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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions >> Modi v Government of India [2025] EWHC 1192 (Admin) (15 May 2025)
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Cite as: [2025] EWHC 1192 (Admin)

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Neutral Citation Number: [2025] EWHC 1192 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2025-LON-000883

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
SITTING IN LONDON

15th May 2025

B e f o r e :

FORDHAM J
____________________

Between:
NIRAV DEEPAK MODI
Applicant
- and -

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
Respondent

____________________

Edward Fitzgerald KC (instructed by Boutique Law LLP) for the Applicant
Nicholas Hearn (instructed by CPS) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 15.5.25
Judgment as delivered in open court at the hearing

____________________

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

    FORDHAM J
    Note: This judgment was produced and approved by the Judge, after authorising the use by the Court of voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment.

    FORDHAM J:

    Introduction

  1. This is a bail application in extradition proceedings. The requesting state, who has throughout been seeking the Applicant's extradition, is the Government of India. Those endeavours, from its perspective, go back to two accusation Extradition Requests in July and August 2018. Extradition was in due course ordered by the Secretary of State in April 2021. That was following a judgment of DJ Goozee in the Westminster Magistrates' Court. That judgment addressed the various contested issues as to whether there was any legal basis on which the Applicant could resist extradition. Mr Fitzgerald KC (who appears for the Applicant) tells me that the oral hearing which led to that February 2021 judgment took place in November 2020. The judge found that there were no legal bars on extradition and what ensued were appeal proceedings in this Court. They culminated in two judgments, the references for which were given in open court today. The judgment of Chamberlain J was on 9 August 2021, dismissing as unarguable a number of legal points: see [2021] EWHC 2257 (Admin). The judgment of the Divisional Court was on 9 November 2022, dismissing the remaining legal points: see [2022] EWHC 2829 (Admin). Those two judgments and two others provide a lot of information, including about the background and extradition context to this case. The two other judgements were both also in this Court. They were both bail judgments. The first was on 12 June 2019, handed down by the then Simler J: see [2019] EWHC 1933 (Admin). The second was on 5 March 2020, handed down by Dove J: see [2020] EWHC 1777 (Admin).
  2. The Divisional Court judgment had given a lot of information relating to the Applicant's mental health. I raised, at the start of today's hearing, a question – which had been raised in the papers – about whether there was any need for protective arrangements restricting what could be ventilated in this public hearing or reported about this case. In the end, those concerns were not maintained by the Applicant's legal team. Everything which has been raised in open court is reportable. So are the contents of the skeleton arguments. So are the contents of this judgment.
  3. A Confidential Impediment

  4. The Respondent's Skeleton Argument describes the reasons, so far as they could be ascertained, why the Applicant has not in fact yet been surrendered to the Government of India, so as to face trial in India, in the light of the April 2021 order for his extradition. The position – as Mr Fitzgerald KC read out in open court – is this. There is a "legal reason" which relates to "confidential proceedings". The nature of this is known to the Applicant, and to his lawyers. It is known to the Home Office. But, apart from what I have recorded, nothing is known by the CPS or by the Government of India. Nor by this Court. During the course of dealing with a previous application by the Applicant for bail, which was in the event withdrawn, Swift J (in July 2024) raised questions to the parties, to explore what the Court could be told about all of this. The Applicant's position was firmly adopted, in response, that any further information was "confidential". It "could not be disclosed", either to the CPS or to the Court.
  5. Mr Hearn (who appears for the Government of India) has confirmed that he recognises and respects (i) the fact of the existing confidential impediment and (ii) the fact of its confidentiality (for whatever reason it is being kept confidential). It is appropriate, in the circumstances, that the Court should proceed with the same recognition and respect. But the consequence is this. There is, as a result, a significant limitation to what this Court can realistically assess, when considering the risks and implications in this case, and for that matter when considering how to characterise the now long passage of time.
  6. Due Diligence

  7. In the course of the exchanges with the Court in July 2024 this point was specifically confirmed by the Applicant's legal representatives: they were making no allegation that there has in this case been any delay on the part of the Government of India in respect of the surrender of the Applicant. One of the consequences of that – as I put to Mr Fitzgerald KC and which he accepted, rightly in my judgment – is that this is not a case in which there could be any want of "due diligence" in the pursuit of the extradition by the Requesting State. I record that, because it links to one part of the body of legal protection relating to detention which arises in the different – but, says Mr Fitzgerald KC, sufficiently analogous – area of immigration detention and deportation. I am referring to the "Hardial Singh Principles".
  8. Length of Detention

