England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		15/03/2017

KAREN STEYN QC:

A. Introduction

1. The Claimant seeks to challenge the lawfulness of the Defendant's decision of 16 March 2016 to give her notice of her liability to removal from the United Kingdom, pursuant to s.10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (as amended by the Immigration Act 2014). In addition, the Claimant challenges the lawfulness of her detention by the Defendant from 16 March 2016 until 13 April 2016.
2. The claim was filed in the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) on 29 March 2016. In view of the challenge to the lawfulness of the Claimant's detention, which is not within the scope of the Upper Tribunal's jurisdiction, the claim was transferred to the Administrative Court on 27 June 2016.
3. By an order dated 20 September 2016, Rhodri Price Lewis QC, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, granted the Claimant permission. The Judge made the following observations:

"The Claimant's leave to remain was curtailed for having used deception in order to obtain that leave on the basis of ETS SELT Source Data showing the Claimant's TOEIC certificate as having been found 'invalid'. That is the very material that the President of the Upper Tribunal, Immigration and Asylum Chamber, expressed serious concern about in SM and Qadir v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKUT 00229 (IAC). This 'generic evidence' was found to suffer 'multiple frailties'. The position should be reconsidered in the light of that case and with the opportunity for the Claimant to put forward any evidence of her own as was done by the Appellants in SM and Qadir."

4. As I explain below, the essential issue before me is whether the claim should be dismissed on the grounds that the Claimant had an adequate alternative remedy, in the form of an out-of-country appeal to the First-Tier Tribunal ("FTT"). The Claimant contends that (a) she has no right to bring an out-of-country appeal (the right she once had, having lapsed), and so she has no alternative remedy; (b) if she has a right to bring an out-of-country appeal, she contends this alternative remedy is not adequate or there are special or exceptional factors justifying the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction; and (c) in any event, she contends the Secretary of State has acted conspicuously unfairly in requiring the Claimant to pursue an out-of-country appeal rather than a judicial review. In addition, I am asked to address the Claimant's challenge to the legality of her detention.


 


B. The Defendant's application for a preliminary issue to be determined

5. On 26 January 2017 the Defendant filed an application for the question whether the claim should be dismissed on the grounds the Claimant has an adequate alternative remedy to be determined as a preliminary issue. At the hearing before me, Counsel for the Claimant agreed that this issue should be determined as a preliminary issue.
6. I raised the question whether the Defendant's application for the alternative remedy question to be determined as a preliminary issue (rather than as a matter that would potentially be relevant to the grant of relief at the end of a substantive hearing) constituted, in effect, an application to set aside the permission decision, contrary to CPR r.54.13. Counsel for the Defendant drew my attention to R (Islam) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWHC 2491 (Admin) in which such an argument was raised and rejected by Sir Stephen Silber at [19]-[26].
7. In the circumstances, in particular having regard to the fact that the parties both agreed to this procedural course, and the fundamental principle that judicial review is always a remedy of last resort, I considered it appropriate to accede to the Defendant's application for the determination of a preliminary issue.


 


C. The Facts

8. The Claimant is a national of India. She entered the United Kingdom lawfully on 22 February 2011 with a valid Tier 4 General Student visa. She successfully applied on two further occasions for limited leave to remain as a Tier 4 General Student with the effect that on 9 December 2013 the Claimant had leave to remain in the United Kingdom until 20 March 2017.
9. On 10 February 2014, the BBC's Panorama programme revealed that widespread fraud had been used in the Test of English for International Communication ("TOEIC") - which is required in order for a person to be credited with the necessary points under the Immigration Rules - at several language test centres run by Educational Testing Services ("ETS"). In particular, the programme investigators discovered the use of "proxies" to take the oral English tests set by ETS.
10. Following the programme, ETS reviewed the validity of test scores it had awarded, including by undertaking voice analysis of the voice recordings submitted for the spoken English component. Where tests were found to be "invalid" or "questionable", the test certificates were cancelled. This resulted in the cancellation of thousands of test certificates. The general background is described more fully in the decisions of the Upper Tribunal in R (Gazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ETS – Judicial Review) [2015] UKUT 00327 at [6]-[15] and SM and Qadir v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ETS – Evidence – Burden of Proof) [2016] UKUT 229 (IAC) at [8]-[26], as well as by the Court of Appeal in Mehmood and Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 744, [2016] 1 WLR 461 at [24]-[26], R (Sood) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 831, [2016] Imm AR 61 at [16] and [19], and Secretary of State for the Home Department v Shehzad and Chowdhury [2016] EWCA Civ 615 at [11].
11. The Claimant's TOEIC test result was found by ETS to be "invalid" by reason of an anomaly in the speaking test which indicated the presence of a proxy test taker. Having been supplied with ETS's findings, on 27 August 2014 the Secretary of State served on the Claimant notice of her liability to be detained and to be removed (Form IS.151A). The statement of reasons stated:

