CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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Roger James Weston |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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John Gribben The Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
Defendants |
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Robert Jay QC and Adam Robb (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) for the Second Defendant
Hearing dates: 13th December 2005
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Crown Copyright ©
Peter Smith J :
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
THE FACTS
1 That FCO owed a common law duty of care to Mr Weston2 That is was in breach of any duty to the Claimant in any event by virtue of a breach of the requirement of the Hague Convention 1961
3 That the cause of action based on misfeasance of a public office is sustainable
4 That it entertains considerable doubts about the nature of the underlying fraud which was allegedly perpetrated on Mr Weston and the circumstances in which his losses were sustained.
THE FCO'S FUNCTIONS
"2. Each Contracting State shall exempt from legislation documents to which the present Convention applies and which have to be produced in its territory. For the purposes of the present Convention, legislation means only the formality by which the diplomatic or consular agents of the country in which the document has to be produced certify the authenticity of the signature, the capacity in which the person signing the document has acted and, where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp which it bears.
3. The only formality that may be required in order to certify the authenticity of the signature, the capacity in which the person signing the document has acted and, where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp which it bears, is the addition of the certificate described in Article 4, issued by the competent authority of the State from which the document emanates…
4. The certificate referred to in the first paragraph of Article 3 shall be placed on the document itself or on an "allonge"; it shall be in the form of the model annexed to the present Convention…"
PROCEDURE
CONSEQUENCES
Paragraph 15 "At the conclusion of the case in the Barcelona High Court, it was decided that Goldstone and Villette were the prime movers in the fraud. However, unfortunately it was not possible to recover the Dominion Beach Property. I understand that this was because the documents produced to enable the Dominion Beach Property to be transferred away from Grass were on their face genuine and authenticated by the British government's apostilles".
Paragraph 20 "My enquiries discovered that the Barcelona Property was transferred into the name of a Spanish company called Golden Promest SL. Within the Barcelona High Court proceedings, I was able to show that Golden Promest SL was beneficially owned by Mr Alvarez's father. Fortunately, I was able to recover the Barcelona Property. As explained in the Particulars of Claim, the damages claimed in relation to the Barcelona Property comprise the substantial legal expenses involved in effecting its eventual successful recovery".
Paragraph 22 "Enquiries that I made in Spain revealed that the Berth was purchased by a German lawyer based in Malaga. My Spanish lawyers inform me that the gentleman in question is believed to have purchased in good faith. I am advised that there is no realistic chance of recovering the Berth".
BASIS OF FCO'S APPLICATION
[210] "The Court of Appeal (Banque Bruxelles Lambert SA v Eagle Star Insurance Co Ltd and other appeals [1995] 2 All ER 769, [1995] QB 375) decided that in a case in which the lender would not otherwise have lent (which they called a 'no-transaction' case), he is entitled to recover the difference between the sum which he lent, together with a reasonable rate of interest, and the net sum which he actually got back. The valuer bears the whole risk of a transaction which, but for his negligence, would not have happened. He is therefore liable for all the loss attributable to a fall in the market. They distinguished what they called a 'successful transaction' case, in which the evidence shows that if the lender had been correctly advised, he would still have lent a lesser sum on the same security. In such a case, the lender can recover only the difference between what he has actually lost and what he would have lost if he had lent the lesser amount. Since the fall in the property market is a common element in both the actual and the hypothetical calculations, it does not increase the valuer's liability.
The valuers appeal. They say that a valuer provides an estimate of the value of the property at the date of the valuation. He does not undertake the role of a prophet. It is unfair that merely because for one reason or other the lender would not otherwise have lent, the valuer should be saddled with the whole risk of the transaction, including a subsequent fall in the value of the property.
