England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN''S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		26/02/2015

 


Mr Justice Collins:

1. This claim is brought pursuant to Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and Section 63 of the Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990 against decisions of the first defendant of 1 June 2014 which allowed the proposed development of a site covering 3.5 hectares lying on the south of the Thames. It is occupied by the Shell Centre, the headquarters of the Shell Petroleum Company. The Shell Tower is not part of the development, but adjoining buildings are to be demolished and redeveloped. The redevelopment is to comprise eight new buildings which will have office, retail and residential uses. There will also be pedestrian walkways and open spaces.
2. Four applications were needed. There were two applications for planning permission. The first covered the main development. The second was needed to cover the external alterations to the Shell Tower which were needed following the demolition and redevelopment of the adjoining buildings. South Bank is a conservation area so that conservation area consent was required. Within the site is what is known as the Franta Belsky Fountain. This is a listed building and the fourth application was for listed building consent to enable it to be relocated. As is I think obvious the four applications stood or fell together. There are other listed buildings which would be affected by the development. These include the Royal Festival Hall (Grade I), County Hall and the National Theatre (Grade II*). The Shell Centre building is locally listed by Lambeth, but has not, despite a number of applications, achieved national listing. The local listing is largely due to its history as one of the first developments on this part of the South Bank which was considered in the early 1960s to have architectural merit.
3. The applications were made to Lambeth as the local planning authority on 13 December 2012. They were referred to the Mayor whose preliminary view was that Lambeth should consider them. Following what were described as ‘'technical briefings’', Lambeth’'s officers issued a favourable report on 10 May 2013. On 21 May 2013 the planning committee voted by a majority of 3 to 2 to approve the development. This was referred to the Mayor who on 17 July 2013 indicated that he was content for Lambeth to deal with the applications. However, having regard to the importance of the site and to the impact it could have not only on the listed buildings but also the World Heritage Site covering Parliament Square and views from St James’'s Park, on 3 September 2013 the first defendant made a direction under s.77 of the TCPA 1990 calling in the applications. An inspector (Mr John Braithwaite) was appointed. Following a pre-inquiry meeting on 9 October 2013, the inspector held an inquiry over 11 days between 21 November and 12 December 2013. Opponents of the applications who appeared at and took part in the inquiry were the claimant, who was acting on behalf of a company called Riverside Communities Limited (RCL), Mr Richard Tamplin, representing the 20^th Century Society and himself and Westminster City Council, represented by one of its planning officers, Mr Robert Ayton.
4. While the claim lies against the decision of the first defendant, the attack is on the conclusions and the conduct of the inspector. It cannot be said that, if there were no errors of law in the inspector’'s report, the first defendant should not have accepted his recommendations. This claim can only succeed if the claimant shows that the decision was “"not within the powers of the Act”" or that there were procedural errors by which he was seriously prejudiced.
5. RCL was formed by a small group of residents who wished to oppose the Shell development applications. The claimant himself had impressed the director in his involvement in a successful opposition to a development at 8 Albert Embankment. He himself holds a degree in International Economics and has been concerned with policy issues in planning in London on sites near or adjacent to the Thames. His particular concern has been in relation to economic viability and he had been involved in meetings with Ministers which included policy matters to be included in the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF). He thus has considerable expertise which has included consideration of affordable housing. I would like to pay tribute to the way in which he presented his case before me, albeit, as will become apparent, I have not accepted his arguments. I have no doubt that if permission had been required to pursue this claim it would have been granted.
6. There is an existing planning permission known as the Belvedere Court Scheme (BCS) granted in 2004 for a new office building to the south of the development with which this claim is concerned. However, that does not have a direct bearing on the matters which are raised in this claim.
7. The inspector sets out the material planning policies and other planning guidance. The material plans are the London Plan (LP), the Lambeth Development Framework Core Strategy (CS) and the saved policies of the Lambeth Unitary Development Plan (UDP). The LP identifies the Shell Centre to be in the Central Activities Zone (CAZ) within which development should promote the roles of the CAZ, enhance its distinctive environment and heritage, increase office floorspace and include a mix of uses including housing. It is also in what is described as an Opportunity Area so that development must optimise residential and non-residential output.
8. Policies contained in chapter 3 of the LP seek to maximise the provision of affordable housing in order to provide mixed and balanced communities. While affordable housing should normally be provided on-site, in exceptional cases it may be provided off-site. Policies contained in chapter 7 of the LP deal with tall buildings and with the need to ensure that the highest architectural standards are applied and that there should be no adverse impact on World Heritage Sites or on strategic views.
9. Policies in the CS include the need to seek the provision of 40% affordable housing on sites over 0.1 Hectares and, where relevant, independently validated evidence of viability. The UDP identifies the Shell Centre site as one of a number of Major Development Opportunities and indicates support for permeability and pedestrian linkages. There must also be an acceptable impact by any development on levels of daylight and sunlight and there should be sufficient outdoor amenity space.
10. There are various supplementary planning policies directed at the Waterloo area. It is unnecessary to refer to those specifically since they apply the principles in the policies already cited specifically to the Waterloo area. There are however two guidance documents to which I should refer. The first relates to London’'s World Heritage Sites (LWHS): it recognises that views into and out of any World Heritage Site (WHS) can contribute to its setting. There is also the London View Management Framework (LVMF). This establishes a number of strategic views and requires that an application that could affect a designated view should be “"accompanied by an analysis that explains, evaluates and justifies any visual impact on the view”". The relevant views for the purposes of this claim are those from Waterloo, Westminister and Hungerford Bridges, from Victoria Embankment between Waterloo and Westminster Bridges, from Parliament Square and from St James’'s Park. Paragraph 445 of the LVMF states:-

“"Any development within the [Waterloo Opportunity Area], or beyond, visible between the central fleche of County Hall and Portcullis House should be sensitively designed and be of the highest architectural quality, reflecting the fact that it will itself form part of the setting of the WWHS”".