"You are specifically considered a person who has sought leave to remain in the United Kingdom by deception following information provided to us by Educational Testing Service (ETS), that an anomaly with your speaking test indicated the presence of a proxy test taker."

12. On the same day, the Secretary of State served a notice of her decision to remove the Claimant from the United Kingdom, pursuant to s.10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (Form IS.151A Part 2, hereafter "the 2014 Removal Decision"). The notice informed the Claimant of her entitlement to appeal the decision under s.82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 "after you have left the United Kingdom". In other words, she was given notice of her right to bring an out-of-country appeal against the 2014 Removal Decision.
13. The Claimant did not leave the United Kingdom and has not (as yet) sought to exercise her right to bring an out-of-country appeal. Instead, she lodged an in-country appeal in the FTT on 21 September 2014 which was (unsurprisingly) struck out on 5 November 2014. The Claimant then filed a judicial review claim in the Upper Tribunal on 27 November 2014.
14. As the Upper Tribunal explained in Roohi and Patel v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 00685 (IAC) at [1]-[2], many claims were stayed awaiting the judgments of the Court of Appeal in Mehmood & Ali and Sood (supra). "When those judgments were both available, the Tribunal's staff began, on judicial authority, a process of writing to the individual claimants inviting them to say whether, in the light of the authoritative statements of the law now available, they wished to proceed with their claim and, if they did, requiring them to submit amended grounds within a specified timescale, failing which their applications would be automatically struck out" (Roohi at [2]).
15. The Claimant was amongst those to whom the Upper Tribunal wrote. She did not submit amended grounds within the time specified in the Upper Tribunal's direction dated 14 August 2015 and so, on 3 September 2015, the Claimant's judicial review claim was struck out. On 12 October 2015 the Claimant applied to amend her grounds. The Upper Tribunal treated this as an application to re-instate the claim. On 21 January 2016 Upper Tribunal Judge Jordan refused the application.
16. As indicated above, on 16 March 2016 the Secretary of State served a further Notice of Removal, informing the Claimant that she was "liable to removal from the United Kingdom under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 (as amended by the Immigration Act 2014)" ("the 2016 Removal Decision"). The reasons given were in these terms:

"On 27/08/14 you was served IS151A and IS151a part 3 as LTR by Deception, you failed to adhere to your reporting conditions and became an absconder from 29/10/14. Your JR was concluded on 10/09/15, no further applications was made to the Home Office to regularise your stay in the UK. You are now a person liable to be detained and removed from the UK." (sic)

17. The Claimant was detained on 16 March 2016. Removal directions were set two days later, with a view to removing the Claimant to India on 31 March 2016, and served on the Claimant on 21 March 2016. This claim was filed on 29 March 2016 in the Upper Tribunal and the Claimant was released from detention on 13 April 2016.


