Case No: CO/5828/2015
Case No: CO/5997/2015
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
| WOJCIECH WISNIEWSKI
|- and -
|REGIONAL COURT OF WROCLAW, POLAND
REGIONAL COURT OF POZNAN, POLAND
DISTRICT COURT IN TORUN, POLAND
Alun Jones QC and Natasha Draycott (instructed by Lawrence & Co.) for Mr. Sapor
Alun Jones QC and Michael Goold (instructed by Sonn Macmillian Walker Solicitors) for the Miss Wirynska
John Hardy QC and Julia Farrant (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: 11 February 2016
Crown Copyright ©
LORD JUSTICE LLOYD JONES :
Wisniewski v Regional Court in Wroclaw, Poland
(1) Fraud by false representation committed in the course of his employment on sixteen occasions between September and November 1999, the total value of the fraud being 6,600PLN;
(2) Theft from his employer between 4 September and 29 October 1999, the total value of the theft being 4,602 PLN.
'Under the binding sentence of the District Court… dated 27th March 2001… Wojciech Wisniewski was sentenced to a cumulative custodial sentence of 2 years. He attended the main trial which led to rendering the judgment, and was present when the judgment was proclaimed.
Under the sentence dated 2nd September 2005… the execution of the said penalty was ordered, as during the probation period the convict evaded the probation officer's supervision, and failed to make any payment by virtue of the duty imposed on him.
The convict, summoned to arrive in prison in order to serve his sentence, failed to comply with the court's order. The search activities carried out as a result proved unsuccessful. As a consequence of the person hiding from justice, under the decision dated 6th December 2006, the District Court for Wroclaw-Srodmiescie ordered his search under an arrest warrant.
Having the foregoing in mind, the District Court for Wroclaw-Srodmiescie, competent for the enforcement proceedings, requested of the Circuit Court in Wroclaw that a European arrest warrant for the said person be issued.'
(1) The appellant was interviewed and pleaded guilty in the preliminary proceedings and before the court.
(2) He was present when sentence was passed.
(3) He was informed of his obligation to appear at any summons during the course of court proceedings and to notify the authorities of any change of address. He was under this obligation during the course of his sentence. He was aware of this obligation and signed a document to confirm this.
(i) He arrived in the United Kingdom on 6 January 2005 in order to settle permanently here with his family and that prior to that he was in Sweden for a couple of months working.
(ii) He was present at the trial in Poland on 27 March 2001 at which he was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment with a conditional suspension of its enforcement for a period of probation of 4 years.
(iii) He states that the assertion in the EAW that he made no payments towards the financial penalty imposed is incorrect as he made a part payment on 21 September 2000 (prior to the imposition of the sentence). He accepts that he made no further payments although he explains his attempts to do so.
(iv) He accepts that he was under probation supervision during his suspended sentence.
(v) He was not aware of the activation of his sentence on 2 September 2005 and was thus unable to lodge an appeal or to undertake any other steps prescribed in the Polish Penal Code.
"The evidence gathered in the case file shows that Wojciech Wisniewski, despite the generated income, has failed to pay any amount due resulting from the obligation imposed on him till this day nor has he undertaken any action to agree the repayment terms and conditions with the injured party. Moreover, during the hearing held on 14th May 2004, the convicted misrepresented that the payment had been made, but when he was requested to produce documents confirming the payment, he failed to do so. Finally he ceased communication with his probation officer failing to inform them about changing his place of residence, without informing anybody about that fact. "
In the court's opinion, the above shows that the convicted not only disrespected the obligation imposed on him, but he purposefully tried to avoid the fulfilment of that obligation - hence, only a decision to execute the conditionally suspended imprisonment will allow to carry out the preventive and educational functions of the penalty.'
"I disagreed with both advocates and find that the requested person is not a classic fugitive but nevertheless a fugitive who was unlawfully at large when he travelled to the United Kingdom."
He had been referred to the judgment of Mitting J. in Pinto v. Portugal  EWHC 1243 Admin., but did not consider this settled law and preferred the approach of Supperstone J. in Budzik v. Regional Court in Tarnow, Poland  EWHC 2856 and that of Ouseley J. in Salbut v. Circuit Court in Gliwice  EWHC 4275 (Admin). The District Judge therefore found that the appellant was not entitled to rely on the passage of time bar. He further found that the Appellant was "unlawfully at large when he travelled to the United Kingdom." The District Judge concluded that extradition would not be unjust or oppressive.