11. The claimant has identified as a ground of primary importance the assessment of economic viability of the development. Such an assessment was required in particular because it determined the provision of affordable housing. It was the developers’' case that only 20% could be achieved rather than 40% because to provide more would mean that the development was not economically viable. Viability was also to an extent material in that it was said by the claimant to have justified a departure from design standards and damage to neighbours. It also impacted on loss of open space. If the claimant is correct in his submissions that the inspector failed to deal properly with the issue of viability and that the evidence put before him by the developers could not justify the conclusion on viability, this claim will be likely to succeed. If, as the claimant argues, the report on which the viability assessment was based could not properly have been taken into account or was unlawful because its conclusions could not be justified, the inspector’'s conclusion might have been different and so the recommendations he made cannot stand.
12. Guidance is given in the Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) which deals with viability. Assessment should be based on current costs and values and present circumstances. Individual schemes’' viability needed to be taken into account in relation to affordable housing contributions. There must be robust evidence reflective of market conditions in considering all costs. These will include development costs, costs of planning obligations and infrastructure and of professionals involved. Assessment of land or site value is crucial. The size and risk profile is material. All this is, I think, fairly obvious, but there is a need for the information to be given and Lambeth’'s own policy requires it.
13. The developers submitted a report from a firm called Quod. This was regarded as confidential. Lambeth decided that it should obtain its own report to see whether the conclusions Quod reached were appropriate. Accordingly it instructed BNP Paribas (BNPP) to carry out a review of the developers’' Financial Appraisal supporting statement (the Quod report). BNPP is a highly respected firm of chartered surveyors, town planning and international consultants. BNPP recommended a number of amendments to some figures upon which Quod based its conclusions, which Quod accepted. BNPP concluded that the viability of the development was ‘'challenging in the current market’'. It stated in the final paragraph:-

“"Based on current costs and values, we consider that the proposed delivery of 20% affordable housing (through a combination of on-site and off-site delivery) is the maximum that the site can viably provide. It is important to consider that the appraisal does not include the costs of delivering the off-site affordable housing; Section 106 payments; and delivery of Hungerford Car Park. However, over the life of the planning application and development period the prospect for an improvement in the economics of the Development are good. We therefore recommend that the Section 106 agreement includes a review mechanism to re-consider viability at an appropriate future point in the development period.”"

The Section 106 agreement does contain a review so that if the housing market achieved a value of £2117 per square foot up to an additional 20% of affordable housing would be provided. Since on the assessment made by BNPP the provision of 20% affordable housing was not required having regard to viability the agreement to provide an additional quantity to the s106 agreement was creditable. The claimant, as will be seen, argued that the BNPP report was not supportable since the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) of 20% used by BNPP was not reasonable and that a value of £2117 per square foot would in any event produce an IRR of 38%.

14. I shall have to deal with the figures so far as necessary in due course. In addition to BNPP, Lambeth commissioned an independent full cost review which was taken into account by BNPP. None of these reports were forwarded to the first defendant when the applications were called in. The claimant has argued that the Quod report in particular should have been disclosed since it was not possible to check or challenge the BNPP appraisal based on full information.
15. It must be open to applicants for planning permission to submit confidential material in support of their applications. It is equally important that decisions, particularly if they are controversial, are not reached by the decision making body (usually a committee of the local planning authority) having regard to material not disclosed to any objectors. In R(Bedford & Clare) v LB Islington [2002] EWHC 2014 (Admin) Ouseley J accepted, in relation to a confidential report relating to viability in connection with affordable housing, that there was no requirement for its disclosure. But it would not have been proper to fail to disclose it if it had been put before the decision makers. What would be disclosed would be the officer’'s report which should include such of the confidential report as could be disclosed and its conclusions. The officer would say whether it was acceptable or whether there were any reservations. Ouseley J’'s decision has since been followed by Flaux and Patterson JJ and by myself. Where there is a call-in, the officer’'s report can be produced but no more is, subject to what the developers may need to include to make their case, required. Thus the claimant’'s contention that the Quod report had to be disclosed is not maintainable.
16. The claimant contends that the decision could not have been properly reached without considering the Quod report. He submitted that the conclusion of the defendant based on the inspector’'s recommendation that on the basis of the viability assessment provision of affordable housing was maximised was wrong. He seeks to pray in aid observations of Nick Boles, MP, the planning minister, that the planning inspectorate was permitted to consider only evidence which was published or available publicly and could not therefore take account of confidential material. That in reality is against the claimant’'s case and serves to reinforce the approach adopted by Ouseley, J. The inspector was satisfied that the BNPP report together with all other relevant evidence including the material produced by and relied on by way of objection by the claimant was sufficient to justify his conclusions in regard to viability. Provided that the inspector was entitled to be so satisfied, the claimant’'s submission must fail.
17. The claimant has submitted that there has been unfairness resulting from procedural errors and the way in which applications made by him were dealt with by the inspector. In addition, he has with support from two others who were present at the inquiry contended that the inspector did not give him the same treatment as was given to counsel representing the developers to such an extent that the inspector appeared to be biased against him. At the very least the treatment of him was unfair and he was not able to present his case as he would have wished particularly as he did not have the resources available to the developers and to Lambeth and the Mayor and their counsel. I shall have to consider this aspect of the claim in due course. But there are complaints which are specific to the production of the BNPP report which I should consider when deciding whether reliance on the BNPP report was permissible.
18. The inquiry was to commence on 21 November 2013. The applications were obviously of major importance having regard to the site and nature of the proposed development. The time allowed for compliance with the Procedure Rules in service of statements of case and evidence was thus very tight. As will become apparent, the inspector at the pre-inquiry meeting dispensed with the need to lodge case statements indicating that in the circumstances statements of evidence would suffice to give objectors and all who might be concerned in the inquiry sufficient information. When the developers produced their statements, they did not include the Quod or the BNPP reports. On 11 October 2013 the claimant wrote to the inspector pointing out that there was no document produced by the developers which provided evidence that the economic viability test had been met. He said that he and RCL would be placed at a disadvantage since the relevant documents which ought to be produced were likely to be lengthy and technical. He notified the developers solicitor on 15 October 2013 that it was his view that the absence of any such documentation should mean that it would not be possible for the developers to maintain that the affordable housing policy was met. The developers solicitor by letter to the inspectorate of 15 October 2013 referred to Lambeth’'s planning committee report which states that the viability of the scheme was challenging but the provision of 20% affordable housing was “"considered to engage with policy requirements”". This reflected the conclusions of the BNPP report.
19. The claimant was informed by the inspectorate on 17 October 2013 that there was no power to direct production of any information.
20. On 11 November 2013 the claimant wrote a lengthy letter to the inspector in which he pointed out the importance of economic viability and the absence of any document, notwithstanding it was referred to in the developers’' evidence, which had been relied on. He drew attention to rulings by another inspector in the 8 Albert Embankment inquiry that such documents should be made available. The inspector responded in a letter of 15 November 2013 in which he stated:-

