England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		16 October 2015

1. MR JUSTICE CRANSTON:
2. introduction
3. This is an appeal by way of case stated by Mr Francis Belton concerning a decision of the Justices sitting at Highbury Magistrates' Court on 16 December 2014 to refuse the adjournment. Mr Belton was charged with intentionally using racially aggravated threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, contrary to sections 28, 31(1b) and 31(4) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. This arose out of an accident on 1 July last year during which a cyclist alleged that he had been racially abused by Mr Belton. During the course of cross-examination the cyclist had said that he had given a brief account to a police officer and had then made a formal statement at the police station 3 days later. Mr Fiddler, who represented Mr Belton, applied for an adjournment so that the police officer who had seen the cyclist on the day could produce his notebook. The Justices refused the adjournment and Mr Belton was convicted.
4. The questions posed by the Justices to the court are as follows:

i. " Were the Justices sufficiently advised on adjournments?

1. Were the Justices wrong in law to refuse the adjournment?

2. In deciding whether to adjourn the case part-heard where the Justices wrong to take into account the length of time before they could reconvene to hear the conclusion from the case?

3. Could the Appellant have a fair trial without the contents of the officer's pocket book being disclosed to the Appellant?

4. Were the Justices right to consider representations on costs before announcing their full decision, including ancillary orders, namely compensation?"

5. background
6. In the case stated, the facts found by the Justices were that the complainant had been cycling home from the gym when he was hit by Mr Belton's motor vehicle. The cyclist then came alongside the vehicle and spoke to Mr Belton about the collision but Mr Belton was rude and dismissive. The cyclist called Mr Belton a "fucking idiot" and cycled away. Mr Belton then followed the cyclist in his vehicle, pulled up beside him and through the open driver's window called him a "dirty Paki cunt" two or three times before driving off. Mr Belton denied using those words that I have just quoted. Although not in the facts as set out in the case stated we know from other parts of it (as I have already indicated) that Mr Belton was interviewed by the police on 5 July; that he accepted he was involved in an altercation with the cyclist, but that denied using the racially offensive language.
7. The case stated then continues that Mr Belton appeared on 22 July 2014 at his first court appearance. He pleaded not guilty. The matter was set down for trial on 22 September. That hearing did not occur because there had not been disclosure by the prosecution. Mr Belton at that point said that he wished to submit a defence statement.
8. The trial was then adjourned for 16 December. There was a case management hearing on 9 December, when Mr Belton's legal representative stated that they had served the defence statement in early October.
9. On 16 December, in other words, on the day of the hearing, Mr Belton was served with the CRIS report, in other words the 'Crime Reports Information System' report, the CAD, the 'Computer Aided Dispatch', and a print-out of the 999 call which the cyclist had made. Mr Belton was content for the case to proceed.
10. During the course of the cross-examination it was put to the cyclist that in his statement to the police on 4 July it was said that upon calling Mr Belton a "fucking idiot", Mr Belton had said: "Wooa, wooa, you can't just say that and cycle off", yet the cyclist had not mentioned that in his evidence in chief. The cyclist said in reply that he recalled those words but he could not recall any further words.
11. Mr Fidler, representing Mr Belton, then put to the cyclist that the CRIS report referred to the cyclist saying that upon Mr Belton calling him a "fucking idiot", Mr Belton had responded: "Come here, come here if you're going to have a go." It was put that cyclist was being inconsistent.
12. In cross-examination, the cyclist also stated that a police officer had visited him at home on the day of the incident and he had given a brief account before going to the police station and making a formal statement a couple of days later.
13. At that point Mr Fidler for Mr Belton sought an adjournment, on the basis that any pocket book entry made by the police officer who went to the house ought to be served on the defence since it was evidence that went to the cyclist's credibility. The Justices refused the adjournment and gave the following reasons which they set out in the case stated:

i. "The words that were not in question, were not the words which constituted the offence, and thus did not go to the heart of the issue;

so far as the words went to the complainant's credibility, the inconsistency point could and had been made in cross-examination; adjourning for the pocket book was unlikely to take the defence case any further forward;

due to the problem of reconstituting the same bench at a future date, when there was a trial slot, the date for the conclusion of the trial was likely to be well into the New Year, it might indeed be so far ahead the the trial had to be heard de novo.

i. Thus an adjournment was not in the interests of justice."

14. the Law
15. Section 10(1) of the Magistrates Court's Act 1980 provides:

i. "A magistrates' court may at any time, whether before Adjournment or after beginning to try an information, adjourn the trial, and may do so, notwithstanding anything in this Act, when composed

ii. Of a single justice."