  9. The Applicant has been in detention on extradition remand since his arrest on 19 March 2019. He was at HMP Wandsworth until September 2023; and since then at HMP Thameside. That, as Mr Fitzgerald KC emphasises and I recognise, is that the very significant period of now 6 years 2 months. Moreover, by virtue of the law of extradition, it is a length period which would automatically count as "time served" were the Applicant to be extradited, tried, convicted and sentenced in relation to the matters of which he is accused. I should emphasise that the Applicant maintains his innocence in relation to all of the accusations which underpin the extradition proceedings.
  10. Materials

  11. The Court has been assisted by a considerable volume of factual and legal material; and by the written and oral submissions the advocates. I am not going to go through every item of evidence that has been canvassed. But I record that I have considered the entirety of the body of material.
  12. Bail Conditions

  13. Proposed bail conditions have been put forward in support of this application. They include a proposed condition to live and sleep at an address in London N1; and to be tagged with a location tag. I am told, and accept, that this could be a "combination location tag", which would act both for conventional home detention "curfew" and as a "trail" tag allowing constant observation. What is proposed is a 24 hour home detention curfew, with the suggestion of allowing a four-hour daily period of time out of the home, for identifiable and benign purposes. It has been made clear that the Applicant would accept, if justified in the view of the Court, a full 24 hour curfew at home. There is the proposed provision of pre-release security of £550,000. That is £50,000 of which arising from family and friends, identified in the papers, and who have put forward witness statement evidence. There is also £500,000 from a company called Diamond Holdings Limited. In addition to the pre-release security there are three proposed sureties, in the aggregate sum of £18,000. Then there are proposed conditions relating to mobile phones, travel documents, and the retention of a passport. I accept, so far as the relevant security and surety individuals are concerned, that – on the face of the evidence – that sums are put forward which are meaningful and which individuals could ill afford to forfeit. I am not making findings of fact. I am in no position to make findings of fact. Rather, I am undertaking an objective assessment of risk, on the basis of the materials put forward and the points made by the advocates.
  14. Afresh and Up to Date

  15. I entirely accept, as does Mr Hearn, the legal appropriateness of this Court considering the question of bail "afresh", for itself, and with a clean slate. I do so, uninfluenced by the number of previous bail decisions or previously expressed views (except to the extent that I happen to agree with them). I also accept, as does Mr Hearn, the admissibility and relevance of "fresh evidence" that has been put before the Court. It is entirely right that the Court should have the most up-to-date picture that can be made available.
  16. The Presumption in Favour of Bail

  17. The starting-point is that there is a presumption in favour of granting bail, this being an "accusation" case.
  18. Bail Act Grounds

  19. Notwithstanding that presumption, I have concluded – based on an objective assessment of risk – that the grant of bail in this case is not justified. To the contrary, I find that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if released by me on bail on the proposed conditions or any conditions that this Court can properly devise, the Applicant would fail to surrender. That is so, whether (as Mr Hearn has emphasised) it be at a crunch period sometime in the future, or whether it be more immediately and in the meantime. I have also been persuaded by Mr Hearn that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if released on bail conditions, the Applicant would interfere with witnesses. As to that, I record that it is a secondary basis for my decision. The primary basis is the assessment of the risk of absconding. I have not been satisfied that bail conditions would allay the concerns that arise. These are grounds for refusing bail under the Bail Act 1976.
  20. Proportionality