 


D. Does the Claimant have an out-of-country appeal?

18. It is common ground that the Claimant does not have a right of appeal (from within or outside the United Kingdom) against the decision which is the direct subject of challenge in this claim, that is, the 2016 Removal Decision. As the Upper Tribunal explained in Roohi at [7], "The Immigration Act 2014 makes sweeping changes to the rights of appeal in respect of immigration decisions. The changes are in Part 2 of the Act, and take effect for the most part by amending the appeals provisions of Part 5 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002."
19. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State contends that the Claimant has an adequate alternative remedy to seeking judicial review of the 2016 Removal Decision, in the form of a right to bring an out-of-country appeal against the 2014 Removal Decision. The Claimant's first line of defence is that she has, she contends, no such right.
20. The Claimant acknowledges that from the date of service of the 2014 Removal Decision she had a right, pursuant to s.82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, to bring an out-of-country appeal against that decision. The Claimant also sensibly accepts that when the provisions of the Immigration Act 2014 were brought into effect, the changes to the available appeal rights did not deprive her of the appeal right against the 2014 Removal Decision that was already vested in her.
21. The latter concession is made in the light of Roohi. In that case, the Upper Tribunal rejected a submission that, as a matter of statutory construction, the applicants lost their right of appeal when the new appeal provisions were brought into effect on 6 April 2015. Amongst their reasons for construing the provisions as saving extant appeal rights, the Upper Tribunal observed at [23]:

"it is necessary to consider the status of individuals who have been notified of a decision and of the rights of appeal against it. The Immigration (Notices) Regulations 2003 require a notice of decision to include an indication of the rights of appeal and as we have said, the required notices were served on the applicants. It is a general principle of statutory construction that a provision will not be regarded as depriving an individual of a vested right unless the legislative intention to do so is clear: we should therefore strain against a construction removing it. … There is nothing in the 2014 Act or the Commencement Orders that indicates an intention contrary to the usual principle: indeed the saving of existing appeal rights suggests that the usual principle is indeed to prevail." (Emphasis added.)

22. The Claimant's submission is that her right to bring an out-of-country appeal was lost when the Secretary of State served the 2016 Removal Decision. The Claimant contends that, if she were to try to appeal against the 2014 Removal Decision, she would be met with the objection that it has been superseded by the 2016 Removal Decision. In this regard, the Claimant relies on Hussein v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWCA Civ 1111 at [21] in support of the proposition that a claimant should generally challenge a later decision in substitution for an earlier one, and SN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT (IAC) in which the Upper Tribunal cautioned, at [34], that "the perpetuation of a challenge to a superseded, historic decision is rarely appropriate".
23. In my judgment, the Claimant has not lost her right to bring an out-of-country appeal against the 2014 Removal Decision. The Claimant seeks to distinguish Roohi on the basis that (she contends) she was deprived of her right of appeal by an executive decision rather than by legislation. But the general principle that the Court should strive to avoid a result which deprives individuals of vested rights applies even more strongly where it is an executive decision, rather than legislation, which is said to have such an effect.
24. Counsel for the Claimant sought to counter the application of this principle on the basis that the appeal right is not of use to her. If this contention had force, it would have applied equally in Roohi. In any event, I do not accept that an executive decision which deprives an individual of a right to bring an appeal on the merits before the FTT (even if only exercisable outside the United Kingdom) would take away nothing of value.
25. Moreover, no strained interpretation is required in this case. There is nothing in the 2016 Removal Decision to suggest that the 2014 Removal Decision (and consequently the right of appeal against it) has been set aside. This is not a case, unlike the position in respect of regular escape classification decisions (which were the subject of Hussein), where the earlier decision has been rendered academic by a later decision. The Claimant has been liable to removal from the United Kingdom since the 2014 Removal Decision was served on her. The 2016 Removal Decision expressly refers back to, and endorses, the 2014 Removal Decision. As in R (Giri) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 784, where the court concentrated on the original decision because, although it had been reconsidered and a fresh decision had been made, there was no material difference between the decision letters (see [5]), so, too, here, any challenge would, in substance, be brought against the 2014 Removal Decision.
26. Accordingly, I am of the view that the Claimant has an alternative remedy in the form of a right to appeal, from outside the United Kingdom, against the 2014 Removal Decision.