“"One of the relevant matters is the provision of affordable housing…..If the proposed level or type of affordable housing falls short of that required by the Development Plan then I will report this to the Secretary of State. I will also report to the Secretary of State on any material considerations that might outweigh or provide justification for any shortfall of the provision of affordable housing. If I am to report on any material considerations then I will need to read and hear evidence on these considerations. In the interests of openness and fairness and in accordance with Section 321 of the [TCPA] 1990 and paragraph 13 of ‘'Section 106 affordable housing requirements’' (a DCLG document published in April 2013), written evidence must be made available to all main and Rule 6 parties, preferably before the inquiry opens on Thursday 21 November”".

21. Following consideration of those comments, on 18 November 2013 the developers produced the BNPP report. They pointed out that there were some amendments since the report which had produced certainty to the number of units in one of the buildings. This had been put to BNPP who confirmed it did not change its conclusion. It further pointed out that the review mechanism in the s106 agreement which BNPP had recommended meant that the developers would, if the revenues generated by the market units exceeded the assumptions set out in the appraisal, pay a contribution of an amount up to £24,480,000.00. This, if reached, would equate to 40% affordable housing.
22. The BNPP report runs to some 17 pages. It identifies and reviews the assumptions made by Quod. It discusses the square foot values provided by Savills and Knight Frank, each of which has considerable experience of London values. It does not wholly accept them. It regarded them as in some aspects to be too low. Construction costs had been independently considered in a cost plan review which Lambeth had commissioned. The BNPP report gives all necessary information and there is no reason to doubt that it considered and dealt with the assumptions made by Quod entirely properly.
23. On 19 November 2013 the claimant sent an e-mail to the inspector submitting that to serve the BNPP report 2 days before the opening of the inquiry was to make it impossible for him to consider it and prepare an adequate response. He therefore asked for an adjournment. The developers’' solicitor responded the same day saying that the request for an adjournment was ‘'completely unjustified’'. The disclosure of the report, which was commercially sensitive, resulted from the inspector’'s letter. It was, ‘'a concise document’' and there would be adequate time to consider it before the inquiry started and during it. That same afternoon the inspector confirmed that the inquiry would start at 10am on 21 November and that “"subject to circumstances not changing in the meantime and in the interests of certainty”" he would not be granting the request for an adjournment. The BNPP report was ‘'a short document’' and there would be sufficient time for parties to consider its content during the inquiry.
24. This did not close the door to a future application in the course of the inquiry if, for example, the claimant or indeed any other party asked for the recall of a witness or wished to submit their own material to seek to challenge the developer’'s case. Having regard to the claimant’'s expertise in the area, I do not think that the inspector’'s decision to refuse an adjournment was in itself unfair. The claimant complains that there was added pressure because in order to accommodate leading counsel for the developer the inspector had agreed to sit for the full working week over the first two weeks and to take the third week off. Usually major inquiries such as in this case sit a four day week to enable parties to prepare for cross-examination or to consider how finally they should present their cases. While I appreciate the pressures on the claimant, I do not think that they were such as to make it impossible for him to present an effective response. He produced two submissions (identified as RCL2 and RCL3). He suggested before me that he was deprived of the opportunity to instruct his own experts to deal with the BNPP report. I do not consider that a reasonable possibility having regard to the lack of resources which the claimant has relied on in his own submissions on the unfairness of the treatment afforded to him as compared to the developers in particular who had very substantial resources.
25. I have dealt at some length with the circumstances surrounding the production of the BNPP report. It is apparent that the inspector had taken on board the claimant’'s submissions that the developers should produce evidence to support their viability case. His refusal of an adjournment in the terms I have identified was not in my view unreasonable. The issue of viability and its impact on affordable housing in particular was regarded by the claimant, as he put it before me, to be the key to the case put forward by the developers. But I have no doubt that the BNPP report was sufficient to enable the inspector to give proper consideration of viability and all other matters dealt within it. It was considered by Lambeth whose officers had seen the Quod report to be satisfactory and I have no reason to doubt that it accurately identified such elements of the Quod report as were material. Despite the claimant’'s submission to the contrary, it did in my view contain all that was necessary and certainly the inspector did not err in regarding it as sufficient.
26. In RCL 2 and 3 the claimant produced his criticism of the BNPP report. He set out a number of calculations which he said provided an IRR totalling some 38%. He produced from the latest Molior report average site values for London figures for comparable Thames side developments which were higher than those accepted by BNPP. However, as the developers submitted, the issue is somewhat immaterial having regard to the review mechanism. If it transpires that the values are or become greater than assessed as reasonable by BNPP, and reach a level of £2117 per square foot, the additional contribution will be required. In paragraph 9.118 the inspector records the submission that the claimant’'s calculations in RCL2 did not establish his proposition that an IRR of 20% would be achieved before site values reached £2117.
27. I can only find an error of law if in accepting the developers’' case and rejecting the claimant’'s the inspector acted irrationally. It is not for me to consider the arguments and evidence so as in effect to rehear the issue. In reviewing the claimant’'s case, at paragraph 12.46 the inspector says that the claimant submitted that the main issue in relation to affordable housing was the residential sale prices.
28. The claimant asserts that in his conclusions in paragraph 16.64 the inspector showed that he had not considered RCL2. He relied on this sentence:-

