CHANCERY DIVISION
CARDIFF
DISTRICT REGISTRY
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL | ||
B e f o r e :
____________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF WINIFRED
VICTORIA EDWARDS (DECEASED) JOHN EDWARDS |
Claimant | |
- and - |
||
TERENCE JAMES EDWARDS ELIZABETH MAUD COOMBES THE PARTNERS OF KTP SOLICITORS |
Defendants |
____________________
Mr Andrew Arentsen (instructed by Lewis Ingrams Solicitors) for the
First Defendant
Ms Lucy Leader (instructed by Keith Thomas & Partners
Solicitors) for the Third Defendant
The Second Defendant was not
represented
Hearing dates: 23, 24, 25 April 2007
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Lewison:
"I also request that my son Terrence Edwards of 20 The Avenue is removed from this property after the funeral or next day and for my son John Edwards to change the locks."
"John found Reggie's wallet for me in Terry's bedroom on Monday."
i) Mr Morris said that there was no controversy;
ii) Mr Morris told Mr Roberts that John had taken items from the house;
iii) Mr Morris said that Mrs Edwards did not want to see "them" (presumably John and Carol) or benefit them in her will;
iv) Mr Morris said that there was money missing from Mrs Edwards' bank account and that the police were investigating it;
v) Mr Morris said that there was a certificate from the doctor that Mrs Edwards was in a lucid state of mind but that she had lost some mental capacity probably as a result of a fall.
i) It was misleading, in the light of the unhappy relationship between Terry and John and the effect that Mr Morris must have known that the changes to the will would have on John, to say that there was no controversy;
ii) It was misleading simply to say that John had "taken" items from the house. Most of what he had removed had been the subject of the receipt signed by both him and Terry and, moreover, had been the items specified in Mrs Edwards' own letter. To say simply that he had "taken" items suggests that he had done so without Mrs Edwards' consent, which was untrue;
iii) It was untrue to say that Mrs Edwards did not wish to see "them". At its highest all that could properly have been said is that Mrs Edwards had said that she did not wish to see Carol;
iv) It was an exaggeration to say that the police were "investigating" missing money. As Mr Morris knew, because the police had told him, they were not investigating.
"There is the money which is being sorted out at the moment, which I am not going to pursue … because I was not well after Reg died and I may have given it to him. But my sister took my possessions by locking Terry out and I want some of them back.
So I want everything to go to Terry because he looks after me and does my washing and cleans the house and does everything and appoint him as executor and solicitors."
"Mrs Edwards was sitting up fully dressed in her chair by the fire. She knew fully what we had come for – to sign the will and power of attorney.
She understood the purpose of the will was to give everything to Terry her son who looks after her as she can't walk because of her legs – and he does everything for her.
I read through the will with her and she signed the will in my presence …
With son [Terry] went through Enduring Power of Attorney which she understood fully as to the notes Part A and the document Part B which she signed and Terry signed in her presence and in mine."
i) In a case of a testamentary disposition of assets, unlike a lifetime disposition, there is no presumption of undue influence;
ii) Whether undue influence has procured the execution of a will is therefore a question of fact;
iii) The burden of proving it lies on the person who asserts it. It is not enough to prove that the facts are consistent with the hypothesis of undue influence. What must be shown is that the facts are inconsistent with any other hypothesis. In the modern law this is, perhaps no more than a reminder of the high burden, even on the civil standard, that a claimant bears in proving undue influence as vitiating a testamentary disposition;
iv) In this context undue influence means influence exercised either by coercion, in the sense that the testator's will must be overborne, or by fraud.
v) Coercion is pressure that overpowers the volition without convincing the testator's judgment. It is to be distinguished from mere persuasion, appeals to ties of affection or pity for future destitution, all of which are legitimate. Pressure which causes a testator to succumb for the sake of a quiet life, if carried to an extent that overbears the testator's free judgment discretion or wishes, is enough to amount to coercion in this sense;
vi) The physical and mental strength of the testator are relevant factors in determining how much pressure is necessary in order to overbear the will. The will of a weak and ill person may be more easily overborne than that of a hale and hearty one. As was said in one case simply to talk to a weak and feeble testator may so fatigue the brain that a sick person may be induced for quietness' sake to do anything. A "drip drip" approach may be highly effective in sapping the will;
vii) There is a separate ground for avoiding a testamentary disposition on the ground of fraud. The shorthand used to refer to this species of fraud is "fraudulent calumny". The basic idea is that if A poisons the testator's mind against B, who would otherwise be a natural beneficiary of the testator's bounty, by casting dishonest aspersions on his character, then the will is liable to be set aside;
viii) The essence of fraudulent calumny is that the person alleged to have been poisoning the testator's mind must either know that the aspersions are false or not care whether they are true or false. In my judgment if a person believes that he is telling the truth about a potential beneficiary then even if what he tells the testator is objectively untrue, the will is not liable to be set aside on that ground alone;
ix) The question is not whether the court considers that the testator's testamentary disposition is fair because, subject to statutory powers of intervention, a testator may dispose of his estate as he wishes. The question, in the end, is whether in making his dispositions, the testator has acted as a free agent.