 


E. Is the alternative remedy adequate?

27. The Claimant acknowledged that it would necessarily follow that if, as a consequence of an out-of-country appeal, the 2014 Removal Decision were to be set aside, the 2016 Removal Decision would be bound also to fall away. That being so, the Claimant's contention that the alternative remedy is inadequate was (rightly in my view) not based on any alleged distinction arising from the fact that the appeal would challenge a different decision to that which, in form, is challenged in this claim.
28. The adequacy of an out-of-country appeal has been considered by the Court of Appeal. Indeed, it has been considered in cases which specifically concerned, or included, individuals whose TOEIC results had been found to be invalid.
29. In Sood, Beatson LJ observed at [7]:

"It is clear law that the court will permit a substantive challenge to a removal decision pursuant to section 10 of the 1999 Act to proceed by judicial review rather than by the appeal channel provided by Parliament, here an out-of-country appeal, only where that person can show there are 'special or exceptional factors': see R (Lim) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 733, R (RK) (Nepal) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 359; and R (Anwar and Adjo) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1279, reported at [2011] 1 WLR 2552 and, most recently, R (Mehmood and Ali) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] EWCA Civ 744".

30. In Mehmood and Ali, Beatson LJ extracted the following propositions from the case-law:

"51. … First, except where there are 'special or exceptional factors', 'the court must accept that an out of country appeal is regarded by Parliament as an adequate safeguard for those who are removed under section 10 of the 1999 Act': RK (Nepal) at [33] per Aikens LJ.

52. Secondly, the existence of disputes of fact are rarely likely to constitute 'special or exceptional factors'. This is because, as Sedley LJ stated in Lim's case (at [25]), 'were it otherwise, the courts would be emptying Parliament's prescribed procedure of content', and also because judicial review proceedings are not best suited to resolve such issues, even if they sometimes have to be used for them, for example in 'jurisdictional fact' cases… Accordingly, the default position for disputes as to whether there has been a breach of the conditions of leave or deception has been used in connection with an application for leave will, absent such special or exceptional factors, be an out-of-country appeal. For the reasons given at [69]-[70] below and by the President of UTIAC in R (Gazi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (ETS – Judicial Review) [2015] UKUT 00327 (IAC) the default position in the case of disputes of opinion between experts, or between a witness of fact and an expert will also normally be an appeal.

53. Thirdly, matters of procedural fairness arise in many cases, can be considered in the appellate process, and are rarely likely to constitute 'special or exceptional factors': see Coulson J in R (Ali Zahid) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 4290 (Admin) at [16] ff." (Emphasis added.)

31. On the face of it, these two judgments make any contention that the Claimant's out-of-country appeal is not an adequate alternative remedy impossible. Nevertheless, the Claimant sought to contend that there has been such a fundamental shift in the understanding of ETS cases, as a result of four Upper Tribunal decisions, that the Court of Appeal judgments in Mehmood and Ali and Sood have been "overtaken". The four Upper Tribunal decisions relied on are SM and Qadir and three cases which were heard together, namely, Secretary of State for the Home Department v MA (ETS – TOEIC testing) [2016] UKUT 00450 (IAC), R (Mohibullah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (TOEIC – ETS – judicial review principles) [2016] UKUT 00561 (IAC) and R (Saha) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Secretary of State's duty of candour) [2017] UKUT 00017 (IAC).
32. In SM and Qadir the two appellants had exercised their right of appeal against the Secretary of State's finding that they had obtained leave by deception. The Upper Tribunal found, on the evidence adduced by the parties, that the Secretary of State had discharged the evidential burden of proving that the appellants' TOEIC certificates had been procured by dishonesty, albeit by a narrow margin (see [68]). However, the "multiple frailties and shortcomings" (see [100]) in the Secretary of State's evidence were such that, in light of the evidence adduced by the appellants, the Secretary of State failed to discharge the legal burden of proving dishonesty on the part of the appellants.
33. At [102] the Upper Tribunal said:

"We take this opportunity to re-emphasise that every case belonging to the ETS/TOEIC stable will invariably be fact sensitive. To this we add that every appeal will be determined on the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties. Furthermore, the hearing of these appeals has demonstrated beyond peradventure that judicial review is an entirely unsatisfactory litigation vehicle for the determination of disputes of this kind: see Gazi at [36]-[37]."

