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England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Sztakowski v Regional Court in Wlcoclawek (Poland) (Re Consequential Matters) [2025] EWHC 1199 (Admin) (16 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2025/1199.html
Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1199 (Admin)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1199 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2024-LON-001059

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
16/05/2025

B e f o r e :

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE SWEETING
____________________

Between:
Karol SZTAKOWSKI
Appellant
- and –

Regional Court in WLCOCLAWEK (Poland)
Respondent

____________________

John Howey (instructed by JFH Law) for the Appellant
Kiera Oluwunmi (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondent

Hearing dates: 27th March 2025

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED CONSEQUENTIAL JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    This judgment was handed down remotely at 11am on 16.05.2025 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
    .............................

    Mr Justice Sweeting:

    Introduction

  1. This is my ruling on an application made on behalf of the Appellant, Mr Karol Sztakowski, subsequent to the delivery of my judgment in his appeal against an order for his extradition to Poland. The appeal was heard on 27th March 2025 and judgment, dismissing the appeal, was handed down on 30th April 2025. He now seeks an order that the published version of that judgment should withhold his identity and that of members of his family.
  2. Factual Background

  3. The underlying appeal concerned the decision of a District Judge at the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court on 21st March 2024 to order the Appellant's extradition to Poland. The principal ground of appeal advanced on behalf of the Appellant focused upon the potential impact of extradition on his children. The submissions made detailed the personal difficulties experienced by the children, both prior to the commencement of proceedings and, it was contended, as a result of them. It is submitted that were the nature of the material before the court to become widely known, particularly to those acquainted with the Appellant's daughters, it would likely cause them distress and embarrassment, particularly the two older daughters. Although the eldest is now 18, it was submitted she remains entitled to protection due to the "highly personal nature of the information contained within the Judgment". Similarly, information concerning the Appellant's younger daughter, although less detailed regarding recent developments, is also described as highly personal.
  4. The Application

  5. The application does not seek a formal order prohibiting the identification of the Appellant or his family members more generally. Rather, it seeks an order specifically directing that the publication of my judgment should be in a form that withholds their names from the public due to the "highly personal nature of the information contained within the Judgment". It is further submitted that there has been no press interest in this case, and none is anticipated, and that there is no public interest in the specific personal details concerning the children being made public. It is suggested that the Appellant and his family be referred to by their initials only, and that there should be further redactions of identifying details such as dates of birth.
  6. The Law

  7. It is well-established that the High Court, when hearing a statutory appeal against an extradition order, possesses the power to make orders to prevent an unjustified interference with a person's rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"). In considering whether to impose reporting restrictions or to order anonymisation, the court must also bear in mind Article 10 ECHR and section 12 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which protect freedom of expression and the principle of open justice. This power and the balancing exercise have been recognised since at least HH v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa and others [2012] UKSC 25, where the Supreme Court implicitly recognised the practice of anonymisation in cases involving children, anonymising appellants who raised issues regarding children in their extradition challenges.
  8. The principle of open justice is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice. It is a cornerstone of English law that justice should be administered in public. This principle applies with particular importance in the area of the extradition of those accused or convicted of crime.
  9. Derogations from open justice must be exceptional. In In re Press Association [2013] 1 WLR 1979, it was held that reporting restrictions preventing the identification of a person accused of crimes should only be imposed in "exceptional circumstances". The Divisional Court in Short v Falkland Islands [2020] EWHC 439 (Admin); 4 WLR 68 ("Short") took a "similar approach in relation to extradition proceedings", holding that the policy requiring identification of criminal defendants, save in very exceptional circumstances, "must be taken to apply with equal force to those sought for extradition to face criminal charges".
  10. While the specific "exceptional circumstances" identified in In Re Press Association (peril to life/safety or significant threat to the administration of justice) may not be necessary when the application is solely to withhold identity in the published judgment, as opposed to a general prohibition on reporting, the threshold remains high. As Lane J observed in BM v Republic of Ireland (No .2) [2020] EWHC 648 (Admin); 4 WLR 70 ("BM"), echoing the approach in Short, a "very good case indeed will need to be made" for a person sought for extradition to avoid being named in a judgment. The mere existence of children is unlikely to be sufficient to justify anonymisation of such an appellant.
  11. In relation to children, the court in Short recognised their vulnerability due to youth and potential medical conditions and noted that both parties in that case supported continuing anonymity. However, the court ultimately declined to continue the order, noting that the material concerning the children was relevant to the Article 8 assessment and was "the kind of material routinely referred to in extradition cases where no reporting restrictions are imposed". The court did, however, invite the press to consider whether reporting the children's names was necessary or in the public interest. In BM, Lane J found that the circumstances of the appellant's daughter, who suffered from a life-limiting and devastating genetic condition requiring detailed and intimate disclosure in the judgment, did constitute such a case where withholding the appellant's name from the judgment was appropriate to prevent serious infringement of the child's Article 8 rights. He considered this to be a case where anonymisation of the appellant was justified, despite the general position stated in Short.
  12. Any order that derogates from the principle of open justice must be strictly necessary to secure the proper administration of justice and requires clear justification. The party seeking such a restriction bears the burden of establishing that it is necessary on the basis of clear and cogent evidence.
  13. Discussion

