England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		24 February 2016

1. THE DEPUTYJUDGE: This is an application by the Nursing and Midwifery Council pursuant to article 31(8) of the Nursing and Midwifery Order 2001 for a 4 month extension of an interim order imposed on the respondent, Rebecca Mullings, suspending her registration as a nurse. The allegation concerns a police caution for theft of medication and possession with intent to supply a class C drug, namely codeine. The initial referral in this matter occurred in February 2015, and on 26 February 2015 an interim order was imposed on the respondent for a period of 12 months, imposing conditions of practice upon her.
2. On 26 October 2015, the interim conditions of practice order was replaced was an interim suspension order for the remainder of its term. On 26 November 2015, the case examiner concluded that there was a case to answer, and the matter was therefore referred to the conduct and competence committee, and I am told that the case is scheduled for a substantive hearing in Cardiff on 23 March 2016.
3. This is the first occasion on which the matter has come before the court, it being nearly 12 months since the original 12 month order was imposed. By this application, the applicant seeks a 4 month extension of the application of the interim order. The respondent has not attended the hearing and, so far as I can see, has been properly served. I have seen the certificate of service. I have read the supporting witness statement of Thomas Baker and note its contents. This application falls to be determined as Mr Kewley has reminded me in his skeleton argument, in accordance with the applicable principles of GMC v Dr Hiew [2007] EWCA Civ 369, the relevant criteria of which are: (1) the gravity of the allegations; (2) seriousness of risk of harm to patients; (3) the reason why the case has not yet been concluded; and (4) prejudice to practitioner of the interim order is continued. The onus is on the applicant, namely the Council, to justify continuance of the order. So dealing with the criteria: (1) gravity, I am satisfied that these are serious allegations in that they are said to arise from a serious breach of trust. The respondent is said to have abused her position by taking drugs from work to supply them to another person; (2) So far as risk of harm is concerned, the committee itself has considered that there was a risk of repetition. The alleged activity was said to have continued over an 8 month period, and I am satisfied in the circumstances that a continuation of this order is necessary for the protection of the public; (3) The reasons for the case not having been concluded, I have noted the chronology and having regard to that, progress has been made, and, as I have said, a final hearing is now imminent; and, lastly, in respect of prejudice, no evidence of actual prejudice has been submitted. Indeed, the respondent has not engaged at all with the regulatory process, and has not contested this application.
4. I am satisfied to the extent that additional prejudice will be caused by the additional 4 month period, it is likely to be minimal, having regard to the loss of income and the like which may have been sustained already. As regards the period of the extension of the interim order sought, although the hearing is in fact next month, as I have indicated, the Council has taken the cautious course of seeking a 4 month extension in case the hearing in March is adjourned for whatever reason. That gives the flexibility to allow a further hearing to be arranged without the need to come back to this court for a further extension.
5. Taking all these matters into account, I am satisfied that an extension of 4 months is justified in the circumstances of this case. It is necessary to make an extended order to protect the public and because it is otherwise in the public interest to do so. I will make the order sought, and as has been provided, the respondent has permission to vary or discharge the order on giving notice. So the order expires on 25 June.