34. Far from supporting the Claimant's contention that an out-of-country appeal is not an adequate remedy, this decision underlines the point that, in a case such as this one, the appeal route is far more suitable than judicial review.
35. The Claimant relies on the obiter dicta that whether an out-of-country appeal in a case of this kind would be fair "may require future judicial determination" (SM and Qadir at [104]). The same point was made in Mohibullah at [89], where the Upper Tribunal suggested that the suitability of an out-of-country appeal in this sphere "remains a moot question". These observations provide no basis for departing from the established position that matters of procedural fairness can be considered in the appellate process, and are rarely likely to constitute 'special or exceptional factors', even aside from the obvious point that decisions of the Upper Tribunal cannot "overtake" or take precedence over Court of Appeal judgments.
36. MA was also an in-country appeal. The Upper Tribunal again emphasised the fact sensitive nature of any finding of deception (see [45]), finding on the facts that the appellant had procured his TOEIC by deception. Saha was a judicial review claim. The Upper Tribunal found that the decision readily withstood the species of challenge the applicants had chosen to mount, throwing the difference between judicial review and a statutory appeal into sharp relief (see [14] and [68]). Far from supporting the Claimant's case, these decisions reinforce the merit of an appeal process, in a case like this, compared to judicial review.
37. In my judgment, the Claimant's out-of-country appeal plainly constitutes an adequate alternative remedy. Subject to consideration of the Claimant's argument that there has been conspicuous unfairness, there are no "special" or "exceptional" factors which would justify the Court exercising its judicial review jurisdiction. In Mehmood and Ali the Court of Appeal rejected a contention that the Secretary of State had "no worthwhile evidence" to satisfy herself that this was an appropriate case to make a removal direction and that this was a special or exceptional factor (see [69]-[70]). The Claimant's contention that the statements of Ms Collings and Mr Millington, on which the Secretary of State relies in this case, have been undermined by SM and Qadir, provides no sound basis for distinguishing Mehmood and Ali. The Secretary of State's evidence was sufficient to meet the evidential threshold in SM and Qadir and to succeed in MA. Each case is fact sensitive and will depend on the evidence adduced by the parties in the particular case. There is a factual dispute as to whether the Claimant obtained leave by deception and that does not render this case in any way special or exceptional.


 


F. Has the Secretary of State acted conspicuously unfairly?

38. The Claimant placed considerable reliance on Mohibullah in support of a contention that the Secretary of State, in this case, made two decisions and she has acted conspicuously unfairly in requiring the Claimant to pursue an out-of-country appeal rather than a judicial review claim.
39. In Mohibullah the applicant's fundamental complaint was that the Secretary of State's choice of decision-making route deprived him of a statutory right of appeal. The Secretary of State elected to take action against the applicant under paragraph 323A(a)(ii)(2) of the Immigration Rules which provides for mandatory curtailment of leave to enter or remain where a Sponsor has excluded or withdrawn the migrant from the course of studies. However, the Upper Tribunal considered that in substance and reality the assessment that the applicant had practised deception in procuring his TOEIC qualification underpinned the impugned decision ([52]). The Secretary of State could have pursued two alternative decision-making mechanisms, namely, a discretionary curtailment of leave on the grounds the applicant had used deception in seeking leave (pursuant to paragraph 323(ia) of the Immigration Rules) or a removal decision (pursuant to s.10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999). Either of these alternative routes would have given the applicant a statutory right of appeal.
40. The Upper Tribunal held the Secretary of State's decision was unlawful, explaining at [72]:

"To summarise, the Secretary of State's selection of decision making mechanism had the effect of depriving the Applicant of a judicial forum in which all of the evidence bearing upon the question of whether he had procured his English language proficiency certificates by deception could be fully ventilated and explored, resulting in a judicial finding on the issue. As we have already observed, the question of whether the Applicant practised deception is the key, dominant one in the overall matrix. By confining the Applicant to pursuing the inferior and limited remedy of judicial review against the background and findings detailed above, the Secretary of State, in our judgment, acted with singular and manifest unfairness. The evidence contains no explanation of why one of the other two available decision making routes was not adopted."