  21. In addition, and independently of those reasons for refusing bail, I find that there is no further or broader consideration which is capable – on assessment – of supporting the grant of conditional bail in this case. Interesting arguments have been raised by Mr Fitzgerald KC about refusal on Bail Act grounds being "permissive" only. He has argued that there is room for a freestanding principle of proportionality, capable of informing the decision on bail, independently of the Bail Act evaluations of risk of absconding and risk of witness-interference. At one point Mr Fitzgerald KC accepted – at least to some extent – this legal logic: that the proportionality and human rights considerations on which he was relying would really serve to focus the Court on the question of "less intrusive measures" to detention. That would really 'loop back' to the Bail Act question of whether bail conditions could satisfactorily deal with the risks of absconding and witness-interference. At other points, Mr Fitzgerald KC advanced the idea of a truly freestanding proportionality principle. He helpfully cited to the Court the passage in the then Whipple J's judgment in Adamescu v Romanian [2019] EWHC 525 (Admin) at §54. Whipple J there made a point about it "no longer being proportionate for bail to be withheld". It is fair to say that she goes on, in the same paragraph, to make a point about risk being "adequately managed for the future" by "stringent conditions". To the extent that those two points were interlinked, they mean proportionality does 'loop back' to the Bail Act grounds.
  22. I am prepared to assume for the purposes of today – in the Applicant's favour – that it is right to consider the freestanding question of the disproportionality or arbitrariness of detention. I cannot accept that there is any direct analogy to executive immigration detention in the context of an immigration deportation or removal. But I have considered Mr Fitzgerald KC's point – which he bases on the immigration detention case of R (Lumba) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 12 [2012] 1 AC 245 at §144 (Lord Dyson) – that "there must come a time when, however grave the risk of absconding … it ceases to be lawful to detain a person pending deportation". Lord Dyson in that passage goes on them to describe the Hardial Singh principles which apply in that area of the law. I have dealt already with any analogous point about the want of "due diligence" in the pursuit of extradition. So far as concerns 'removability within a reasonable time', I do not accept that there is any direct analogy. But in any event, in the circumstances of the present case, I am quite unable to accept a submission based on that legal idea. It has been said on the Applicant's behalf that, realistically, in the light of the confidential legal impediment and the length of time which has already endured, it is not foreseeable that extradition could take place at any time in the foreseeable future. That is an assertion. Even if, from the perspective of the Applicant's legal representatives it is put forward from an informed position, I am simply unable to explore it or evaluate it. That is because of the circumstances in which I have invisibility in relation to the "confidential" impediment. That leaves the proportionality aspects of this case which relate to the human cost of detention, to which I will return.
  23. The Incentive to Abscond

  24. The first topic which is of great significance relates to the strength of the incentive which, in my assessment, the Applicant has and would have – if released on bail – to seek to avoid any return to India, by any means available to him. Objectively, that incentive and its strength arise from these facts: that he is wanted to face trial in India, for matters of very great seriousness and substance relating to allegations of economic crime, in which he is said to have been principal perpetrator. That means, objectively, seriousness in terms of (i) substance (ii) role and (iii) sanction. Having said that, I have adopted some caution in relation to the reference made by Mr Hearn to life imprisonment. That, as I understand it, is a reference to a statutory maximum sentence. It does, however, give an indication so far as seriousness is concerned. I accept, as I have said, that the 6 years and 2 months would count as time served. I accept that, logically, a lengthier period of time already served must serve to reduce the individual's appetite for absconding and the risk of absconding. But the scale of that time served needs to be seen against the context of the gravity and seriousness of the charges. I am not going to go into any detailed description of the allegations at this stage. I have given the citation references for this Court's four earlier judgements, from which the relevant background can be derived.
  25. I accept on the evidence that co-defendants facing trial have been released by the Indian authorities in India, on conditional bail. I accept on the evidence that one of those individuals had an alleged role said to be a leading role, at least of the roles of those within the Indian bank which was the subject of the alleged fraud. I also accept that the passage of time has reduced objectively the scope and risk of interference with witnesses (or with evidence). But I am not able to accept that there are now no substantial grounds so far as that risk is concerned. The Applicant is, on the face of it, imperilled by the prospect of extradition, which he would have a very strong incentive to avoid if possible. He would in my assessment be extremely motivated to seek to achieve that avoidance. He has failed in his legal resistance to extradition. He has failed in his High Court appeal. And one implication of the materials that have been put forward on his behalf, which are said to support risks of ill-treatment at the hands of the Indian authorities after any extradition, is that these would themselves reinforce the Applicant's incentive and resolve, if at all possible, to avoid extradition. I will need to return to what has been said about the case of Bhandari. I am quite satisfied that the correct starting point in this case is the very strong incentive which I have identified.
  26. The UK

  27. I turn to the topic of the United Kingdom as a safe place for the Applicant, and the features put forward which are said to 'anchor' the Applicant to the UK, militating against the suggestion that he would seek to leave. He came to the UK in February 2018. That was at a time when he was under criminal investigation in India. By 16 February 2018 his Indian passport had been suspended. His business associate Mr Patel gives evidence that it was known and understood at that stage that the Applicant was already facing that criminal investigation.
  28. Pausing there, I accept as a point in the Applicant's favour that, on the evidence, there was a 13 month period from February 2018 to his arrest on March 2019. During that period the following were all true: (i) the Applicant knew that he was under criminal investigation in relation to these matters; (ii) he knew that the authorities were likely to be in pursuit of him; (iii) he was not subject of restrictions on his movement (so far as I am aware); (iv) he was at liberty here; and (v) he would be said (on the Respondent's case) to have had access to vast economic resources. And yet he did not leave the UK. He stayed here. Moreover, his then solicitors twice wrote on his behalf offering to cooperate with the authorities as to any arrest or initial step relating to extradition. I do think that point is a strong one. I have needed to identify it, evaluate it, and include it in my overall assessment.
  29. Having said that, and as I have explained, the legal process has – on the face of it – run its course, so far as concerns the Applicant's resistance to extradition. As I have also explained, I cannot evaluate, and therefore give weight to, the extraneous "confidential" impediment to extradition; nor as to whether and how it may operate as an 'anchoring' factor, beyond what I know about the length of time that it has stood as an impediment. I certainly cannot accept the assertion that the Applicant is and will not be extraditable in the foreseeable future.
  30. Michel

