England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		22 July 2016

1. MR JUSTICE KING: This comes before me as a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review after refusal on the papers by Ouseley J.
2. The Applicant is not before me. There is before the court an application notice from the Claimant seeking an adjournment of the permission hearing listed today. She says, first, she has had insufficient time to prepare properly. Secondly, she pleads ill health, and being a victim of circumstances. Her statement in support says this:

"First, as you will see from my judicial review permission to appeal form 86B, my counsel was to be confirmed. It was not until the latter part of last week that my counsel, Simon Ralph of Carmelite Chambers, confirmed acceptance of my instructions to represent me for leave to appeal. The terms and fees are yet to be agreed until he's acquainted himself with and assessed the papers. The bundle for my permission for JR is quite lengthy and I have not had the opportunity to forward the papers together with preparing a brief for counsel.

Secondly, I am in the regrettable position due to my limited means that I'm not in a financial position this month to pay counsel's fees, which is yet to be agreed and will be based on the amount of paperwork and therefore is likely to be substantial.

Thirdly, in addition, I have several other court deadlines to comply with both this week and next week, so am under a huge amount of pressure this month to meet these deadlines. These other matters are outlined in my JR bundle at pages A9 and A10.

Fourth, further to this, this month I have unfortunately been a victim of circumstance. Not only am I currently unwell and I enclose a sick certificate with my application, but also having to contend with taking care of my daughter, who is mentally unwell and has suffered a psychotic episode. This occurred over the weekend of 11th July 2016. Unfortunately, she has had a relapse this week, having come off her medication and this has caused several domestic situations that have been a huge strain on me.

Five, this is a desperate situation as both my good name and character of 50 years are at stake, not to mention financial stability, should permission to appeal not be granted. I desperately need counsel to be properly prepared to do my case the justice it deserves and granting an adjournment assists me in obtaining access to justice.

I respectfully request the grace of the honourable court to at the very least adjourn this forthcoming hearing to the latter part of August 2016 so I can catch my breath and agree terms with my counsel and properly help prepare counsel for this upcoming hearing."

3. The judicial review is a challenge to decisions of, first, the St Helen's Magistrates' Court and, secondly, the Liverpool Crown Court. The St Helen's Magistrates' Court decision dates as far back as 17 September 2014. It was a decision convicting the Applicant of an offence of failing to comply with an improvement notice contrary to the Housing Act 2004, section 30. The decision of the Liverpool Crown Court, although not identified on its face in section 3 of the claim form, appears to relate to an application to the Liverpool Crown Court to appeal out of time the decision of the Magistrates' Court. That application was refused by the Liverpool Crown Court on 27 February 2015.
4. When refusing permission on the papers, Ouseley J said this:

"The application is hopeless, but I have not marked it as totally without merit since as a criminal causal matter no application could then be renewed at all.

The Claimant pleaded guilty to failure to comply with a Housing Act improvement notice before the Magistrates' Court on 17 September 2014. She then considered the District Judge had been biased and had coerced her into pleading guilty by suggesting firmly that she had no defence. She failed to persuade the District Judge to reopen the case in January 2015. She applied to the Crown Court for permission to appeal out of time. This was refused on 27 February 2015 so far as the conviction was concerned, but an extension of time was granted in relation to sentence. It is not clear whether that appeal was ever pursued and there may also be other proceedings which are brought fleetingly in the papers.

I am far from clear what the defence was. In the way she blamed her agents and said that she had sought to address the defects which underlay the requirements of the notice. However, the trial before the Magistrates' Court is not about whether the requirements are sensible or have been dealt with in another way. The trial is about whether she, the person served, has done what is required by the terms of the notice.

There is an earlier process whereby the requirements themselves can be challenged. Any judge is entitled to press what the point of the defence is since she who had been served was admitting during cross-examination that requirements had not been complied with.

All the points went in mitigation, so far as I can see, which would have been pursued on an appeal against sentence.

Be that as it may, the only possible challenge now is to the decision of the Crown Court to refuse an extension of time. That decision is not arguably wrong in law and there is no evidence near strong enough for a robust intervention to amount to partiality, let alone coercion. What would she have said if, after listening politely to all the questions, the DJ had said that she was guilty because what she had to say was irrelevant to the offence?

The criminal justice system is entitled to take steps to reduce the waste of time and money. There is no adequate basis for the extension of time for the bringing of these proceedings lodged in March 2016. She had many matters on her plate, but nothing which could have prevented her lodging this claim in three months from February 2015, neither were the papers being served on the St Helen's Borough Council as prosecutor. If the Claimant renews her application, she must do so when she lodges the renewed application."

5. The matters referred to by Ouseley J as regards the merits of any appeal from the First Defendant, referred in part to the fact that the Claimant initially pleaded not guilty but changed her pleas on that date, but now says that she was effectively coerced into doing so by the District Judge. She was fined £3,500 and ordered to pay costs of £3,800.
6. I have read the statement of the Claimant in support of her application to renew permission which is dated 27 June 2016.
7. I deal first with the application for an adjournment. I refuse that application. The Claimant has had a long time in order to determine how she would respond to the decision on the papers of Ouseley J. The so-called certificate of ill health is unparticularised and simply states that the Applicant is unfit for work. None of the matters which she relies on can justify not being in a position to appear before me today, whether it be with or without representation.
8. If I thought that there was any merit in this renewed application, I might have been more generous in the application for an adjournment, but the application is, in truth, truly hopeless. This judicial review claim is way out of time in relation, obviously, to the decision of the magistrates on 17 September 2014, but equally in relation to the decision complained of in the Crown Court of February 2015.
9. There is no justification made out in the papers for the delay in issuing the claim form when it was, which was on 1 April 2016. Equally, even if it were within time, there is nothing on the face of the papers I have seen which could begin to make out an arguable case which would support judicial review of either the magistrates conviction or the decision of the Crown Court to refuse permission to appeal out of time.
10. For all these reasons, this application for an adjournment is refused. I repeat there is nothing on the face of it which justifies, in my judgment, such an application. Secondly, it is apparent from what I have already said that the renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review is refused. I agree entirely with the reasons given by Ouseley J.