragraph 59).
54. As the Court has already observed, preventing tax evasion, avoidance and abuse is an objective recognised and encouraged by the Sixth Directive (see Joined Cases C-487/01 and C-7/02 Gemeente Leusden and Holin Groep [2004] ECR I-5337, paragraph 76). Community law cannot be relied on for abusive or fraudulent ends (see, inter alia, Case C-367/96 Kefalas and Others [1998] ECR I-2843, paragraph 20; Case C-373/97 Diamantis [2000] ECR I-1705, paragraph 33; and Case C-32/03 Fini H [2005] ECR I-1599, paragraph 32).
55. Where the tax authorities find that the right to deduct has been exercised fraudulently, they are permitted to claim repayment of the deducted sums retroactively (see, inter alia, Rompelman, paragraph 24; Case C-110/94 INZO [1996] ECR I-857, paragraph 24; and Gabalfrisa, paragraph 46). It is a matter for the national court to refuse to allow the right to deduct where it is established, on the basis of objective evidence, that that right is being relied on for fraudulent ends (see Fini H, paragraph 34).
56. In the same way, a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was taking part in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT must, for the purposes of the Sixth Directive, be regarded as a participant in that fraud, irrespective of whether or not he profited by the resale of the goods.
57. That is because in such a situation the taxable person aids the perpetrators of the fraud and becomes their accomplice.
58. In addition, such an interpretation, by making it more difficult to carry out fraudulent transactions, is apt to prevent them.
59. Therefore, it is for the referring court to refuse entitlement to the right to deduct where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the taxable person knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, and to do so even where the transaction in question meets the objective criteria which form the basis of the concepts of 'supply of goods effected by a taxable person acting as such' and 'economic activity'.
60. It follows from the foregoing that the answer to the questions must be that where a recipient of a supply of goods is a taxable person who did not and could not know that the transaction concerned was connected with a fraud committed by the seller, Article 17 of the Sixth Directive must be interpreted as meaning that it precludes a rule of national law under which the fact that the contract of sale is void - by reason of a civil law provision which renders that contract incurably void as contrary to public policy for unlawful basis of the contract attributable to the seller - causes that taxable person to lose the right to deduct the VAT he has paid. It is irrelevant in this respect whether the fact that the contract is void is due to fraudulent evasion of VAT or to other fraud.
61. By contrast, where it is ascertained, having regard to objective factors, that the supply is to a taxable person who knew or should have known that, by his purchase, he was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT, it is for the national court to refuse that taxable person entitlement to the right to deduct."
"47. As the Advocate General observed in para 27 of his opinion, each transaction must therefore be regarded on its own merits and the character of a particular transaction in the chain cannot be altered by earlier or subsequent events. …
51. It follows that transactions such as those at issue in the main proceedings, which are not themselves vitiated by VAT fraud, constitute supplies of goods or services effected by a taxable person acting as such and an economic activity within the meaning of arts 2(1), 4 and 5(1) of the Sixth Directive, where they fulfil the objective criteria on which the definitions of those terms are based, regardless of the intention of a trader other than the taxable person concerned involved in the same chain of supply and/or the possible fraudulent nature of another transaction in the chain, prior or subsequent to the transaction carried out by that taxable person, of which that taxable person had no knowledge and no means of knowledge.
52. Nor can the right to deduct input VAT of a taxable person who carries out such transactions be affected by the fact that in the chain of supply of which those transactions form part another prior or subsequent transaction is vitiated by VAT fraud, without that taxable person knowing or having any means of knowing."
"I agree entirely with the Tribunal when it said that "there must come a time when a trader, told that every one of his purchases followed a tainted chain, is compelled to recognise that without a significant change in his trading methods every one of his future purchases is more likely than not also to follow a tainted chain"."
"..it is not contrary to Community law to require the supplier to take every step which could reasonably be required of him to satisfy himself that the transaction which he is effecting does not result in his participation in tax evasion."
The facts
Calltel and Opto and their businesses
The Commissioners become interested in MTIC fraud
"VAT fraud involving mobile phones is widespread and growing significantly".
"Due diligence"
"There are differences of detail between the steps taken by Calltel and Opto in relation to these and the other traders about which Mr Leach provided details, but these two cases are typical. He had criticisms to make in every case and, in essence, his evidence was that such due diligence as was undertaken was too late, superficial and often incomplete; and that the information which was obtained frequently indicated that the trader concerned was not reliable, but was disregarded."