Sapor v Regional Court of Poznan, Poland
i. On 17 August 2008 in Poznan he stole a Maestro ATM card from the purse of Dorota Glowacka;
ii. On 17 August 2008 he withdrew 300PLN from an ATM to the detriment of Dorota Glowacka;
and which was implemented in its entirety on 5 October 2011.
'the person was not summoned in person but by other means actually received official information of the scheduled date and place of the trial which resulted in the decision, in such manner that it was unequivocally established that he or she was aware of the scheduled trial, and was informed that a decision may be handed down if he or she does not appear for the trial.'
It then states at Box E.2:
'Tomasz Sapor was aware of the criminal proceedings against him. On 5th March 2010 he was formally charged with the offence, advised of his rights and duties, and questioned as a suspect in the case. Tomasz Sapor admitted to the offence and requested to be convicted without holding a full trial and given a sentence agreed upon with the prosecution.
Tomasz Sapor was duly notified of the date of the hearing scheduled for 11th June 2010 - notice was sent to his latest address available in the court files. Advice of delivery was twice left in his mailbox, the addressee failed to collect the registered letter on time, which was returned to the sender- the District Court Poznan-Nowe Miasto and Wilda in Poznan.
Pursuant to article 133 of Polish code of criminal procedure, if a letter cannot be served on the addressee in person, letters sent by post shall be deposited at the nearest public post office. The person serving the letter in this way shall leave a notice in the addressee's mailbox or on the door to his abode or in another conspicuous place, informing the addressee when and where was the letter deposited and that it should be collected within 7 days; should that term expire without the addressee collecting the letter, the above notice shall be left once again at the addressee's abode.'
'He said that the agreement with the Prosecutor was that he would receive a suspended sentence for the offences. He travelled to the United Kingdom on 27th September 2010. From 2008 to 2010 he was not living with his parents, which possibly explains why he did not receive any formal correspondence. He said that his mother had deregistered him from her address. He did not know why she took that action but he was not getting on with his parents at the time. He did not inform anyone of his change of address because there was no need to do so. He said he never had a Probation Officer.
The requested person said that he was not aware that his suspended sentence was activated and that he would be required to serve it. He admitted that without his parents' cooperation both the court and probation service would be unable to contact him.'
'…understanding from dealing with other similar cases is that the obligation to report any change of address in Polish criminal proceedings continues until the conclusion of the appeal process and also continues until the end of a suspended sentence of imprisonment.'
"Whilst not a classic fugitive in that he was aware of the date when his suspended sentence was activated, I concluded that the requested person was nevertheless a fugitive and unlawfully at large when he left Poland without complying with his requirement to submit to probation supervision and without informing the prosecutor or court of his change of address."
As in the case of Wisniewski, the judge referred to the conflicting decisions in Pinto, Budzik and Salbut, rejecting the approach of Mitting J. in Pinto.
"I was arrested in relation to offences of theft and fraud which took place in 2008. I was interviewed and had admitted to the offences at the police station stage, as the authorities had told me that I would receive a suspended sentence. I agreed to this, and was told that the details of such a suspended sentence would be communicated to me following the interview. I did not attend court for these matters, as I was informed that this would be a procedural matter that would be dealt with outside of court.
I was never told of the conditions of the suspended sentence. This was despite me having provided the police with my contact details. Until I was arrested and underwent these extradition proceedings at the Magistrates Court, I did not know there was a condition of supervision with probation.
I remained in Poland until 27 September 2010, after which I travelled to the UK to start a new life and find work.
I have lived openly in the UK. …
I did not know that my suspended sentence had been activated in June 2011.
The first time I found out that I was wanted for these matters was when I was arrested in the UK on 24 September 2015."
Wirynska v District Court in Torun, Poland
"In her statement made before the public prosecutor on 13 October 2006, Karolina Wirynska pleaded guilty and she agreed on the sentence with the prosecutor. The accused person did not appear during the court sitting on 20 December 2006 when the sentence was adjudged. The court passed the judgement in accordance with the motion of the prosecutor. The notice about the date of the court sitting and a copy of the sentence were sent to the accused person in accordance with the provisions of Article 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but she did not collect them. Since Karolina Wirynska was absent from her place of residence, the person delivering the notices left advice of delivery twice within an interval of seven days notifying the requested person that the notices could be collected at her post office."
