England and Wales High Court (Chancery Division) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CHANCERY DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		19/12/2008

Mr Justice Morgan:

1. The Defendant is the subject of an extended civil restraint order made by Waller LJ on 5^th September 2007. That order provides, amongst other things, that the Defendant may not make certain applications without my consent (or the consent of another judge, on the direction of the Chancellor). I will refer to the terms of that order in greater detail, later in this judgment.
2. The Defendant has applied to me for permission to make a number of applications for which he says he needs my consent. These applications for permission have been made at various times over a period of some weeks. The applications for permission which are the subject of this judgment are applications by application notices dated 25^th September 2008 (called by the Defendant: "CD9"), 25^th September 2008 ("CD10"), 5^th November 2008 ("CD11"), 18^th November 2008 ("CD12"), 25^th November 2008 ("CD13") and 2^nd December 2008 ("CD14"). I will refer to these applications as CD9, CD10 etc, as the Defendant has done.
3. These applications for permissions seek permission for a large number of further applications to be made by the Defendant as follows: CD9 – 22 applications, CD10 - 6 applications, CD11 – 6 applications, CD12 – 6 applications, CD13 - 6 applications and CD14 – 7 applications. Therefore, the Defendant seeks my permission to make a total of 53 applications.
4. The extended civil restraint order of 5^th September 2007 was not the first such order in this case.
5. The first extended civil restraint order made against the Defendant was made by the Court of Appeal (Auld and Neuberger LJJ) on 1^st March 2005. The judgment of the Court of Appeal on that day dealt with the Defendant's substantive appeal in relation to a judgment given against him in action no. HC01 01288 as well as the Claimant's application for a civil restraint order against the Defendant. The principal judgment was given by Neuberger LJ. He said in the course of his judgment:

[6] I turn now to the appeal of Mr Brent. Very briefly, the relevant events occurred as long ago as 1993. The claimant patent agents began proceedings in 1994 for professional fees in respect of work they said they carried out for Mr Brent in relation to the registration of certain patents, the sum involved being £4,400. The defendant defended on the basis that he had paid everything that was owing, and he counterclaimed for (a) £5,000 which he said was owing to him in respect of overpayments to the claimant and (b) damages for the claimant's alleged negligence. These counterclaims were also raised by way of defence in the form of a set-off.

[7] The proceedings took what I described in my earlier judgment as a long and complex course, and came before Jacob J on 25 July 2003. He said that there had been 22 previous applications by the defendant by that time and he made an order, the only relevant part of which was in para 2, which ordered that the defence and counterclaim be struck out unless the defendant by a specified time:

"a. provides a full, clear and concise statement of allegations against the Claimant, effectively a Re-amended Defence and Counterclaim, replacing all 8 sets of the existing Particulars and the Amended Defence and Counterclaim; [and]

b. complies with the outstanding costs order of Master Moncaster dated 8 April 2002 and pay the sum of £1,250 to the Claimant."

In this connection, there were at the time eight sets of particulars and amended defence ran to over 100 pages.

[8] The defendant failed to comply with either limb of that paragraph of the order of Jacob J. Accordingly on 25 September 2003, pursuant to an application made by the claimant, Laddie J ordered that the defence and counterclaim be struck out and made appropriate orders for costs.

[9] - [11] …

[12] In my judgment, Jacob J was entitled to make the order that he did in para 2(a) that I have read out. Accordingly, this appeal should be dismissed. It follows that Laddie J was entitled to strike out the claim. Quite apart from that, it is my view that the appeal would in any event be pointless because Mr Brent has failed to comply with para 2(b) of Jacob J's order, against which there is no appeal.

[13] – [15] …

[16] In those circumstances, in my view this appeal should be dismissed.

[17] That then brings me to the extended civil restraint order which the defendant seeks. In light of the history of this matter, and subject to one point, it is my view that this is a clear case for making such an order. Even now, Mr Brent is writing letters indicating that he is, to put it bluntly, out of control. On 15 January he wrote to the claimant's solicitors with a copy to this court:

"I now have claims against the Court for breaches of my rights ... and I have been seeking from the Crown/Court to be added to the Claimants for the purposes of my counterclaims."

