England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		18 February 2015

1. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Mr Ranbir Singh Bains is a solicitor. At a hearing in March 2014 a tribunal of the Solicitors Regulation Authority ("the SRA") made certain findings of misconduct against him and ordered that his name be struck off the roll of solicitors. This is Mr Bains' statutory appeal from one in particular of those findings, namely a finding of dishonesty. If I were to conclude that the finding of dishonesty could not stand, then inevitably the sanction of striking off would also require reconsideration by the tribunal.
2. Mr Bains is now aged in his mid 50s and had had many years of unblemished service as a solicitor. Indeed, he was able to produce to the tribunal over 30 glowing testimonies to his ability and integrity as a solicitor. Accordingly, this case and the decision of the tribunal is undoubtedly a great personal and professional tragedy.
3. Mr Bains was in practice with a single other partner. Part of the background to the case is that that partner became terminally ill and rapidly died. So, at the material time, Mr Bains found himself acting as a sole practitioner, which undoubtedly added considerably to the pressures upon him. Another part of the background of which the tribunal were perfectly well aware and to which they referred in their reasons is that Mr Bains had been under a number of personal pressures as well. His late mother became seriously ill and later died. He himself suffered and was treated for depression, and he also had certain physical problems of which the tribunal were aware and I am aware, but which it is not necessary to further specify in a public judgment.
4. The charges related to the management of, and dealings or transactions upon, Mr Bains' client account or accounts. They fell under two broad headings. Charge 1.1 was that he withdrew monies from the client account in respect of certain named clients that exceeded the funds held for those clients. That gave rise to a shortage on the client account and was in express breach of rule 22(5) of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules 1998 which provides that:

"Money withdrawn in relation to a particular client... from a general client account must not exceed the money held on behalf of that client... in all the solicitor's general client accounts..."

5. Charge 1.2 was that Mr Bains improperly utilised client monies for the purposes of other clients in breach of rule 30 of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules 1998. Rule 30 provides that:

"A paper transfer of money held in a general client account from the ledger of one client to the ledger of another client may only be made if..."

Certain situations are then specified under which such a transfer would be permissible. It is not suggested that any of the permissible circumstances existed or were satisfied in this case.

6. The essential background is that the clients of Mr Bains and his firm included four linked or related clients who appear to have had very large property funds and dealings. The essence of charge 1.1 was that on occasions Mr Bains caused or authorised that payments would be made out of his client account on behalf of one or more of those four clients that exceeded the actual money held by him on their behalf. He says that generally what happened was that he was put under extreme pressure by one or more of the clients to make an immediate payment out of his client account before sufficient funds had been paid into his client account or a cheque making a sufficient payment had been honoured and cleared.
7. The essence of charge 1.2 was that a solicitor cannot permit a client to overdraw on the solicitor's client account. From time to time it came about that one or more of these four clients were showing a debit within the client account. In order to cover that up, a ledger transfer was made from credit funds standing to the credit of another client or clients. During the course of the hearing this morning, Mr Bains (who represents himself before me as he did before the tribunal) described these activities as "a short term fix".
8. In 2011 there had been an investigation of the books and records of Mr Bains by an investigator, Ms Sarah Taylor. She had interviewed Mr Bains and also his bookkeeper, who had been his bookkeeper for several years and at all material times. Ms Taylor had also removed a considerable quantity of documents and accounting records. The SRA then intervened into the practice of Mr Bains. At the hearing before the tribunal in 2014 Mr Bains admitted the underlying facts of these and indeed other allegations to which it is not necessary to refer.
9. The essential question for the tribunal was whether the conduct of Mr Bains in breaching the requirements of the Solicitors' Accounts Rules 1998 was in any alleged respect dishonest or grossly reckless in his stewardship of client funds. The oral hearing lasted two long days. Both Ms Taylor and Mr Bains gave considerable oral evidence. The tribunal record their findings and reasons in a long, closely typed judgment that extends to approximately 52 pages and 223 paragraphs.
10. The tribunal were not satisfied to the required standard of being sure that Mr Bains had been dishonest in relation to the transactions the subject of charge 1.1. In relation to that charge they said at paragraph 201.17 of their judgment, now bundle page 54, that he had been "clearly reckless" and "naive in the extreme" in accepting the promises of the four clients that he would very shortly be put in funds. However, they said:

"The Tribunal had some doubt about whether it could properly be said that the Respondent knew at the relevant time that what he was doing was dishonest. He had been trusting when he should not have been, with extremely serious consequences. The Tribunal accepted that the Respondent had believed what he was told and that all would be made right. Whilst this belief appeared unreasonable, the Tribunal could not be sure that the Respondent had known at the relevant times that what he was doing was wrong. The Tribunal was satisfied that the Respondent had been reckless in his conduct of his client account in authorising payments out in excess of monies held but was not satisfied to the required standard that he had been dishonest. The Respondent had been overawed by clients who he perceived as being very wealthy and honourable members of the community."

11. However, in relation to allegation 1.2 the tribunal did conclude that Mr Bains:

"had acted dishonestly by the standards of reasonable and honest people. Further, the Tribunal was satisfied to the required standard that in making the transfers, which he knew were unauthorised loans at the relevant time, the Respondent knew that what he was doing was dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people. His use of other client money was grossly reckless - for the reasons set out in relation to allegation 1.1 - but the Tribunal was not satisfied to the required standard that he had been dishonest in that regard. The Tribunal was, however, satisfied to the highest standard that the Respondent had been dishonest in relation to his use of money belonging to the Mr D and Mr A estates" - namely the subject of charge 1.2.

12. It is from that finding of dishonesty in relation to charge 1.2 that Mr Bains now brings this statutory appeal. As I have said, if the finding of dishonesty cannot stand, then inevitably the ultimate sanction of striking off would require to be reconsidered by the tribunal. The grounds of appeal are well summarised and set out by Mr Bains at page 9 of his bundle for this appeal. There are a number of matters of general complaint that he makes about the course or conduct of the hearing. He complains, first, that the tribunal did not sufficiently take into account his medical and psychiatric history to which I have briefly already referred. In support of that, he has shown to me today a further letter from his consultant psychiatrist, dated 9 April 2014, which is, however, substantially to the same effect as that before the tribunal.
13. There is, frankly, nothing in this particular point, although I am sympathetic to the psychiatric and physical ill health from which Mr Bains was suffering and does still suffer. There is no doubt that the tribunal had his medical evidence and the position with regard to his health well in mind. They also had well in mind the personal and professional pressures that he had been suffering under from the unexpected death of his partner and the illness and later death of his mother. That is all clearly referred to in paragraph 77 of the judgment, now at bundle page 23. With regard to his health specifically, this was referred to in sufficient detail at paragraphs 79 and 80 of their judgment, pages 23 and 24, and again in paragraphs 167 to 170 at pages 44 and 45, and again at paragraph 192 on page 48. Finally, within their reasons themselves for their conclusions under allegation 1.1, the tribunal referred again to the report from the psychiatrist and the issues of depression and ill health at paragraph 201.16 on page 53. The tribunal were satisfied that Mr Bains was not disadvantaged in conducting his own case by his physical or psychiatric ill health.
14. Having now met Mr Bains for some hours today, it is quite clear to me that although his health problems persist and require regular medication, he is in no way disadvantaged in conducting this hearing before me. He is, if I may respectfully say so, a man of obvious high intelligence. He has a very thorough grasp of this case and the documents, and he has presented his case with clarity and cogency.
15. The tribunal also separately addressed the question of whether or not his mental health was or might have been such that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. They said, however, at paragraph 101.16:

"The Tribunal noted that the Respondent had contended that his mental health was such that at the relevant time... he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. There was no evidence to support this contention... An impairment of his professional judgment was not the same as such a significant impairment that the Respondent would be unable to recognise that his behaviour was objectively dishonest... Although he had undoubtedly been operating under considerable pressure, in particular after the death of his business partner in 2009, the various testimonials suggested that despite the many stresses he experienced the Respondent had maintained high professional standards in conducting client matters and in his personal life. The only known area in which the Respondent's conduct had been below proper standards was in respect of [the four linked clients]. The Tribunal did not consider that this evidence went far enough to create a reasonable doubt about the Respondent's ability to understand that what he was doing - in using clients' money for the benefit of other clients - was dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people".