Much of the discussion, both in the judgment of the Court of Appeal and in argument at the Bar, has assumed that the case is about the correct measure of damages for the loss which the lender has suffered. The Court of Appeal ([1995] 2 All ER 769 at 838, [1995] QB 375 at 401–402) began its judgment with the citation of three well-known cases, Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Exch 850 at 855, [1843–60] All ER Rep 383 at 385, Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25 at 39 and British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co Ltd v Underground Electric Rlys Co of London Ltd [1912] AC 673 at 688–689, [1911–13] All ER Rep 63 at 69, stating the principle that where an injury is to be compensated by damages, the damages should be as nearly as possible the sum which would put the plaintiff in the position [211] in which he would have been if he had not been injured. It described this principle as 'the necessary point of departure' (see [1995] 2 All ER 769 at 839, [1995] QB 375 at 403).
I think that this was the wrong place to begin. Before one can consider the principle on which one should calculate the damages to which a plaintiff is entitled as compensation for loss, it is necessary to decide for what kind of loss he is entitled to compensation. A correct description of the loss for which the valuer is liable must precede any consideration of the measure of damages. For this purpose it is better to begin at the beginning and consider the lender's cause of action.
The lender sues on a contract under which the valuer, in return for a fee, undertakes to provide him with certain information. Precisely what information he has to provide depends, of course, upon the terms of the individual contract. There is some dispute on this point in respect of two of the appeals, to which I shall have to return. But there is one common element which everyone accepts. In each case the valuer was required to provide an estimate of the price which the property might reasonably be expected to fetch if sold in the open market at the date of the valuation.
There is again agreement on the purpose for which the information was provided. It was to form part of the material on which the lender was to decide whether, and if so how much, he would lend. The valuation tells the lender how much, at current values, he is likely to recover if he has to resort to his security. This enables him to decide what margin, if any, an advance of a given amount will allow for: a fall in the market; reasonably foreseeable variance from the figure put forward by the valuer (a valuation is an estimate of the most probable figure which the property will fetch, not a prediction that it will fetch precisely that figure); accidental damage to the property and any other of the contingencies which may happen. The valuer will know that if he overestimates the value of the property, the lender's margin for all these purposes will be correspondingly less.
On the other hand, the valuer will not ordinarily be privy to the other considerations which the lender may take into account, such as how much money he has available, how much the borrower needs to borrow, the strength of his covenant, the attraction of the rate of interest, or the other personal or commercial considerations which may induce the lender to lend.
Because the valuer will appreciate that his valuation, though not the only consideration which would influence the lender, is likely to be a very important one, the law implies into the contract a term that the valuer will exercise reasonable care and skill. The relationship between the parties also gives rise to a concurrent duty in tort (see Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, Hallam-Eames v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, Hughes v Merrett Syndicates Ltd, Arbuthnott v Feltrim Underwriting Agencies Ltd, Deeny v Gooda Walker Ltd (in liq) [1994] 3 All ER 506, [1995] 2 AC 145). But the scope of the duty in tort is the same as in contract.
A duty of care such as the valuer owes does not, however, exist in the abstract. A plaintiff who sues for breach of a duty imposed by the law (whether in contract or tort or under statute) must do more than prove that the defendant has failed to comply. He must show that the duty was owed to him and that it was a duty in respect of the kind of loss which he has suffered. Both of these requirements are illustrated by Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 1 All ER 568, [1990] 2 AC 605. The auditors' failure to use reasonable care in auditing the company's statutory accounts was a breach of their duty [212] of care. But they were not liable to an outside take-over bidder because the duty was not owed to him. Nor were they liable to shareholders who had bought more shares in reliance on the accounts because, although they were owed a duty of care, it was in their capacity as members of the company and not in the capacity (which they shared with everyone else) of potential buyers of its shares. Accordingly, the duty which they were owed was not in respect of loss which they might suffer by buying its shares. As Lord Bridge of Harwich said ([1990] 1 All ER 568 at 581, [1990] 2 AC 605 at 627):
'It is never sufficient to ask simply whether A owes B a duty of care. It is always necessary to determine the scope of the duty by reference to the kind of damage from which A must take care to save B harmless.'
In the present case, there is no dispute that the duty was owed to the lenders. The real question in this case is the kind of loss in respect of which the duty was owed.