[18] Three days later in a letter to the same addressee, similarly copied, he wrote this:

"The Court case is a developing case with new causes of action, and I now have claims against you. I also have claims against the Court for breaches of my rights under the Human Rights Act 1998."

[19] On the same day, in a letter written direct to this court, he stated that he had claims in the European Court of Human Rights against the "United Kingdom", the claimant's instructing solicitor, and PAMIA, the body responsible for Patent Agents' insurance.

[20] Mr Brent has also at various times tried to join the Crown, the DCA, the Lord Chancellor, various judges, and the entire partnership of the claimant's solicitors in these proceedings and he has embarked on satellite litigation seeking criminal sanctions against the High Court, the Court of Appeal, various members of the Court of Appeal, and "the Health and Safety Executive."

[21] When one judges that against the history of applications and appeals set out for instance in Jacob J's judgment leading to the order he made and in my judgment of 2 December 2004, and adds to it the fact that he has suggested that Chadwick LJ, myself and Master Moncaster have committed criminal offences, it seems to me that there is no alternative but to protect the claimant by the means of such an order.

[22] In [those] circumstances, it seems to me that, as I say, subject to one point, it would be appropriate to make an order as sought by the claimant. It is necessary to identify a judge to whom applications would be made (if he wishes to make them) by Mr Brent. As this is a patent action and as Laddie J has made one order, to which I have referred, I would think it right to adopt the proposal made by Mr Norris that Pumfrey J be nominated as the judge to whom applications are made.

[23] However, given that Mr Brent is absent from court, it seems to me that it would be right to give him an opportunity to make written submissions as to why an extended civil restraint order should not be made. Therefore, I would suggest giving him two weeks to make submissions in writing as to why such an order should not be made.

6. The Defendant did make submissions in writing to the Court of Appeal in response to the order of 1^st March 2005 and on 10^th May 2005, the Court of Appeal (Auld and Neuberger LJJ) gave a further judgment, being a judgment of the court, delivered by Neuberger LJ who said this:

[1] This is a judgment of the court. Following our dismissal of Mr Brent's appeals and our making a civil restraint order against him on 1 March 2005, he has made representations to us. Those representations, which run to 135 pages (which were then supplemented by yet further submissions), deal not merely with the point upon which he was given a specific opportunity to deal, namely the making of the civil restraint order, but with a large number of other matters as well.

[2] We do not consider that Mr Brent's submissions contain anything which would justify discharging the civil restraint order. Further, insofar as his submissions seek additional relief, we do not consider that it would be appropriate to grant it. We propose to give our reasons very shortly.

[3] It is inappropriate to accede to Mr Brent's suggestion that his appeals be dealt with by the Lord Chief Justice. It is not, and should not be, open to litigants to pick and choose their judges. In any event, his appeals had been disposed of on their merits. The notion that there is "a cabal of Lord Justices that are intent on ensuring that the defendant does not achieve justice" (Para S37), the sort of contention which is found in a number of places in Mr Brent's submissions, is quite unjustified and is unhelpful. That sort of allegation indicates the frame of mind on the part of Mr Brent which helps justify the making of the civil restraint order: contrary to Mr Brent's suggestion on the same page, he has mounted a large number of appeals and applications which are "totally without merit."

[4] - [5] …

[6] So far as the merits of the civil restraint order are concerned, there is really not much we can add to brief reasoning in our judgment. This is a case where the history of applications and appeals by Mr Brent speak for themselves. It may seem unkind, but we are bound to add that both the length and the contents of the 135 page document he has now submitted appear to us strongly to reinforce our conclusion that a civil restraint order should be made. Although he has expressed himself very clearly and intelligently, Mr Brent has become wholly obsessed with these proceedings. The course he has adopted, a course which he is still adopting and is likely to continue to adopt unless restrained from doing so, has been, is and would be wholly inappropriate and disproportionate on any view. Whatever the merits of the claim and the counter-claim may have been, this is a plain case for the making of a civil restraint order to protect the claimants.

[7] An extraordinarily large number of points were made about the civil restraint order by Mr Brent. They are either self-evidently bad or involve requests for advice, which, absent exceptional circumstances, we should not give. However, it is right to mention, in answer to what is said in Para A022.2 on p 38, that a civil restraint order made by this court cannot prevent Mr Brent from applying to the European Court of Human Rights (although, in fairness to Mr Brent, we should emphasise that we are not encouraging him to make any such application).