(1) During a period of 3 years commencing 17 August 2006 the appellant was obliged to inform the authorities of any change of address for a period of longer that 7 days. She was instructed of this duty which she confirmed by her signature.
(2) During the preparatory proceedings the appellant pleaded guilty and on 13 October 2006 she agreed to the penalty, including the obligation to pay compensation. She was aware of the duties imposed on her by the court and of the possibility that the conditionally suspended sentence might be implemented if the duties were not fulfilled.
(3) The appellant was required to pay compensation in the amount of 4,295.00 PLN not later than 28 December 2006 but she did not comply.
(4) On 23 June 2008 the District Court in Torun made an order that the appellant be supervised by a probation officer, with the intention of encouraging her to pay the compensation due and to avoid the necessity of implementing the suspended sentence. However, this could not be done because the appellant had moved from the address she had provided.
(5) Her failure to pay the compensation due resulted in the decision of 15 June 2009 implementing the suspended prison sentence.
(6) The District Court in Torun sent a copy of the decision implementing the suspended sentence to the address indicated by the appellant and also to the address where she was registered as permanently resident. These attempts were ineffective but the notice was deemed to have been served after 14 days from the first attempt to serve it.
(7) The appellant was summoned to prison on 26 August 2009 but failed to attend pursuant to the summons and an arrest warrant was issued on 13th April 2010.
(1) She accepted being arrested, pleading guilty to the offences and agreeing the penalty of 1 year's imprisonment suspended for 3 years.
(2) She accepted that she was made aware of the need to pay compensation but she had insufficient funds to do this.
(3) She accepted that she did not inform the Polish authorities of her decision to leave Poland, describing it as a very spontaneous decision. However, she denied being informed of an obligation to inform the Polish authorities of any change of address.
(4) She said that she was not aware that her sentence was going to be activated.
"This court finds that KW is unlawfully at large and that, in the circumstances, this clothes her with fugitive status. The reasons for this finding are:
The Judicial Authority have sent further information wherein they have stated that KW had been notified on 17 August 2006 of the need to notify the relevant Polish authorities of any change of address for a period of more than 7 days. This she failed to do. The last registered address provided by her was an address in Torun, Poland (as set out in the EAW). Furthermore, KW failed to comply with the terms of probation supervision as ordered by the sentencing court. Also KW was summonsed on 26 August 2009 to surrender to the Polish penal institution to serve her sentence, but failed to do so."
The applicable law
Passage of time
"11 Bars to extradition
iii. If the judge is required to proceed under this section he must decide whether the person's extradition to the category 1 territory is barred by reason of –
1. the passage of time"
"14 Passage of time
A person's extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have–
(a) committed the extradition offence (where he is accused of its commission), or
(b) become unlawfully at large (where he is alleged to have been convicted of it)."
"Unjust" I regard as directed primarily to the risk of prejudice to the accused in the conduct of the trial itself, "oppressive" as directed to hardship to the accused resulting from changes in his circumstances that have occurred during the period to be taken into consideration; but there is room for overlapping, and between them they would cover all cases where to return him would not be fair. Delay in the commencement or conduct of extradition proceedings which is brought about by the accused himself by fleeing the country, concealing his whereabouts or evading arrest cannot, in my view, be relied upon as a ground for holding it to be either unjust or oppressive to return him. Any difficulties that he may encounter in the conduct of his defence in consequence of the delay due to such causes are of his own choice and making. Save in the most exceptional circumstances it would be neither unjust nor oppressive that he should be required to accept them.