16. In my view, that assessment and judgment by the tribunal was impregnable and the undoubted history of ill health cannot weigh with me or impact upon the tribunal's ultimate finding and conclusion with regard to dishonesty.
17. The next area of undoubted concern to Mr Bains is around the role in this case of the forensic investigating officer, Ms Sarah Taylor, to whom I have referred. During the course of her evidence, Mr Bains asked her various questions which elicited that she does not have any significant academic or any professional qualification. She is not, for instance, an accountant, nor a solicitor, nor in possession of a university degree. He says (and I will accept) that it came as something of a surprise to him that the forensic investigating officer might be a person so lacking in formal academic or professional qualifications. Be that as it may, she was to explain that she does in fact have a number of years' experience in carrying out exactly this kind of investigation. In any event, Mr Bains' concerns with regard to her absence of qualifications were developed before, and well known to, the tribunal. At paragraph 150 of their judgment, now bundle page 41, they say:

"Ms Taylor told the Tribunal that she had no professional qualifications, e.g. as an accountant or solicitor..."

and they then describe her 10 years of experience and the 300 or so investigations of this kind that she has carried out.

18. At paragraph 195 on page 49 of their judgment they said:

"The Tribunal noted that the Respondent had raised a number of complaints and allegations against the applicant and, in particular, against the FIO, Ms Taylor. The Tribunal did not consider that Ms Taylor's Report or investigation were deficient by reason of her lack of accountancy qualifications..."

19. It seems to me, therefore, that there is nothing at all either in that particular ground of complaint. The real heart of the complaint of Mr Bains on this appeal is that Ms Taylor gave some evidence to the effect that transfer slips did not exist in relation to the transactions that were the subject matter of charge 1.2. Subsequent to the hearing and his being struck off, Mr Bains made arrangements to visit and has visited the depository where the Solicitors Regulation Authority now hold all his documents that were removed by, or under the direction of, Ms Taylor. He has in fact found within that mass of documents the original transfer slips in relation to the two transactions which were the subject of charge 1.2.
20. Mr Bains strongly contends, accordingly, that the evidence of Ms Taylor on this topic was erroneous, as it clearly was. He clearly has a personal reservation, to put it no higher, about the integrity of Ms Taylor, but he submits in any event that if the tribunal had not been told that there were no transfer slips but had indeed been shown the transfer slips which he later found, then they would or might not have reached their finding of dishonesty.
21. The position of Mr Bains is that so far as he was and is concerned there is simply no material difference between the substance of charge 1.1 and the substance of charge 1.2. He says that the transfers that were made in the ledgers and records (which were purely paper transfers) are in all material respects exactly the same as the payment out of monies from the client account to third parties that were the subject of charge 1.1. He says that in both cases payments were credited to, or made on behalf of, certain clients who did not have sufficient funds within the client account and that the source of those payments or credits must necessarily have been another client or clients. As he submits that there was simply no material difference between the substance of charges 1.1 and 1.2, he says that there can be no rational explanation or basis for why the tribunal did not find dishonesty proved in relation to charge 1.1 but did in relation to 1.2. He says the only possible explanation why they might have discriminated or differentiated in that way is the evidence of Ms Taylor that there were no transfer slips for the transactions which were the subject of charge 1.2.
22. In support of that contention, Mr Bains has drawn my attention to a passage in the verbatim transcript of the oral evidence at internal pages 34 to 40 of the second day of the hearing, now at bundle pages 99 to 105. He has indeed sought to bolster his point on this passage by playing in court, so that I could hear it, a recording of the actual material part of the hearing itself which lasted about 10 minutes. So I have now not only read in transcript form, but also heard in oral recorded form, the passage upon which he so heavily relies.
23. It arises in questions from the tribunal themselves to Ms Taylor right at the end of her evidence. A male person described as a "Tribunal member" said in a question that:

"One of the areas that is relevant is the extent to which the paperwork -- the green slips I think they were called -- for the transfers between the various accounts were part of a big batch or were individually identified or whether there was discussion. From your discussions with the bookkeeper, could you explain to us what she said about the process for those transfers happening, who was involved, and how involved they were? Who knew what?"

