CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court of Justice)
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SWISSPORT (UK) LIMITED (in liquidation) | Claimants/Respondents | |
and | ||
AER LINGUS LIMITED | Defendants/Appellants |
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Mr Christopher Harrison (instructed by Olswang) for the Respondents
Hearing date : 27 March 2007
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Peter Prescott QC :
(a) Ground handling services includes cleaning the aircraft, handling the passengers' baggage, and so forth.
(b) Swissport did perform ground handling services at Heathrow for Aer Lingus pursuant to a contract, whereby Aer Lingus incurred charges.
(c) Aer Lingus do not now dispute the amount of those charges. Together with interest, they amounted to the sum that the Deputy Master held to be due.
d) Swissport are insolvent. They ceased trading and went into administration on 16 November 2004. On or about 10 November 2006 (which was after the date of the Deputy Master's decision) they went into liquidation.
(e) There are said to be employment proceedings, still unresolved, that would or might affect the outcome of the present case. The claims were brought by former employees or their unions. They have failed so far, but there is an appeal pending before the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Its decision should be available soon.
The Facts
(a) On 15 October 2004 Swissport's parent company wrote to say that Aer Lingus was a very valuable customer with whom they wished to pursue "a strong and lasting relationship" but that they wanted an urgent meeting to discuss a "New Collaboration Model". Aer Lingus did not reply.
(b) On 27 October 2004 Swissport wrote again, this time purporting to impose substantially higher handling charges at Heathrow Airport with effect from the 1st November 2004. They said "It is the only way we can continue to handle Aer Lingus". The letter concluded: "Should you decide not to accept these rate increases from this point, then please regard this letter as 60 days notice, in writing, that we will not handle Aer Lingus flights at LHR , effective from 1st January 2005".
(c) On 1 November 2004 Aer Lingus replied, pointing out – correctly – that Swissport had no right to impose higher handling charges unilaterally, nor to determine the contract upon notice. They demanded immediate confirmation that Swissport's demands would be revoked.
(d) On 5 November 2004 Swissport said that their directors had become increasingly concerned about the company's unsustainable losses over the recent months and that unless Aer Lingus could agree within the next 7 days to modify the contract "to make it a commercially viable contract", their directors would be forced to consider placing the company in some form of insolvency proceedings very shortly thereafter. The letter added that Aer Lingus' existing contractual rights were "of no practical relevance" because any claim would rank with the unsecured creditors.
(e) On 10 November 2004 Aer Lingus replied to the effect that it had been Swissport themselves who had insisted on a ground handling agreement, with fixed rates, that was to last 10 years, and that their parent company had given assurances at the time to support Swissport.
(f) Early in the morning of 16 November 2004 Swissport ceased to provide the ground handling services at Heathrow Airport and their employees who turned up to work were locked out. Later that day Swissport went into administration. (It is Aer Lingus' case that Swissport went out of business, not because of rising costs that could not have been foreseen, but because their parent company had decided no longer to support them.)
The TUPE Claims
"Prior to 16 November 2004 there did not exist an undertaking within the meaning of the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981 ("TUPE") that was identifiable as being the provision of ground handling operation services by [Swissport] to [Aer Lingus] at Heathrow Airport. Accordingly, when on 16 November 2004 [Swissport] ceased to trade and [Aer Lingus] commenced the provision to itself of ground handling operations at Heathrow Airport there was no transfer of undertaking to which Regulation 3 of TUPE applied".
The Tribunal's judgment was directed to whether the provision of the ground handling services by Swissport for Aer Lingus at Heathrow was an 'undertaking' in the sense of 'a stable economic entity' and whether that 'undertaking' had been transferred to Aer Lingus on 16 November 2004. In the event that the Tribunal had decided that a transfer of an undertaking had taken place, which it did not, it would have been for a different Tribunal to determine which, if any, of the employees on behalf of whom the claims were brought had transferred to Aer Lingus pursuant to Regulation 5 of TUPE.
The Indemnity
"The Purchaser [i.e. Swissport] shall indemnify and keep indemnified the Vendor [i.e. Aer Lingus] for and against all liabilities arising out of or in connection with:10.12.1 the refusal of an Employee to transfer to the Purchaser pursuant to Regulation 5(5) of the Employment Regulations; or
10.12.2 the employment by the Purchaser on or after the Apportionment Time of any of the Employees other than on terms (excluding terms relating to occupational pension schemes except …) at least as good as those enjoyed immediately prior to the Apportionment Time or the termination of the employment of any of them on or after the Apportionment Time; or
10.12.3 any claim brought by any Employee or any trade union or worker representative in respect of an Employee or Employees arising out of any act or omission of the Purchaser on or after the Apportionment Time
except for [irrelevant]".
