England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		24/01/2017

Mr Justice Holroyde :

1. The appellant Mr Ashok Sancheti ("Mr Sancheti") was admitted as a solicitor on 1^st February 1999. Between June 2005 and October 2009 he practised from premises at 115A Chancery Lane, London as a member and director of Morgan Walker LLP ("the LLP"). Between November 2009 and the 31^st January 2012 he practised from the same premises as the sole director of Morgan Walker Solicitors Limited ("the firm"). The LLP went into liquidation on 19^th January 2011, and the firm ceased to practise on 31^st January 2012. In 2011 a number of complaints about Mr Sancheti were made to, and investigated by, the respondents to this appeal, the Solicitors Regulation Authority ("SRA"). On 30^th March 2012 the SRA resolved to intervene into the remnants of the firm, and on 3^rd April 2012 it made a similar resolution in relation to the LLP and Mr Sancheti. The effect of those interventions was that Mr Sancheti's practising certificate was suspended. He subsequently became bankrupt, and remains undischarged. The SRA alleged against Mr Sancheti ten breaches of the Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 ("SCC") and the Solicitors' Accounts Rules 1998 ("SAR"). On 9^th April 2014 a panel of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal ("the SDT") found nine of those allegations, including four allegations of dishonesty, proved against Mr Sancheti, and ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors and that he pay the SRA's costs. The SDT's reasons were given in a written judgment dated 21^st May 2014. Mr Sancheti now appeals against the decision of the SDT.
2. Mr Sancheti had not been present at the hearing before the SDT: I set out below the circumstances in which the hearing proceeded in his absence. He appeared in person at the hearing of his appeal before this court. The SRA was represented, as it has been throughout the proceedings against Mr Sancheti, by Mr Geoffrey Williams QC.

The statutory framework:

3. The SDT was constituted under section 46 of the Solicitors Act 1974, which reads in part as follows:

"(1) Applications and complaints made by virtue of any provision of this Act shall be made, except so far as other provision is made by this Act or by any regulations under it, to the tribunal known as the 'Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal'.

(2) The Master of the Rolls shall appoint the members of the Tribunal.

(3) The Tribunal shall consist –

(a) of practising solicitors of not less than ten years' standing (in this section referred to as 'solicitor members'); and

(b) of persons who are neither solicitors nor barristers (in this section referred to as 'lay members').

(4) A member of the Tribunal shall hold and vacate his office in accordance with the terms of his appointment and shall, on ceasing to hold office, be eligible for re-appointment.

(5) The Tribunal may pay its members such remuneration, fees or allowances as it may determine with the approval of the Legal Services Board.

(5A) The Tribunal may do anything calculated to facilitate, or incidental or conducive to, the carrying out of any of its functions."

4. Section 46A of the 1974 Act provides for the annual budget of the SDT to be approved by the Legal Services Board (in consultation with the Law Society), and paid by the Law Society.
5. Section 47 sets out the powers of the SDT, which include the power to order that the name of a solicitor against whom a complaint has been made be struck off the Roll. By section 49, the person against whom the complaint was made may appeal to the High Court. Section 49(4) provides –

"The High Court shall have power to make such order on an appeal under this section as it may think fit."

6. Appeals to the High Court are governed by the Civil Procedure Rules. CPR Part 52 therefore applies, with the result that this appeal is a review. The High Court on appeal has all the powers of the lower court, and so in this case has all the powers of the SDT. In accordance with CPR 52.21(3), this court will allow the appeal if the decision of the SDT was

"(a) wrong; or

(b) unjust because of serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings [below]."

7. Section 46(9)(b) of the 1974 Act gives the SDT the power to make rules

"about the procedure and practice to be followed in relation to the making, hearing and determination of applications and complaints (including provisions about the composition of the Tribunal)."

The SDT has exercised that power by making the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2007 ("SDPR"). In those Rules, a panel of three members of the SDT appointed for the hearing of an application, or of a matter relating to an application, is referred to as a "division". So far as material for present purposes, Rule 4 provides –

"… a Division shall be constituted for the hearing of any application or matter relating to an application. Two of the Division members shall be solicitor members and one shall be a lay member and (unless the President shall determine otherwise) a solicitor member shall act as Chairman."

8. Rule 5 of the SDPR requires that any application to the SDT in respect of an allegation or complaint against a solicitor must be made in specified form and accompanied by a statement "setting out the allegations and the facts and matters supporting the application and each allegation contained in it". Rule 7 permits the filing of supplementary statements "containing additional facts or matters on which the applicant seeks to rely or further allegations and facts or matters in support of the application".
9. Rule 16(2) of the SDPR provides –

"If the Tribunal is satisfied that notice of the hearing was served on the respondent in accordance with these Rules, the Tribunal shall have power to hear and determine an application notwithstanding that the respondent fails to attend in person or is not represented at the hearing."

The allegations against Mr Sancheti:

10. The allegations which were made against Mr Sancheti by the SRA were set out in a Rule 5 statement dated 28^th March 2013 and a Rule 7 supplementary statement dated 11^th October 2013. In Mr Sancheti's absence, the SDT treated him as having denied all the facts alleged, and directed itself that it was for the SRA to prove the allegations to the criminal standard of proof.
11. It is unnecessary to refer to all the evidence in support of those allegations which was before the SDT, and which is analysed at length in their written judgment. It is however necessary to summarise the key features of the allegations. It is convenient at the same time to note the decisions of the SDT in relation to those allegations and as to sanction. As the SDT did, I will anonymise the names of Mr Sancheti's clients in the relevant matters, and refer to them only by letters of the alphabet.

The case of V:

12. The Rule 5 statement related to matters raised in a complaint to the SRA by the director of a company, V. On 21^st December 2009 RM Ltd entered into an agreement to purchase the assets and goodwill of two other companies. Mr Sancheti and the firm acted for RM Ltd in relation to this agreement. The acquisition was to be routed via V. On 18^th December 2009 Mr Sancheti on behalf of the firm signed an undertaking as to how the completion funds would be kept and paid over. He did so in the firm's name, but he does not dispute that he was personally liable upon that undertaking. So far as is material for present purposes, and without needing to set out the detailed definitions of some of its terms, it read as follows:

"We undertake to hold upon Completion the Retained Consideration in the sum of £150,000 in our bank account and disburse these sums in the following manner:

1. If there are no Claims in the first six months after Completion, then in accordance with clause 3.2 of the Agreed APA [Asset Purchase Agreement] the sum of £75,000 shall be paid to the Seller or their solicitor after the end of the six month period from the Completion Date.

2. If there are no Claims in the following six months period thereafter, then in accordance with clause 3.2 of the Agreed APA the remainder sum of £75,000 shall be paid by the Buyer to the Seller or their solicitor after the end of the twelve month period from the Completion Date.

3. If any claim arises during the period of 12 months after Completion, no sums shall be paid to either of the Buyer or the Seller out if the Retained Consideration or part thereof as applicable, until a Claim made by the Buyer under this Agreement has been adjudicated or settled in accordance with the dispute resolution provisions contained in this Agreement."