24. Pausing there, Mr Bains understandably places emphasis on the use by that member of the tribunal of the phrase "one of the areas that is relevant". He suggests, therefore, that at any rate at that point in the evidence that particular member of the tribunal was considering the presence or absence of these transfer slips or green slips as being relevant. It is not necessary to read out in any detail the ensuing questions and answers which cover several pages. The gist of the answers by Ms Taylor was to the effect that she or the SRA did take away everything that they could find like bank statements and the slips and the ledgers in relation to each of the cases "if they were there".
25. After that tribunal member had finished asking questions, the chairman himself asked some questions, the gist of which was to clarify whether transfer slips - or green slips - existed in relation to the transfers the subject of charge 1.2. There is the following short passage:

"Q: Yes, and there was no piece of paper authorising the transfer, is that what you were saying?

A: Not that I can recall.

Q: Right, but did you have any understanding as to how the bookkeeper came to make the transfer?

A: She would have been told to do the transfer.

Q: But that is an assumption?

A: Yes, it is my assumption, but...

Q: She did not tell you that?

A: She didn't, no."

26. So Mr Bains fairly makes the point that not only one tribunal member but also the chairman of the tribunal was digging away by questions in relation to these transfer slips, and elicited the evidence from Ms Taylor in effect that they did not exist in relation to these particular transactions.
27. Mr Bains then has a very strong sense of grievance about what followed. After the chairman had concluded asking some questions on that and other topics, he said:

"All right, well that is all. Anything to come back on?"

28. At that point Mr Goodwin, the solicitor advocate who was presenting the case to the Tribunal immediately said:

"Just one question, if I may."

29. The chairman said: "Yes, yes."
30. Mr Goodwin then asked a short number of further questions. The strong grievance of Mr Bains is that he considered that in answer to those questions from members of the tribunal, Ms Taylor had given inaccurate, if not indeed untruthful, answers and evidence, but he was not given an express opportunity to ask further questions of her. It is true that the chairman had said:

"Anything to come back on?"

31. But Mr Bains says that Mr Goodwin immediately jumped in with his further question or questions and it was not made expressly clear to Mr Bains himself that he also could ask further questions "to come back on" that which the tribunal members had elicited. I do have to say that it was in my view regrettable that the chairman did not specifically and directly address Mr Bains separately from Mr Goodwin, so as to make quite clear that he, the chairman, was affording to Mr Bains an opportunity to ask any further questions arising out of the questions asked by the tribunal and the answers given by Ms Taylor.
32. When a court or tribunal asks a series of questions, particularly at the end of the primary examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination of a witness, it is, in my view, good practice for the court or tribunal formally and expressly and clearly to offer to each party or their advocates an identified opportunity to ask any further questions that might arise from the questions just asked and the evidence given.
33. That said, I cannot accept the complaint of Mr Bains that there was any fundamental unfairness or irregularity at this point of the proceedings. Mr Bains is an intelligent man. He clearly conducted the whole case with skill and considerable grasp of all of the relevant facts. He had heard Ms Taylor give the evidence and answers that she did. He had seen Mr Goodwin exercise the opportunity of asking a further few questions. He cannot possibly have imagined that he could not ask the chairman if he himself could ask some further questions arising. The entire transcript of this whole hearing indicates that the tribunal took scrupulous care to respect any disadvantage to Mr Bains of acting in person or of being less than completely fit. If Mr Bains had given the slightest indication that he disagreed with what Ms Taylor had just said, or wished to ask her some further questions arising, then I am in no doubt that he would have been afforded that opportunity. So I do not accept that there was some fatal unfairness or irregularity in that point of the proceedings.
34. The fundamental question nevertheless arises: were the tribunal misled or influenced in their ultimate conclusion as to dishonesty by the evidence of Ms Taylor to the effect that there were no transfer slips or green slips in relation to the transactions in question.
35. Mr Bains submits that the tribunal did regard the apparent absence of any such slips as significant. First, he relies on the very fact that both the chairman and another tribunal member did ask questions in relation to transfer slips and whether they existed, and he points out that the tribunal member had used the phrase "one of the areas that is relevant". He also points out that at paragraphs 164 and 165, now at bundle page 44 of their judgment, the tribunal summarised the evidence that Ms Taylor had given in answer to those questions from the tribunal themselves.
36. In my view no significance attaches to the fact as such that they summarised that evidence. The whole of this very long judgment involves often verbatim summary of effectively all the evidence that had been given. Paragraphs 164 and 165 are merely part of the narrative of the course of the hearing and are no more than a summary record of the evidence that was given at that point at the narrative. Nowhere in paragraphs 164 or 165 do the tribunal say or imply that they are attaching any particular significance to that evidence. They merely record the giving of the evidence as a fact.
37. What is to my mind conspicuous is the absence of any reference to that evidence in paragraph 202 of their judgment, now at bundle pages 54 to 57, in which the tribunal give their reasons for concluding that Mr Bains had acted dishonestly in relation to the transactions the subject matter of allegation 1.2. Unquestionably, if they had said within that part of their judgment words to the effect that it was significant that no transfer slips existed in relation to these transactions, then the whole question of dishonesty would fall for reconsideration since Mr Bains has now produced from the store of the Solicitors Regulation Authority the very transfer slips in question.
38. What the tribunal said, however, in considerable detail over some three and a half pages, included the following:

"The facts of the transfers were clear and undisputed... The Tribunal noted that the unauthorised loan from the Mr A ledger was repaid within three weeks but the unauthorised loans from the Mr D ledger had not been repaid in full... The Tribunal further noted that the greatest part of the unauthorised loans had been outstanding for approximately 7 months on the Mr D ledger; this ledger in particular had been short of funds."

39. The actual transfer from the Mr D ledger was a sum of £250,000. The tribunal continued:

"The Tribunal found that, as the Respondent had admitted, there was no connection between Mr D or Mr A and [the other four clients]... The Respondent had told the Tribunal in his evidence that he had not been dishonest and that he did not realise at the time that what he was doing was wrong. Again, he had told the Tribunal that he believed his clients would repay the money very soon, that he had been under a lot of pressure and was not in his right mind... As noted above, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the Respondent's present ill health cast any reasonable doubt on his ability to tell right from wrong at the relevant time, or to appreciate whether what he was doing was dishonest... There was no doubt that the Respondent was responsible for the three transfers from the Mr D and Mr A ledgers, which took place over a period of about four months... The Tribunal accepted that Respondent did not himself specifically target the accounts of Mr D and/or Mr A as he was probably unaware of the balances on the various probate files handled by the firm; this was an area of work previously dealt with by his [now deceased] business partner... However, he was responsible for authorising the transfers, and on his own evidence was responsible for how the transfers were described. The Respondent knew at the relevant time that money was being transferred from a designated deposit account to the general client account and then to an unconnected client, where there was no good reason to use money belonging to Mr D and Mr A for the benefit of [the other clients]. There was a degree of deliberation here which the Tribunal had not been satisfied existed in relation to the more general use of client funds. Indeed, there was a degree of planning in that the money had been refunded in time to pay out to the beneficiaries. The Tribunal was satisfied that in transferring monies from the Mr D and Mr A ledgers, for the benefit of [the other clients] the Respondent had acted dishonestly by the standards of reasonable and honest people. Further, the Tribunal was satisfied to the required standard that in making the transfers, which he knew were unauthorised loans at the relevant time, the Respondent knew that what he was doing was dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people..."