[8] Mr Brent makes frequent reference in his submissions to the fact that he suffers from a "stress related heart condition". It is clear from his medical reports that his health is not good, and obviously we are sorry about that. However, as has been said on more than one occasion, there is nothing in the medical report to suggest that Mr Brent is incapable of dealing with these proceedings; indeed, the length and contents of his recent submissions reinforce that point.

[9] In paragraphs A1 and following (pp 43 and following) Mr Brent submits our judgments of 1 March to detailed consideration. We do not think it is appropriate to indulge in arguments with Mr Brent about our judgments. We have read what he says in this connection, and see no reason to change our views.

[10] On pp 89 and onwards, Mr Brent makes a large number of requests about whether we have seen certain documents. We cannot pretend to remember every document that we saw in advance of, and during, the hearing on 1 March. However, having considered the various points made by Mr Brent in this connection, we see no reason to change our conclusions. In particular, we have noted Mr Brent's reliance of various aspects of the Human Rights Act 1998, but we feel that there is nothing in any of them either.

[11] In these circumstances, we confirm our order of 1 March 2005.

7. The period of 2 years for the operation of the extended civil restraint order of 1^st March 2005 expired on 1^st March 2007. In that 2 year period, the Defendant made a large number of applications for permission to make applications to the court. On 2^nd March 2007, he applied to the Court of Appeal seeking permission to re-open and set aside a number of earlier decisions of the Court of Appeal in the underlying litigation and also to re-open and set aside various orders made by Pumfrey J pursuant to the civil restraint order of 1^st March 2005. Before the application of 2^nd March 2007 was dealt with, Pumfrey J on 19^th July 2007, when giving judgment on another application made by the Defendant, made a further civil restraint order against the Defendant, such order to continue pending receipt of submissions by the Defendant as to why such an order should not be made.
8. The Defendant's application of 2^nd March 2007 came before Waller LJ on 5th September 2007. He dismissed it in its entirety. He ruled that the application of 2^nd March 2007 was totally without merit. Of the court's own initiative, Waller LJ made an extended civil restraint order in these terms:

"The Defendant be restrained until 5 September 2009 or further Order from issuing claims or making applications or taking steps in any court without the permission of the court in any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in which this order is made namely, the instructions of Messrs Forrester Ketley & Co to act on Mr Brent's behalf. Any applications for permission of the court to proceed must be made in writing to Mr Justice Morgan or to such judge as the Chancellor of the High Court may direct. Any refusal of permission to proceed shall be final and, subject to contrary order, there shall be no right of appeal."