“"[Mr Turner] questioned whether an [IRR] of 20%, used by [BNPP] in their assessment, was reasonable, without bringing forward any evidence to justify such a claim”".

He went on to say that a 20% rate was “"quite common for a development of such complexity as that proposed for the Shell Centre site”". He then dealt with the criticism of the site values used by BNPP and concluded:-

“"[Mr Turner] did provide evidence but some of this confirmed the figures used to assess the scheme and some was from a source that was used to market and promote schemes to investors, rather than figures used to assess development viability.”"

The inspector introduced paragraph 16.64 by observing that he found the claimant’'s criticism to be confused. In 16.65 he observed that the developers’' evidence was clear, was as precise as it could be and had been independently verified by BNPP “"a leader in the field of development viability”".

29. I need not go into further detail. To do so would be to stray beyond what is proper in considering whether there was any error of law. There were arguments raised on the figures for housing and whether affordable units were properly accounted for. None of that can show any error of law. I am satisfied that on the issue of viability the inspector was entitled to find as he did. I would only add that I accept the arguments put forward by the defendants in dealing with the viability issue and its effect in particular on affordable housing.
30. I should note a matter which had been raised by the claimant based on the second sentence in paragraph 16.65 of the inspector’'s report. This reads:-

“"The summary of the viability assessment is sufficient to show that the Applicant’'s provision of 20% affordable housing is contrary to the conclusion of the assessment and their later assessment of what the sales value would have to be for the development to achieve an IRR of 20% is realistic”".

The claimant contended that the reference to “"their later assessment”" showed that there was a later BNPP report which had not been disclosed to him. However, I have been assured that there was no other report and “"their”" refers to the applicant not BNPP.

31. Before turning to the procedural issues, I should deal with the other matters which are relied on by the claimant as errors of law by the inspector.
32. The first such matter relates to open space. The proposed development will provide less open space than now exists. In particular, there is what are called the podium and the courtyard of the Shell Centre. Those are not designated open spaces but fall within the definition and so must be taken into account in considering whether there is a loss. Thus paragraph 74 of the NPPF is material. It provides, so far as material:-

“"Existing open space…..should not be built on unless…

The loss resulting from the proposed development would be replaced by equivalent or better provision in terms of quantity and quality in a suitable location..…”".

33. The inspector dealt with this issue in paragraphs 16.84 to 16.87 of his report:-

“"16.84. The podium and the courtyard of the Shell Centre are not designated open spaces. They do, however, fall within the definition of ‘'open space’' found in the LP, principally because they are not developed. However, an assessment of open space must consider quality as well as quantity, and must also take into account the extant BCS permission. The Secretary of State, when determining the BCS applications, stated that “"…the recreational value of the podium is very limited….and there would not be a serious and adverse effect on the quality, distribution or accessibility of open space in the area…”". Furthermore, the podium can be discounted because the extant BCS permission ensures that the open space will, inevitably, be built on even if the applications that are the subjects of this report are not approved. [9.69, 10.57, 12.7-12.11]

16.85. The courtyard is 3,266 square metres of inaccessible space that is of poor visual, amenity and recreational value. The proposed development includes three principle open spaces, the square and two amenity areas either side of Building 4B. These would total less than 3000 square metres. There would be, on paper, a minor loss of open space if the development was to be built. But the quality of the proposed open spaces would significantly exceed that of current open space on the site. In this regard, there is no reason to suppose that the high quality of the architecture would not be continued through the design and materials of the public realm. The public spaces would, furthermore, be fully accessible. [9.71, 12.13]

16.86. The public spaces within the proposed development would be overshadowed, to a significant degree, by the surrounding buildings. However, this is not unusual for inner-city developments and certainly not unusual in London, particularly in the CAZ. Furthermore, regard must be given to reflective sunlight entering, and contributing to the amenity of, the public spaces, and to the proximity of Jubilee Gardens and Queen’'s Walk, open and accessible public spaces that are not overshadowed and that afford panoramic views over the river and beyond.

16.87. The quality and full accessibility of the open space that would be provided within the development outweighs the greater amount but poor quality of open space currently provided. The proposed development, in this regards, does not conflict with paragraph 74 of the NPPF or with the spirit of LP policy 7.18 and CS policy S5”".