40. There is simply no reference whatsoever in any of the passages I have quoted above, nor indeed anywhere at all throughout paragraph 202, to the apparent non-existence of transfer slips -- or green slips -- in relation to these transactions. The case of Mr Bains is that, to him at any rate, there was no material difference between the substance of charge 1.1 and charge 1.2. There is no logical or consistent reason or explanation why the tribunal should have found him not dishonest on charge 1.1 but dishonest on charge 1.2 and in his mind the only conceivable explanation is the evidence that Ms Taylor had given that apparently no transfer slips existed. To my mind this is, in the end, speculative and, as I have been at pains to describe, the apparent absence of the transfer slips did not impact at all on the express reasons of the Tribunal.
41. Further, it seems to me that if the transfer slips in question had been found and produced by Ms Taylor that would tend to have fortified, not diminished, the case on dishonesty. Each slip clearly shows a transfer from the account within the client account of Mr D to the account within the client account of one of the four clients. One is for £250,000, the other is for £42,500. The first is described as "in respect of short term loan." The second is described as "in respect of temporary loan". In each case, there was in truth no loan of any kind whatsoever, and the transaction was a bookkeeping transfer made by the bookkeeper on the express authority of Mr Bains in order to cover up the debit balances in the accounts of other clients. Both slips are clearly signed by Mr Bains himself. So if these slips had indeed been produced at the hearing by Ms Taylor they would, first, have evidenced the fraud in that they referred to "short term loan" or "temporary loan" when no such loan existed. Second, they would have been incontrovertible proof that the person authorising the transfers was Mr Bains himself who signed the slips. For those reasons, it does not seem to me that the undoubted error in the evidence of Ms Taylor and the discovery of these slips since the conclusion of the hearing can in any way be said to undermine or expose as wrong the decision of the tribunal with regard to dishonesty.
42. I repeat that this case is one of great personal and professional tragedy. I have a considerable element of sympathy for Mr Bains. It seems highly unlikely that he would have found himself in this position but for the untimely death of his partner and the pressures that were placed upon him by certain clients whom he thought were honourable and good for the money when, in truth, they were not. But for the reasons I have given, I am not able to conclude that there is any respect in which the decision of the tribunal was wrong or reached unfairly, and this appeal must be dismissed.
43. Are there any matters that now arise?
44. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, the appeal has been dismissed on all grounds and I make an application for costs on behalf of the respondent.
45. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Yes.
46. MR WILLIAMS: First in principle, there was an order made against him in the Tribunal.
47. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Yes, I know.
48. MR WILLIAMS: Not to be enforced without leave.
49. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Leave of the tribunal?
50. MR WILLIAMS: Of the Tribunal.
51. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Yes.
52. MR WILLIAMS: I understand that Mr Bains is now out of bankruptcy. And I have to apply for the costs, the significant costs brought about by this unsuccessful appeal.
53. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Do you have a costs schedule? Assume for the minute I am with you on the principle, are you asking me to assess them?
54. MR WILLIAMS: Yes, please.
55. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Have you got a costs schedule?
56. MR WILLIAMS: I have.
57. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: When did you first supply that to Mr Bains?
58. MR WILLIAMS: Yesterday, by email.
59. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: What time yesterday?
60. MR WILLIAMS: I am awaiting instructions on it. 2.30 pm, as I understand it.
61. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: It should have been sooner.
62. MR BAINS: I think it was amended and sent after that.
63. MR WILLIAMS: There was another one for slightly less --
64. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Is this the bottom line: £44,000?
65. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, yes. You have a breakdown.
66. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: All right, well, let's just take this by stages.
67. MR WILLIAMS: Yes.
68. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: You say in principle he has to be ordered to pay your costs?
69. MR WILLIAMS: Yes, my Lord.
70. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Can you resist that, Mr Bains? You have brought an appeal and I am afraid it has been unsuccessful and normally the costs follow the event. That is not talking about the quantum.
71. MR BAINS: Well sir, I did straight after the hearing write to the SRA to say I was very worried about some of the things which had happened and I was going to appeal, and I suggested to them that we should have a meeting where we could discuss things and perhaps there may be a way out without having proceedings. That led to nothing so then I did write to them again. I did it in normal correspondence.
72. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Do you know, really there was nothing that could be discussed. The tribunal had made their finding. These people do not have an authority to set aside the finding. They might possibly have agreed to a consensual approach to the tribunal to reconsider or something.
73. MR BAINS: They said at that time this would be a highly unusual step that they would wait something or other at that time, and then again when we submitted skeleton arguments, I said exactly the same: that really I didn't need the stress and aggravation and the costs of a hearing but this time I got no response at all.
74. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: I know. But the trouble is you brought the appeal and you have maintained it to the end. I don't honestly think there is any possible basis on which I can not exercise a discretion in principle to order you to pay their costs. I am very sympathetic to you but it is solicitors' money. I expect this is funded ultimately by payments made by the practitioners. Is that right?
75. MR BAINS: That's right, my Lord.
76. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: At any rate, it is solicitors' money and they obviously have to husband it.
77. MR BAINS: I note your judgment and I do take some comfort that you do find that the evidence given to the Solicitors Tribunal was incorrect. I placed a lot of emphasis on that and I believe that I was entitled to. I don't think that was in any malintentioned proceedings by me. I do accept that I lost on that point but it is not a question of it being vexatious and I do --
78. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Mr Bains, Mr Williams hasn't used the word vexatious and I can assure you there has not been a single moment at any stage today when I have thought it was remotely vexatious. In fact I am very sympathetic to you. I also do understand that you do have a strong sense of grievance which to a degree is very justifiable -- that she said these documents did not exist and they did exist. The difficulty is what you did not do was stand back and ask the question: does it in the end make any difference? I am afraid, after considering this carefully all day today, my own view, as I have just told you, is it doesn't make any difference. I don't see how I can not in principle order you to pay the costs. Then there is the question of the amount of them. You have this, haven't you? Yes. I think you should have had it longer ago than yesterday, quite frankly.
79. They say the bottom line is £44,000 which I have to say does strike me as a very considerable amount of money for what in the end is a one day hearing.
80. MR BAINS: Yes, sir. They have leading counsel --
81. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Yes, well, they've made a decision to instruct leading counsel and that, without being disparaging in any sense to Mr Williams, necessarily carries with it expense, higher than if they had instructed junior counsel.
82. MR BAINS: I think the total cost for the two day --
83. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Well, do you want a detailed assessment, or the right to a detailed assessment?
84. MR BAINS: I think I should, sir. I can't possibly consider it.
85. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: I am not going to assess the costs in this amount, that's for sure. And I don't think I am going to sit here and horse trade. Whether you, Mr Williams, wish to have a short discussion with Mr Bains and I will rise, and see if there is a figure the two of you can agree. He is, after all, a solicitor. He's got some idea of legal costs. He could agree with you and you could agree with him that the costs will be quantified as X, whatever X may be. But I am not going to assess them. This is a very very high figure. I am not going to assess them in anything like this figure. But if you wish to hold out for that figure, which you are entitled to do, you can have a detailed assessment. Shall we just briefly see if there is a figure that your solicitor, you have a solicitor with you?
86. MR WILLIAMS: Yes.
87. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Who would be a solicitor in private practice?
88. MR WILLIAMS: A solicitor with the SRA.
89. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Oh, a solicitor with the SRA. This was conducted by the gentleman, Mr Goodwin.
90. MR WILLIAMS: Yes.
91. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Who I understand simply to be a solicitor in private practice of Jonathan Goodwin Solicitor Advocates.
92. MR WILLIAMS: Yes.
93. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: But you are instructed by the SRA internal legal department?
94. MR WILLIAMS: I am.
95. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: I will just rise for a moment or two and you can have the briefest of discussions with the gentleman who instructs you and with Mr Bains. If there is a figure, whatever it may be, that is agreed, then I will by consent assess the costs in that amount, but if not there will have to be a detailed assessment.
96. MR WILLIAMS: I understand, my Lord. I just thought I would say we have had brief discussions earlier in the day in the event that they may be relevant but we are quite happy to have another brief go.
97. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: The alternative is I just say it will be subject to detailed assessment.
98. MR WILLIAMS: Yes.
99. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: That does not preclude instantly reaching agreement.
100. MR WILLIAMS: That's right.
101. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: If you have already had some discussion. Shall I just rise for a moment or two. But there is no pressure. You don't have to agree a figure. If there is no figure agreed I am just going to say: you are to pay the costs, to be the subject of a detailed assessment if not agreed. So you don't have to agree the figure. There is no pressure. On the other hand, it may be they would rather draw a line and may, I have no idea, accept a relatively low figure in order just to draw a line. So there is no pressure on you whatsoever. Do you understand that? If you agree something you agree; if you don't, you don't and there will be a detailed assessment. Two minutes.
(A short adjournment)
102. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: Is there an agreed figure?
103. MR WILLIAMS: No, my Lord. Regrettably there is not.
104. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: That's all right. It doesn't preclude further negotiation.
105. MR WILLIAMS: No, not at all.
106. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: So in fact the order will be very short, won't it. It will be upon hearing the appellant Ranbir Singh Bains in person, leading counsel on behalf of the respondents, it is ordered (1) the appeal is dismissed; (2) the appellant must pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the appeal to be assessed if not agreed.
107. MR WILLIAMS: My Lord, yes. I am grateful. I am instructed to apply for an order that Mr Bains should pay a modest amount on account, pending the detailed assessment.
108. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: I am not going to do that. He already owes you £50,000. You haven't got leave from the tribunal to enforce that, so I am not going to meantime say that he should pay something on account of this.
109. MR WILLIAMS: No.
110. MR JUSTICE HOLMAN: I won't do that, no. All right. Can you draw something up, Mr Williams, send it by email to Mr Bains. Presumably he can receive it by email for his agreement. And once it is agreed as to its wording, lodge it with today's associate who will give you his email address. And that will be the order.