The transactions
"Most of the chains were, at least superficially, straightforward. If Mrs Bushby's [the HMRC officer with responsibility for this case] analysis is right, a typical chain began with a defaulting trader, or with a trader whose identity had been hijacked, who sold to a buffer. The phones then passed through the hands of, usually, two or three further buffers (though occasionally more or fewer) before being bought by Calltel which, in most cases, sold them to Opto, which then sold them to an overseas customer. We take one such chain as an example. On 20 January 2006, a date to which we shall return in another context, Ultimate Security Agency Ltd (which Mr Patchett-Joyce [then counsel for Opto and Calltel] agreed was a defaulter) sold 4780 Samsung D600 phones for £183.55 each to Perrypoint Ltd which, on the same day, sold the same phones to W A Communications at £183.80 each, making a profit of 25p per phone (an aggregate profit of £1,195). They were then sold, also on 20 January, to Global Enterprise (GB) Ltd at £184.45 each, a profit of 65p per phone (£3,107). Global Enterprise immediately sold them to Calltel at £185 each, a profit of 55p each or £2,629. Calltel sold them, on the same day, to a Swiss company, Digi Trading GmbH, at £192.50, a gross profit of £7.50 per phone, or £35,850 in total. Some chains of transactions are longer, some shorter, and some also include Opto. In those cases, whichever of the two appellant companies sold to the other made a gross profit of, almost always, £1 or, sometimes, 50p per unit, while the second company, selling to an overseas customer, made a substantial profit. "
"Our attention was drawn particularly to one chain. On 31 March 2006—the last day of the period with which we are concerned—Opto bought 1200 Nokia phones from World Communications Imp-Exp at £292 per unit (it appears that all the transactions in every one of the chains with which we are concerned, regardless of the nationality of the participants, were priced in sterling). It sold them, on the same day, to Calltel for £293 per unit. Also on the same day, Calltel sold the consignment to World Communications Sàrl—the French company associated with the Spanish supplier—for £304.70 per unit. The Appellants, between them, made a gross profit of £12.70 per unit, or £15,240. We were not provided with any information about the shipping and storage costs. Mr Gohir was unable to offer any explanation of the purpose, from World Communications' point of view, behind its making a loss of £12.70 per unit when it could as easily have arranged a sale from the Spanish company to its French associate without the Appellants' intervention."
"We can describe his evidence only as vague in some parts and evasive in others. He mentioned telephone calls and checks on other traders' websites, in order to ascertain what stock was available and who was interested in buying, but he was quite unable to explain, at least to our satisfaction, how it was that Calltel was able to buy goods for which it had a customer from a supplier who had no stock of his own, but had to buy the goods from another trader who, also, had no stock but had to buy from yet another trader with no stock, and how all of the necessary negotiations of model, quantity and price, the paperwork, the payments, the inspections and the release of the goods, in a chain which might involve as many as eight traders, could all take place in the course of a single day. He told us that he and the Appellants' staff viewed other traders' websites and made and received telephone calls, but we were left with no clear impression at all of the process by which they were able to find suppliers of the right quantity of the required model of phone when those suppliers held no stock, nor how they managed to identify purchasers of entire consignments of phones which the Appellants were able to secure."
Dealings between Calltel and Opto
"Mr Gohir was asked why each company had done so, when his objectives of sharing the risk and generating sufficient income for Opto to enable it to service its loans could have been achieved by the expedient of sharing the available deals between the two companies, by their handling the available transactions alternately, or in some similar fashion. He was unable to provide an answer, but merely repeated that the Commissioners were aware of what the companies were doing. We deduce that we were asked to draw the inference that the mere fact that the Commissioners knew of the practice was sufficient justification of it."
Changes in phone specifications
Mr Gohir's knowledge and means of knowledge
"Due to the large-scale fraudulent activity in this sector we will only buy and sell goods after rigorous commercial checks and thorough scrutiny of our suppliers and the origin of the goods."
