QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
London WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
|MARCIN SEBASTIAN PULIK||Appellant|
|JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF POLAND, DISTRICT COURT OF LUBIN||Respondent|
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Miss Florence Iveson (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) appeared on behalf of the Respondent
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"In our view Beatson LJ was correct in suggesting that it is the 'review' approach that should be taken by this court when it is considering an appeal from the conclusion of the District Judge on an issue of Article 8 'proportionality' in an extradition case. Under section 27(3) of the Extradition Act this court can only allow an appeal if it concludes that the 'appropriate judge' should have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently. In this context the relevant 'question' is whether the extradition of the requested person would be disproportionate to the interference it would have with his (and, if relevant, his family's) Article 8 rights. If, as we believe, the correct approach on appeal is one of review, then we think this court should not interfere simply because it takes a different view overall of the value-judgment that the District Judge has made or even the weight that he has attached to one or more individual factors which he took into account in reaching that overall value-judgment. In our judgment, generally speaking and in cases where no question of 'fresh evidence' arises on an appeal on 'proportionality', a successful challenge can only be mounted if it is demonstrated, on review, that the judge below (i) misapplied the well-established legal principles, or (ii) made a relevant finding of fact that no reasonable judge could have reached on the evidence, which had a material effect on the value-judgment, or (iii) failed to take into account a relevant fact or factor, or took into account an irrelevant fact or factor, or (iv) reached a conclusion overall that was irrational or perverse."
"We can, therefore, draw the following conclusions from Norris: (1) There may be a closer analogy between extradition and the domestic criminal process than between extradition and deportation or expulsion, but the court has still to examine carefully the way in which it will interfere with family life. (2) There is no test of exceptionality in either context. (3) The question is always whether the interference with the private and family lives of the extraditee and other members of his family is outweighed by the public interest in extradition. (4) There is a constant and weighty public interest in extradition: that people accused of crimes should be brought to trial; that people convicted of crimes should serve their sentences; that the United Kingdom should honour its treaty obligations to other countries; and that there should be no 'safe havens' to which either can flee in the belief that they will not be sent back. (5) That public interest will always carry great weight, but the weight to be attached to it in the particular case does vary according to the nature and seriousness of the crime or crimes involved. (6) The delay since the crimes were committed may both diminish the weight to be attached to the public interest and increase the impact upon private and family life. (7) Hence it is likely that the public interest in extradition will outweigh the Article 8 rights of the family unless the consequences of the interference with family life will be exceptionally severe."
With those principles in mind I turn to consider the arguments advanced by Mr Solley and the response to them of Miss Iveson for the requesting authority.
"While extradition would clearly amount to an interference with the requested person's family life, I have come to the conclusion that the interference is both necessary and proportionate. There is nothing to suggest that the requested person's partner with or without the help of her mother could not discharge her parental obligations if the requested person were extradited and although there will be financial and personal consequences."
I shall come back to Mr Solley's overarching submissions shortly.
"... exercise caution not to impose our views about the seriousness of the offence or offences under consideration or the level of sentences or the arrangements for prisoner release which we are informed are likely to operate in the country seeking extradition."
"The European Arrest Warrant scheme is based on the principle of mutual recognition by the Member States of the European Union. Whilst the offences are not necessarily of the most serious type, they are in my view nowhere near trivial enough to tip the scale against extradition. I have considered the delay but I have to suggest that most if not all of the delay is as a result of the requested person leaving Poland, knowing of his obligations and not giving any notification of a change of address."
For those reasons this appeal fails and is dismissed.