  31. Mr Fitzgerald KC submits that this is a case where the sheer passage of time in the UK, on remand in detention, reaches a level of disproportionality. I have described above the points made about freestanding proportionality. But at this point I will deal with a specific and linked submission about "arbitrary" detention. Mr Fitzgerald drew my attention to a 4 March 2021 decision of the UN Human Rights Council's Working Group on Arbitrary Detention. It was Opinion No. 88/2020 concerning Christian James Michel (UAE and India). In that decision there were findings by the Working Group of violations of various human rights whose substantive content evidently matches the substantive rights protected by the Human Rights Act 1998. There was a finding of arbitrary detention, triggering release as a necessary remedy of release. This was an example of a case, relied on in support of the contention that this Court should decide that the duration of detention has reached the point of being arbitrary and disproportionate.
  32. The suggestion that detention has become "arbitrary" in human rights terms is one which, obviously, needs to be taken seriously by me as a judge considering exercising a power of conditional release. I put to Mr Fitzgerald KC this question: if I were to read into the detail of the Working Group's decision in Michel, would I find within that case features which are mirrored in present case? His response was that no, I would not. He accepts that Michel was a decision about arbitrariness in a case involving special and distinct features. I am therefore satisfied that there is no question of a 'read-across' from Michel to the present case. I have not therefore needed to delve further into Michel as a basis on which it can be said that the passage of time in this case has led to a human rights violation, so as to trigger a duty on the part of a bail judge to grant conditional release.
  33. Financial Resources

  34. The next key topic is this. In my judgment, there are very strong objective reasons to consider that the Applicant would be able to access very considerable financial resources, were he released on bail. Mr Fitzgerald KC and the Applicant's legal team have urged that this Court should not make "assumptions" as to this topic. It is a topic which has loomed large in previous decisions about bail. I am not making any "assumption". I am evaluating that there is a basis in the evidence for the strong objective concerns which I have described.
  35. The starting point is the sheer scale of the alleged fraud on the Indian bank (Punjab National Bank). The allegation is that, as the lead perpetrator, the Applicant (acting in conjunction with others) fraudulently induced the bank to issue documents which allowed money then to be withdrawn from foreign banks. The central points put forward on the Applicant's behalf in the earlier extradition proceedings were, as I have understood it, that there was a good and lawful explanation for the transfer of the monies to the relevant entities who received those monies; rather than any denial that the monies were in fact transferred. The amounts alleged to have been transferred, induced by the fraud, come to an aggregate amount (I am told) of 1,015.35 million US dollars. The Courts, in the context of the Applicant's extradition, have on two occasions assessed the underlying evidence being relied on against the Applicant. On each occasion, the court has been satisfied that there is a "prima facie case". The first occasion when the evidence was considered was before Simler J, in June 2019. The second occasion was DJ Goozee evaluating the evidence in February 2021 (a challenge to which was held to be unarguable by Chamberlain J).
  36. The next point is the differential between (a) the sums which were transferred allegedly under the fraud in which the Applicant was key lead perpetrator and (b) the sums which have been located around the world and either frozen or recovered and confiscated. All of this has been assessed in previous judgements. The differential is between (a) the 1,015.35 million US dollars transferred and (b) the 405.75 million US dollars located. That leaves a differential of 600 million US dollars, yet to be found. These feature of the evidence are, in my assessment, an evidenced and objective basis for the strong objective reasons to which I have referred, to consider that the Applicant would be able to access very considerable financial resources.
  37. Diamond Holdings Ltd