"138. Between 2002 and 2005 there were several visits by HMRC officers to Calltel and, latterly, Opto at which the continuing levels of VAT fraud in the industry were mentioned to Mr Gohir. During the same period there was correspondence between the parties in which the Commissioners' officers expressed misgivings about Calltel's claims for input tax credit. On 27 February 2004 an officer wrote to Calltel's accountants making the specific assertion, apparently for the first time, that some of the goods purchased by Calltel had been traced back to defaulting traders. On 29 September 2004, at which time only Calltel was trading, two of the Commissioners' officers visited Mr Gohir, and advised him again of their concerns about the provenance of some of the goods in which it was dealing, informing him that many of the consignments had been traced back to defaulters. One of the transactions included in Calltel's VAT return for September 2004 was selected for verification, and Mr Gohir was notified in December 2004 that its repayment claim would not be met until the verification had been concluded. We understand that the repayment was, eventually, made.
139. Mrs Bushby became the assurance officer for both Calltel and Opto, which had recently begun to trade, in April 2005. She paid her first visit to Mr Gohir on 11 April, and a second on 9 May 2005. … At the second meeting Mrs Bushby told Mr Gohir that almost all of the goods in which Calltel had dealt in July and August 2004 had been traced back to defaulting traders. Mr Gohir assured Mrs Bushby that he was equally concerned about fraud in the industry, and identified a transaction which he had cancelled because he had received adverse information from the Redhill office. There was a lengthy discussion of Calltel's due diligence procedures. Mrs Bushby wrote further letters to Calltel in September and December 2005. In them, she identified a large number of transactions which, she said, she had traced to a defaulter. One of the letters contained the following passage:
"The continued incidence of MTIC VAT fraud in the verified supply chain (100% of the 4 months covered above) would indicate that a fundamental reappraisal of the due diligence carried out by your company is now appropriate. If the due diligence routinely undertaken by Calltel Ltd in these periods was carried out with the aim of ensuring that the company would not profit in trade from deals emanating from a UK MTIC VAT fraud, then it can be seen, as evidence above, this due diligence has not worked.
… can you please explain how the company can continue to deal in this way in future whilst at the same time claiming neither the knowledge or the grounds to expect that the VAT due on the supply of those goods will go unpaid."
140. In this letter, as on other occasions, the transactions were identified by means of Calltel's or Opto's sales invoice number, from which Mr Gohir was able also to determine the identity of the customer and, indirectly, the supplier (since consignments were not kept in stock but, almost invariably, sold intact), but no information was provided which would have enabled him to identify the trader who, the Commissioners contended, had defaulted. The officers maintained that they were prevented, by various statutory provisions, from providing such information; Mr Gohir and his advisers protested that, without the identity of the defaulting trader, the information was of little or no value. Mr Gohir made the same point, repeatedly, in his evidence: he could and did undertake effective due diligence in respect of his suppliers and customers, and the fact that neither Calltel nor Opto had ever dealt directly with a defaulter or hijacker showed that their due diligence was effective; but he could do no more because he had no means of finding out the identities of other traders who had dealt in the goods."
The issues before the Tribunal
"(1) Has a tax loss referable to the supply chain in question been proved?
(2) If so, has the fraudulent nature of the tax loss been proved?
(3) Had the relevant tax loss been suffered at the time of the Appellants' transactions? If not, what, if any, consequences flow?
(4) Did the Appellants know, or have the means of knowledge, of the relevant tax loss in the supply chain in question at the time of entering into their transactions in that supply chain?"
The Tribunal's conclusions
"We … have stood back from the chains of transactions we have to consider, in order to determine what is their true character. A single chain, taken in isolation and without knowledge or even awareness of any other, might well appear entirely legitimate; but the picture could change fundamentally when what the tribunal in Dragon Futures described as a "web of contracts" is examined. Having conducted that examination it is, in our view, perfectly obvious that trade of the kind in which the Appellants were engaged is not legitimate.
While we are quite willing to accept that there is a genuine grey wholesale market in mobile phones we consider it an inescapable conclusion from the evidence we heard and read, and not least Mr Gohir's own evidence, that the Appellants were not engaged in it. We were left in no doubt that almost all, if not, indeed, all, of the transactions into which the Appellants entered were wholly artificial. We are satisfied that, far from being a means by which those with a genuine surplus can dispose of their unwanted stock to other traders who have a genuine need, it is nothing more than a device by which the taxing authorities, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, can be cheated. We are also driven to the conclusion, from the content of Mr Gohir's evidence as well as the manner in which it was given, that he knew perfectly well that the purpose of the chains of transactions in which the Appellants participated was fraudulent, and that the Appellants entered into them in order to benefit from the fraud." (Emphasis supplied).