34. The ‘'BCS application’' is a reference to a permission which had been granted by the then Secretary of State in 2004 for a development known as the Belvedere Court Scheme. This had not been pursued, albeit it had been implemented by some work done, and the conservation consent had lapsed, but it was clear that Lambeth would approve a subsequent application to restore it. The claimant points out that the developers’' evidence was that they no longer considered that the BCS scheme should go ahead. Thus the inspector’'s view that the podium could be discounted expressed in the final sentence of paragraph 16.84 is he submits clearly incorrect since the likely abandonment of the BCS scheme would mean that it was not inevitable that the podium would be built on.
35. The claimant’'s main argument is that paragraph 74 of the NPPF requires equivalent quantity and quality. Quantity will be less since it is accepted that the courtyard and podium are to be regarded as open space within the meaning of paragraph 74. Furthermore, he contended, as he submitted to the inspector, that the loss would be over half which could not be regarded as minor.
36. I think the inspector was wrong to regard the BCS scheme as meaning that it was inevitable that the open space would be built on. However, the previous decision of the Secretary of State on the BCS scheme would mean that a subsequent refusal to allow building on that open space would be inconsistent. To that extent his view that it would not survive as open space was not erroneous. But the requirements of paragraph 74 of the NPPF would still need to be met.
37. The claimant submits that the natural and so correct meaning of paragraph 74 requires any development to provide open space which is at least equivalent to that lost both in quantity and quality. It is not a correct interpretation to allow a smaller quantity because of enhanced quality. The claimant has referred to observations of a MP who was making particular reference to allotments saying that it meant that open spaces were not to be lost. However, I think that that is an over mechanistic approach. No doubt when spaces are fully used such as allotments or playing fields or entirely accessible recreation areas it will be difficult if not impossible to justify a loss of quantity. But it is in my view appropriate in a case such as this to consider the reality which is that the existing spaces were largely unused by the general public. The requirement in such circumstances for equivalent quantity is too restrictive and would, if applied to the letter, prevent sensible development when in reality there has been no overall loss. Accordingly, I do not think the inspector erred in dealing with open space.
38. The inspector concluded that the development constituted high quality and therefore good design and would make the Waterloo Area better for people, including current and future residents, workers and visitors. There were disagreements raised in the inquiry on the calculation of available office space. However, that I have not considered it necessary to detail since it is clear that the development provides for an increase in employment. The inspector’'s judgment on the quality of the development is relevant in considering the other main area of attack by the claimant, namely the inspector’'s conclusion in paragraph 16.59 of his report. This reads:-

“"The historical context of the Shell Centre includes many heritage assets of the highest significance, including the WWHS and Grade I listed buildings and a Grade I RPG [namely St James’'s Park]. The proposed development is of the highest quality, would cause no harm to any heritage asset and is consistent with Government policies in planning for the conservation and enhancement of the historic environment. The proposed development thus accords with paragraph 132 and Section 12 of the NPPF”".

Paragraph 132 emphasises that great weight must be attached to the need to conserve and avoid harm to designated heritage assets. The more important the asset, the greater the weight to be attached.

39. In reaching this conclusion, the inspector was exercising his planning judgment. Thus it is only if a matter upon which he placed reliance is shown to be erroneous could a challenge succeed. The claimant contends that there are a number of such errors, but many relate to findings which could not be said to be irrational. The hurdle to be surmounted in establishing irrationality is a very high one.
40. In paragraph 16.45, under the heading ‘'The Setting of the WWHS and Heritage Assets on the North Bank’' the inspector said:-

“"The LWHS does not designate a belt or zone for the setting of WWHS and no party to the inquiry has suggested that the setting of the WWHS or any listed building or conservation area on the north side of the river extends across the river. In views from the WWHS and from within any conservation area on the north side of the river the proposed development on the Shell Centre site, if it can be seen, must therefore be regarded as in the background of those views”".

He then in 16.47 said that the proposed development “"would be in the background, would be outside the setting of the WWHS, would be of the highest architectural quality, and no harm would be caused to the setting of any listed buildings in the WWHS”".

41. As already stated in paragraph 10 above, paragraph 445 of the LVMF shows that any development within the WOA will itself form part of the setting of the WWHS. The inspector’'s view of setting is not, it is submitted, consistent with that. It may well be that he has not expressed himself as well as he should have done in paragraph 16.45, but he clearly has considered whether there would be harm caused to the setting of any heritage asset on the north side of the river. English Heritage, as the inspector records, had in written representations, opposed the development because, in relation to St James’'s Park RPG, it would seriously harm its setting since it would harm the quality of the views. Westminster’'s opposition was based on the height of the proposed buildings and the consequential impact on heritage assets within its boundaries, including the WWHS. It contended that the harm would be substantial. The inspector made up his own mind having undertaken views for himself. He clearly had regard to the relevant considerations, whether or not he expressed himself entirely satisfactorily, namely whether there would be harm caused to the heritage assets and their setting. English Heritage was in addition concerned at harm caused to the setting of the Royal Festival Hall, but accepted that any such harm within the SBCA would not be substantial. I have no doubt that the inspector did not reach his decision on wrong principles nor does the claimant show that his ultimate conclusion was irrational. Neither English Heritage nor Westminster have indicated a wish to have any input into this claim.
42. The Shell Centre is included in Lambeth’'s local list. It is thus, submits the claimant, to be regarded as a heritage asset. The glossary to the NPPF defines heritage assets thus:-

“"A building, monument, site, place, area or landscape identified as having a degree of significance meriting conservation in planning decisions, because of the heritage interest. Heritage asset includes designated heritage assets and assets identified by the local planning authority (including local listing)”".