9. Waller LJ's order of 5^th September 2007 also directed that the papers be referred to the Attorney General for her to consider making an application under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The Attorney General has considered that matter and has decided not to make an application under section 42 of the 1981 Act.
10. Having referred to the circumstances in which the two extended civil restraint orders were made I now need to go back to the underlying litigation between the Claimant and the Defendant. Having obtained judgment from Laddie J on 25^th September 2003, the Claimant obtained an interim charging order on 14^th November 2003, which charging order was made final on 8^th January 2004. The Claimant obtained a second final charging order on 6^th June 2005 for further sums due from the Defendant to the Claimant. These charging orders were obtained in action no. HC01 01288. The charging orders are in respect of the interest of the Defendant in a residential flat at 20 Chantry Close, Sunbury on Thames. The Defendant says that he did not have at the time of the interim charging orders, nor subsequently, had any interest in that flat. I am not asked to determine at this stage whether that is so or not.
11. On 12^th July 2007, the Claimant commenced new proceedings against the Defendant (HC07C01850) seeking an order for the sale of the flat in order to enforce the charging orders. Those proceedings have been the subject of various orders made, and directions given, by Master Moncaster and are continuing.
12. On 10^th September 2008, the Claimant served on the Defendant a statutory demand dated 5^th September 2008 in relation to part, but not all, of the sums said to be due from the Defendant to the Claimant. The statutory demand stated that if the Defendant wished to have the demand set aside, he must make application to do so within 18 days from service of the demand on him. The Claimant says that the Defendant did not make an application to set aside the statutory demand within the 18 day period. The Defendant counters that by saying that he did make an application to the court in that he applied on 25^th September 2008 to me for permission to make an application to set aside the statutory demand and that application is one of the matters I will now deal with in this judgment.
13. On 29^th October 2008, the Claimant issued a bankruptcy petition in the Kingston upon Thames County Court (No. 771 of 2008) seeking a bankruptcy order against the Defendant on the ground that he had not complied with the statutory demand and that he had made no application to set aside the statutory demand: see section 267(2)(d) of the Insolvency Act 1986.
14. The first two of the applications which are now before me (CD9 and CD10) were made on 25^th September 2008. Having considered the number of the applications which had been made, the number and nature of the detailed matters of fact asserted by the Defendant, the length of the history of the underlying litigation and the fact that I had not been involved in the many previous applications for permission under the first civil restraint order, it was obvious to me that the appropriate course was for there to be an oral hearing at which the Claimant should participate for the purpose of assisting the court with information as to the many matters which would necessarily require to be investigated. I recognised that the purpose of the civil restraint order was to offer the Claimant a measure of protection against having to incur the trouble and expense of dealing with inappropriate applications made by the Defendant. Nonetheless, I concluded that, at any rate on this first occasion when I was called upon to consider applications for permission made by the Defendant, I required assistance from the Claimant as well as from the Defendant. I gave directions accordingly. The difficulty then arose that the Defendant indicated that the state of his health meant that he could not attend an oral hearing. I then directed that the hearing should take the form of a telephone conference in which the Claimant and the Defendant could participate. A telephone conference was then arranged for 12^th December 2008 and it duly took place. The Defendant did not take part in the telephone conference as he indicated that the state of his health was such that he could not do so. I had pre-read the voluminous papers that appeared to me to be the relevant papers and I conducted a telephone conference in which the solicitor for the Claimant participated. That solicitor was of considerable assistance in answering questions of fact as to the history of the litigation which had been referred to or described by the Defendant. At the conclusion of the telephone conference, I indicated that I would consider my decision in relation to the applications arising and that I would given a written reasoned judgment dealing with those applications.
15. Before addressing the applications, I will deal with some points which arise in relation to the order of 5^th September 2007.
16. The Defendant draws attention to the fact that Waller LJ included a reference to "taking steps in any court" in his order and that those words do not appear in the standard form of extended civil restraint order (N19A), nor are they used in the relevant Practice Direction, 3CPD, para. 3.2(1) which simply refers to "issuing claims or making applications". The Defendant's observation is correct. The Defendant then seeks my permission to apply to the court for a discharge of Waller LJ's order on the ground that it was ultra vires and/or was unjust.
17. In my judgment, Waller LJ had power to include the words "taking steps in any court" in the order which he made. It was held in Ebert v Vinvell [2000] Ch 484 that the judge at first instance in that case (Neuberger J) had power to make what was described as "an extended Grepe v Loam order" which prevented the litigant in that case from, amongst other things, taking any steps in any court, and that such an order was appropriate in that case. The inherent jurisdiction of the court in this respect continues alongside the specific rules as to civil restraint orders: see R (Kumar) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [2007] 1 WLR 536, although I accept that the court in that case at para. [62] suggested that it would be " very rare" for a judge to rely on the inherent jurisdiction.