How is the scope of the duty determined? In the case of a statutory duty, the question is answered by deducing the purpose of the duty from the language and context of the statute (see Gorris v Scott (1874) LR 9 Exch 125). In the case of tort, it will similarly depend upon the purpose of the rule imposing the duty. Most of the judgments in Caparo are occupied in examining the Companies Act 1985 to ascertain the purpose of the auditor's duty to take care that the statutory accounts comply with the Act. In the case of an implied contractual duty, the nature and extent of the liability is defined by the term which the law implies. As in the case of any implied term, the process is one of construction of the agreement as a whole in its commercial setting. The contractual duty to provide a valuation and the known purpose of that valuation compel the conclusion that the contract includes a duty of care. The scope of the duty, in the sense of the consequences for which the valuer is responsible, is that which the law regards as best giving effect to the express obligations assumed by the valuer: neither cutting them down so that the lender obtains less than he was reasonably entitled to expect, nor extending them so as to impose on the valuer a liability greater than he could reasonably have thought he was undertaking.
What therefore should be the extent of the valuer's liability? The Court of Appeal said that he should be liable for the loss which would not have occurred if he had given the correct advice. The lender having, in reliance on the valuation, embarked upon a transaction which he would not otherwise have undertaken, the valuer should bear all the risks of that transaction, subject only to the limitation that the damage should have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties.
There is no reason in principle why the law should not penalise wrongful conduct by shifting on to the wrongdoer the whole risk of consequences which would not have happened but for the wrongful act. Hart and Honoré Causation in the Law (2nd edn, 1985) p 120 say that it would, for example, be perfectly intelligible to have a rule by which an unlicensed driver was responsible for all the consequences of his having driven, even if they were unconnected with his not having a licence. One might adopt such a rule in the interests of deterring unlicensed driving.
[213] But that is not the normal rule. One may compare, for example, Western Steamship Co Ltd v NV Konninklijke Rotterdamsche Lloyd, The Empire Jamaica [1955] 3 All ER 60 at 61, [1955] P 259 at 264 per Evershed MR, in which a collision was caused by a 'blunder in seamanship of … a somewhat serious and startling character' by an uncertificated second mate. Although the owners knew that the mate was not certificated and it was certainly the case that the collision would not have happened if he had not been employed, it was held in limitation proceedings that the damage took place without the employers' 'actual fault or privity' because the mate was in fact experienced and (subject to this one aberration) competent (see [1955] 3 All ER 60 at 69, [1955] P 259 at 271). The collision was not, therefore, attributable to his not having a certificate. The owners were not treated as responsible for all the consequences of having employed an uncertificated mate, but only for the consequences of his having been uncertificated.
Rules which make the wrongdoer liable for all the consequences of his wrongful conduct are exceptional and need to be justified by some special policy. Normally the law limits liability to those consequences which are attributable to that which made the act wrongful. In the case of liability in negligence for providing inaccurate information, this would mean liability for the consequences of the information being inaccurate.
I can illustrate the difference between the ordinary principle and that adopted by the Court of Appeal by an example. A mountaineer about to undertake a difficult climb is concerned about the fitness of his knee. He goes to a doctor who negligently makes a superficial examination and pronounces the knee fit. The climber goes on the expedition, which he would not have undertaken if the doctor had told him the true state of his knee. He suffers an injury which is an entirely foreseeable consequence of mountaineering, but has nothing to do with his knee.
On the Court of Appeal's principle, the doctor is responsible for the injury suffered by the mountaineer because it is damage which would not have occurred if he had been given correct information about his knee. He would not have gone on the expedition and would have suffered no injury. On what I have suggested is the more usual principle, the doctor is not liable. The injury has not been caused by the doctor's bad advice, because it would have occurred even if the advice had been correct.
The Court of Appeal summarily rejected the application of the latter principle to the present case, saying ([1995] 2 All ER 769 at 840, [1995] QB 375 at 404):
'The complaint made and upheld against the valuers in these cases is … not that they were wrong. A professional opinion may be wrong without being negligent. The complaint in each case is that the valuer expressed an opinion that the land was worth more than any careful and competent valuer would have advised.'