41. The Claimant submits that in her case the Secretary of State made two decisions (the 2014 and 2016 Removal Decisions), the first of which could be challenged by way of an out-of-country appeal and the second could only be challenged in judicial review proceedings. She contends that the Secretary of State is trying to prevent her following the better route, by depriving her of the right to bring judicial review proceedings. In other words, her argument is to the opposite effect to that which succeeded in Mohibullah.
42. There is no merit in this argument. The Secretary of State has not deprived the Claimant of a right to bring judicial review proceedings. The question whether this claim should be dismissed on the ground that the Claimant has an adequate alternative remedy is a matter for the Court to determine, applying well-established principles. The Claimant has had a right to bring an out-of-country appeal since the 2014 Removal Decision was served on her. Her submission amounts, in effect, to an argument that the Secretary of State has acted conspicuously unfairly by not removing her statutory right of appeal when making the 2016 Removal Decision. It is highly questionable whether it would even have been open to the Secretary of State to do so, but in any event refraining from taking away a vested appeal right cannot sensibly be characterised as an unfair (let alone conspicuously unfair) act.


 


G. Challenge to the removal decision: summary of conclusions

43. For the reasons given above, I dismiss the Claimant's application for judicial review of the Defendant's decision that (by reason of having obtained leave to remain by deception) she was liable to be removed from the United Kingdom. The Claimant has an adequate alternative remedy in the form of a statutory right to bring an out-of-country appeal to the FTT. There are no special or exceptional factors justifying the exercise of the Court's judicial review jurisdiction in this case. And the contention that the Secretary of State has acted with conspicuous unfairness in choosing the route by which the Claimant may bring a challenge has no foundation.
44. The Secretary of State raised, by way of a second preliminary issue, an alternative defence to this aspect of the claim. She contended that it is res judicata or alternatively an abuse of process given that the Claimant's judicial review of the 2014 Removal Decision was struck out. In view of my conclusion in respect of the alternative remedy issue, it is unnecessary to address this issue.


 


H. Lawfulness of the Claimant's detention

45. The Claimant was detained from 16 March 2016 until 13 April 2016. She contends that her detention was unlawful on the grounds that it was for a period that was not reasonable in the circumstances. In particular, the Claimant contends that when this claim was lodged on 29 March 2016 it was apparent that the Secretary of State would not be able to effect removal within a reasonable period.
46. It is not disputed that the Secretary of State had the power to detain the Claimant pursuant to paragraph 16 of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971. Equally, it is common ground that the power to detain can be exercised lawfully under this provision where there is a realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable period.
47. On 16 March 2016, when the Claimant was first detained, there was no barrier to her removal. She had a valid passport and no outstanding applications or claims. She was detained on the grounds that she was considered likely to abscond if given temporary admission or release and her removal from the United Kingdom was imminent. Given the Claimant's immigration history, the Secretary of State's view that there was a high risk the Claimant would abscond was reasonable.
48. Removal directions were set on 18 March 2016 with a view to removing the Claimant to India on 31 March 2016. It cannot sensibly be disputed that at that stage the Secretary of State was entitled to take the view that the Claimant's removal was imminent. No basis for contending that the Claimant's detention was unlawful from 16 to 29 March 2016 has been put forward and in my judgment it plainly was lawful.
49. The dispute relates to the fortnight after this claim was filed on 29 March 2016 during which the Claimant's detention was maintained. In my judgment, the Defendant did not breach the Hardial Singh principles in maintaining the Claimant's detention until 13 April 2016. Although the Claimant's intended removal to India was cancelled on 31 March 2016, it was not unreasonable to anticipate that the judicial review claim might be expedited and this barrier to removal might be addressed speedily. It is apparent from the GCID notes of 30 March 2016 and 11 April 2016 that detention was only maintained whilst the possibility of expedition and the overall circumstances were considered. Moreover, the Claimant was released well before the expiry of the 21 day period allowed by the CPR for the Secretary of State to file an Acknowledgment of Service.
50. In all the circumstances, I am persuaded that the Claimant's detention throughout the period until she was released on 13 April 2016 has been justified and her detention was lawful.


 


I. Conclusion

51. For the reasons I have given, this claim for judicial review is dismissed.