18. I do not think that the addition of "taking any steps" in the order of 5^th September 2007 has led, or is likely to lead, to injustice in this case. After all, the steps of issuing claims and making applications are already expressly dealt with and the "step" of seeking my permission to issue a claim or to make an application or to take a further step is obviously not caught by the order.
19. Further, the first civil restraint order in this case (of 1^st March 2005) as well as the current order referred to not "taking any steps". The Defendant did not apply to have the order of 1^st March 2005 set aside on that ground. Further, the Defendant has only now applied to have the order of 5^th September 2007 set aside on account of the inclusion of the additional words. In my judgment, particularly at this late stage, the Defendant has no prospect of successfully applying to discharge the order and I withhold permission for making any such application. The same applies to the Defendant's request for permission to apply to discharge the order of 1^st March 2005 with the additional reason that that order has in any event expired.
20. The Defendant applied to me to adjourn the telephone conference arranged for 12^th December 2008 to enable him, with my permission if given, to apply to discharge the order of 5^th September 2007. As I concluded at an early stage that it was not appropriate to give permission to the Defendant to apply to discharge that order, I also concluded that it was not appropriate to adjourn the telephone conference.
21. I have also considered the effect of the words following "namely" in the order of 5^th September 2007. I considered, in particular, whether the earlier wording which referred to "any matter involving etc" only applied to any matter involving etc the instructions of Forrester Ketley to act on behalf of Mr Brent. I do not think that is the right reading of the order. I hold that the words following "namely" are there to identify "the proceedings" to which the order refers. Those proceedings are the proceedings under action no. HC01 01288.
22. The words "any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings…" are deliberately wide words. The safeguard for the Defendant in relation to the width of these words is that in a proper case, the court can give permission to issue a claim or make an application or take a relevant step.
23. An issue might arise as to whether the Defendant needs permission to defend himself in relation to the new proceedings which have been brought by the Claimant against him. As described above, the Claimant has brought proceedings seeking an order for sale pursuant to the charging orders and has issued a petition for a bankruptcy order. Those two new sets of proceedings are not the proceedings referred to in the order of 5^th September 2007. The Defendant is therefore, prima facie, entitled to defend himself in those proceedings by putting forward any proper argument available to him. It will be for the judge dealing with those proceedings to manage those proceedings and to rule on any matter which falls properly to be determined. However, I have qualified the above with the phrase prima facie for this reason. If the Defendant wishes to try to defend the new proceedings by relying on something which involves or relates to or touches upon or leads to the proceedings in action no. HC01 01288, then he needs permission pursuant to the order of 5^th September 2007. Of course, even without the civil restraint order, the Defendant is bound by the decision of Laddie J on 25^th September 2003, upheld by the Court of Appeal on 1^st March 2005, giving judgment for the Claimant and dismissing the Defendant's counterclaim.
24. I have considered what test should be applied when considering whether to grant or to withhold permission to issue a claim, or make an application, or take a step, when such permission is required by the order of 5^th September 2007. I do not think that I have to attempt a comprehensive definition of the circumstances to be taken into account. It will be highly relevant to assess whether the suggested claim or application or step has a realistic prospect of success. If it does not, it would normally be right to withhold permission. An exception might be where there is some other reason, which appears to the court to be sufficient, when assessing where the interests of justice lie, as to why the claim or application or step should be permitted. Conversely, even where the claim or application or step has a realistic prospect of success, there might exceptionally be a case where the claim or application or step would nonetheless be oppressive to the other party and that might suffice to persuade the court to withhold permission.
25. The above discussion of the effect of the order of 5^th September 2007 and my refusal to permit the Defendant to seek to discharge that order and my refusal to adjourn the telephone conference deals with a number of the applications that need to be dealt with. In relation to the many other applications which the Defendant has made to me, it seems to me that the most convenient course is to attempt to group the applications together by subject matter or content, rather than simply to take the applications one by one in the sequence set out in the applications CD9 to CD14. When I have considered the relevant groups, I will consider whether the further specific applications not thereby dealt with need separate mention or whether I can deal with them collectively.
