BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY
CHANCERY DIVISION
33 Bull Street Birmingham B4 6DS |
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B e f o r e :
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(1) JAIME WALLBANK (2) LYNSEY WALLBANK |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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SUSAN JOAN PRICE |
Defendant |
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Mr. Glenn Willetts (instructed by Foster Baxter Cooksey) for the Defendant.
Hearing dates: 19, 20 November 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Lewison:
Introduction
"I Susan Joan Wallbank
Have voluntarily agreed to vacate the above premises and also to forfeit any monies or profit in anyway connected with this property, and by signing this declaration I revoke any rights in the disposal of the above property.
The only exception to this is that my Daughters Jaime and Lynsey Wallbank should receive my half share of the property on its disposal or at the discretion of my husband Martin Harry Wallbank."
The facts
"This 28 year old lady was admitted on the 7th of September 1980 having [taken] an overdose of eight paracetamol tablets [illegible] she was annoyed with her husband and was feeling under the weather with flu and heavy periods."
"Took OD in effort to make husband listen to her. Hasn't worked –husband told her she was stupid.
Has had flu this week
Heavy period
Still gone to work
But husband has picked on her all week – always "stupid" and useless. Husband has problems at work….
Usually gets on with husband.
No previous ODs"
"Thereafter we settled into the pattern of the next 18 years. I did my best to bring up the girls whilst trying to earn as much money as possible to keep the family afloat. Martin moved between jobs. The verbal abuse continued as did the hitting and punching. There would be periods when there was less of it and there would be periods when there was more of it. It never in fact went away. I just learned to cope with it."
"Martin then read out to me and I wrote down on the piece of paper the words which are set out on the document at the heart of this dispute. Martin then told me to sign the same. I was obviously frightened given that I had only left Martin some 14 days earlier. If Martin told me to do something then I did it. If I did not then I would be hit or threatened with being hit. That was the nature of our marriage as it made been from the outset. The threat of disclosing the sexually intimate Polaroid's of me was also still firmly in my mind. I signed the piece of paper."
"The marriage was an abusive one and our client was told to attend at the property for the purposes of signing an agreement, the words of the agreement were dictated to her by her husband and she was then told to sign he same. At no point did she have any opportunity to obtain legal advice. As you are aware the relationship between husband and wife sets up a rebuttable presumption. We believe that as a matter of law the burden of proof will shift to your clients to establish that our client was not unduly influenced."
Undue influence and duress
i) The objective of the doctrine of undue influence is to ensure that the influence of one person ("the donee") over another ("the donor") is not abused (¶ 6);ii) The law will investigate the manner in which the intention to enter into a transaction was secured: "how the intention was produced". If the intention was produced by an unacceptable means, the law will not permit the transaction to stand. The means used is regarded as an exercise of improper or "undue" influence, and hence unacceptable, whenever the consent thus procured ought not fairly to be treated as the expression of a person's free will. It is impossible to be more precise or definitive. The circumstances in which one person acquires influence over another, and the manner in which influence may be exercised, vary too widely to permit of any more specific criterion (¶ 7).
iii) Equity identified broadly two forms of unacceptable conduct. The first comprises overt acts of improper pressure or coercion such as unlawful threats. Today there is much overlap with the principle of duress as this principle has subsequently developed. The second form arises out of a relationship between two persons where one has acquired over another a measure of influence, or ascendancy, of which the ascendant person then takes unfair advantage (¶ 8).
iv) The second type of case is typically one where one person places trust and confidence in the other and for that reason there is an imbalance between them. However, the principle is not confined to these cases. It also includes, for instance, cases where a vulnerable person has been exploited. Indeed, there is no single touchstone for determining whether the principle is applicable. Several expressions have been used in an endeavour to encapsulate the essence: trust and confidence, reliance, dependence or vulnerability on the one hand and ascendancy, domination or control on the other. None of these descriptions is perfect. None is all embracing. Each has its proper place (¶ 11).
v) Whether a transaction was brought about by the exercise of undue influence is a question of fact. Here, as elsewhere, the general principle is that he who asserts a wrong has been committed must prove it. The burden of proving an allegation of undue influence rests upon the person who claims to have been wronged. This is the general rule. The evidence required to discharge the burden of proof depends on the nature of the alleged undue influence, the personality of the parties, their relationship, the extent to which the transaction cannot readily be accounted for by the ordinary motives of ordinary persons in that relationship, and all the circumstances of the case (¶ 13).
vi) Disadvantage to the donor is not a necessary ingredient of undue influence (¶ 12). However, it may have an evidential value, because it is relevant to the questions whether any allegation of abuse of confidence can properly be made, and whether any abuse actually occurred (¶ 104);
vii) If the claimant proves (a) that the donor placed trust and confidence in the donee in relation to the management of the donor's financial affairs, and (b) that the transaction calls out for explanation, the claimant has discharged an evidential burden, which will also enable an inference of undue influence to be drawn, and thus satisfy the legal burden, unless the donee produces evidence to counter the inference which would otherwise be drawn (¶¶ 14, 21 and 156). The same principle would apply where the donor proves that her relationship with the donee was one of subordination to domination or control.
viii) This is simply a question of evidence and proof. At the end of the day, after trial, there will either be proof of undue influence or that proof will fail and it will be found that there is no undue influence. In the former case, whatever the relationship between the parties and however the influence was exerted, there will have been found to have been an actual case of undue influence. In the latter there will be none (¶ 93).