" The first matter to determine is whether Mrs Bushby correctly drew the conclusion that, where a buffer could be shown to have acquired its supplies from a defaulter in those chains which could be fully traced, it was reasonable to infer that, in those chains which could not be fully traced, it had acquired its supplies from the same source. In our judgment the inference is not merely reasonable, but compelling. It would be remarkable if illicit deals could be traced, while legitimate deals could not. There would be no reason for a buffer to conceal its source in such circumstances; on the contrary, it would be in its interests to be forthcoming about it. The simple fact that Mrs Bushby was unable to complete the chain (accepting as we do that her efforts were diligent) speaks for itself."
"We were left in no doubt, from the manner in which he gave his evidence, and on which we have already commented, that Mr Gohir was not an innocent swept into a fraud committed, at several removes, by someone else. On the contrary, we are satisfied that he took great care to distance the Appellants from frauds which he knew were being committed. The Appellants' due diligence served no useful purpose other than the cosmetic one of showing that some steps had been taken. The claim that phones had been modified was transparently false. There is, in our view, almost nothing in the transactions which is consistent with the workings of a genuine market. We are quite sure, from his demeanour and from his untruthful evidence, that Mr Gohir was under no illusion about the nature of the trade in which the Appellants were engaged. We think the Commissioners are right to contend that he was one of the ringleaders. But even if he was not, we are satisfied that he was well aware that the Appellants were dealing in goods which were being used as the instrument of fraud. We are equally satisfied that the transactions were arranged for no other purpose, and that the fact that the defaulters' failure to account for output tax post-dated the Appellants' dealings in the relevant goods is irrelevant. The Appellants, for those reasons, were properly deprived of their right of deduction." (Emphasis supplied).
"We do not need to deal with the question whether the Appellants had the means of knowledge, since we have concluded that they had actual knowledge of the fraudulent purpose of the transactions. However, even if we had not so found, it would in our view be impossible not to conclude that the Appellants had failed, in the words of the Court of Justice in Kittel, to "take every precaution which could reasonably be required of them to ensure that their transactions are not connected with fraud". Their due diligence and their response to it fell, in our judgment, well below the requisite standard."
"We are satisfied that:
- Mr Gohir knew that the Appellants were engaged in transactions whose purpose was the commission of a fraud on the Commissioners;
- The Appellants' creation and assembly of the documentation relating to each deal into which they entered and their due diligence were designed only to persuade the Commissioners that they were legitimate traders;
- The transactions between the two Appellants had no true purpose other than to shift their respective VAT liabilities and repayment claims;
- Every one of the transactions, including those described as contra-trading, had as its objective the defrauding of the Commissioners;
- The decision to withhold the Appellants' repayment claims was correct."
The nature of an appeal from the VAT and Duties Tribunal
"13. Section 11 (1) of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 provides that an appeal lies to the High Court if a party "... is dissatisfied in point of law" with a decision of the VAT and Duties Tribunal.
14. In Georgiou v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1996] STC 463 CA at 476, Evans LJ refers to excerpts from the speeches of Viscount Simonds and Lord Radcliffe in Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14, 14-15) and observes (at 476 f-g) that
" .. .it is all too easy for a so-called question of law to become no more than a disguised attack on findings of fact which must be accepted by the courts. As this case demonstrates, it is all too easy for the appeals procedure to the High Court to be abused in this way. Secondly, the nature of the factual inquiry which an appellate court can and does undertake in a proper case is essentially different from the decision-making process which is undertaken by the tribunal of fact. The question is not, has the party upon whom rests the burden of proof established on the balance of probabilities the facts upon which he relies, but was there evidence before the tribunal which was sufficient to support the finding which it made? In other words was the finding one which the tribunal was entitled to make? Clearly, if there was no evidence, or the evidence was to the contrary effect, the tribunal was not so entitled." [Emphasis added].