26. The Defendant has applied to the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") for various heads of relief against the United Kingdom Government for various alleged infringements of the Defendant's rights under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Defendant relies upon Articles 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 13, 14, 17 and 34. The matters complained of concern the conduct by the courts of these proceedings between the Claimant and the Defendant and the making of the civil restraint orders against the Defendant. The Claimant in the present proceedings is not, of course, a party to the case in the ECHR and no relief is sought in that case against the Claimant herein. The Defendant has applied to me for permission to apply for a stay of the proceedings between the Claimant and the Defendant pending the determination of his proceedings before the ECHR. The Defendant does not state how far the proceedings before the ECHR are advanced and what the expected future timetable is for those proceedings.
27. I do not give the Defendant permission to apply for a stay of the present proceedings pending the determination of the proceedings before the ECHR. The Claimant is entitled in the present proceedings to rely upon the orders it has obtained and to take the steps which might otherwise be open to it to enforce or follow up those orders. The Defendant has no prospect of success in any application for a stay of these proceedings.
28. The Defendant has applied to me for permission to apply to the court for a reference of an issue of law to the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). The Defendant has not identified any question which it would be appropriate for the court to refer to the ECJ. Accordingly, I decline to grant the permission sought in this respect.
29. The Defendant has asserted that Shakespeare Putsman LLP, the solicitors on the record for the Claimant, are not in fact acting on the instructions of the Claimant but are instead acting on the instructions of a non-party. The Defendant relies on an email which refers to the fact that the insurers for the Claimant are giving instructions to the solicitors. The circumstances described in the email are commonplace in litigation where a party to the litigation is insured and the subject matter of the litigation is covered, or said to be covered, by the insurance, and the insurers have conduct of the litigation on behalf of the party. The Defendant's allegation that there is impropriety on the part of the Claimant or the solicitors is without any foundation and involves a misunderstanding of this commonplace feature of litigation.
30. The Defendant referred to the fact that there are various matters proceeding in different courts. There are the bankruptcy proceedings in the Kingston upon Thames County Court and there are the charging order proceedings before the Chancery Master in the High Court. Further, any applications by the Defendant seeking permission to bring an application in any court, notwithstanding the terms of the civil restraint order, are to be made to me. Some of the 53 applications with which I am now dealing are said to arise in relation to the charging order proceedings and the bankruptcy proceedings. In some of his applications, the Defendant asked for permission to seek various directions that might be described as case management. In particular, he asked for the bankruptcy proceedings to be transferred to the High Court and for the charging order proceedings to be dealt with by a judge other than Master Moncaster.
31. In the course of the telephone conference to which I have referred above, I invited the solicitor for the Claimant to indicate the Claimant's position in relation to case management of the bankruptcy proceedings and the charging order proceedings. The Claimant indicated it would support the suggestion that all relevant matters should be dealt with in the High Court, and by the same judge.
32. In view of the fact that a transfer to the High Court of the bankruptcy proceedings is supported by both parties, and that I think that such a transfer would be appropriate, I will order the bankruptcy proceedings to be transferred from the County Court to the High Court. I make that order under rule 7.11(4) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 and/or section 41 of the County Courts Act 1984. As regards the charging order proceedings, in view of the fact that both parties wish it and I think it is appropriate, I direct that those proceedings are dealt with by a judge of the Chancery Division, rather than continue before a Master. In practice, it may well be the case that all future applications in these matters will be placed before me in view of the fact that I am the judge identified in the civil restraint order of 5^th September 2007. If either party wishes to have a more formal direction that I be the designated judge in relation to the bankruptcy proceedings and the charging order proceedings, then the correct procedure to follow is to apply to the Chancellor for a direction to that effect. Such applications are normally considered on paper without the need for a hearing.
33. The Defendant has applied for permission to make an application to set aside the statutory demand served on him by the Claimant. The statutory demand identified three sums which were the subject of judgments or orders made in favour of the Claimant and against the Defendant in action no. HC 01 01288. These sums together with interest came to some £26,000. The Defendant has prepared an application to set aside the statutory demand to indicate the grounds of the application which he wishes to make. The grounds put forward are essentially as follows: (1) the sums in the statutory demand are not finally due because of the applications which the Defendant has made to me, to the Court of Appeal and to the ECHR; (2) the Defendant has a counterclaim in action no. HC01 01288 and an outstanding costs order; and (3) the Defendant will be seeking his costs in HC07 C01850 (the charging order proceedings). The Claimant certainly needs permission to rely on (1) and (2) above as they are matters within the scope of the civil restraint order. The position under (3) is not so clearly within the scope of the civil restraint order but that is principally because the basis on which the Defendant says that he will seek his costs in the charging order proceedings is not spelt out in any detail. However, I conclude that the basis referred to by the Defendant does come within the scope of the civil restraint order as the Defendant appears to me to be challenging the charging orders by asserting that the Claimant was not entitled to the relief it obtained in action no. HC01 01288. Quite apart from this ruling on whether the Defendant needs permission to apply to set aside the statutory demand, I have of course considered the grounds of the proposed application. I have applied the conventional principles as to when the court intervenes to set aside a statutory demand. Applying those principles in this case, I have formed the view that the Defendant has no realistic prospect of making a successful application to set aside the statutory demand. Accordingly, I decline to grant to the Defendant permission to apply to set aside the statutory demand.
