England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice
		10th October 2017

SIR ROSS CRANSTON:

1. This is an appeal by way of case stated from a decision of the Highbury Corner Magistrates' Court.
2. The appellant, Mr Edward Phiri, appeals against the decision of Deputy District Judge Bennett, who, on 5th October 2016 convicted him of an offence under s.172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.
3. The case stated sets out the details of the offence: on 29th February 2016, the appellant, having been required by the Chief Officer of Police for the Metropolis, failed to give information relating to the identification of the driver of a vehicle, namely a BMW with a specified index number.
4. The case stated recalls that the prosecution evidence was agreed. That was contained in a statement by a police administrative officer admitted under s.9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 detailing the background to the sending of the notice.
5. Thus it was accepted by the court that at 06.45 am on 21st January 2016, the appellant's vehicle activated a red light traffic camera on the A298. In consequence, the notice of intended prosecution dated 28th January 2016 was sent to the appellant as the registered keeper of the vehicle at his home address. That required that he give information as to the driver of the vehicle at the time. No response was received from the appellant.
6. The case stated then turns to the defence case and to the evidence given by the appellant. That was that he accepted that he was the registered keeper of the vehicle, that he had February 2016, nominating a third party as driver.
7. The appellant's evidence continued that he had left the signed notice in a suitably addressed envelope in the post tray in a post room at his place of work, which was the University of Arts, where he was a lecturer. His evidence was that the person working in the post room had the responsibility for posting items left in the room. As a result, he assumed that the letter would be posted.
8. The Deputy District Judge accepted the appellant's evidence. He then recorded that he found the case proved. He concluded that s.172(2(b) of the 1998 Act imposes a personal responsibility on the person keeping a vehicle to give information relating to the identification of the driver of the vehicle, who it was alleged should have been given for the offence. A defendant had the burden of proving on the balance of probabilities that he had discharged that responsibility:

"That on the evidence given by the defendant [ appellant] he had not discharged the burden placed upon him, given that he relied upon a third party to ensure that this personal post was posted in the appropriate manner."

9. The question posed for this court by the Deputy District Judge is as follows:

"Was I correct on the accepted evidence in finding that the defendant had failed to show that he had discharged the responsibility placed upon him by section 172(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988?"

10. Section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 obliges a registered keeper in certain circumstances to provide information relating to the identity of the driver. In so far as it is relevant, it provides:

"172(2) Where the driver of a vehicle is alleged to be guilty of an offence to which this section applies —

(a) the person keeping the vehicle shall give such information as to the identity of the driver as he may be required to give by or on behalf of a chief officer of police or the Chief Constable of the British Transport Police Force, and

(b) any other person shall if required as stated above give any information which it is in his power to give and may lead to identification of the driver.

(3) Subject to the following provisions, a person who fails to comply with a requirement under subsection (2) above shall be guilty of an offence.

[...]

(7) A requirement under subsection (2) may be made by written notice served by post; and where it is so made —

(a) it shall have effect as a requirement to give the information within the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which the notice is served, and.

(b) the person on whom the notice is served shall not be guilty of an offence under this section if he shows either that he gave the information as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of that period or that it has not been reasonably practicable for him to give it."

11. Reference was made in argument to s.7 of the Interpretation Act 1989, which deals with when and how service by post is deemed to be effective:

"7. Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post [...] then unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effective by properly addressing, pre paying and posting a letter containing the document and unless the contrary is proved there being effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post."