15. At page 476H Evans LJ set out a four stage process for examining challenges to findings of fact:
" … the appellant must first identify the finding which is challenged; secondly, show that it is significant in relation to the conclusion; thirdly, identify the evidence, if any, which was relevant to that finding; and fourthly, show that that finding, on the basis of that evidence, was one which the tribunal was not entitled to make."
16. Complete absence of evidence, or the evidence being to the contrary effect, are two of the grounds on which it may be said that a tribunal was not entitled to reach a conclusion of fact. It is also well settled that a tribunal is not entitled to find serious allegations established against a party who calls relevant witnesses unless those allegations are clearly formulated and put in cross examination. As Briggs J said in HMRC v Dempster [2008] EWHC 63 (Ch) (unreported)
"..it is a cardinal principle of litigation that if serious allegations, in particular allegations of dishonesty are to be made against a party who is called as a witness they must be both fairly and squarely pleaded, and fairly and squarely put to that witness in cross-examination."
17. For a more extensive analysis of the obligation to put such allegations see Jacob LJ's summary in Zipher v Markem [2005]EWCA Civ 267 at [57] – [61]. …
18. Subject to these very tight limitations, it is not open to the High Court to conduct a review of the evidence to see whether it would have reached the same conclusion. An appellate court is poorly placed to assess the value of oral evidence given before the Tribunal. Moreover, if the analysis of the evidence is such that reasonable judicial minds might differ on the outcome, there is no basis for saying that the decision of the tribunal of first instance is wrong."
The grounds of appeal
i) The conclusion that the UK high volume, wholesale secondary mobile phone market was wholly or largely corrupt, and without any obvious justification apart from defrauding the Crown of VAT ("the market finding"); andii) The conclusion that Mr Gohir was himself guilty of fraud (as a ringleader) as opposed to merely having knowledge of the fraud of others ("the fraud finding").
The first set of grounds: disputed findings of fact
The market finding
"that the wholesale market in mobile phones is nothing more than a device by which the taxing authorities, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, can be cheated."
"While we are quite willing to accept that there is a genuine grey wholesale market in mobile phones we consider it an inescapable conclusion from the evidence we heard and read, and not least Mr Gohir's own evidence, that the Appellants were not engaged in it. We were left in no doubt that almost all, if not, indeed, all, of the transactions into which the Appellants entered were wholly artificial. We are satisfied that, far from being a means by which those with a genuine surplus can dispose of their unwanted stock to other traders who have a genuine need, it is nothing more than a device by which the taxing authorities, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, can be cheated"
"… we are satisfied that [Mr Gohir] was well aware that the Appellants were dealing in goods which were being used as the instrument of fraud. We are equally satisfied that the transactions were arranged for no other purpose."
"Trade In Mobile Phones
80. In order to place the decision of the Commissioners to assess the claimants in context it is necessary to outline a description of the trade in mobile telephones. The global market for mobile telephone handsets in 2003 is said to be approximately 500 million pieces a year. This number is increasing. Products are designed to operate in any country. The trade in mobile phones has become similar to that in other commodities such as oil, coffee beans and pork bellies. There is a primary market in which mobile phones are supplied directly by manufacturers to distributors, which service for example retail chains.
81. There is also a secondary market described by Mr. Hewetson, director of Rapid Marketing Services Ltd, in his second statement as a "grey wholesale market". It is on that market that the claimants trade. In the primary market there may be delivery delays for up to six months for new models. This results in much speculative ordering, by retailers, distributors and networks. Retailers, distributors and networks may be left with either too few or too many mobile phones of a particular model. The grey market has developed in order to deal with over or under supply and to redistribute products wherever there is an actual retail demand. Manufacturers might also produce, as a matter of speculation, excess stock which, if another model is launched which is more attractive to consumers, will leave that manufacturer with an excess of telephones. The grey market is used also to clear older products. Those retailers or distributors who have ordered too many telephones may sell those, which are excess to their requirements, onto the grey market for immediate cash. If retailers or distributors have under-ordered, because of the delay in production it will be necessary for them to buy from the grey market.
Supply and retail demand and accordingly price, fluctuate daily. A trader may buy a batch of telephones one day, for cash, and discover that the price of telephones has fallen by as much as 20% the next day.