13. The firm subsequently complied with clause 1 of that undertaking by releasing £75,000 to V's solicitors. The sum originally covered by the undertaking was then further reduced by £12,000 when V authorised the release of a further payment. The remaining £63,000 however was not released at the end of the 12-month period after completion. V confirmed that there was no claim as defined in the agreement, and that no such claim was contemplated, and required the firm to release the remaining monies. Mr Sancheti nonetheless contended that the firm was entitled to retain the money because there was a valid and subsisting dispute between RM Ltd and V. Both V and RM Ltd confirmed that there was no such dispute, but Mr Sancheti continued to deny that he was under any obligation to pay over the remaining £63,000.
14. On 3^rd June 2011 V reported the non-release of the funds, and its concerns about the whereabouts of the monies, to the SRA. When the SRA took up the matter with Mr Sancheti, he asserted that the undertaking was conditional, that it had expired in December 2010 and was discharged, that there was no liability to make any payment in connection with the undertaking, and that in any event no payments were due because there were existing, and possible future, claims.
15. Later in 2011, V commenced proceedings against both Mr Sancheti and the firm. On 15^th February 2012, at a hearing before Master Fontaine, V recovered summary judgment against the firm for the sum of £63,000, and an order for summary enforcement against Mr Sancheti. Mr Sancheti did not comply with the order. He brought an appeal, but was unsuccessful. He failed to attend the court when required to do so on 20^th April 2012 for questioning as to his means. He has never paid the £63,000 to V. When V sought to recover their loss from Mr Sancheti's professional indemnity insurers, Mr Sancheti told the insurers that he had legitimately applied the monies in question in payment of his outstanding fees, but provided no evidence to support his claim.
16. The SDT heard evidence about these matters from a partner in the firm of solicitors which had acted for V. He stated that he had originally advised his clients that the retained monies should be held in an account operated on the joint instructions of the solicitors for both parties, but had been willing to accept Mr Sancheti's undertaking as a suitable alternative. He confirmed that in correspondence with Mr Sancheti he had made clear that there were no claims, and that the monies should be released.
17. Written evidence was also received by the SDT from the director of V, who confirmed that neither the outstanding sum of £63,000, nor the legal costs which had been incurred in seeking to recover those monies, had ever been paid by Mr Sancheti or by the firm.
18. 4 allegations were laid against Mr Sancheti in relation to these matters:

i) Breach of the terms of a professional undertaking, contrary to Rule 10.05 of the SCC: the SDT found both the underlying allegation and the element of dishonesty proved beyond reasonable doubt. Rejecting the various arguments which Mr Sancheti had advanced in correspondence, and which it regarded as no more than attempts at causing delay and avoiding detection, the SDT was sure that he was throughout bound by his undertaking, and that there were no such outstanding claims as he said. It concluded that the "irresistible adverse inference" was that he must have used the £63,000 for his own purposes. Applying the two-limb test of dishonesty set out in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, it was sure that he had acted dishonestly.

ii) Failure to account for funds held pursuant to the undertaking, contrary to SCC Rules 1.04 and 1.06: the SDT found both the underlying allegation and the element of dishonesty proved beyond reasonable doubt. It rejected the explanation which Mr Sancheti had put forward in correspondence as to what he had done with the money, and concluded that monies entrusted to him had disappeared without any credible explanation being given. It drew the inference that he had not accounted for the funds because he had used them for his own purposes. Again applying the two-limb test of dishonesty set out in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley [2002] UKHL 12, it was sure that he had acted dishonestly.

iii) Failure to comply with an order of the High Court, contrary to SCC Rule 1.01: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that Mr Sancheti had tried unsuccessfully to appeal against the order of Master Fontaine, and that having exhausted all the options open to him he had still not complied with her order.

iv) Failure to maintain properly written-up books of account, contrary to SAR Rule 32(1): the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that no relevant accounting records had been found at the time of the intervention into the firm, and none had been produced subsequently by Mr Sancheti.

19. The allegations in the Rule 7 statement related to matters raised in three separate complaints. The first complaint related to money transferred into the firm's account by a client, Mr G. The second complaint related to money paid into the firm's account by a client company, H. The third complaint related to money paid into the firm's account by a client company, AHL.

The case of Mr G:

20. Mr G is a wealthy Indian gentleman, for whom Mr Sancheti and the firm had acted in divorce ancillary relief proceedings. Mr G reached terms of settlement with Mrs G, under which he was to pay her £3.19 million. Mr G was also involved in litigation in India in relation to a family trust. A firm of Indian advocates who were acting for Mr G's relative, Mr RNG, in the Indian litigation wrote to the firm on 25^th February 2011 stating that their clients

"… would be remitting the sum of USD 3.5 million to be held to our order. The objective is to have the aforesaid money readily available should a settlement [be] achieved between the parties in the aforesaid matter. With specific instruction from our client abovenamed we say that you will seek specific instruction of the settlement terms before you can make any payment towards the said settlement."

