QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMIRALTY COURT
B e f o r e :
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RAMON C SANTOS | Claimant | |
and | ||
(1) OWNERS AND/OR DEMISE CHARTERERS OF THE | ||
SHIP OR VESSEL “BALTIC CARRIER” | ||
(2) THE OWNERS AND/OR DEMISE CHARTERERS OF | ||
THE SHIP OR VESSEL “FLINTERDAM” | Defendants |
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Crown Copyright ©
Limitation of time – Collision – Personal injury to claimant – Whether reasonable opportunity for arrest - Second claim form issued after expiry of time limit – Whether reasonable steps taken to serve first claim form – Whether prompt application - CPR Part 7.6 – Merchant Shipping Act 1995 s. 190
Mr Justice David Steel:
Background
“We therefore assume that you acknowledge this claim is time barred against our members and that you will return the club letter of undertaking issued on the 28th June 2001.”
“My firm did not receive advance notification as to the arrival of Flinterdam which in fact arrived a Fowey on 17th August 1999...”
(5) Any Court having jurisdiction in such proceedings may, in accordance with Rules of Court, extend the period allowed for bringing proceedings to such extent and on such conditions as it thinks fit.
(6) Any such Court, if satisfied there has not been during any period allowed for bringing proceedings any reasonable opportunity for arresting the defendant’s ship within –
(a) The jurisdiction of the Court, or
(b) The territorial sea of the country to which the plaintiff’s ship belongs or in which the plaintiff resides or has his principal place of business which are material:-
shall extend the period allowed for bringing proceedings to an extent sufficient to give a reasonable opportunity of so arresting the ship”.
Extension pursuant to Merchant Shipping Act 1995
` “(1). The Claimant may apply for an order extending the period within which the claim form may be served.
(2) The general rule is that an Application to extend the time for service must be made,
(a) within the period for serving the claim forms specified by Rule 7.5 or
(b) where an order has been made under this rule within the period for service specified by that order.
(3). If the Claimant applies for an order to extend time for service of the claim form after the end of the period specified by Rule 7.5 or by an order made by this Rule, the Court may make such an order only if:-
(a)….
(b)The Claimant had taken all reasonable steps to serve the claim form but has been unable to do so and,
(c)In either case the Claimant has acted promptly in making the Application.
“I would suggest that if the vessel had been on watch service in August 1999, we would not have informed you the vessel was even bound for Fowey until at least August 24/25....”.
“The standard procedure in respect of the listings forwarded is that the previous days callings at the port are collated and are forwarded to this office by fax the next day following. Depending on the actual time of receipt here, the advice, having been logged, and checked for legibility etc., and then passed through to the individual analyst for validation, the expectation would generally be that said message would be processed (i.e. on the database) within 24 hours of receipt although it has to be stressed this is not always achieved. In relation to the date specified (August 1999), there is no way I can guarantee this would have been the case in this particular instance.”
“In my experience the placing of a vessel on ship-watch is only one of the steps that a competent Admiralty Solicitor is reasonably required to take in order to ensure that an opportunity to serve proceedings on a vessel is not missed. In the circumstances of the present case I would have expected a reasonably competent Shipping Solicitor to place the vessel on a world-wide search and kept a very close eye on the vessel’s movements particular given that proceeding had already been served on the Baltic Carrier on the 8th June 1999, and there was as Mr Kushner states in paragraph 14 of his first Affirmation an intention to pursue the claim as against both vessels. By closely tracking the vessel with the assistance of a world-wide search it would have been possible to monitor the vessel’s trading patterns and to anticipate her likely destination port. If the search revealed that the vessel was at a French port I would have expected a competent solicitor to anticipate the possibility that she was subsequently call at a port in England and Wales. That possibility would be increased if the vessel was in a port such as Le Havre from which vessels often sail to ports in England.”
i. Although the limitation period had expired some three months earlier, the validity of the first claim form had only expired some three weeks earlier.
ii. Further the court has always treated the principles applicable to renewal and extension in circumstances of the lack of practicable opportunity for an arrest as the same.
iii. If an application to renew the first claim form had been made in place of the issuance of the second claim form, such application would (and I do not that the contrary was contended) have been fairly categorised as promptly made.
Conclusion
i. Whilst strictly speaking the owners of Flinterdam are being deprived of the advantage of the time bar, it must be borne in mind throughout that there was no reasonable opportunity for service or arrest until the visit to the River Usk in June.
ii It remains notable as already recorded that following the arrest of Flinterdam on 28th June, the North of England P & I Association were no more alert to the implications of the 2 year time limit than had been the Claimants and their solicitors. Once the point was taken by the North of England on 7th July, the Application to extend the earlier claim form was duly issued some 5 days later.
iii. The attempt to avoid the vulnerability of an application to renew the existing claim form for failure to act during the visit of Flinterdam to Fowey in August has in fact not afforded any advantage to the Claimant because that very issue has arisen in the context of the second claim form.
iv. I have not forgotten that the claimant is still in a position to proceed against the carrying vessel Baltic Carrier. But it seems almost inevitable that Baltic Carrier if found liable to the claimant will seek to make a recovery from the owners of Flinterdam for an appropriate contribution by reference to the fault of Flinterdam (sole responsibility for a collision between 2 vessels underway being very much an exception rather than the rule). Thus avoidance of proceedings brought by the Claimant from the Defendants’ point of view would not necessarily result in the avoidance of proceedings arising out of a collision altogether