CHANCERY DIVISION
BRISTOL DISTRICT REGISTRY
Small Street, Bristol BS1 1DA |
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B e f o r e :
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DAVID THORNER | Claimant | |
- and - | ||
WINIFRED CURTIS | ||
ENA JOYCE MAJOR | ||
LESLEY DAWN HEUSEN | ||
(as Personal Representatives of Jesse Peter Thorner decesased) | Defendants |
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Miss Penelope Reed instructed by Messrs Gould & Swayne, Solicitors of Glastonbury, appeared for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 19th – 20th September 2007, at The Guildhall, Bristol
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Crown Copyright ©
The Deputy Judge, John Randall QC :
INTRODUCTION
THE LAW
(i) The applicable legal principles
"In Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustee Co Ltd Oliver J provided the following statement of the elements of the doctrine: 'If A, under an expectation created or encouraged by B that A shall have a certain interest in land thereafter, on the faith of such expectation and with the knowledge of B and without objection from him, acts to his detriment in connection with such land, a Court of Equity will compel B to give effect to such expectation.' This remains the most important and authoritative modern statement of the doctrine although it must now be qualified by the proposition that the relief granted by the court must be proportionate to the detriment suffered and that the court is not always required to satisfy his or her expectation by awarding the promised or expected interest in land."
"(1) The overriding concern of equity to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the different elements of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel: assurance, reliance, detriment and satisfaction are all intertwined.
(2) The broad inquiry in a case such as this is whether, in all the circumstances, it is unconscionable for a testator to make a will giving specific property to one person, if by his conduct he has previously created the expectation in a different person that he will inherit it.
(3) The expectation may be created by (a) an assurance to the other person by the testator and intended by him to be relied upon that he will leave specific property to him; (b) consequent reliance on the assurance; and (c) real detriment (not necessarily financial) consequent on the reliance.
(4) The nature and quality of the assurance must be established in order to see what expectation it creates and whether it is unconscionable for the testator to repudiate his assurance by leaving the property to someone else.
(5) It is necessary to stand back and look at the claim in the round in order to decide whether the conduct of the testator had given rise to an estoppel and, if so, what is the minimum equity necessary to do justice to the claimant and to avoid an unconscionable or disproportionate result.
(6) The testator's assurance that he will leave specific property to a person by will may thus become irrevocable as a result of the other's detrimental reliance on the assurance, even though the testator's power of testamentary disposition to which the assurance is linked is inherently revocable."
"for convenience, divided into several sections with headings which give a rough indication of the subject matter, it is important to note at the outset that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel cannot be treated as subdivided into three or four watertight compartments. Both sides are agreed on that, and in the course of the oral argument in this court it repeatedly became apparent that the quality of the relevant assurances may influence the issue of reliance, that reliance and detriment are often intertwined, and that whether there is a distinct need for a 'mutual understanding' may depend on how the other elements are formulated and understood. Moreover the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the doctrine. In the end the court must look at the matter in the round."
"The court's aim is, having identified the maximum [extent of the equity], to form a view as to what is the minimum required to satisfy it and do justice between the parties."
In the later case of Jennings, he explained (at para 48) that :
"… reference to the minimum [in such a context] does not require the court to be constitutionally parsimonious, but it does implicitly recognise that the court must also do justice to the defendant."
"50 …. there is a category of case in which the benefactor and the claimant have reached a mutual understanding which is in reasonably clear terms but does not amount to a contract. I have already referred to the typical case of a carer who has the expectation of coming into the benefactor's house, either outright or for life. In such a case the court's natural response is to fulfil the claimant's expectations. But if the claimant's expectations are uncertain, or extravagant, or out of all proportion to the detriment which the claimant has suffered, the court can and should recognise that the claimant's equity should be satisfied in another (and generally more limited) way.
51 But that does not mean that the court should in such a case abandon expectations completely, and look to the detriment suffered by the claimant as defining the appropriate measure of relief. Indeed in many cases the detriment may be even more difficult to quantify, in financial terms, than the claimant's expectations. Detriment can be quantified with reasonable precision if it consists solely of expenditure on improvements to another person's house, and in some cases of that sort an equitable charge for the expenditure may be sufficient to satisfy the equity (see Snell's Equity, 30th ed., para.39–21 and the authorities mentioned in that paragraph). But the detriment of an ever-increasing burden of care for an elderly person, and of having to be subservient to his or her moods and wishes, is very difficult to quantify in money terms. Moreover the claimant may not be motivated solely by reliance on the benefactor's assurances, and may receive some countervailing benefits (such as free bed and board). In such circumstances the court has to exercise a wide judgmental discretion."
"The value of [such an] equity will depend upon all the circumstances including the expectation and the detriment. The task of the court is to do justice. The most essential requirement is that there must be proportionality between the expectation and the detriment."
(ii) Must there be an express promise made in terms as such?
"requires a very much broader approach which is directed rather at ascertaining whether, in particular individual circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly, or unknowingly, he has allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment than to inquiring whether the circumstances can be fitted within the confines of some preconceived formula serving as a universal yardstick for every form of unconscionable behaviour."
(emphasis added)
"… the circumstances may make clear that the assurance is more than a mere statement of present (revocable) [testamentary] intention, and is tantamount to a promise".
(emphasis added)
"A must establish that O … has represented that he or she will obtain an interest in property either by making an express promise … or by encouraging A to believe that he or she will obtain such an interest by words or conduct … or by encouraging A's belief passively and by remaining silent …'The circumstance of looking on is in many cases as strong as using terms of encouragement' … but it is necessary to show that O intended it to be relied upon or that it was reasonable in the circumstances for A to assume that it was intended to be relied on …"
"proprietary estoppel can apply in a wide variety of factual situations, and any summary formula is likely to prove to be an over-simplification. The cases show a wide range of variation in both of the main elements, that is the quality of the assurances which give rise to the claimant's expectations and the extent of the claimant's detrimental reliance on the assurances. The doctrine applies only if these elements, in combination, make it unconscionable for the person giving the assurances (whom I will call the benefactor, although that may not always be an appropriate label) to go back on them."
(emphasis added)
THE WITNESSES
THE LATE JESSE PETER THORNER
STEART FARM, CHEDDAR
DAVID THORNER
OTHERS WHO HELPED ON STEART FARM
FURTHER FINDINGS OF FACT (chronologically)
a. (speaking of one of the farm buildings) "Don't you touch that, old Mr Evans [i.e. Sarah's father] put that up". Given that there were no plans or discussions for any alteration to the building in question at the time, I am satisfied both that David understood this as a reference to a future time when Peter had passed away and David was in charge of the farm, and that Peter intended it to be so understood;b. "you look after the farm and the farm will look after you". At one level, this remark might be regarded as little more than a piece of rather folksy country wisdom, but in the context of the long relationship between David and Peter, one feature of which was discussions about the long term future of the farm and its management (discussions which Peter had only with David), I am satisfied both that David understood this as a reference to a future time when Peter had passed away and Steart Farm was David's living, and that Peter intended it to be so understood;
c. He told David (i) that a baler which he owned was out on long term loan to a Mr Hole, (ii) that a stock car enthusiast had been paying him £1,000 p.a. for the use of a circuit on Peter's land on the top of the Mendips, (iii) that there was a lady trying to get a grant of £500 p.a. in connection with bats somewhere on the farm, and (iv) that he had agreed certain special terms in respect of one of his grass keep agreements to help with future maintenance of Steart Farm. In respect of each of these 4 statements (made on separate occasions) I am satisfied they were made by Peter, and (correctly) understood by David to have been made, in the context of the unspoken mutual understanding which by then existed between them that David was to inherit Steart Farm. That was the reason why David needed to know about such assets, income sources and the like;
d. I am also satisfied (i) that all these remarks further encouraged the expectation which David had formed that he would be Peter's successor to Steart Farm, upon his death, and encouraged David to continue with his very considerable unpaid help to Peter there, and (ii) that it was reasonable for David to understand them and rely on them in that way. That being the case, it is unnecessary for me to undertake the somewhat artificial exercise of seeking to make a specific finding, in respect of each of these more indirect remarks, as to whether Peter positively intended any particular remark to bring about the reliance which it did.
ANALYSIS
(i) David's expectation
(ii) Assurances from Peter which caused or encouraged that expectation
(iii) Detrimental reliance by David
"The promises relied upon do not have to be the sole inducement for the conduct: it is sufficient if they are an inducement – Amalgamated Property Co v Texas Bank [1982] QB 84 at 104-105."
(iv) Looking at the matter in the round / Unconscionability
(v) Satisfying the equity and proportionality
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF
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