  38. At this point, I take one illustration which surfaces from the evidence before the Court on this application for bail. It is an illustration which itself resonates and raises questions about financial resources. It concerns the company that I have already mentioned: Diamond Holdings Ltd. The evidence before the Court is this. A semi-retired accountant called Raj Thakorbhai Patel says he met the Applicant in the UK in February 2018. He says he was aware of the Indian criminal investigation. He says he incorporated Diamond Holdings Ltd in May 2028. He says the company entered an employment relationship with the Applicant as its CEO, in which the Applicant was being paid £20,000 a month. The sole director of the company was Mr Patel. Mr Patel was also the sole shareholder. The questions that start arising relate to the amounts of money that were subsequently being offered as pre-release security in the context of bail applications, by Mr Patel on behalf of the company. On 20 March 2019, £0.5 million was being put forward. Just 9 days later, £1.0m was being put forward. Pausing there, as Mr Hearn points out, that gear-change is itself of relevance when considering the idea put forward at this hearing, that it can be taken that all available means are being committed as security in support of bail. By May 2019, the company was offering £2.0m. By November 2019, it was offering £4m. (The Applicant had been detained from 19 March 2019.) All of those amounts are being said by Mr Patel as being capable of being put forward while leaving the company's position entirely and responsibly financially secure.
  39. I would not want to underestimate the "lucrative" nature of the diamond industry, of which Mr Fitzgerald KC has reminded me. But I do need to be transparent in giving my reasons. That evidential picture about Diamond Holdings Ltd does raise questions. The Court does not have all of the answers, from the materials which have been filed. It may be that all of this is entirely benign. And I should record that my assessment of risk, ultimately, would be the same even absent this illustrative feature. It does, however, raise reinforcing concerns about the Applicant's access to very considerable financial resources.
  40. Depletion

  41. It is said on behalf of the Applicant that he has experienced a "massive depletion of resources". The consequence of that depletion is said to be seen in the far lower pre-release security that Mr Patel, on behalf of Diamond Holdings Ltd, is now putting forward when compared to what was offered previously. What is said is that the reduced offer of pre-release security speaks for itself. It is said to be obvious, from the lower amount, that this is the limit of what the Applicant can offer. It is said to be obvious that this is the limit of his resources. It is said to be obvious that he cannot have any access to any undisclosed funds, for if he did he would be putting it forward as prerelease security. I understand the logic of all that. But there is, in my assessment, another explanation of precisely those same facts. I make no criticism at all of the Applicant's legal representatives and the evidence that they have put forward on his behalf. What I have to assess, objectively, is the picture so far as concerns the prospect of access to financial resources. One clear possibility is this. The very point that is now being made, based on the reduced offer, is what – by design – is intended by the Applicant to be made. And I have to remember that, underlying all of this, are allegations – which have twice been found to have evidential support to the extent of a "prima facie" case – which is all about the Applicant has having been lead perpetrator in the fraud, diversion and concealment of huge sums.
  42. Bhandari

  43. I said earlier that I would return to this case. It is Bhandari v India [2025] EWHC 449 (Admin). It has loomed very large in today's submissions on the Applicant's behalf. Mr Fitzgerald KC has drawn my attention to this recent decision of the Divisional Court. It is a judgment which reaches conclusions leading to the discharge of a requested person, whose extradition the Indian authorities were also seeking under an accusation Extradition Request. He too was wanted ultimately to face trial. The Divisional Court's decision addresses objective evidence about the risk of torture during police interrogation on being sent to India. Mr Fitzgerald KC has made points about the perils and risks of human rights violations which he says are faced by the Applicant, so far as any return to India is concerned. He reinforces those points by his citation of Bhandari and other materials. He also refers to evidence supporting allegations of extra-territorial arrest and kidnapping (see Bhandari at 112(x) and (xi)), and even alleged extra-territorial killings in the US and Canada. He says these are evidential support for concerns on the part of the Applicant relating to the prospect of treatment at the hands of the Indian authorities.
  44. What has emerged as Mr Fitzgerald KC's main point on Bhandari is this. He says Bhandari is a decision of the Court which provides new "light of the end of the tunnel", so far as the Applicant is concerned. He says it is a case which would give rise to new optimism on the Applicant's behalf, that by relying on the legal protections of human rights as enforced in the UK, the Applicant – through his lawyers – will be able to persuade the Court that the same conclusion should now arise in the present case as arose in Bhandari: ie. discharge from extradition. Mr Fitzgerald KC accepts that the forum for the argument would need to be an application to this Court, for permission to reopen the previous extradition appeal (see Criminal Procedure Rules r.50.27), on the basis of new developments said now to sustain a new Article 3 argument. For the purposes of the bail application today, Mr Fitzgerald KC's point is that this new "light of the end of the tunnel" is an objective anchoring feature which explains why the Applicant would not wish to abscond to some far-flung other part of the world, but rather would have a clear basis for wanting to remain in the UK and take the protection of the rule of law.
  45. I am not able to place significant weight on this feature. It must be viewed through the prism of the Applicant's perception of his position. It must be viewed against the other circumstances in the case. That includes the strong incentive to which I have referred; and the reasons for supposing access to considerable financial resources. I am in no position to evaluate whether there might, or would not, be any basis for a reopening of the extradition appeal. An immediate point of distinction with the present case on the face of it, says Mr Hearn, is that unlike this case Bhandari was a case about the prospect of post-extradition police interrogation. I am not going to say more about this feature of the case. I recognise that there is another forum at which legal arguments can be put forward. If and to the extent that there is some development, along Bhandari lines, which is then said to make a difference to the bail position, that in my judgment would need to be addressed by a court having the advantage of a properly informed position. I have, to the extent that I can, taken this feature into account, when objectively assessing the circumstances as they are before me. As I have said, I cannot place significant weight on it.
  46. Going Elsewhere