82. The market dictates that transactions have to be completed on the same day. Purchases are usually for cash on delivery and it is uneconomic to purchase volumes of less than 1000 units. If a trader holds onto a product for more than 24 hours it risks losing substantially. Profit margins are low, in the region of 2 to 4 percent. Success is based on turnover. Traders only hold stock for very short periods and, usually, turn over their working capital between four to six times a week. Thus it is important that transactions are completed within the course of one working day.
83. Some warehouses are sufficiently secure for goods of small size and value. Stock is often bought and sold by telephone a number of times a day without moving from the secure warehouse. Such secured warehouses are shared by many companies which pay in proportion to their use of that warehouse."
i) The absence of manufacturers or authorised distributors or recognised high street traders in the supply chains [159]. Given that the explanation proffered of the market was that it originated with traders of this kind, this was a significant and free-standing reason for saying that the Appellants were not concerned in a genuine secondary market;ii) The absence of split consignments which, as a matter of common sense one would expect in a legitimate market [159];
iii) The absence of any explanation as to why phones with an incorrect specification would be on the market in the UK and the evasive evidence given about changes [160] and [161], evidence which the Tribunal described as having all the hallmarks of having been invented;
iv) The artificial transactions involving World Communications, as to which it was left to counsel for the Appellants to come up with an explanation not proffered by Mr Gohir [162];
v) The fact that the "due diligence" conducted by the Appellants was merely window-dressing carried out in most cases after the commencement of trade [163] and [164];
vi) The poverty or absence of the contractual conditions, which the Tribunal took as an indication that the deals were pre-arranged [165];
vii) The extraordinary size and rapid growth in the turnover of the Appellants [167];
viii) The absence of any explanation as to why the Appellants had to secure their supplies through long chains of suppliers; or why Mr Gohir could not identify shorter supply chains despite all his years of experience [168];
ix) The trading between Calltel and Opto, and the absence of an explanation beyond Mr Gohir's repeated assertion that HMRC were aware of it [169].
The fraud finding
"We think the Commissioners are right to contend that [Mr Gohir] was one of the ringleaders. But even if he was not, we are satisfied that he was well aware that the Appellants were dealing in goods which were being used as the instrument of fraud."
"In respect of each of [the impugned purchases] by the Appellant, the Commissioners contend that the Appellant knew or should have known that, by its purchase, it was participating in a transaction connected with fraudulent evasion of VAT" (emphasis supplied)
"In briefest summary, it is HMRC's case that the relevant transactions underlying the 01/06, 02/06 and 03/06 VAT returns submitted by both companies were transactions connected with such fraudulent evasion of VAT and that the [Appellants] knew or should have known that they were participating in transactions of such a character." (emphasis supplied)
"It is of course our case that [the Tribunal] are required to draw inferences here. We would not be here if we had Mr Gohir with a white flag up saying, "I knew". There would not have to be a trial because there would be no issue. His case is, "I did not know" and more than that, "I could not have known". So we cannot tackle that with an admission or a plea of guilty. We can only deal with it by saying, "You had all of this information, you must have known, you should have known." (emphasis supplied)
"MR CUNNINGHAM: Again, I rise only to help, I hope. Sir, my learned friend is absolutely right, sir, generally. Absent a confession or an admission or a document that amounts to either of those, actual knowledge is not something that we can allege, sir.
MR PATCHETT-JOYCE: I am very grateful.
THE CHAIRMAN: You have not identified any such document.
MR CUNNINGHAM: Quite, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN: But actual knowledge of the hazards of the trade is conceded, is it not, Mr Patchett-Joyce?
MR CUNNINGHAM: That is another matter.
THE CHAIRMAN: That was the first point you put to Mrs Bushby. But actual knowledge of the alleged taintedness of any individual deal is not alleged.
MR CUNNINGHAM: No, sir."
"3. Initially [the Commisioners'] position was that the Appellants had the means of knowledge of the fraud, but they did not go so far as to assert actual knowledge. As the hearing progressed, however, their position changed and they added an argument that the Appellants knew of, and indeed were party to, the fraud which, they say, the transactions were designed to perpetrate.