I find this reasoning unsatisfactory. It seems to be saying that the valuer's liability should be restricted to the consequences of the valuation being wrong if he had warranted that it was correct, but not if he had only promised to use reasonable care to see that it was correct. There are, of course, differences between the measure of damages for breach of warranty and for injury caused by negligence, to which I shall return. In the case of liability for providing inaccurate information, however, it would seem
[214] paradoxical that the liability of a person who warranted the accuracy of the information should be less than that of a person who gave no such warranty but failed to take reasonable care.
Your Lordships might, I would suggest, think that there was something wrong with a principle which, in the example which I have given, produced the result that the doctor was liable. What is the reason for this feeling? I think that the Court of Appeal's principle offends common sense because it makes the doctor responsible for consequences which, though in general terms foreseeable, do not appear to have a sufficient causal connection with the subject matter of the duty. The doctor was asked for information on only one of the considerations which might affect the safety of the mountaineer on the expedition. There seems no reason of policy which requires that the negligence of the doctor should require the transfer to him of all the foreseeable risks of the expedition.
I think that one can to some extent generalise the principle upon which this response depends. It is that a person under a duty to take reasonable care to provide information on which someone else will decide upon a course of action is, if negligent, not generally regarded as responsible for all the consequences of that course of action. He is responsible only for the consequences of the information being wrong. A duty of care which imposes upon the informant responsibility for losses which would have occurred even if the information which he gave had been correct is not in my view fair and reasonable as between the parties. It is therefore inappropriate either as an implied term of a contract or as a tortious duty arising from the relationship between them.
The principle thus stated distinguishes between a duty to provide information for the purpose of enabling someone else to decide upon a course of action and a duty to advise someone as to what course of action he should take. If the duty is to advise whether or not a course of action should be taken, the adviser must take reasonable care to consider all the potential consequences of that course of action. If he is negligent, he will therefore be responsible for all the foreseeable loss which is a consequence of that course of action having been taken. If his duty is only to supply information, he must take reasonable care to ensure that the information is correct and if he is negligent, will be responsible for all the foreseeable consequences of the information being wrong.
I think that this principle is implicit in the decision of this House in Banque Financière de la Cité SA v Westgate Insurance Co Ltd sub nom Banque Keyser Ullmann SA v Skandial (UK) Insurance Co Ltd [1990] 2 All ER 947, [1991] 2 AC 249. Some banks had lent a large sum of money on the security of, first, property which the borrower had represented to be valuable, and, secondly, insurance policies against any shortfall on the realisation of the property. When the borrower turned out to be a swindler and the property worthless, the insurers relied upon a fraud exception in the policies to repudiate liability. The banks discovered that the agent of their broker who had placed the insurance had, by an altogether separate fraud, issued cover notes in respect of non-existent policies for part of the risk. This had come to the knowledge of one of the insurers before a substantial part of the advances had been made. The banks claimed that the insurers were under a duty of good faith to disclose this information and that, if [215] they had done so, the banks would have so distrusted the brokers that they would have made no advance and therefore suffered no loss.
Lord Templeman (with whom all the other members of the House agreed) dealt with the matter in terms of causation. He said that assuming a duty to disclose the information existed, the breach of that duty did not cause the loss. The failure to inform the lenders of the broker's fraud induced them to think that valid policies were in place. But even if this had been true, the loss would still have happened. The insurers would still have been entitled to repudiate the policies under the fraud exception.
Lord Templeman could only have dealt with the case in this way if he thought it went without saying that the insurers' duty to provide information made them liable, not for all loss which would not have been suffered if the information had been given, but only for loss caused by the lender having lent on a false basis, namely, in the belief that insurance policies had been effected. If that had not been the principle which the House was applying, the discussion of whether the non-existence of the policies had caused the loss would have been irrelevant. I respectfully think that the underlying principle was right and that it is decisive of this case. The Court of Appeal distinguished Banque Financière de la Cité on the ground that the insurers could not have foreseen the borrower's fraud. No doubt this is true: it shows that the rule that damages are limited to what was within the reasonable contemplation of the parties, can sometimes make arguments over the scope of the duty academic. But I do not think it was the way the House actually decided the case. Lord Templeman's speech puts the matter firmly on the ground of causation and the analysis makes sense only on the footing that he was concerned with the consequences to the lenders of having lent without knowing the true facts, rather than with what would have been the consequences of disclosure.