12. Two authorities were cited to me. The first is Director of Public Prosecutions v Broomfield [2002] EWHC 1962 (Admin). That was a case where a s.172 notice had been sent to Mr Broomfield, who telephoned the Camera Processing Unit at the relevant police force. In the course of that telephone conversation Mr Broomfield provided certain information, which was recorded by an officer. However, he did not return the notice of intended prosecution.
13. He was convicted under s.172. On appeal by way of case stated the judge held that the notice required that the information be given in written form and signed. That that had not been done in Mr Broomfield's case. His appeal was dismissed. I cannot see the immediate application of that case to this appeal.
14. The other case referred to in argument was Whiteside v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2011] EWHC 3471 (Admin), which concerned the separate issue of whether the registered keeper of the vehicle had received the relevant notice. It had been sent to his registered address but he was unaware of the requirement to give information, and consequently the information was not provided.
15. The justices found on the balance of probabilities that the defence under s.172(7)(b) was not made out and, on appeal, this court agreed. In the course of his judgment, with which King J agreed, Elias LJ said in relation to an argument by counsel representing the CPS:

"22 [...] He submits, however, that it is ultimately a question of fact for the justices whether it was reasonably practicable for the defendant to have responded or not. The burden is on him to satisfy the court that it was not reasonably practicable and he failed to do that. It is not for this court on a case stated to question the justices' conclusions on that matter.

23 I think that analysis is right."

16. For the appellant in this case, Mr Hendron submits that the method of complying with the statutory obligation under s.172(2(a) is left open. He submits that if a recipient of a notice uses, as the appellant did in this case, an established post room in an established organisation, then that constitutes compliance.
17. In the course of the argument Mr Hendron invoked analogies with what happens in a range of organisations including the House of Commons, the Court Service and indeed what probably happened in this case when the police staff member sent the notice to the appellant.
18. In all such cases it is highly unlikely that persons working in those organisations deliver the letters to the post office or to a post-box. They would almost inevitably place their letters in a postal tray and rely on the person appointed by the organisation to collect the post to deal with it in the ordinary way by either affixing the necessary stamp or necessary frank.
19. In this case, Mr Hendron highlighted that there was no reason for the appellant to suspect that the procedure which operated at the University of Arts was in any way not fit for purpose. It was a perfectly functioning postal room. Thus it was almost equivalent to posting a letter in a post-box or through any of the private postal service companies which now provide an equivalent service. In other words, the appellant had a legitimate expectation that the post including his letter in reply to the notice would be dealt with carefully and efficiently.
20. Mr Hendron referred to s.7 of the Interpretation Act and contended that it could no longer be the case in the modern day, with the array of private postal companies, that post had to be dealt with in the traditional manner by using the Post Office.
21. Consequently, the Deputy District Judge had been incorrect in his approach to the matter. The appellant had simply done what was done what many others do in posting letters and the fact that in this case the reply to the notice went astray should not have led to his conviction for the offence.
22. Section 172(2)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 has to be interpreted against the background of providing a system which is practical, fair and enforceable for ensuring that drivers of vehicles comply with the requirements of the road.
23. To my mind, the section imposes a personal burden on a recipient of a notice to prove on the balance of probabilities that they have discharged the obligation imposed, which is to give the police information about the driver of a vehicle when a traffic offence is uncovered.
24. In this case, the appellant placed what was his personal responsibility in the hands of a third party, in other words the employee or employees of the university charged with collecting letters and posting them. The appellant did not place the letter either in the hands of the Post Office by posting the letter or by using one of the other private posting companies which provide a comparable service.
25. In my view, the approach of the Deputy District Judge was correct. That is not because, as Mr King for the CPS contended I should in light of Whiteside v The Director of Public Prosecutions, that it is not for me on a case stated to question the Deputy District Judge's conclusions.
26. Rather it is because in my view the Deputy District Judge applied the right legal analysis and then applied that analysis to the facts as he found them. He heard the evidence of the appellant that he left the completed form in an envelope in the postal tray at his place of work; that there was an employed there who had the responsibility of posting the items; and that the appellant assumed that the letter would be posted. However, he concluded that the appellant, by not doing that himself, had not given the notice to the police as required by the statute.
27. I can see no flaw in that analysis of the appellant's legal duty or in the judge's application of that analysis to the facts of the case.
28. I would dismiss the appeal and answer the question posed by the Deputy District Judge in the affirmative.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Is there anything else?

MR HENDRON: My Lord, no, there is no further application.

SIR ROSS CRANSTON: Thank you very much, to the two of you.