Significance in this context is the value to this and future generations because of its heritage interest. This may be archaeological, architectural, artistic or historic. Paragraph 133 of the NPPF states that where a proposed development will lead to substantial harm to a heritage asset permission should only be granted if inter alia it can be demonstrated that such harm is necessary to achieve the substantial public benefit that outweighs that harm.

43. The inspector dealt with this in paragraph 16.54, saying:-

“"If the Wing Buildings stood alone they would not, on their own merit, be worthy of retention. Their historical significance as part of the Shell Centre is well documented and the demolition of the Wing Buildings would change, but that would not harm, the character of the SBCA”".

His views in this regard are entirely reasonable. The NPPF is not to be mechanically applied and, while the inspector does not specifically refer to paragraph 133, his overall view was clearly in conformity with it. The proposed development would produce a far more attractive set of buildings than those which are to be demolished.

44. The inspector considered the issue of loss of light. Suffice to say that his conclusion, having regard to an inevitable effect in urban conditions of development, cannot be regarded as in any way erroneous. It was a matter for his judgment.
45. Having rejected the claimant’'s arguments in relation to what can be termed his substantial case, I must now turn to alleged procedural impropriety. Not only is it said that the claimant did not receive a fair hearing but that the inspector displayed an apparent bias against him.
46. At the pre-inquiry meeting, the inspector accepted the suggestion made on behalf of the developers that statements of case need not be provided but that their proofs of evidence would suffice. There had it seems been an agreement with the planning inspectorate that the inquiry would commence on 21 November and so the time for following any procedural requirements in service of evidence or statements of case was relatively short. Furthermore, the development was substantial and of considerable importance for a very sensitive site so that the evidence produced by or on behalf of the developers ran to hundreds of pages. Initially, the inspector agreed, apparently without asking for the views of the objectors, that the developers should be excused from providing summaries of their evidence. However, he changed his mind following representations from the claimant.
47. The Town and Country Planning (Inquiries Procedure) (England) Rules 2000 set out the procedural requirements. Since the inquiry was expected to last more than 8 days, a pre-inquiry meeting was required (Rule 5(1)(a)). Rule 6(3) provides, so far as material:-

“"The applicant shall ensure that within…….(b) in any case where a pre-inquiry meeting is held pursuant to rule 5, 4 weeks of the conclusion of that pre-inquiry meeting, 2 copies of their statement of case have been received by the Secretary of State…..”".

Rule 2 defines a statement of case to mean:-

“"a written statement which contains full particulars of the case which a person proposes to put forward at an inquiry and a list of any documents which that person intends to refer to or put in evidence”".

Rule 6 contains detailed provisions in relation to powers of the Secretary of State to require further information from any party, powers of parties to comment on other parties’' statements of case and timetabling.

48. Rule 13 deals with proofs of evidence. It requires any person entitled to appear at an inquiry who proposes to give or proposes to call another to give evidence at the inquiry by reading a proof of evidence to provide no later than 4 weeks before the date fixed for holding the inquiry any such proof together with, if it exceeds 1500 words, a summary. Rule 13(6) requires a copy of any document referred to in a proof (unless already available for inspection as a result of a similar requirement in relation to a statement of case) to be provided to the Secretary of State. Rule 13(5) provides that, where a summary is provided, only that shall be read at the inquiry unless the inspector permits or requires otherwise.
49. It had been intended that directions should be given at the pre-inquiry meeting that statements of case be provided by 17 October 2013 and proofs of evidence by 24 October 2013. Thus it has been submitted by the third defendant that to dispense with statements of case was reasonable. However, the rules do not permit that course of action. There is no discretion given to an inspector to dispense with what are clearly mandatory requirements. No counsel sought to argue the contrary. Furthermore, the inspector’'s decision to dispense with summaries was a breach of Rule 13 since the proofs exceeded 1500 words. Fortunately, the inspector reversed that decision when the claimant pointed out the breach.
50. There was thus a breach of the Rules and so a clear procedural impropriety. The claimant in addition alleges a breach of Rule 13(6) in that the report dealing with viability was a document referred to in the main proof submitted on behalf of the developers and so copies had to be provided. I do not think that the rule requires production of a document unless reliance is going to be placed on that document. A party will have to decide whether or not to rely on a particular document and will not be able to use it in support of their case unless it is disclosed. Thus the developers had, once they had received the inspector’'s letter following the claimant’'s request that he needed disclosure of the report, to decide whether, despite confidential elements in the report, they needed to rely on it and so should disclose it. Rule 13(6) did not require disclosure of the Quod report.
51. The claimant received all the information which would have been included in the developers’' statement of case in the proofs of evidence and summaries. Thus, in the circumstances of this case I do not think that the breach of the rules produced in itself any prejudice. The purpose of the production of the statements of case and evidence is to give all parties and in particular objectors details of the case to be presented at the inquiry. Those details were provided through the proofs of evidence and the summaries. However, the rules are, as I have said, mandatory in this regard and they must be followed. Any breach could mean that a decision following an inquiry would be quashed thus causing cost and inconvenience.
52. The claimant complained that, albeit the inspector made it clear at the pre-inquiry meeting that the deadlines set for production of proofs were to be met because of the shortness of time before the inquiry commenced, Lambeth was given extra time. However, having seen the e-mails from and statement of Lambeth’'s officer who was dealing with the matter, I am satisfied that the request made was entirely reasonable and nothing adverse to the claimant can be read into it.
53. I have set out the pre-inquiry decisions of the inspector in some detail since his actions before the inquiry commenced did not in my view indicate any hostility towards the claimant or any objector or give any suggestion that he had formed any views about the applications which would be dealt with at the inquiry. He acted in breach of the inquiry rules, but thought he was adopting a course which would prejudice no-one and would achieve the necessary expedition.
54. The main complaint raised by the claimant relates to the inspector’'s conduct at the inquiry. The claimant wrote a letter to the planning inspectorate on 3 April 2014 raising a number of complaints about the conduct of the inspector at the inquiry. Those complaints he has amplified before me. I have already considered the pre-inquiry actions of the inspector. At the start of the inquiry, the inspector entirely properly asked all parties for estimates of the time they would take in giving or taking witnesses through evidence in chief and cross-examination. He made it clear by telling not only the claimant but also Westminster’'s planning officer that they were coming to the end of their allowed time. He would, as it is put, count down the minutes left to them. But he did not adopt this approach to the experienced counsel appearing for the developers and the planning authorities. In particular, when Mr Corner QC asked for considerable further time to cross examine the claimant, he was allowed it, the inspector saying that the claimant had not been helpful in his answering of questions.
55. Following the refusal of an adjournment requested by the claimant to enable him to deal with the BNPP report, the claimant produced RCL2 on Friday 22 November at lunchtime when the inquiry was to be adjourned. He had not then put all the documents stapled together or in a file and so, not unreasonably, the inspector refused to accept them. The claimant remedied the situation, which took a short time, but the inspector refused to wait, saying he would look at them before sitting on the following Monday. The claimant says that he did not have time to look at them properly and they were material to put to the developers’' witness.
56. The claimant was, he says, interrupted by the inspector when questioning the developers’' witness on design standards, stating:-

