CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Qayyum Ansari |
Claimant |
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New India Assurance Limited |
Defendant |
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Mr Jonathan Watt-Pringle Q.C (instructed by Turner & Debenhams Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 21,22,23 January 2008
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Patten :
Introduction
"The Insured having applied to New India Assurance Company Ltd the Insurer for this insurance and having paid or agreed to pay the premium the Insurer will provide insurance during the Period of Insurance in accordance with the Sections of the Policy shown as operative on the Schedule, subject to the terms of this Policy.
Provided that the liability of the Insurer in any one Period of Insurance in respect of any Item shall not exceed the Limit of Liability thereon.
This Policy incorporates the Schedules and Endorsements which shall be read together as one contract."
"The Business" Property Owner
The Premises the addresses stated in the Schedule of Premises leased or rented to third parties by the insured in connection with the Business"
"The Insurer will indemnify the Insured in respect of Damage to the Buildings and/or Landlord's Contents at the Premises by any of the Contingencies stated as operative in the Schedule by payment or at its option by repair reinstatement or replacement. "
"The interest of the freeholder lessor or mortgagee in this insurance shall not be prejudiced by any act or neglect whereby the risk of destruction or damage is increased without the authority or knowledge of the freeholder lessor or mortgagee provided they shall immediately on becoming aware thereof give notice in writing to the insurer and on demand pay such reasonable additional premium as the insurer may require."
" Policy voidable
1. This Policy shall be voidable in the event of misrepresentation, misdescription or non-disclosure in any material particular
Changes in Facts
2. This insurance shall cease to be in force if there is any material alteration to the Premises or Business or any material change in the facts stated in the Proposal Form or other facts supplied to the Insurer unless the Insurer agrees in writing to continue the insurance
Reasonable Precautions
3. The Insured shall take and cause to be taken all reasonable precautions
a) to prevent Damage
b) for the safety and security of the property insured
c) to prevent bodily injury and Damage to the property of others
."
"The proposal and declaration made by you the Insured are incorporated in and form the basis of this contract with the New India Assurance Company Limited (referred to in the Policy as "the Insurer"
In return for the Insured having paid or agreed to pay to the Insurer the premiums for the periods of insurance stated in the Schedule the Insurer undertakes to provide the insurance described in the Policy subject to its terms and conditions
The Policy is effective only whilst the Insured is carrying on the Business described in the Schedule and no other for the purpose of this insurance"
i) The use of the premises for the storage of motorised mini-motorcycles and scooters; and
ii) the turning off of the sprinkler system.
i) That the contract and its renewal were induced by misrepresentations in the proposal form to the effect that the premises were protected by an automatic sprinkler and/or that the use was limited to that of a kitchen wholesaler;
ii) That these statements also amounted to contractual warranties to that effect;
iii) That if the sprinkler system ceased to operate and/or the use changed after the inception or renewal of the policy General Condition 2 applied and the insurance had thereupon terminated; and
iv) In breach of General Condition 3 the Claimant has failed to take all reasonable precautions for the safety and security of the property by failing to ensure it was protected by a properly functioning sprinkler system.
i) The reference in General Condition 2 to the facts stated in the Proposal Form has to be read as referring to the declaration by the insured at the end of the form that as at the date of the proposal he believed all the statements in the form to be true. There is no suggestion that Mr Ansari did not believe those things at the time and that has not changed;
ii) Even if that construction of General Condition 2 is incorrect and the facts referred to in the proposal form included the description of the tenant's business and the statement that the Premises were protected by an automatic sprinkler installation, the expansion of Mr Asim's business and the turning off of the sprinkler system did not constitute material changes in the facts stated because they did not create a situation that was outside the risk which on the true construction of the policy New India had agreed to cover: see Kausar v Eagle Star Insurance Co. Ltd. [2000] Lloyd's Rep IR 154;
iii) If, however, General Condition 2 does apply to either of the two changes alleged then Mr Ansari was entitled to the benefit of the non-invalidation clause because the act or neglect of his tenant had increased the risk of damage but had done so without his knowledge or authority and the cover had therefore continued up to and including the fire;
iv) General Condition 3 required New India to prove not merely that Mr Ansari was negligent in failing to take all reasonable precautions to prevent damage, but rather that he had been reckless in the sense of deliberately courting a danger, the existence of which he recognised, by refraining from taking any measures to avert it: see Fraser v B.N. Furman (Productions) Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 898. There is no evidence that Mr Ansari ever went this far even if (which is denied) he was aware of the change in the tenant's business and the inoperability of the sprinkler system.