  14. The application before me is made following the handing down of my judgment dismissing the appeal. While the practice of considering anonymisation in the context of judgment publication post-delivery is recognised, as seen in BM, the fact that the judgment has been finalised and handed down adds weight to the presumption that it should be publicly accessible in its full form, including the names of the parties involved. No application for anonymisation was made at the hearing of the appeal, nor was the matter raised in connection with the District Judge's decision.
  15. I accept that the judgment necessarily refers to sensitive and personal information concerning the Appellant's daughters and the difficulties they have experienced. I also accept that publication of these details could cause some distress and embarrassment, particularly to the two older daughters. This mirrors, albeit perhaps less extreme than the circumstances in BM, the type of sensitive material considered in Short.
  16. However, applying the principles derived from Short and BM, the information concerning the children's circumstances, while sensitive, is, as described in Short, "the kind of material routinely referred to in extradition cases where no reporting restrictions are imposed". While the court retains the power to make an order under Article 8, BM confirms that a "very good case indeed" must be made out for anonymising an appellant, and Short states that the mere fact that children are mentioned and their circumstances considered is unlikely to be sufficient. If it were otherwise, then the common features of many Article 8 challenges to extradition by reference to family life would routinely lead to anonymisation; contrary to existing practice.
  17. The circumstances in this case, while undoubtedly difficult for the children, do not appear to me to reach the level of exceptionality found in BM, where the child suffered from a devastating and life-limiting condition necessitating disclosure of highly intimate details. The information referred to in my judgment in summary form only, whilst sensitive, falls within the ambit of material routinely considered in Article 8 assessments in extradition cases.
  18. Furthermore, the timing of this application, being made after the judgment has been handed down, reinforces the strong principle of open justice. The judgment stands as a public record of the court's determination. To alter it at this stage to withhold the identity of the Appellant and his family would require a clear and convincing demonstration of necessity to protect the Article 8 rights of the children, sufficient to overcome the significant public interest in access to the full, unamended judgment. The burden is on the applicant to show that anonymisation is strictly necessary.
  19. Having reviewed the material presented and the principles established in the relevant case law, I am not satisfied that the circumstances, whilst undoubtedly attracting sympathy, are so exceptional as to justify a departure from the fundamental principle of open justice by anonymising the Appellant and his family in the published judgment. The potential distress and embarrassment, while real, do not, in my judgment, meet the high threshold required to override the public interest in the transparency of court proceedings and judgments, particularly given the nature of the information, routine in this class of case, and the fact that the application is made post-judgment.
  20. Conclusion

  21. For the reasons given above, I am not persuaded that the circumstances of this case warrant anonymisation of the Appellant or his family in the published judgment. The application is therefore refused.
  22. END

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