“"You will no doubt list all of the ways in which you find the scheme deficient, in fact I demand that you do. And your case will no doubt be that these deficiencies are so terrible that they warrant refusal”".

There were other unwarranted interruptions which, the claimant asserts, gave a clear impression that the inspector was hostile not only to him but to Westminster and to any objections to the proposed development. One particular issue related to office space discrepancies on the developers’' case. Lambeth accepted that they had mistakenly included the Shell Tower in their calculations, but the inspector interrupted Westminster’'s officer in his cross-examination saying the mistake did not matter. The claimant complains of other comments made by the inspector which, coupled with his apparent hostility to the claimant and his case as opposed to his treatment of the other sides, created unfairness and made the claimant reasonably feel he did not have a fair hearing.

57. The claimant’'s concerns are supported by two other witnesses. Mr Tamplin, a retired planning inspector, attended the inquiry on behalf of the Twentieth Century Society. He confirms the difficulties created by the late service of the BNPP report and the need to cross-examine the developers’' witnesses with the inquiry sitting for the whole week. It was particularly difficult for those such as himself and the claimant who had only limited assistance in contrast to the developers and the planning authorities. Thus both he and the claimant felt that they had not been able to present their cases as well as they would have wished. He confirms that the inspector counted down the minutes left for the claimant and Westminster planning officer in particular and cut them off when their time was up.
58. Mr Tamplin’'s view was that the inspector acted in an overbearing and intimidating way with the claimant and Westminster’'s planning officer but was easy-going with counsel. This gave the impression of partiality and prejudgment by the inspector. Some comments by the inspector compounded this impression. For example, he said that he would not be reporting that the scheme was too dense despite the contentions that it was. On office floorspace, he commented during the claimant’'s cross-examination “"As the witness has pointed out, this is all about jobs”". He commented that the scheme was “"entirely permeable”". Mr Tamplin concludes his statement with these words:-

“"Unfortunately, I can say that I have never seen an inquiry run in such a prejudicial and unfair manner so that I have felt bound to make this statement in order that the Court should be aware of the situation”".

59. Mr Michael Ball is the Director of the Waterloo Community Development Group (WCDG). The WCDG adopted a neutral approach and so Mr Ball attended the inquiry to comment on various aspects of the development and to ask a few questions. He has participated in 12 major planning inquiries on behalf of WCDG. He confirms the matters raised by the claimant and Mr Tamplin and says he was left with a strong impression of unfairness and unwillingness to be even handed. He drafted a complaint to the chief planning inspector stating that the inspector had made and continued to make decisions and interventions which were unhelpful to the Rule 6 parties who were opposing the scheme. None of those concerned had, he said, ever experienced such systemic unfairness at a public inquiry or had cause to make a complaint of this nature before.
60. A statement from the inspector has been lodged by the first defendant. He says that his aim throughout the inquiry was to ensure that it was conducted in a fair and efficient manner which would assist him in reporting to the Secretary of State. He defends his decision not to grant an adjournment following production of the BNPP report and his refusal to accept RCL2 in its unbound state. Those decisions were in themselves justifiable. But they have to be looked at in the context of his behaviour as a whole and the overall effect on the claimant. He indicates that it is his practice to intervene when a line of questioning does not seem to him to be of sufficient relevance to assist him in his task. In paragraph 17 to 19 of his statement he states:-

“"17. At this inquiry, Mr Turner was not a trained advocate and at times, I perceived that he was persisting in questioning witnesses when he was not going to get the answers he was seeking and the discussion was not assisting me in gaining the information that I would need to prepare my report to the Secretary of State. I intervened on topics such as design standards, daylight and floorspace figures to ensure the efficient conduct of the inquiry. I did so to prevent wasting inquiry time on matters of fact and because I considered that I had all the necessary information to reach conclusions on these matters.

18. Riverside Communities Limited were not represented by professional advocates whilst the Applicant and Lambeth Council were; by very experienced advocates. Mr Turner, though he had given evidence at previous inquiries, is not a professional or expert witness. On a number of occasions I found him to be evasive in answering questions during cross-examination and he gave lengthy answers to simple questions. Some questions had to be asked repeatedly before he gave an answer. I recall, in fact, on one or more occasion, interceding to seek answers to questions put to him by the Applicant’'s Counsel. Mr Turner’'s approach to answering questions resulted in cross-examination of him exceeding the time estimates given.