As respects delay which is not brought about by the acts of the accused himself, however, the question of where responsibility lies for the delay is not generally relevant. What matters is not so much the cause of such delay as its effect; or, rather, the effects of those events which would not have happened before the trial of the accused if it had taken place with ordinary promptitude. So where the application for discharge under section 8(3) is based upon the 'passage of time' under paragraph (b) and not on absence of good faith under paragraph (c), the court is not normally concerned with what could be an invidious task of considering whether mere inaction of the requisitioning government or its prosecuting authorities which resulted in delay was blameworthy or otherwise. Your Lordships have no occasion to do so in the instant case." (at pp. 782-783)
'26… This is an area of the law where a substantial measure of clarity and certainty is required. If an accused like Goodyer deliberately flees the jurisdiction in which he has been bailed to appear, it simply does not lie in his mouth to suggest that the requesting state should share responsibility for the ensuing delay in bringing him to justice because of some subsequent supposed fault on their part, whether this be, as in his case, losing the file, or dilatoriness, or, as will often be the case, mere inaction through pressure of work and limited resources. We would not regard any of these circumstances as breaking the chain of causation (if this be the relevant concept) with regard to the effects of the accused's own conduct. Only a deliberate decision by the requesting state communicated to the accused not to pursue the case against him, or some other circumstance which would similarly justify a sense of security on his part notwithstanding his own flight from justice, could allow him properly to assert that the effects of further delay were not "of his own choice and making".
27 There are sound reasons for such an approach. Foremost amongst them is to minimise the incentive on the accused to flee. There is always the possibility, often a strong possibility, that the requesting state, for want of resources or whatever other reason, may be dilatory in seeking a fugitive's return. If it were then open to the fugitive to pray in aid such events as occurred during the ensuing years—for example, the disappearance of witnesses or the establishment of close-knit relationships—it would tend rather to encourage flight than, as must be the policy of the law, discourage it. Secondly, as was pointed out in Diplock para 2, deciding whether "mere inaction" on the part of the requesting state "was blameworthy or otherwise" could be "an invidious task". And undoubtedly it creates practical problems. Generally it will be clear one way or the other whether the accused has deliberately fled the country and in any event, as was held in Krzyzowski  EWHC 2754, given that flight will in all save the most exceptional circumstances operate as an almost automatic bar to reliance on delay, it will have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt (just as the issue whether a defendant has deliberately absented himself from trial in an inquiry under section 85(3) of the Act). But it will often be by no means clear whether the passage of time in requesting the accused's extradition has involved fault on the part of the requesting state and certainly the exploration of such a question may not only be invidious (involving an exploration of the state's resources, practices and so forth) but also expensive and time consuming. It is one thing to say… that in borderline cases, where the accused himself is not to blame, culpable delay by the requesting state can tip the balance; quite another to say that it can be relevant to and needs to be explored even in cases where the accused is to blame.'
"We recognise, of course, that in a section 82(b) case [i.e. a conviction case] the defendant will by definition have been 'unlawfully at large' and will generally, therefore, be subject to the rule in Diplock paragraph 1. Given, however that in these cases he will by flight have brought upon himself such difficulties as may then ensue from the passage of time, we see no reason why he should not be required to accept them - again, save in the most exceptional circumstances. He, after all, will not merely be accused of the crime but will actually have been convicted of it." (at )
"Oppression can be relied upon by a requested person in a conviction case since he is alleged to have 'become unlawfully at large'. A person can only become unlawfully at large if he knows that he is required to serve a sentence of imprisonment. It is not enough that he might be eligible to be called upon to serve that sentence of imprisonment. In a case such as this where the sentence is suspended, at the minimum he must know that the sentence has been activated. On the facts there is no room to doubt that he did not know that his sentence had been activated until he was arrested on 4 July 2013. Accordingly… the judge's conclusion that he was a fugitive is wrong." (at )
"I apply that approach, which I find to be persuasive to the question of whether this appellant is a fugitive. If it is correct that for an individual to be a fugitive because he is eligible to serve a sentence of imprisonment which he has not attended to serve, he must know of that sentence, then that requires careful application to the facts of this case. While it may very well be that this appellant guessed there might be enforcement proceedings in Poland, he did not know of them. He was not told of them. He was not present at the proceedings and he therefore cannot have known that the sentence had been activated. At the very least there is no evidence demonstrating that he knew the sentence had been activated."
Irwin J looked afresh at the determinations in relation to both section 14 and Article 8. In the context of Article 8 he accepted the submission that, even if the requested person was not a fugitive, he was "close to it because of his failure to comply".
"… [T]here was considerable fault at the hands of the appellant. He must have known he should keep in touch. Had he done so, even with a phone call or a letter, none of this would have happened. It seems to me, therefore, that although he is not a fugitive, and I do not describe him as a quasi-fugitive, the Article 8 balance and proportionality balance come down in favour of his extradition."