144. The Commissioners' principal argument had become, by the conclusion of the hearing, that Mr Gohir knew of, and was very probably one of the organisers of, an attempt to defraud them. What had, originally, been their principal contention, that he had the means of knowing that there was a fraud, had become a secondary argument. If Mr Gohir did not have actual knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transactions, they say, it could be only because he had deliberately shut his eyes to it. They point to his admitted awareness of the prevalence of fraud in the mobile phone trade, the poor quality of the Appellants' due diligence procedures and their irrelevance to Mr Gohir's having decided whether or not to enter into any transaction, his failure to heed the repeated warnings given by Mrs Bushby and other officers and what they contend was the incredible evidence of Mr Gohir and Mr Khan about inspection and modification of phones. The whole, they say, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the transactions were contrived and that Mr Gohir was well aware of that fact."
The second set of grounds: Did the Tribunal apply the wrong test of knowledge, proximity and causation?
"It follows that if a trader in the Appellants' position has actual knowledge that he is participating in a transaction which forms part of a chain whose purpose is the fraudulent evasion of tax, even if he has no privity of contract with the perpetrator of the fraud, he will forfeit his right to deduct."
"The words which record these definitive statements are untrammelled by any reference to the need for establishing that the taxable person must be a member of a defaulter chain, or that he must be dealing in the same goods as had been the subject of a defaulter chain."
Multiple recovery/penalty
"92. It is important, however, to note in that respect that the measures which the Member States may adopt under art 22(8) of the Sixth Directive in order to ensure the correct levying and collection of the tax and for the prevention of fraud must not go further than is necessary to attain such objectives (see Gabalfrisa [2002] STC 535, [2000] ECR I-1577, paragraph 52, and the order in Transport Service [2004] ECR I-1991, paragraph 29). They may not therefore be used in such a way that they would have the effect of undermining the neutrality of VAT, which is a fundamental principle of the common system of VAT established by the relevant Community legislation (see Schmeink & Cofreth AG & Co KG v Finanzamt Borken, Strobel v Finanzamt Esslingen (Case C-454/98) [2000] STC 810, [2000] ECR I-6973, para 59).
93. It must also be borne in mind that a finding of abusive practice must not lead to a penalty, for which a clear and unambiguous legal basis would be necessary, but rather to an obligation to repay, simply as a consequence of that finding, which rendered undue all or part of the deductions of input VAT (see, to that effect, Emsland Stärke [2000] ECR I-11569, paragraph 56)."
"If, as I conclude, Kittel sanctions the action by the Revenue in this case, on the assumed facts, then [counsel for one of the claimants] is right that the effect of those principles will need to be worked through, depending upon the precise facts, in the slightly different circumstance of a contra-trade chain. Even in relation to a defaulter chain itself, where the right to refuse deductions is expressly sanctioned by Kittel, the kind of questions which [counsel] canvasses, of penalty and multiple recovery, might arise, but it is certainly true that they are more likely to arise once the principle applies to an additional chain. However, I am far from persuaded that, once the effects of these three cases are analysed, it will necessarily be the case that any questions of multiple or double recovery will arise, and I am certainly not persuaded that they are bound to arise."
"In our judgment the loss of the right, in either circumstance, is not to be equated with a penalty: in that, we take the same view as Burton J in Just Fabulous (see [48] to [50]). If the Commissioners are right in their factual analysis of the Appellants' activities (and for the purpose of considering this argument we must assume they are), they were participants or, as the Court of Justice said, accomplices in the perpetration of a fraud. The objective of the fraud is to extract from the Commissioners the very input tax which is the subject of the appeals. If that objective is not achieved, there is no purpose at all behind the transactions, if the Commissioners' perception of them is correct. It cannot be said that preventing the participants from achieving that objective is tantamount to the imposition on them of a penalty, just as one would not regard the preventing of a thief from taking the property he intended to steal amounted to the imposition on him of a penalty. Viewed in that way, it is immaterial whether there is any relation between the value of the tax for which, elsewhere in the chain, another trader has failed to account: what the Commissioners are seeking to do is to prevent a theft, rather than to recover a loss. In our judgment there is no basis on which it can be said that they are seeking to impose a penalty on the Appellants, and we do not accept that what was said by the Court of Justice at paragraph 93 of its judgment in Halifax is of any application in this case."
"under what conditions VAT may be recovered where an abusive practice has been found to exist"
"It follows that the answer to [the question] must be that, where an abusive practice has been found to exist, the transactions involved must be redefined so as to re-establish the situation that would have prevailed in the absence of the transactions constituting that abusive practice."
Conclusion