The Deputy Master's Decision
"In my judgment, this indemnity does not apply to the 2004 circumstances. Clause 10 of the vending agreement sets out an entire scheme for the TUPE transfer of the business in 1999 and expressly sets out in clause 10.2 the adoption by the claimant of the employment contracts. The defendants give indemnities in respect of that transfer at paragraphs 10.5, 10.8 and 10.10. 10.12 is the corresponding indemnity by the claimant. In my judgment, it cannot be construed as anything other than claims which might arise in respect of the 1999 transfer, and the fact that the defendant stepped briefly into the baggage handling market in 2004 is what triggers the employment claims, not anything done under the 1999 agreement."
It is well settled by the authorities that the court should exercise caution in granting summary judgment in certain kinds of case… In my judgment, the court should also hesitate about making a final decision without a trial where, even though there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case.
Summary Judgment
(a) a claimant has a cast-iron case so that, subject to what follows, he would get summary judgment against the defendant; but
(b) the defendant alleges that he has a cross-claim: a counterclaim that overtops the amount of the claimant's claim, or a legal set-off; yet
(c) the defendant's cross-claim is not very certain – meaning that the defendant could not himself have obtained summary judgment if the roles had been reversed.
What happens then? I believe that in the general case there can be no bright-line rule: see the notes in the 2007 White Book, §24.26. The court's overriding objective is to do justice between the parties, which includes expedition and economy. The court must exercise its discretion under CPR 24.2 in order to promote that objective and it must depend on the circumstances of each particular case. Where both parties are solvent it may make sense to give judgment on the claim and leave the defendant to pursue his cross-claim. To the extent that he succeeds, he will get his money back. It gets murkier where the court's judgment might produce a damaging effect on a party's cash-flow position, and murkier still if the claimant is insolvent.
(a) Insolvency set-off is not just a matter of procedure: it affects the substantive rights of the parties.
(b) In particular, an insolvent party's creditor can use his own indebtedness to the insolvent party as a form of security. "Instead of having to prove with other creditors for the whole of his debt in the bankruptcy, he can set off pound for pound what he owes the bankrupt and prove for or pay only the balance".
(c) "Legal set-off is confined to debts which at the time when the defence of set-off is filed were due and payable and either liquidated or in sums capable of ascertainment without valuation or estimation. Bankruptcy set-off has a much wider scope. It applies to any claim arising out of mutual credits or other dealings before the bankruptcy for which a creditor would be entitled to prove as a 'bankruptcy debt'." This is widely defined and interpreted.
'An account shall be taken of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the mutual dealings, and the sums due from one party shall be set off against the sums due from the other'.
At paragraph 6 Lord Hoffmann continued:
If the requirements of paragraph (1) are satisfied, the account and set-off required by paragraph (2) are mandatory and apply whenever it is necessary to ascertain the net amount owing by one party to the other.
It is not however necessary for the purposes of rule 4.90(2) that the debt should have been due and payable before the insolvency date [by which he meant the date upon which the company went into liquidation]. It is sufficient that there should have been an obligation arising out of the terms of the contract … by which a debt sounding in money would become payable upon the occurrence of some future event or events. The principle has typically been applied to claims for breach of contract where the contract was made before the insolvency date but the breach occurred afterwards.
But the winding up of the estate of a bankrupt or an insolvent company cannot always wait until all possible contingencies have happened and all the actual or potential liabilities which existed at the bankruptcy date have been quantified. Therefore the law adopts a second technique, which is to make an estimation of the value of the claim. Section 322(3) says: "The trustee shall estimate the value of any bankruptcy debt which, by reason of its being subject to any contingency or contingencies or for any other reason, does not bear a certain value". This enables the trustee to quantify a creditor's contingent or unascertained claim, for the purposes of set-off or proof, in a way which will enable the trustee safely to distribute the estate, even if subsequent events show that the claim was worth more. There is no similar machinery for quantifying contingent or unascertained claims against the creditor, because it would be unfair upon him to have his liability to pay advanced merely because the trustee wants to wind up the bankrupt's estate.
The occasion for taking the account
In what circumstances must the account be taken? The language of section 323(2) suggest an image of the trustee and creditor sitting down together, perhaps before a judge, and debating how the balance between them should be calculated. But the taking of the account really means no more than the calculation of the balance due in accordance with the principles of insolvency law… But it has long been held that [the lodging of a proof] is unnecessary …
Once one has eliminated any need for a proof in order to activate the operation of the section, it ceases to be linked to any step in the procedure of bankruptcy or litigation… The "account" in accordance with section 323(2) must be taken whenever it is necessary for any purpose to ascertain the effect which the section had.
I should have thought that must include a summary judgment application pursuant to CPR Part 24.
I think that "due" merely means treated as having been owing at the bankruptcy date with the benefit of the hindsight and, if necessary, estimation prescribed by the bankruptcy law. The valuation provision in section 322(3) shows that the contingency need not have occurred even at the time when the account has to be taken.
Discretion
Note 1 Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 1981. [Back]