16. Crown Prosecution Service v Picton [2006] EWHC 1108 (Admin) 170 JP 657 is the leading authority on the section. In the course of his judgment, Jack J said this:

i. "9. [...]

(a) A decision whether to adjourn is a decision within the discretion of the trial court. An appellate court will interfere only if very clear grounds for doing so are shown.

(b) Magistrates should pay great attention to the need for expedition in the prosecution of criminal proceedings; delays are scandalous; they bring the law into disrepute; summary justice should be speedy justice; an application for an adjournment should be rigorously scrutinised.

(c) Where an adjournment is sought by the prosecution, magistrates must consider both the interest of the defendant in getting the matter dealt with, and the interest of the public that criminal charges should be adjudicated upon, and the guilty convicted as well as the innocent acquitted. With a more serious charge the public interest that there be a trial will carry greater weight.

(d) Where an adjournment is sought by the accused, the magistrates must consider whether, if it is not granted, he will be able fully to present his defence and, if he will not be able to do so, the degree to which his ability to do so is compromised.

(e) In considering the competing interests of the parties the magistrates should examine the likely consequences of the proposed adjournment, in particular its likely length, and the need to decide the facts while recollections are fresh.

(f) The reason that the adjournment is required should be examined and, if it arises through the fault of the party asking for the adjournment, that is a factor against granting the adjournment, carrying weight in accordance with the gravity of the fault. If that party was not at fault, that may favour an adjournment. Likewise if the party opposing the adjournment has been at fault, that will favour an adjournment.

(g) The magistrates should take appropriate account of the history of the case, and whether there have been earlier adjournments and at whose request and why.

(h) Lastly, of course the factors to be considered cannot be comprehensively stated but depend upon the particular circumstances of each case, and they will often overlap. The court's duty is to do justice between the parties in the circumstances as they have arisen."

17. Keene LJ agreed and said:

i. "A decision to adjourn or not is par excellence a matter of discretion for the court in question."

18. discussion
19. In crisp and attractively put submissions Mr Kiss-Wilson for Mr Belton contends that applying paragraph 9(d) of Picton the Justices in this case deprived Mr Belton of the opportunity to put his case. In cross-examination there were inconsistencies in the cyclist's evidence: he had conceded while omitting to mention this in evidence in chief, that he had said the words: "Wooa, wooa, you can't just say that and cycle off." And then, when further pressed by Mr Fidler, he had conceded that he had had said in addition the words recorded in the CRIS statement: "Come here, come here if you are going to have a go."
20. Mr Kiss-Wilson contended that it was wrong for the Justices to refuse the adjournment since the defence were entitled to know the material that was contained in the police officer's notebook and whether in fact the CRIS statement was a true reflection of it. That material had never been seen by the defence. They did not know what the notebook contained, if anything. Therefore the prosecution could not say that it would not advance the defendant's case. The account in the police officer's notebook was the first statement by the cyclist and was a crucial piece of evidence.
21. In my view, the Justices were entitled to exercise their discretion and refuse the adjournment. There is no doubt that they were properly advised on the matter since their attention was drawn to Picton(supra) by their legal adviser. I cannot regard the decision they made as a decision which a reasonable bench of magistrates could not have reached. I cannot regard it as in any way as irrational in the public law sense.
22. In their case stated the Justices give reasons as to the bearing which any evidence produced on the adjournment would have on the outcome of the case. The heart of the case against Mr Belton was whether or not he had racially abused the cyclist. The inconsistency in the evidence of the cyclist was already before them and did not go to the issue of racial abuse. This reasoning is clear and Mr Belton could be in no doubt about why the justices reached the conclusion that they did. The Justices then addressed the issue of the delay in a manner consistent with the authority of Picton. The plain fact is that the only way that a pocket book entry would have assisted the appellant would be if the cyclist had made no reference to Mr Belton racially abusing him. The two contemporaneous documents, the CRIS and the CAD report supported the prosecution case that he had. The interests of justice were against an adjournment.
23. I dismiss the appeal. I would answer the first four questions posed by the Justices as "yes, "no", "no" and "yes". There is a fifth question about the costs. I am not entirely sure as to why that question has been put to this court but in as much as it requires an answer, I would give the answer "yes".
24. MR CHINWEZE: My Lord, could I say that in that case there is no application for costs on behalf of the respondent.
25. MR KISS-WILSON: I am grateful.
26. MR JUSTICE CRANSTON: That is very helpful. Anything further?
27. MR CHINWEZE: No, thank you.
28. MR JUSTICE CRANSTON: Thank you very much indeed.