19. In these circumstances I am not particularly surprised that there was a perceived imbalance in the extent of my interventions. However, my aim was to conduct the inquiry fairly and efficiently at all times. I only intervened when I considered that it would help focus issues or that the discussion had got to a point or topic which was not conducive to the effective use of inquiry time because it was not assisting me in preparing my report to the Secretary of State”".

61. So far as paragraph 18 is concerned, in his statement the claimant says that he recognised that Mr Corner found cross-examination of him difficult because “"I would not give him the answer he wanted”". He was unable to comply with Mr Corner’'s indication that he should answer yes or no to questions since he had not had access, he says, to all material information. That refers to the Quod report. No doubt, the manner in which he responded to cross-examination could have given the impression that he was being unhelpful. However, the inspector could and perhaps should, if agreeable to Mr Corner’'s request for extra time to cross-examine, have referred to the complex issues and the claimant’'s difficulties in giving clear and succinct answers rather than state that the claimant was being unhelpful.
62. The inspector’'s attitude is said to have given rise to an appearance of bias. It is not now suggested nor could it be that he was in fact biased. No doubt, he had formed preliminary views on some matters which were in issue in the inquiry, but of course he should not have said anything which suggested a closed mind or prejudgment. Equally, any inspector or judge for that matter will need to ensure that parties keep to relevant matters and do not waste time. Furthermore, it is important that time estimates for examination and cross-examination are kept. But always a reasonable flexibility must be applied and to count down parties in the way described by the claimant and Mr Tamplin in particular (evidence not disputed by the inspector) is unsatisfactory.
63. Mr Kolinsky accepted that the inspector may have given the unfortunate impression that he was more favourable to the developers than to the objectors. I have no doubt that the inspector’'s conduct was such as to give rise to a real concern that he was unfair to the objectors. He seriously mismanaged his conduct of the inquiry. It may well be that the individual decisions he made were justifiable, but the way in which he made them was unacceptable. Observations which are against a party’'s interests may be reasonable, but care has to be taken to ensure that they do not give the wrong impression. It is of course essential that parties to an inquiry feel that they have had a fair hearing and that their case has been properly taken into account. That did not happen in this inquiry so far as the claimant is concerned.
64. The test applicable to determine whether there has been apparent bias is based on the notional fair minded and informed observer. That individual must be taken to have formed an objective judgment having regard to all the circumstances. The fears expressed by a complainant that there has been an appearance of bias are relevant, as Lord Hope said in paragraph 104 of Porter v Magill 2002 2 AC 387 at 494, at the initial stage when the court has to decide whether the complaint needs to be investigated. But they lose their importance when the stage is reached of looking at the matter objectively. And the assertions by the inspector that he was not biased are not likely to be helpful even if true. The test applicable is whether having regard to all the circumstances a fair minded observer would conclude that there was a real possibility that the inspector was biased.
65. The fair minded and informed observer will be taken to know that the inspector will have been provided with and have read the documentation lodged by the parties. Inevitably, he will have formed some provisional views. Equally, he will try to ensure that parties keep to that which is relevant and so interventions designed to avoid irrelevancies are proper. The essential requirement is that whatever preliminary views he may have formed, he keeps an open mind and is prepared to be persuaded by the evidence produced if it shows his preliminary views are wrong. It is clear that in this case the inspector’'s conduct fell short of that which should have been displayed. I have already expressed serious criticism based on the evidence of the claimant, Mr Tamplin and Mr Ball.
66. The inspector made it clear to the developers that he needed material on viability particularly in relation to affordable housing. That indication followed the claimant’'s requests. The refusal of the adjournment, while considered hostile in the light of his overall conduct, was not in itself unjustifiable and, albeit perhaps unhelpful, the way in which he dealt with RCL2 did not indicate any bias. His conduct in appearing to favour the applicants’' counsel against the claimant was most unfortunate, but is consistent with judicial misconduct as opposed to bias. Inspectors are well aware of the need for objective consideration of all evidence. The claimant was not prevented from putting forward the evidence he wished to present although I recognise he felt that there were difficulties which he should not have had to face.
67. Overall, I am not persuaded that the test for establishing apparent bias as opposed to creating difficulties for the claimant is established. I have no doubt that the claimant reasonably considered and that any fair minded observer would equally have considered that the inspector’'s conduct fell below that which was to be expected. However, that does not mean that there was a real possibility that he was biased.
68. The final question to be determined is whether in all the circumstances the overall conduct of the inquiry and the procedural irregularities led to serious prejudice to the claimant. While I recognise that he had greater difficulties in assembling his evidence having regard to the time constraints, the decision to sit the full Monday to Friday in the first two full weeks and the need to produce evidence in rebuttal of the BNPP report at relatively short notice, I have already decided that there was no error in the failure to produce the Quod report. However, the claimant, no doubt with increased hard work, used his considerable expertise to produce his case. He was able to cross-examine and to give his own evidence. While the inspector did not accept his case, it was considered and there is no doubt that the inspector’'s conclusions were properly based on the evidence before him. He was entitled to accept the developers’' case, supported as it was by the planning authorities.
69. In all circumstances, I take the view that the prejudice which he suffered was not sufficient to meet the test set out in s.288 of the 1990 Act. Accordingly I must dismiss the claim. It must, however, be obvious that I have been seriously concerned at the inspector’'s conduct at the inquiry and I hope that steps are taken to ensure that lessons have been learnt.