The principle that a person providing information upon which another will rely in choosing a course of action is responsible only for the consequences of the information being wrong is not without exceptions. This is not the occasion upon which to attempt a list, but fraud is commonly thought to be one. In Doyle v Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd [1969] 2 All ER 119 at 122, [1969] 2 QB 158 at 167 Lord Denning MR said:
"The defendant is bound to make reparation for all the actual damage directly flowing from the fraudulent inducement. The person who has been defrauded is entitled to say: "I would not have entered into this bargain at all but for your representation …"
Such an exception, by which the whole risk of loss which would not have been suffered if the plaintiff had not been fraudulently induced to enter into the transaction is transferred to the defendant, would be justifiable both as a deterrent against fraud and on the ground that damages for fraud are frequently a restitutionary remedy.
The question of liability for fraud does not arise in this case, and I therefore confine myself to two observations. The first is that although I have said that fraud is commonly thought to be an exception, Hobhouse LJ seems to have expressed a contrary view in the recent case of Downs v Chappell [1996] 3 All ER 344 at 362, when he said that the damages recoverable for fraudulent misrepresentation should not be greater than [216] the loss which would have been suffered 'had the represented, or supposed, state of affairs actually existed'. In other words, the defendant should not be liable for loss which would have been a consequence of the transaction even if the representation had been true. This, as I have said, is what I conceive to be in accordance with the normal principle of liability for wrongful acts. But liability for fraud, or under s 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act 1967, for a negligent misrepresentation inducing a contract with the representor, has usually been thought to extend to all loss suffered in consequence of having entered into the transaction. We have received written representations on Downs v Chappell, which was decided after the conclusion of the oral argument, but since the issue in that case is not before the House, I prefer not to express any concluded view.
My second observation is that, even if the maker of the fraudulent misrepresentation is liable for all the consequences of the plaintiff having entered into the transaction, the identification of those consequences may involve difficult questions of causation. The defendant is clearly not liable for losses which the plaintiff would have suffered even if he had not entered into the transaction or for losses attributable to causes which negative the causal effect of the misrepresentation.
The measure of damages in an action for breach of a duty to take care to provide accurate information must also be distinguished from the measure of damages for breach of a warranty that the information is accurate. In the case of breach of a duty of care, the measure of damages is the loss attributable to the inaccuracy of the information which the plaintiff has suffered by reason of having entered into the transaction on the assumption that the information was correct. One therefore compares the loss he has actually suffered, with what his position would have been if he had not entered into the transaction and asks what element of this loss is attributable to the inaccuracy of the information. In the case of a warranty, one compares the plaintiff's position as a result of entering into the transaction with what it would have been if the information had been accurate. Both measures are concerned with the consequences of the inaccuracy of the information, but the tort measure is the extent to which the plaintiff is worse off because the information was wrong, whereas the warranty measure is the extent to which he would have been better off if the information had been right."
"Also reasonably straightforward is Lord Hoffman's illustration in SAAMCO now cited, it seems, upon every conceivable occasion, of the man who would not have gone mountaineering had he been properly advised by his doctor of a weak knee. It is not going to be part of the duty of the doctor to protect the man from accidents unrelated to the condition of his knee. If, on the other hand, the accident, or any other accident, is attributed to the knee and happens in the course of an activity in which the man would not have engaged but for the doctors's advice, this would fall within the scope of the duty. But cases can be difficult to resolve as to the scope of the duty, as is shown by the opposing views often taken of a case by the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal and the court of first instance. Contrasts abound. "
"If his duty is only to supply information he must take reasonable care to ensure that the information is correct and if he is negligent he will be responsible for all the foreseeable consequences of the information being wrong".
THE PRESENT APPLICATION