34. In the charging order proceedings, the Defendant has served a Request for Further Information purportedly pursuant to CPR Part 18. The Claimant has served a response to the request. The response deals with some of the questions in the request but declines to deal with other questions in the request. The Defendant has applied to me for permission to apply for an order that the Claimant do reply to the request. I am not wholly satisfied that the Defendant needs my permission to apply for such an order. However, I have considered the terms of the request. I am clear that it would not be appropriate for the court to make an order that the Claimant provide any further answer to the request. If the Defendant applies to me for such an order, it would not be right to make such an order. In so far as the Defendant needs my permission to apply for such an order, I decline to grant such permission.
35. The Defendant has applied to me for permission to appeal against earlier orders made in these proceedings. I refuse permission to appeal. The suggested appeals do not have any realistic prospect of success and there is no other ground on which it is appropriate to grant permission to appeal.
36. The above rulings deal with the main categories of applications made by the Defendant in applications CD9 to CD14. In relation to all of the other applications made by the Defendant in CD9 to CD14, I can say collectively without setting out each of the applications separately, that the application in question stands no prospect of success and for that reason it is not appropriate for me to give permission to the Defendant to make such an application. The nature of the applications is such that they do not require to be discussed further and in particular they do not require to be discussed separately.
37. The Defendant also has written to the court asserting that the court has not dealt with earlier applications which he made, which he has referred to as CD3 to CD8.
38. I will first deal separately with application CD8. On 19^th July 2007, at a time when the civil restraint order of 1^st March 2005 had expired, Pumfrey J made a fresh civil restraint order which was to continue pending the receipt of submissions from the Defendant as to why such an order should not be made. Application CD8 was dated 30^th August 2007, that is, just before Waller LJ's order of 5^th September 2007. The application asked that it be dealt with by a judge other than Pumfrey J. The application was placed before Briggs J. He directed that the application was of such a contentious nature that it ought to be served on the Claimant and that until it was served, it could not be taken further. Briggs J also directed that the application, if it were to proceed, should be heard at an oral hearing. The Defendant has not so far as I am aware notified the court that application CD8 has been served on the Claimant or that the Claimant has been notified of the date of any oral hearing in compliance with the order of Briggs J.
39. In relation to applications CD3 to CD8, matters appear to me to have moved on. These applications were all made before Waller LJ dismissed the application of 2^nd March 2007 on the ground that it was totally without merit and made a further civil restraint order. Further, I have by this judgment dismissed all of the 53 applications made in CD9 to CD14. It seems likely, or at the lowest it is possible, that many of the applications in CD3 to CD8 no longer need to be considered. I do not regard it as a proper use of the court's time for it to take on itself the burden of considering whether applications CD3 to CD8 contain any matter which continues to have any relevance and which is different from the application of 2^nd March 2007 to the Court of Appeal and from the 53 applications in CD9 to CD14, which I have now dealt with. In my judgment, it is appropriate for the Defendant himself to take stock of that matter, following the failure of all 53 of his most recent applications. The Defendant will be able, if he considers it appropriate, to decide whether there are matters still outstanding which need attention and where he can properly ask the court for permission to apply, notwithstanding the terms of the civil restraint order. This comment is not in any way intended to be any form of encouragement to the Defendant to bring forward new, or re-present old, applications for permission. It should be clear to the Defendant that applications of the kind which he has been making are generally misconceived and, from his point of view, pointless. Applications of the kind he has made have been shown to be a total waste of his time. The Defendant also tells me that he finds the making of these applications stressful in that they make him acutely anxious. For these various reasons, the Defendant when taking stock of the matter, should reflect on where his best interests lie.
40. The Claimant has asked for an order that the Defendant do pay its costs of dealing with applications CD9 to CD14 and complying with the court's request that it participate in the telephone conference. In my judgment, it is appropriate for me to make such an order for costs. I will summarily assess those costs in the sum of £1,690.00.
41. As stated in Waller LJ's order of 5^th September 2007, my decision to refuse permission to the Defendant to make his various applications is final in the absence of any contrary order. For the avoidance of doubt, I now state that I do not make any contrary order.