i) What are the facts stated in the proposal form for the purposes of General Condition 2;
ii) If the facts included the nature of the tenant's business and the state of the sprinkler system, whether Mr Ansari was aware prior to the fire that Mr Asim was no longer selling kitchen items alone but had a significant trade in motorbikes, scooters and other items and/or that the sprinkler system had been switched off; and
iii) If he was so aware, whether the change in facts which he had knowledge of was material within the meaning of General Condition 2.
Knowledge
(1) The sprinkler system
(2) Change of use of the premises
General Condition 2
"
A circumstance may be material even though a full and accurate disclosure of it would not in itself have had a decisive effect on the prudent underwriter's decision whether to accept the risk and if so at what premium. But (2) if the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of a material fact did not in fact induce the making of the contract (in the sense in which that expression is used in the general law of misrepresentation) the underwriter is not entitled to rely on it as a ground for avoiding the contract.
."
" You must tell us of any change of circumstances after the start of the insurance which increases the risk of injury or damage. You will not be insured under the policy until we have agreed in writing to accept the increased risk "
" .
In my judgment all that this condition does is to state the position as it would exist anyway as a matter of common law, namely that without the further agreement of the insurer, there would be no cover where the circumstances had so changed that it could properly be said by the insurers that the new situation was something which, on the true construction of the policy, they had not agreed to cover. The mere fact that the chances of an insured peril operating increase during the period of the cover would not, save possibly in the most extreme of circumstances, enable the insurers properly to say this, since the insurance bargain is one where, in return for the premium, they take upon themselves the risk that an insured peril will operate. In calculating that premium it is for the insurers to assess the chances of insured perils operating; and the fact that they may (in hindsight) have got this assessment wrong does not begin to establish that what has happened falls outside the cover they have agreed to give. In the present case all that the facts and matters upon which Eagle Star rely show is, at best, that during the period of the cover events occurred which increased the chances that an insured peril (namely damage to the buildings by vandals or malicious people) would operate. Thus to my mind condition 3 does not afford a defence to the claim in question.
Mr Davis argued that such a construction should not be adopted since it deprived condition 3 of any effect. In the sense that the condition does no more than state the common law this is true, but the difficulty with this argument is twofold.
In the first place the argument assumes, with no factual justification, that those drafting policy conditions such as these wanted to go further than or change the common law position, rather than just restating that position for the convenience and assistance of those taking out insurance on this form of policy, not all of whom are likely to be insurance law experts. Indeed it is apparent from the policy wording as a whole that Eagle Star have made a serious attempt to draft their policy terms in what might be described as 'user friendly' language, rather than in the more ponderous legalese often found in insurance documents. To my mind, therefore, it is not in the least surprising to find in the conditions something which under common law would in any event be the legal position.
In the second place, the alternative suggested meanings of the condition produce either bizarre results which cannot have been intended, or require the wholesale rewriting of the provision. For example, on one suggested construction the entire insurance would automatically lapse if anything new happened which increased the chance or risk of damage, thus turning the insurance into one which only lasted so long as the chance of loss or damage from any peril did not increase. Again, on the construction preferred by Mr Davis, this would on the face of it entail that the moment a threat was made to the insured to damage the building, malicious damage cover would cease, so that if the threat was immediately followed by damage there would be no cover. Mr Davis said that this would not be so, since either such a circumstance was so closely connected with the actual damage that it should be ignored, or that the insured had a reasonable time in which to report a change of circumstances such as a threat, but these qualifications are not hinted at, let alone set out, in the wording of condition 3.
."
Conclusion