ix) The evidential presumption is to be distinguished sharply from a different form of presumption which arises in some cases. The law has adopted a sternly protective attitude towards certain types of relationship in which one party acquires influence over another who is vulnerable and dependent and where, moreover, substantial gifts by the influenced or vulnerable person are not normally to be expected (¶ 18). Where this special presumption applies, the donee has a positive obligation to justify the impugned transaction. The relation of husband and wife is not one of the relationships give rise to this special presumption. (¶ 19).
x) The sort of conduct that can amount to undue influence includes cases of coercion, domination, victimisation and all the insidious techniques of persuasion (¶ 93); and excessive pressure, emotional blackmail or bullying (¶ 160).
i) First, there is the complete absence in any of the surviving medical records of any allegation of injury at the hands of Mr Wallbank. Such explanations as there are are to the contrary effect. Thus the headaches are ascribed to tension or to the effect of a whiplash injury in a traffic accident. The history taken at the time of Mrs Price's admission after the overdose of paracetamol says that she usually got on well with her husband and presents the week of being picked on as abnormal. Although Mrs Price attended her GP regularly there is no allegation of physical violence against her husband. Mrs Price gives two reasons for this silence. The first is that she was ashamed that it was happening and did not admit it to anyone. However, her case is also that she was assaulted in the presence of others; including clients at the hairdressing salon, her mother in law and Mr Price. According to Mr Humphries Mrs Price told him about her injuries in the 1970s. These two bodies of evidence are, in my judgment, inconsistent and cannot both be true. The second reason that Mrs Price gives is that she was afraid that if she admitted or asserted that she was being physically abused her children would be taken away from her. But she never sought any advice to see whether that was a reality; and according to her own evidence she went to a womens' refuge in the late 1970s.ii) Second, with the exception of Mr Humphries, who says that he saw bruises on Mrs Price's arms and neck in the 1970s and 1980s, no one saw any signs of physical abuse. If Mr Humphries really saw what he said he saw it is surprising that none of Mrs Price's family members (including her daughters, sister and brother in law) ever saw the same thing. Nor did Mrs Rowland who is a nurse. Nor did any of the doctors who examined her on many occasions throughout her marriage. Nor did Mr Price with whom she was conducting an intimate affair for well over a year.
iii) Third, even though Mrs Price confided in Mr Price, with whom she began an intimate relationship in July 1996 which was still in being until the spring of 1998, she never told him about any physical abuse. If Mrs Price is truthful in saying that Mr Wallbank deliberately scalded her in July 1997, it is very surprising that she did not tell Mr Price that that had happened.
iv) Fourth, the catalogue of Mr Wallbank's alleged abuse has grown as the case has progressed. Extremely serious allegations (the laceration and the scald) were omitted from both the pleaded case and Mrs Price's first witness statement, even though Mrs Price pleaded and gave evidence about older and less serious incidents. If these incidents really happened it is very surprising that Mrs Price apparently did not recall them or chose not to give evidence about them. Her explanation given in evidence was that she had not documented the whole of her long relationship with Mr Wallbank. I found this an unconvincing explanation. In the first place, to the extent that there is any documentation at all, these incidents are documented in the medical records, which Mrs Price had when preparing her first witness statement. In the second place, it is not a question of documenting the whole of the relationship but recalling the most serious occasions of alleged abuse. By the time of her re-examination Mrs Price was willing to testify of numerous occasions when Mr Wallbank pushed her down the stairs or injured her so badly that she had to go to hospital.
v) Fifth, although Mrs Price left Mr Wallbank at least once she was prepared to try to save the marriage, which is one reason why they went on holiday together in July 1998. If the marriage had been so abusive it is difficult to see why she thought it was worth saving, particularly as by 1998 both her daughters were adults.
vi) Sixth, Mrs Price said that she wanted a divorce, but Mr Wallbank refused to agree. Yet if her allegations of abuse were correct she could have initiated divorce proceedings on the ground of Mr Wallbank's unreasonable behaviour. She did not; and when they were divorced, the ground for divorce was two years' separation and consent.
vii) Seventh, Mrs Price's performance in the witness box did not strike me as that of a person who is easily intimidated or bullied.
"The presumption of undue influence, whether in a category 2A case, or in a category 2B case, is a rebuttable evidential presumption. It is a presumption which arises if the nature of the relationship between two parties coupled with the nature of the transaction between them is such as justifies, in the absence of any other evidence, an inference that the transaction was procured by the undue influence of one party over the other. This evidential presumption shifts the onus to the dominant party and requires the dominant party, if he is to avoid a finding of undue influence, to adduce some sufficient additional evidence to rebut the presumption. In a case where there has been a full trial, however, the judge must decide on the totality of the evidence before the court whether or not the allegation of undue influence has been proved. In an appropriate case the presumption may carry the complainant home. But it makes no sense to find, on the one hand, that there was no undue influence but, on the other hand, that the presumption applies. If the presumption does, after all the evidence has been heard, still apply, then a finding of undue influence is justified. If, on the other hand, the judge, having heard the evidence, concludes that there was no undue influence, the presumption stands rebutted. A finding of actual undue influence and a finding that there is a presumption of undue influence are not alternatives to one another. The presumption is, I repeat, an evidential presumption. If it applies, and the evidence is not sufficient to rebut it, an allegation of undue influence succeeds."
The effect of the declaration
"I Susan Joan Wallbank
Have voluntarily agreed to vacate the above premises and also to forfeit any monies or profit in anyway connected with this property, and by signing this declaration I revoke any rights in the disposal of the above property."
"my Daughters Jaime and Lynsey Wallbank should receive my half share of the property on its disposal or at the discretion of my husband Martin Harry Wallbank."
Result