21. Mr G thereafter arranged for US$3.5 million to be transferred from a bank account in his name into the firm's account with the Bank of Baroda in London. The funds were received into that account on 5^th April 2011, under a reference naming Mr G.
22. In August 2011 Mrs G applied to the High Court for an order embodying the terms of settlement which had been agreed between her and her husband. On 7^th September 2011 (after a successful application by Mr Sancheti to adjourn a hearing date in August) that application came before Holman J. Three days before that hearing, Mr Sancheti sent an e mail to one of Mr G's relatives in which he said that he had USD 3.5 million "to settle the matter" but said he would use that money if necessary to meet the firm's costs. Then on 6^th September 2011, the day before the hearing, Mr Sancheti informed the court that he was no longer acting for Mr G.
23. In the course of the hearing, Holman J required urgent enquiries to be made of Mr Sancheti to confirm the amount held by the firm and to confirm that the funds could be remitted within the next few days. On Friday 9^th September 2011 Holman J made an order which recited that he had seen the evidence that Mr G had transferred $3.5 million into the firm's account and had seen an e mail from Mr Sancheti which clearly evidenced that the firm continued to hold that sum "to settle the matter". The order required Mr G to make a lump sum payment to Mrs G of £3.19 million, and required the firm to pay $3.5 million, or its sterling equivalent, to Mrs G's solicitors by 4pm on 30^th September 2011. The firm did not comply with that order. Instead, on Monday 12^th September 2011, Mr Sancheti instructed the Bank of Baroda to convert the monies (and the accrued interest thereon) into Indian rupees and to issue a bank draft for the total sum (164,819,300 rupees), payable to the Reserve Bank of India in Calcutta.
24. Mr G sued the firm for his money. In his defence to those proceedings, Mr Sancheti pleaded that the money had been sent to the Indian government because he believed it had probably been taken out of India in breach of Indian laws governing taxation and currency exchange. He said that the money could be claimed from the Indian government by any person who was lawfully entitled to it, and he therefore denied that he had misappropriated any money. He said in a witness statement (verified by his statement of truth) that he had had the banker's draft collected from the Bank of Baroda and had given it to an associate, a Mr S, who happened to be travelling to Calcutta that night and who had offered to lodge the draft at the RBI. He said that he therefore had no power or control over the monies which had formerly been held in the firm's account. He also said – remarkably - that he had no contact details for Mr S, but he also claimed to be "taking steps to obtain" a "token" which he said had been issued to Mr S as confirmation of the submission of the banker's draft.
25. Also on 11^th October 2011, Lloyd Jones J made an order which inter alia ordered the firm to communicate with the RBI requiring it not to present the draft but to return it to the firm.
26. On 8^th December 2011 the High Court ordered the firm to send the banker's draft to Bank of Baroda for cancellation and retention of the funds. The firm failed to comply with that order. On 14^th December 2011 Mr Sancheti was ordered to instruct Bank of Baroda to cancel the draft and hold the funds in the firm's account, and he was also ordered to swear an affidavit.
27. In February 2012 HH Judge Seymour QC gave judgment in Mr G's civil proceedings. He referred to evidence showing that on 29^th September 2011 Mr Sancheti signed a document relating to an attempted deposit with RBI of a banker's draft drawn on Bank of Baroda in London for 164,819,300 rupees "by way of advanced income tax payable by Morgan Walker Solicitors, Calcutta": that attempt had failed because RBI had not presented the draft in view of the order of Lloyd Jones J. Judge Seymour QC found that Mr Sancheti had failed to comply with the order of 14^th December 2011, and was thereby in contempt of court.
28. The SDT heard evidence from an SRA investigator, Mr Page, who had visited the firm in February and March 2012. On one of those visits Mr Page had spoken to Mr Sancheti. Mr Page had arranged for the substantial volume of papers relating to Mr G to be delivered to the SRA, and for copies to be provided to Mr Sancheti.
29. The SDT also heard evidence from a solicitor who had been instructed by Mr G to recover the monies which had been transferred to the firm's account at Bank of Baroda. He confirmed that those monies had been transferred for the purpose of the settlement of Mr G's divorce proceedings. He stated that, in order to comply with the order made by Holman J, Mr G had in effect paid the settlement figure of £3.19 million twice. He also gave evidence of an e mail timed at 1003 on 13^th September 2011 in which Mr Sancheti had acknowledged receipt of a copy of the sealed order made by Holman J: the witness stated that it would not have been physically possible for the banker's draft (issued on 12^th September) to have been delivered to the RBI in Calcutta before the time at which that e mail was sent, and he therefore inferred that Mr Sancheti must have known of the order before that delivery was made. It would, accordingly, have been possible for Mr Sancheti to have stopped the delivery of the banker's draft when he saw the order of Holman J.
30. Four allegations were laid against Mr Sancheti in relation to these matters:

i) Failure to maintain a client bank account, contrary to SAR Rule 14: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. It noted that in a pleading filed in the civil proceedings brought against the firm by Mr G, Mr Sancheti had admitted that the firm did not maintain a client account.

ii) Failure to pay client money into a client account without delay, contrary to SAR Rule 15: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. Given that the firm had received client monies paid to it on behalf of Mr G, breach of this Rule followed inevitably from the finding that the firm did not maintain a client account.

iii) Wrongly paying away funds held to the order of a third party, contrary to SCC Rules 1.02, 1.04, 1.05 and 1.06: the SDT found both the underlying allegation and the element of dishonesty proved beyond reasonable doubt. The SDT was sure that the $3.5 million received by the firm had not been sent to Mrs G or her solicitors, or to Mr G, Mr RNG or Mr RNG's solicitors. Holman J's order of 9^th September 2011 – made after giving Mr Sancheti an opportunity to provide information about the monies – made it clear that the monies were intended to be used for the purpose of Mr G's payment of a lump sum in settlement of the divorce proceedings. If Mr Sancheti had genuinely been concerned about the appropriate payee, he could and should have brought his concerns to the attention of the High Court. They were sure that on 9^th September 2011 Mr Sancheti knew that the ancillary relief proceedings were about to be settled, and that the monies were required to effect that settlement. The SDT was sure that he nonetheless wrongly paid away the monies by converting them into rupees and removing them from the jurisdiction of the Court. Again applying the two-limb test of dishonesty set out in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, it was sure that he had acted dishonestly.

iv) Failure properly to account to third parties and to clients for funds received from those parties, contrary to SCC Rules 1.05 and 1.06: the SDT found both the underlying allegation and the element of dishonesty proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was sure that Mr Sancheti had failed properly to account for the funds received, thereby behaving in a way which was likely to diminish the trust which the public placed in him as a solicitor and in the legal profession. It was sure that he knew he was subject to a court order to pay the monies and to account to Mr G's new solicitors. Again applying the two-limb test of dishonesty set out in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley, it was sure that he had acted dishonestly.

The case of H:

31. H was a company for which the firm had acted in relation to a commercial dispute. The dispute was settled on terms which required H to pay £4,284.63 to the other party. H paid that sum into the firm's account, but the firm did not release the money to the other party. As a result, judgment was entered against H, which paid a further £4,864.64 to settle the matter. H was never repaid the £4,284.63 which had initially been paid to the firm.
32. In October 2011, H complained to the SRA. The SRA twice wrote to the firm about the matter. In belated response to their letters, Mr Sancheti said in an e mail of 30^th January 2012 that he did not understand what sums had not been accounted for, and that the SRA should make enquiries of the solicitor and paralegal who had dealt with the matter (whom he named). He added that the firm was now closed and that very little could be done. When pressed by the SRA for a fuller response, Mr Sancheti said he needed more time. Nothing more was heard from him.
33. The SDT received in evidence a statement from an in-house lawyer, based in the USA. His evidence was consistent with the documents exhibited by the SRA.
34. Four allegations were laid against Mr Sancheti in relation to these matters:

i) Failure to maintain a client bank account, contrary to SAR Rule 14: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ii) Failure to pay client money received into a client account without delay, contrary to SAR Rule 15: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.

iii) Failure properly to apply funds received from a client to effect the settlement of a civil dispute, contrary to SCC Rules 1.02, 1.04, 1.05 and 1.06: the SDT found this allegation not proved, because it accepted it was at least possible that initially Mr Sancheti may not have known that settlement funds had been received into the firm's account. There came a time when he did know that was the position, and he did then fail to apply the funds properly; but the SDT did not regard the pleaded allegation as extending to that failure.

iv) Failure properly to account to third parties and to clients for funds received by him from those parties, contrary to SCC Rules 1.05 and 1.06: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was sure that the firm had received funds from H and that Mr Sancheti - once he became aware they were in the firm's account - had neither paid the funds to the other party, nor returned the funds to H.