"I am, however satisfied that the appellant had become a fugitive in relation to the conviction offence in these circumstances. By the time he had been sentenced and was subject to provisions which required him to keep in touch with the probation officer and let her know his whereabouts and had failed to do so, thereby failing to comply with the restrictions, he is properly described as unlawfully at large, but not before that point. I put it that way because I do not regard the phrase "unlawfully at large" as simply and only applying from the point at which the sentence was activated in all circumstances. I have been referred to, but have been unable to read, a decision of Mitting J in Pinto v Judicial Authority of Portugal  EWHC 1243 (Admin). In that case, as best as I have been able to understand it, the appellant, having been given a suspended sentence in Portugal, came to the United Kingdom with the consent of the relevant official, kept in touch, but failed to pay the compensation, which was a further obligation under the suspended sentence. Mitting J held that he did not become unlawfully at large merely because he had failed to pay the sum of money given that he had come with the consent of the Portuguese police. Be that as it may, it does not seem to me that it deals with the position where somebody, although coming to the United Kingdom with permission, thereafter breaches terms that require him to keep in contact, thereby becoming somebody whose whereabouts are unknown to the authority which is entitled to know of them, putting it beyond their power to deal with him for the breach which is he is committing. In the alternative, if what Mitting J said in that case, and it would be a view to which I would naturally give the greatest weight before disagreeing, is that the point at which a person convicted becomes unlawfully at large where they had been subject to a suspended sentence is the point at which that suspended sentence is activated, then this appellant became unlawfully at large on 19 September 2011 when the sentence was activated. I say that because it would be the prior act of failing to keep in contact which would have given rise to his inability to be told that the sentence was being activated. It seems to me in those circumstances those are matters of his choice and decision, and he cannot complain that, by concealing his whereabouts, or thereby evading arrest, he is not unlawfully at large." (at )
"I reject this submission. It is not settled law that a person can only become a fugitive when his suspended sentence is activated. In Salbut v Circuit Court in Gliwice  EWHC 4275 (Admin) Ouseley J. held at (at para 8) that the phrase 'unlawfully at large' was capable of applying from the moment the conditions of such a sentence are breached. In the present case the Appellant admitted in his evidence that he was aware when he left Poland that he had to pay compensation. He did not do so. I accept Miss Farrant's submission that he therefore can properly be said to have become unlawfully at large as soon as he failed to meet the payments. The District Judge was entitled, in my view, to find that he was a fugitive from the time that he left Poland and failed to comply with the requirements under his suspended sentence. In any event, as Ouseley J. observed when granting permission to appeal: whether or not the Appellant is a fugitive seems unlikely to matter since he knew that he was not complying with the requirements of suspension and left Poland knowing that he would be imprisoned if he stayed." (at )
Article 8 ECHR
"(1) There may be a closer analogy between extradition and the domestic criminal process than between extradition and deportation and expulsion, but the court has still to examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with family life."
(2) There is no test of exceptionality in either context.
(3) The question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members of his family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition.
(4) There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition: that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the United Kingdom should honour its treaty obligations to other countries; and that there should be no 'safe havens' to which either can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back.
(5) That public interest will always carry great weight, but the weight to be attached to it in the particular case does vary according to the nature and seriousness of the crimes involved.
(6) The delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and family life.
(7) Hence it is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the Article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe."
(1) HH concerned three cases each of which involved the interests of children.
(2) The public interest in ensuring that extradition arrangements are honoured
is very high. So too is the public interest in discouraging persons seeing
the United Kingdom as a state willing to accept fugitives from justice.
(3) The decisions of the judicial authority of a Member State making a request
should be accorded a proper degree of mutual confidence and respect.
(4) Decisions on whether to prosecute an offender in England and Wales are
on constitutional principles ordinarily matters for the independent
decision of the prosecutor save in circumstances set out in authorities
such as A (RJ)  2 Cr App R 8.