  47. Mr Fitzgerald KC strongly submitted that it was fanciful, not credible, and even ridiculous for the Respondent to suggest that the Applicant would, in all the circumstances, choose to go to some remote part of the world rather than to remain here in the UK. He advances that submission, independently of any question of access to financial means. He does so by reference to a number of features of the case which are said to make the UK obviously the right and safe place for the Applicant to remain, rather than "some far-flung corner of the world". Among those features, reliance is placed on the medical care that the Applicant needs for his various mental and physical health conditions, and would readily be able to access here. Reliance is placed on family relationships and an ability to remain in contact and visit. This point about going elsewhere was a point – albeit in June 2019 – that Simler J specifically considered. She said this in her judgment (at §21): "there are still places in the world that one can escape to if one has the means and the will to do so, that will afford an even safer haven from access by the Indian investigating authorities". I have to put this part of the case alongside the points that I have made about access to very considerable resources, since that is a point which is capable of being transformative of the reality of relocating. I am looking at all of the features afresh and with a clean slate. But I have the same view as Simler J expressed in June 2019. I do not accept that it is fanciful, or ridiculous, or lacking in credibility, that the Applicant would choose to locate to another part of the world.
  48. The Human Cost of Detention

  49. I have had close regard to the points which have been made about the human cost of detention. That includes all of the points that have been advanced about physical and mental health, including in terms of deterioration and in terms of delays in treatment, and the concerns very properly raised in the clinicians' expert evidence all of which I have read. I have also taken account of the evidence about assaults and threats and the prospect of coercion. I have taken account of the fact that this evidence covers not only detention at Wandsworth but also Thameside. All of these aspects have featured in the arguments about proportionality, and the arguments about 'anchoring' to the UK. But I am not able to conclude that, when put alongside the other relevant features of the case, they can serve to displace or undermine the assessment which I have described.
  50. The Alleged Events of 2018

  51. Finally, I want to return to the question of the underlying allegations, to identify one part of the case against the Applicant in the Indian criminal proceedings. Part of what is alleged is that he was criminally responsible for actions in which witnesses were interfered with and evidence was destroyed. The evidence which was evaluated by Simler J included what is alleged to have occurred in March 2018. People who are said to have been dummy directors were moved from Dubai to Cairo. Their mobile phones are said to have been removed and destroyed. Also said to have been destroyed was evidence on a computer server in Dubai in February 2018. All of that would have taken place at the time when the Applicant was here in the UK. And I repeat, after careful evaluation, UK courts have twice concluded that there is an evidenced prima facie case, against the Applicant. Those courts were given a benign explanation, on the Applicant's behalf, of what happened to those individuals and their mobile phones in 2018. It is a story all about protection and cooperation. That point resurfaces within Mr Fitzgerald KC's skeleton argument for today. Having considered that explanation, it was not accepted by the two courts, so far as a prima facie case on the evidence is concerned. The reason why – leaving aside the obvious relevance regarding interference with witnesses and evidence – all of this is significant, in my assessment, is this. It is part of the case, objectively supported by evidence, which has all of these features: (i) mobilisation; (ii) evasion; (iii) the use of associates; and (iv) actions crossing borders. It is illustrative, in my assessment, of the sorts of concerns to which the materials in this case give rise.
  52. Conclusion

  53. In the light of all the considerations, and for the reasons that I have given, I am refusing the application for bail in this case.

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