The case of AHL:

35. AHL is a company for which the firm and Mr Sancheti had acted in respect of a purchase of property. A completion statement was sent by the firm to AHL, requiring a total of £2,847,887.30, including stamp duty of £135,080. AHL paid the US dollar equivalent of that sum into the firm's account, and the purchase was completed. The stamp duty, however, was not paid by the firm by the due date or at all. AHL instructed other solicitors to recover the missing monies, but the firm was then in liquidation.
36. The solicitor who had acted for AHL in seeking to recover the monies gave evidence to the SDT. She confirmed that the stamp duty had not been paid by the firm, and that in order to complete the purchase it had been necessary for AHL to make a further payment of not only the stamp duty but also interest and a late payment fee. When she wrote to the firm, requiring the return of the monies, Mr Sancheti replied to the effect that the firm was in liquidation and he had no access to its accounts and so could not confirm whether the monies had been received. When she wrote again to Mr Sancheti, she received no reply.
37. These matters gave rise to four allegations against Mr Sancheti:

i) Failure to maintain a client bank account, contrary to SAR Rule 14: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.

ii) Failure to pay client money received into a client account without delay, contrary to SAR Rule 15: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt.

iii) Failure to discharge a liability for stamp duty having received funds from a client for that express purpose, contrary to SCC Rules 1.02, 1.04, 1.05 and 1.06: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dishonesty was not alleged in this instance, but the SDT regarded this allegation as "particularly serious". It was sure that Mr Sancheti was well aware of the purpose for which the client money had been received, and the date by which the stamp duty should have been paid was before the firm went into liquidation; but he had failed to pay the stamp duty, and had provided no explanation. The money had not been traced.

iv) Failure properly to account to third parties and to clients for funds received by him from those parties, contrary to SCC Rules 1.05 and 1.06: the SDT found this allegation proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was sure that Mr Sancheti, having received client monies provided for the express purpose of paying stamp duty, had neither paid the stamp duty liability nor returned the monies to AHL.

The SDT's decision as to sanction:

38. The SDT regarded this case as being "about as serious as a case gets". Nine allegations had been proved, including four allegations of dishonesty. The starting point, in view of the findings of dishonesty, was that the appropriate sanction, necessary for the protection of the public and for the maintenance of public confidence in the solicitors' profession, was striking off. The SDT noted that Mr Sancheti had not put forward any mitigation. He had taken every conceivable step to evade payment of the client funds to which the allegations related, and had done his best – with some success – to cover his tracks. He had acted in breach of the trust and confidence of his clients and of third parties, and had caused considerable harm both to his clients and to the public confidence. His complete failure to maintain proper accounts had made it hard to trace the missing money and had added to the difficulties experienced by his victims. There had been an element of planning in his actions.
39. The SDT concluded, applying the familiar principles in Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, that his proven lack of integrity and dishonesty made it appropriate to strike him off. In addition, applying the principles in Weston v Law Society (The Times, 15.07.1988), they concluded that the harm which Mr Sancheti had caused was so significant that it would have been appropriate to strike him off even if dishonesty had not been proved.
40. The SDT's decision as to sanction was expressed as follows:

"The appropriate, indeed the only, sanction open to the Tribunal bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations proved, including dishonesty, absence of any financial stewardship, lack of integrity and trustworthiness and the seriousness of the underlying facts, was that [Mr Sancheti's] name should be struck off the Roll of Solicitors immediately. He was not fit to practise as a solicitor. The Tribunal would be failing in its duties to protect the public from harm and to maintain public confidence in the reputation of legal services providers, and in particular all other solicitors, if it imposed any other sanction. Members of the public would be shocked and dismayed if the Tribunal permitted [Mr Sancheti] to continue to practise. He had only himself to blame."

41. Mr Sancheti was ordered to pay the SRA's costs, to be subject to a detailed assessment if not agreed, and to make an immediate interim payment.

The appeal to this court:

42. Before coming to the grounds of appeal, and in order to understand them, it is necessary first to summarise the chronology of the proceedings which culminated in the hearing before the SDT in April 2014. Throughout the course of those proceedings, Mr Sancheti was resident in India. He remained an undischarged bankrupt, and has repeatedly said that he has very little money.

The chronology of proceedings:

43. The Rule 5 statement, dated 28^th March 2013, was served on Mr Sancheti on 18^th April 2013.
44. The Rule 7 statement, dated 11^th October 2013, was thought to have been served on Mr Sancheti in October 2013. However, it was later accepted by the SRA that there had been a failure to effect proper service. That failure was remedied when a copy of the Rule 7 statement was served by post on 18^th December 2013. In a later skeleton argument Mr Sancheti accepted that he had received it on 24^th December 2013.
45. There was a case management hearing before the SDT on 16^th October 2013. Mr Sancheti was not present: he had raised in correspondence the possibility of his attending by way of Skype link, but the Chairman had refused that request on the grounds that both parties were able to make written submissions and that the proposed link was likely to involve technological challenges. Mr Sancheti subsequently sent his proposed directions by e mail. These included directions relating to his wish to have the right to cross-examine Mr Williams, and his wish to conduct all further hearings by way of video conference.
46. In written directions dated 17^th October 2013, the SDT ordered Mr Sancheti to file and serve his answer to the Rule 5 and Rule 7 statements by 15^th November 2013, stating which allegations (if any) were admitted, which (if any) were denied, and the reasons for any denials. They also ordered him to make any application for a video conference hearing by the same date. As I have noted above, the Rule 7 statement had not been validly served at this time, so the order in relation to answering that statement was made in error. In any event, Mr Sancheti did not comply with either direction. Other directions were also given, including that the matter be listed for a substantive hearing "on the first available date with a time estimate of 5 days".
47. On 1^st November 2013 Mr Sancheti wrote to the SDT raising his concern that the direction hearing had proceeded in his absence. He asked the SDT to treat his letter as an application to vary the directions, but did not identify any specific variation which he sought. In a memorandum dated 29^th November 2013 the SDT, without a hearing, confirmed the orders previously made but varied to 19^th December 2013 the time for making any application in respect of hearings taking place by way of video conference.
48. On 9^th December 2013 Mr Sancheti applied for judicial review of the decisions made by the SDT at the hearings on 16^th October and 28^th November 2013. He claimed relief including a stay of the proceedings before the SDT. Permission to apply was refused on 19^th February 2014. The application was considered to be totally without merit.
49. On 16^th December 2013 the SRA served a bundle of witness statements.
50. On 18^th December 2013, as noted above, the SDT served the Rule 7 statement on Mr Sancheti.
51. On 10^th February 2014 Mr Sancheti was to attend a directions hearing by Skype link. Unfortunately, the hearing could not start at the scheduled time, because one of the SDT members (through no fault of his own) was delayed. Mr Sancheti asked for the hearing to be adjourned, on the ground that he had only been available for the expected duration of the hearing and had to attend an important family event later in the day. He later agreed however that he would be available in mid-afternoon, but at the agreed time he could not be contacted by Skype or telephone and the hearing therefore proceeded in his absence. In its later memorandum of the hearing, the SDT noted that "the events of that day had confirmed that it would not be suitable for a substantive hearing to take place by video conference".
52. In his submissions to this court, Mr Sancheti accepted that he had said he would be available in the afternoon, but then was not in fact available, and that he therefore took no point about the directions hearing proceeding in his absence. That was a realistic concession, but is in marked contrast to his correspondence at the time, in which he said he was "surprised" that the hearing proceeded in his absence, accused the SRA of misrepresenting the facts and questioned the impartiality of the SDT.
53. Following that hearing, the SDT gave written directions dated 11^th February 2014. It recorded an undertaking by the SRA to

"procure, in advance of the hearing on 7^th April 2014, for [Mr Sancheti] air travel tickets and hotel accommodation and provide [Mr Sancheti] with a sum to cover his reasonable subsistence expenses for the period 05 April 2014 to 13 April 2014 inclusive, together with any additional days if the hearing should last longer than 5 days, [Mr Sancheti] having indicated in his skeleton argument that he agrees to the proposal as an alternative to his request for a final hearing to be heard by video link."

It ordered that Mr Sancheti file and serve his Answer to the Rule 5 and Rule 7 statements by 24^th February 2014, and gave further directions in preparation for the substantive hearing, which it fixed for 7^th April 2014.

54. Mr Sancheti still did not file any Answer to the SRA's allegations. He filed an application for a rehearing, which was refused by the Clerk to the SDT on the ground that it did not fall within SDPR Rule 19. I see some force in Mr Sancheti's criticism of that decision, but I do not think that the point assists him because I find it impossible to see how a rehearing could have resulted in any different orders.
55. On 18^th February 2014 Mr Sancheti also filed a Request for Further and Better Particulars of the SRA's case, and sought an extension of time. The SRA indicated in correspondence that it would respond to the Request by 28^th February, and the SDT did not feel it necessary to make any formal order in that regard. In a memorandum dated 21^st February 2014 the SDT refused the application for an extension of time and confirmed the directions given on 10^th February. It explained its reasons as follows:

"So far as [Mr Sancheti's] request for an extension of time is concerned, on 16 October 2013 [he] was directed to provide an Answer to the Rule 5 statement by 15 November 2013 but has failed to do so. Subsequently he was served with the Rule 7 statement on 24 December 2013. A further order was made on 10 February 2014 for him to file an answer to the Rule 5 and Rule 7 statements by 24 February 2014. [Mr Sancheti] has had many months to consider and prepare his Answer. It is a matter of concern to the Tribunal that he has failed to do so and that he has shown so little regard or the orders made by the Tribunal to date. Having regard to the history of this matter it is not in either the parties' or the public interest that there should be further delay."

56. On 19^th February 2014 the SRA sent a discovery bundle, which Mr Sancheti accepts he received on 24^th February. The accompanying letter indicated that the bundle comprised the remaining material which the SRA viewed as disclosable, and stated that the SRA had fulfilled its disclosure obligations.
57. On 21^st February 2014, Mr Sancheti made an application to strike out the Rule 5 and Rule 7 statements against him. His grounds, in summary, were that there had been a lack of disclosure, that there was an absence of evidence from persons with first-hand knowledge of relevant facts, and that the panel should have been reconstituted because solicitor members were biased against him.
58. On 24^th February 2014 Mr Sancheti sent to the SDT and the SRA a document which he described as "a draft response … which will be perfected in due course after the receipt of the files and the further particulars".
59. On 27^th February 2014 Mr Sancheti filed a request for disclosure of documents, which he said were needed to enable him "to properly formulate the final Defence in answer to the two statements".
60. On 10^th March 2014 the SRA served a further bundle of witness statements.
61. Also on 10^th March 2014, Mr Sancheti sent an e mail to the SDT in which he reiterated his views – which he had expressed many times in correspondence – that he was the victim of oppression by the SRA and that he could not receive a fair hearing because the SDT was biased in favour of the SRA. Later the same day he sent a further e mail, in which he said that his brother – whose office facilities he had been using – had refused to provide any further facility for Mr Sancheti "to participate in the farce".
62. On 14^th March 2014 the SDT heard Mr Sancheti's applications to strike out and for disclosure and directions. Attempts to arrange a Skype link were unsuccessful because the Skype address provided by Mr Sancheti proved to be unobtainable, and he did not answer calls to his mobile phone. The SDT decided to deal with the application on the basis of Mr Sancheti's written submissions, which included assertions that he was being maliciously prosecuted, that the true purpose of the proceedings was to close his business in the UK and to "punish him financially for the fact that the Chennai High Court had passed an Order in February 2012 ordering almost 35 or more English law firms to close down in India pursuant to a petition by his brother", that documents had been wrongly withheld from him by the SRA and that he had not responded to the Rule 5 and Rule 7 statements because the documents which would show his innocence were being withheld. The SDT rejected the grounds on which the application to strike out was based. It accepted the SRA's submission that all relevant documents had been disclosed or were already in Mr Sancheti's possession. It decided that no further directions were necessary, and that the directions made on 10^th February 2014 should stand. The applications were therefore refused, and Mr Sancheti was ordered to pay the SRA's costs.
63. Mr Sancheti subsequently applied for a rehearing of his application to strike out. That application was refused on 31^st March 2014.
64. On 27^th March 2014 the SRA served a skeleton argument, which summarised the issues in the case and identified the witnesses who would be attending the hearing on 7^th April. It indicated that if Mr Sancheti failed to attend the hearing on 7^th April, the SRA would ask the SDT to proceed in his absence.
65. Mr Sancheti then failed to appear for the substantive hearing on 7^th April 2014. There is no doubt that he was aware of the date, and he had as I have said been provided with his air tickets for the return journey and with hotel accommodation, and had been offered funds to cover his subsistence whilst attending the hearing. Having considered the circumstances, the SDT exercised its power under SDPR rule 16(2) to proceed in his absence. It did not consider the contents of Mr Sancheti's "draft response" dated 24^th February 2014, because it did not think it appropriate to see a draft document. The SDT heard the evidence to which I have referred. At the conclusion of a three-day hearing it announced the findings and decision as to sanction which I have summarised above.
66. It should be noted for completeness that on 28^th April 2014 Mr Sancheti applied (out of time) for a rehearing. That application was refused on 25^th June 2014.

The grounds of appeal:

67. On 5^th June 2014 Mr Sancheti put in grounds of appeal in the following terms:

"1. The decision of the SDT is perverse and arbitrary.

2. For the fact that the members of the SDT are not independent being members of the Law Society which is the prosecuting the Appellant through its arm SRA. It is the case of the Appellant that judges and the prosecutor belong to the same club. No justice can be expected when the objective task handed over the members and staff of the Tribunal was to intentionally harass the Appellant as well as ensure that there is finding of dishonesty against the Appellant.

3. For the fact that the actions of the Appellant can be terms dishonest by any standards or international standards. [sic: Mr Sancheti must have intended to say "cannot be termed"]

4. For the fact that the Tribunal and its members are subservient to the Law Society and several of them themselves approved and named regulators. Therefore they had a mandate to fix the Appellant. The Tribunal was not impartial or independent.

5. For the fact that the Appellant was refused equal treatment before the law.

6. For the fact that the hearings were rushed through to ensure that the Appellant did not have adequate opportunity to defend himself.

7. For the fact that the Respondent and the SDT abused their dominant position to prosecute the Appellant.

8. The matters in question related to two regulated bodies Morgan Walker Solicitors LLP which is in liquidation. This was further intervened by the Respondent in March 2012. Therefore all practice papers relating to this regulated body is either with the Respondent or the Liquidator. The second regulated body was Morgan Walker Solicitors Limited. This was also intervened in March 2012 and all the papers relating to the practice are in possession of SRA. The Appellant has been asked to defend the allegations without providing any papers or access to information which is relevant for the proper Defence.

9. For the fact that multiple requests for disclosure have been resisted by the SRA which had been supported by the SDT to ensure that the Appellant is not given any documents required for the proper trial.

10. For the fact that only selective documents were produced by the SRA.

11. There has not been a fair trial in accordance with Article 6. The Appellant did not have opportunity to present the defence.

12. The Appellant was not allowed adequate or proper opportunity to defend himself.

13. The Law Society and SRA withheld the crucial files and documents.

14. Request and application for Disclosure were refused as they would have shown the innocence of the Appellant. The Applications for disclosure were summarily rejected by the Tribunal without any hearing or reasons.

15. The Tribunal and its staff acted in antagonistic manner to the Appellant by refusing to accommodate for the Appellant to participate in the proceedings by video conference or provide copies of the relevant documents thereby created a situation in which a fair trial was not possible.

16. The Appellant crave leave to add further grounds of Appeal after receipt of the transcript of hearing."

68. Mr Sancheti has not in fact made any application for leave to put forward further grounds of appeal. He has however developed his grounds in two skeleton arguments, and in his oral submissions. I summarise his principal arguments, and Mr Williams' submissions in response to them on behalf of the SRA.
69. Mr Sancheti has set out various respects in which he says he was denied a fair trial. Inevitably, these overlap to some extent. The principal complaints which he makes are –

i) that he was refused proper disclosure and therefore could not put forward documents supporting his case, and that the SRA unfairly relied on a limited selection of documents rather than disclosing documents which would have supported his case;

ii) that he was denied the right of effective participation, that the case against him relied on hearsay evidence which denied him the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and that there was no effective hearing in his absence;

iii) that the SDT was biased against him: the panel should have been constituted without any solicitor member because solicitor members were not independent of the Law Society or the SRA;

iv) that every request and application he made was refused, and that the timetable of proceedings left him insufficient time to prepare his case properly.

Mr Sancheti's case is that the actions of the SRA have been motivated by actual bias. He says that his brother was prominently involved in proceedings in India (Balaji v Government of India, heard in the Madras High Court on 21^st February 2012) which resulted in a number of large UK and USA firms being unable to practise law in India, and he asserts that the interventions into the LLP and the firm were "tit for tat" measures to cause him financial and reputational damage. He describes the hearing in April 2014 as a "show trial".

70. Mr Sancheti's first skeleton argument also included a section headed "Merits" in which he made a number of points about the allegations against him. It should however be noted that he had filed no evidence with the SDT, which declined to consider the document described as a "draft response".
71. On behalf of the SRA, it is submitted that Pine v Law Society (CO/1385/2000) provides authoritative confirmation that the members of the SDT are independent and impartial. The SRA has complete operational independence from the Law Society. Mr Williams argues that the transcript of the lengthy judgment of the SDT in this case shows no evidence of any bias or partiality.
72. Mr Williams rejects the criticism that Mr Sancheti was allowed insufficient time, pointing out that his application to strike out the proceedings was based in part on an allegation of delay. He also rejects the assertions that there was a failure to give proper disclosure and that Mr Sancheti was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself via a video conference.
73. Mr Williams further submits that the SDT was correct to refuse to consider the contents of what was described as a "draft response". He took the court to the circumstances of the various matters alleged against Mr Sancheti, and argued that in reality Mr Sancheti could never have defended any of those allegations, or have successfully resisted the sanction of striking off which followed inevitably from the SDT's findings.

Discussion:

74. I think it logical to begin with Mr Sancheti's complaints as to the constitution of the SDT panels which heard his case in its interlocutory stages and at the substantive hearing. I have cited, in paragraphs 3 and 7 above, the provisions of section 46 of the Solicitors Act 1974 which set out the requirements as to the composition of the SDT as a whole, and the provisions of SDPR Rule 4 which set out the requirements as to the composition of an individual panel. No other provision of the statute, or of the Rules made under it, was brought to the court's attention which imposes any specific requirement as to the composition of a panel of the SDT. Mr Sancheti may have wished for the panel to be comprised entirely of non-solicitor members of the SDT, but he put nothing before this court to suggest that Rule 4 did not apply to this case. Nor did he put forward anything to suggest that the arrangements for the composition of the various panels which heard his case were in any way unusual or a departure from the normal practice of the SDT. The court's attention was drawn to an e mail dated 23^rd January 2014 in which the Clerk to the SDT explained to Mr Sancheti that the members of each division were appointed to sit

"… according to the workload of the Tribunal, availability of members and their workload, and on a strict rota system. Actual and potential conflicts of interest are also considered"

Mr Sancheti has put forward nothing to suggest that approach was not followed in this case, nor has he put forward any convincing reason why the normal arrangements should not have been made.

75. In Pine a Divisional Court rejected a submission that the Disciplinary Tribunal was not independent or impartial. The court noted that under the statutory scheme of regulation, the Tribunal was independent of the Law Society, and there was "no indication that the Law Society can influence its decisions, except in the sense of making submissions to the Tribunal as a party before the Tribunal". Nor was there any evidence that the particular Tribunal which had heard that case had demonstrated partiality in any way. Although the court's decision was the subject of an appeal to the Court of Appeal on other issues, the allegation of a lack of independence or impartiality was not pursued: see [2001] EWCA Civ 1574.
76. In my judgment, a similar conclusion must be reached in this case. Although Mr Sancheti has repeatedly made serious allegations against the SDT as a body, and against the individuals involved in this case, he has failed to provide any evidence to support those allegations. He has not identified any feature of the case which indicates actual bias, or raises an appearance of bias, beyond the fact that the SDT's decisions have been adverse to him. The proposition that the SDT must be biased against him simply because some of its members practise, or have practised, as solicitors, is untenable. So too is the proposition that the SDT must be biased in favour of the SRA simply because they are "all members of the same club". Members of the SDT are not chosen by the SRA or by the Law Society. They are appointed by the Master of the Rolls. The Chairman of the panel was correct when he stated at the outset of the hearing that the SDT is independent of the Law Society and the SRA, and Mr Sancheti has not identified anything in the SDT's judgment which demonstrates bias or gives rise to an appearance of bias. The statutory framework set out above expressly provides for the composition of the SDT, and there is obvious good sense in a professional disciplinary body including not only lay members but also professional members who are familiar with the duties and obligations imposed on members of the profession. It is not possible to argue that the SDT in this case, composed as it was in accordance with the statutory framework, was by its very nature biased, or by its very nature gave rise to an appearance of bias. Nor is it possible to argue that the members of the panels which determined this case in any of its interlocutory stages, or at the substantive hearing, in fact displayed bias or acted in a way which gave rise to an appearance of bias. I therefore reject Mr Sancheti's submissions on this point.
77. I turn next to Mr Sancheti's complaints that the hearing was unfair because he had been given inadequate disclosure. In doing so, I assume in Mr Sancheti's favour (but without deciding the point) that the SRA's disclosure obligations were governed by the CPR 31.6 and not solely by the SDT's own Practice Direction, which provides as follows:

"Where directions are sought as to disclosure or discovery of documents, the Tribunal will adopt the view that material should be disclosed which could be seen on a sensible appraisal by the applicant –

i. To be relevant or possibly relevant to an issue in the case;

ii. To raise or possibly raise a new issue whose existence is not apparent from the evidence the applicant proposes to use, and which would or might assist the Respondent in fully testing the Applicant's case or in adducing evidence in rebuttal;

iii. To hold out a real (as opposed to fanciful) prospect of providing a lead on evidence which goes to (i) or (ii)."

78. The evidence before the SDT showed that when the SRA was investigating the firm, in March 2012, it removed 50 boxes of papers relating to Mr G's case, and provided Mr Sancheti with copies of all of those documents on the following day. Mr Sancheti has subsequently said that the copies were provided to the firm, not to him; but he signed for their receipt, and on any view they were available to him if he wanted them. In April 2012, when the SRA required the delivery up of all practice papers, Mr Sancheti responded by arranging for all the papers to be deposited outside the Law Society's Hall over a weekend. None of those papers contained anything of relevance to the allegations considered by the SDT. Such documents as were in the possession of the SRA and were relevant to these proceedings were provided to Mr Sancheti on 19^th February 2014. Where Mr Sancheti had put forward explanations for his actions, the SRA presented its case on that basis. Where the issue turned on the construction of a document – in particular, in relation to the issue of whether or not Mr Sancheti was in breach of his undertaking in the case of V – the relevant documents had been provided to him long before the hearing. The SDT was entitled in those circumstances to find that proper disclosure had been made, and that any further requests for disclosure by Mr Sancheti were irrelevant to the proper conduct of the proceedings. Nothing in Mr Sancheti's submissions to this court has persuaded me that there is any document, or class of documents, which would have been relevant and helpful to his case, and which should have been disclosed to him but was not. He has provided no support at all for his assertion that documents were deliberately withheld from him in order to hinder his defence.
79. Next, Mr Sancheti complains that every request and application which he made to the SDT was refused, with no proper reasons given, and that some of the adverse decisions were made by the Clerk to the SDT rather than by members of the SDT. I am unable to accept these complaints. It is not correct that every application was refused: Mr Sancheti's submission overlooks, for example, the efforts made at his request to arrange for Skype links to the interlocutory hearings, and the provision made for him to be flown from India at the SRA's expense so that he could attend the substantive hearing. Nor is it correct that the SDT failed to give proper reasons for its decisions: each decision was in my view sufficiently explained, and it seems to me that Mr Sancheti's real grievance is that he simply disagreed with those decisions. As to the role of the Clerk, who did make certain decisions during the interlocutory stages, Mr Sancheti was not able to identify any decision made by her which was not within the scope of the powers conferred on the Clerk by the SDPR.
80. Mr Sancheti further submits that his actions could not be regarded as dishonest. I can deal with this submission briefly, because in my view the argument is untenable. Even the summary of the allegations and evidence set out above makes it clear that, in the instances where dishonesty was charged, the SDT was entitled to regard the inference of dishonesty as irresistible. Mr Sancheti has not put anything before this court which suggests that any of the SDT's findings of dishonesty was wrong.
81. I turn finally to the group of complaints which Mr Sancheti makes, to the broad effect that he was prevented from participating in his trial and that there was no fair hearing of his case.
82. As I have indicated above, the SDT declined to consider the document provided by Mr Sancheti which was referred to as a "draft response". Mr Sancheti submits that the document should have been taken into account, and that the hearing on 7^th April 2014 was unfair because he was deprived of the opportunity to put forward his defence to the allegations. There are two reasons why I cannot accept that submission.
83. First, Mr Sancheti had failed to comply with the orders which required him to file his Answer by particular dates, and in particular had failed to comply with the order in that regard made on 10^th February 2014. The initial failure by the SRA to effect proper service of the Rule 7 statement in October 2013 ceased to be of any significance in this regard when that statement was belatedly served. Mr Sancheti had ample time thereafter to comply with the SDT's orders. Even if there were any merit in his complaints of non-disclosure (which, for the reasons indicated above, there is not), an absence of documents was not a bar to Mr Sancheti's pleading at least the principal features of his defence, and if necessary making a later application to amend in the light of any further documentation he contended was relevant. There was therefore no impediment to his complying with the orders, and I see no merit in his explanation that he could not do so without further disclosure. Indeed, in his submissions to this court, Mr Sancheti accepted that he could have put in a defence. Moreover, following the orders made by the SDT on 14^th and 31^st March 2014 (see paragraphs 62 and 63 above), Mr Sancheti knew that there would be no further disclosure. If at that stage he had wanted the draft document to stand as his Answer, he could have said so, and could have asked the SDT to take it into account notwithstanding his non-compliance with the directions. He did not take that course, and has no legitimate complaint that the SDT decided to proceed as it did at the substantive hearing on 7^th April 2014. The SDT was aware of the "draft response", but took the view that Mr Sancheti had failed to comply with a number of directions as to the time for filing his Answer to the Rule 5 and Rule 7 statements, and that it was inappropriate for the panel to consider a draft document. Those were conclusions which the SDT was plainly entitled to reach, and in my view it is difficult to see what other conclusion it could have reached.
84. Secondly, I accept Mr Williams' submission that it would have been wrong for the SDT to consider the contents of a document described as a "draft Defence", for if it had done so – and had made findings against Mr Sancheti – it would no doubt have been argued on appeal that the panel had unfairly considered a pleading which was expressed to be only a draft and therefore should not have been regarded as a definitive statement of Mr Sancheti's case.
85. Although it is not necessary to my decision, I would add that, having read the "draft response", I accept Mr Williams' submission that its contents could not have assisted Mr Sancheti even if the SDT had considered it.
86. As to the complaint that Mr Sancheti was unable to defend himself:

i) The SDT was in my view entitled to refuse Mr Sancheti's request for the substantive hearing to take place by video conference on the grounds that it was not a suitable medium for the cross-examination of witnesses in a case of this nature, and that experience in the interlocutory hearings had shown it to be an unreliable medium. The practical difficulties encountered in earlier hearings were of course increased by Mr Sancheti's indication (see paragraph 61 above) that his brother had withdrawn the use of office facilities.

ii) In any event, Mr Sancheti himself had proposed that one way in which he could participate in the hearing would be by the SRA funding his travel and accommodation.

iii) The SRA purchased flight tickets (and on 4^th March 2014 forwarded to Mr Sancheti a link to electronic copies, later sending him hard copies by post), booked a hotel, and arranged to pay a sum into Mr Sancheti's bank account to cover his subsistence whilst attending the hearing. Mr Sancheti was asked to provide his bank account details so that his subsistence expenses could be paid in advance in accordance with the SRA's undertaking, but he did not do so.

iv) On 4^th April 2014 Mr Sancheti sent a number of e mails to the SDT in which he first said that he did not have a ticket to travel, then said that the ticket was "improper" and then said that he was unable to be in London "in the absence of suitable travel arrangements being made".

v) Mr Sancheti has at different times also put forward the following alternative reasons for his non-attendance:

a) Attendance was futile because he had not been given proper disclosure and/or because the SRA were relying on hearsay evidence and there would therefore be no opportunity for him to cross-examine witnesses with personal knowledge of the matters which were the subject of the allegations against him;

b) Attendance was futile because the proceedings would not be fair and because he could not get justice;

c) The tickets which had been provided were not suitable for travel because they were standard class seats on an airline he did not favour, and there was insufficient flexibility of flight times.

87. The SDT found as a fact that air tickets had been provided by the SRA, and that accordingly Mr Sancheti's initial explanation for his absence was untrue. The SDT rejected his claim that standard class travel was "unsuitable".
88. The SDT was satisfied that Mr Sancheti's absence was voluntary. It went on to consider whether It should exercise its discretion to proceed when he was absent and unrepresented. It considered the cases of R v Hayward [2001] QB 862 and Tait v Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons [2003] UKPC 34, which gave guidance as to the circumstances in which it may be proper to proceed with a trial in the absence of a defendant. It took into account the circumstances of Mr Sancheti's absence; his "limited and disruptive degree of engagement with the proceedings to date"; the suitable arrangements which had been made for his travel and accommodation; the seriousness of the allegations; and the general public interest, and the particular interest of Mr Sancheti's former clients, in the proceedings being heard within a reasonable time after the relevant events. The SDT concluded –

"that this was a rare and exceptional case in which its discretion should be exercised in favour of the hearing taking place in the unrepresented Respondent's absence. It was difficult to identify what else could have been done by either the Applicant or the Tribunal to enable the Respondent to participate in the proceedings in person. The hearing would therefore proceed as listed."

89. In my judgment, the SDT was plainly entitled to conclude that Mr Sancheti's absence was voluntary and that the hearing should proceed. It is difficult to see what other conclusion it could have reached. Before this court, Mr Sancheti has not provided any answer to the point that there was nothing more that could reasonably have been done to facilitate his attendance and participation. The SRA's undertaking to pay his travel and accommodation expenses had been given in response to a suggestion which Mr Sancheti himself had made, in his written submissions before the directions hearing on 10^th February 2014. His first explanation, that he did not have a ticket to travel, was rightly rejected by the SDT because there was clear evidence that he had received the flight tickets. His subsequent complaints about the choice of airline and the class of ticket were devoid of merit, and were rightly rejected by the SDT. At least some of his later explanations for his absence are mutually inconsistent: indeed, even before this court he sought to argue both that there was no point in attending because he could not cross-examine relevant witnesses, and that it was unfair to proceed in his absence because one of the witnesses had a personal grudge against Mr Sancheti and "the outcome would surely have been different" if Mr Sancheti had been present to cross-examine that witness.
90. In those circumstances I am unable to accept Mr Sancheti's submission that his rights under Article 6 were breached and that he was denied a fair hearing because he was not present. His absence from the hearing was plainly voluntary, and he has given no credible explanation for his absence. Mr Sancheti's conduct of the proceedings prior to the substantive hearing strongly suggests that his absence was motivated by a desire to delay proceedings and a desire to create a ground of appeal if the case were decided in his absence.
91. Nor can I accept the submission that Mr Sancheti was given insufficient time to prepare his case. He had many months in which to do so, and the documents we have seen make it clear that he found himself with plenty of time to engage in correspondence.
92. Mr Sancheti further submits that the witnesses called by the SRA were solicitors rather than witnesses of fact, and that he was therefore deprived of any opportunity to cross-examine relevant witnesses. I can see no merit in this submission. First, as my summary of the allegations shows, it is factually incorrect: the witnesses called before the SDT included the director of V, and an SRA investigator who gave factual evidence of his visits to the firm's offices. Secondly, those witnesses who were practising solicitors were rightly called, because they could give relevant and admissible factual evidence as to their dealings and correspondence with Mr Sancheti in relation to the matters which were the subject of the allegation. I do not accept Mr Sancheti's argument that their evidence was inadmissible hearsay. Thirdly, insofar as Mr Sancheti's argument is that the witnesses called did not have personal knowledge of relevant matters, and that the evidence was therefore incomplete and insufficient, that was an argument which he could have put before the SDT if he had chosen to attend the hearing. Fourthly, it was not clear from Mr Sancheti's submissions which other witnesses he contended should have been called, or what the relevance might have been of the points he would have wished to put to any such witness in cross-examination.
93. I accept of course that Mr Sancheti's Article 6 rights are engaged by these proceedings, which involve the determination of his civil right to practise law. I cannot however accept his submission that those rights have been infringed. He had been given sufficient time to prepare his case, with proper disclosure of relevant documents to which he did not already have access; his various applications had been refused by the SDT for sound reasons; and his absence from the substantive hearing was entirely voluntary. Far from being unfair, it seems to me that throughout the proceedings the SDT went to considerable efforts to assist Mr Sancheti to participate, acted fairly and gave valid reasons for its decisions. Regrettably, Mr Sancheti chose to focus his efforts on creating obstacles to the progress of proceedings and on making allegations of bias and impropriety for which he has shown no foundation whatsoever.
94. Given the findings which had been made against Mr Sancheti, including findings of dishonesty, the sanction of striking off was plainly open to the SDT. Indeed, this was a very clear case for the imposition of that sanction. None of the grounds of appeal challenges the sanction imposed, and Mr Sancheti did not seek to challenge it in his oral submissions. That was a sensible approach, because in my judgment it is not arguable that the sanction was disproportionate or inappropriate.
95. It follows that in my judgment the decision of the SDT was neither wrong nor unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.
96. For those reasons I would dismiss this appeal.
97. The parties have been given the opportunity to make written submissions as to costs.  The SRA have made such submissions.  Mr Sancheti has not.  There is no reason to depart from the general rule that the losing party should pay the successful party's costs.  Although an order was made for the detailed assessment of the costs below, it is unnecessary to make such an order on this appeal, as the costs can be assessed summarily.  The sum claimed by the SRA is in my view reasonable, having regard to the nature and extent of the work which had to be undertaken by counsel and solicitors.  I would therefore order that Mr Sancheti pay the SRA's costs of this appeal, summarily assessed at £45,110.22.

Lord Justice Hamblen:

98. I agree