(5) Factors that mitigate the gravity of the offence or culpability will
ordinarily be matters that the court in the requesting state will take into
(6) In relation to conviction appeals:(a) The judge at the extradition hearing will seldom have the detailed knowledge of the proceedings or of the background or previous offending history of the offender which the sentencing judge has before him.(b) Each Member State is entitled to set its own sentencing regime and levels of sentence. Provided it is in accordance with the Convention, it is not for a judge in the United Kingdom to second guess that policy.(c) It will therefore rarely be appropriate for the court in the United Kingdom to consider whether the sentence was very significantly different from what a UK court would have imposed, let alone to approach extradition issues by substituting its own view of what the appropriate sentence should have been. (at  – )
"… [I]f a state has a sentencing regime under which suspended sentences are passed on conditions such as regular reporting and such a regime results in such sentences being passed much more readily than the UK, then a court in the UK should respect the importance to courts in that state of seeking to enforce non-compliance with the terms of a suspended sentence." (at )
"The single question therefore for the appellate court is whether or not the district judge made the wrong decision. It is only if the court concludes that the decision was wrong… that the appeal can be allowed. Findings of fact, especially if evidence has been heard, must ordinarily be respected. In answering the question whether the district judge, in the light of those findings of fact, was wrong to decide that extradition was or was not proportionate, the focus must be on the outcome, that is on the decision itself. Although the district judge's reasons for the proportionality decision must be considered with care, errors and omissions do not of themselves necessarily show that the decision on proportionality itself was wrong." (at )
"Unlawfully at large"
Article 8 ECHR
(1) The public interest in compliance with international extradition obligations.
(2) The fact that there was a two year prison sentence outstanding in respect of 23 offences of fraud. Here I note that although the warrant relates to only two convictions it is clear from the particulars in Box E of the EAW that these relate to 23 different instances of fraud or theft. Accordingly, contrary to the submission on behalf of the appellant, the judge was correct in his description of the offending.
(3) The requested person was unlawfully at large when he arrived in the United Kingdom, having failed to repay compensation in full to his victims, having failed to comply with his probation supervision and having failed to report his change of address to the authorities. For reasons explained earlier in this judgment, I consider that when Mr. Wisniewski arrived in the United Kingdom he was a fugitive but was not unlawfully at large. However, this has no bearing on the substance of the considerations invoked by the District Judge.
(1) The requested person had established a settled life in the United Kingdom
with his partner and two daughters. Article 8 was clearly engaged.
(2) It was not clear to what extent he had failed to comply with the probation supervision requirement. However, he had failed to pay outstanding compensation to the victims. Here I note that, while he had made some effort to compensate his victims, not all had been compensated and so it remains a proper consideration.
(3) The offences were old and dated back to 1999.
(4) The impact on his family would be considerable both emotionally and financially. In particular, he gave importance to Ms Stepura's medical condition and forthcoming surgery.
(5) The statute of limitations for enforcing the sentence will expire on
4 April 2016.
(1) The public interest in compliance with international extradition
(2) A term of 2 years' imprisonment remained to be served. Although the District Judge considered the sentence harsh by UK standards, he reminded himself, correctly, of the need to respect different sentencing levels in other Member States.
(3) The appellant left Poland while subject to a suspended sentence in breach of obligations to notify his change of address and in breach of probation supervision requirements. I have addressed earlier in this judgment the lack of evidence on these points. However, I consider that the District Judge was entitled to proceed on the basis that the appellant was in breach of the conditions of his sentence and that this resulted in the activation of the sentence of imprisonment. Whether he was unlawfully at large when he travelled to the United Kingdom does not affect the substance of the considerations invoked by the District Judge.
(4) The delay since sentence was imposed is relatively short.
(1) The appellant had established a settled life in this country and his extradition would inevitably impact on his partner and daughter both emotionally and financially. Article 8 was clearly engaged.
(2) He had not been convicted of any offence since arriving in the United Kingdom in 2010.
(3) The amount of money obtained by the use of the stolen credit card was relatively small.
(1) The public interest in performing international extradition obligations.
(2) The seriousness of the offences in respect of which the appellant was convicted.
(3) The assertion by the judicial authority that she is a fugitive from justice.
(4) Her failure to comply with the obligations of her suspended sentence.
(1) She has been settled in the United Kingdom since 2008. She has a fixed address and is in settled employment.
(2) She has now paid compensation and an accompanying fine in full.
(3) She has led a law-abiding life since coming to the United Kingdom.
(4) She has no close family in Poland.
(5) She asserts she is not a fugitive from justice.
Mr Justice Holroyde: