England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		15 May 2015

Lord Justice Davis :

Introduction

1. By judgment handed down on 9 September 2014 District Judge Purdy, sitting in the Westminster Magistrates Court, decided that the case of the appellant, Rajesh Kapoor, should be sent to the Secretary of State for her decision whether to order extradition of the appellant to India. Subsequently the Secretary of State decided that he should be so extradited.
2. The appellant now appeals against the decision of the District Judge.
3. This was a case to which Part 2 of the Extradition Act 2003 ("the 2003 Act") applied. In that context it is said that the decision of the District Judge was flawed and was wrong. Four grounds of appeal are advanced.

1) First, it is said that the District Judge erred in concluding that the respondent (the Government of the Union of India) had made out a sufficient case to answer under s.84 (1) of the 2003 Act.

2) Second, it was said that the District Judge should have found that there had been an abuse of the process on the part of the respondent.

3) Third, it is said that the District Judge should have found that extradition would not be compatible with the appellant's Convention rights, under s.87 of the 2003 Act.

4) Fourth, it is said that the District Judge should have found that it would be unjust or oppressive, by reason of lapse of time, for the appellant to be extradited, under s.82 of the 2003 Act.

4. The appellant was represented before us by Mr David Josse QC leading Ms Natasha Draycott. The respondent was represented before us by Mr Daniel Sternberg. The respective arguments were presented to this court with skill and care.

Background facts

5. Put shortly, the respondent's case on extradition involves, although is not confined to, alleged child abduction.
6. The child in question is Aishley Kapoor, who was born in India on 14 August 1999. She is the biological child of Deepak Kapoor (the appellant's brother) and his wife Jyoti.
7. It is not disputed for present purposes that Aishley was on 22 December 2007 brought to London from India by her aunt Seema Kapoor, who is the sister of the appellant and of Deepak Kapoor. They travelled by plane to Heathrow. This was in violation of a court order made in family law proceedings then current in the High Court in Chandigarh. Those proceedings had been commenced in the early part of 2006. The parties were Seema Kapoor and her husband Surinder Kumar (whom she had married in March 2003) on the one hand and Deepak Kapoor and Jyoti Kapoor on the other hand. The proceedings involved a custody dispute relating to Aishley. Seema Kapoor and her husband were saying that they had previously adopted Aishley by a form of family adoption. Deepak and Jyoti Kapoor strongly denied that and sought custody as the biological parents.
8. On the 3 June 2006 the High Court in Chandigarh had initially granted custody of Aishley to Deepak and Jyoti Kapoor. However, it is not clear that Aishley was at any stage returned to her parents: it seems not. At all events, there came a time when they applied for a further order that Aishley be produced. Such an order was initially made; but it then was stayed on the 23 December 2006, with interim custody then being granted to Seema Kapoor. There was thereafter some delay in the progress of the proceedings: but on 19 November 2007 the High Court in Chandigarh ordered that Aishley be brought before the court on 10 January 2008. It was the operation of that order which was frustrated by Seema Kapoor bringing Aishley to London on 22 December 2007.
9. Proceedings were then commenced by Deepak and Jyoti Kapoor in the High Court in London. On 23 April 2008 the High Court in London ordered that Aishley be returned to India. Seema Kapoor did not comply with that order. On the contrary, very shortly after it was made she and Aishley disappeared. Their current whereabouts remain unknown to the authorities to this day. Aishley will now be nearly 16 years old.
10. The appellant had initially come to the United Kingdom on various occasions over the years. In 2006 he came to London to study (it is to be emphasised that it is not in any way said that he was a fugitive from justice). He has remained resident in London, although the agreed chronology indicates that on occasion he went back to India in the course of 2007. The appellant had been living in Southall, West London, at the time Seema and Aishley came to Heathrow in December 2007, although it was not evidenced that they stayed with him. He married Sandeep Kaur in India on 18 March 2006. Sandeep Kaur then joined him in London in 2009, together with their young son. They have since had two more children, both born in the United Kingdom. The appellant (a qualified teacher in India) had in the meantime enrolled on an accounting course, paying his own fees. In due course, according to his evidence, he was granted a Tier 1 visa as a Highly Skilled Migrant worker. That expired in 2011 and he has been unable to obtain any extension. He has expressed the view that he will not be able to satisfy the requirements of the current points system.
11. The background to the custody proceedings in India was complex. In 1997 Deepak Kapoor (after graduating from university) was posted to the State of Uttar Pradesh, a long way from the family home in Dasuya in Punjab. In 1999 Aishley was born to Deepak and Jyoti. In 2001 Deepak received another posting. In the meantime the appellant had himself qualified as a teacher and was posted to a school in Dasuya. It seems that because of Deepak's frequent postings (with Jyoti joining him on them) it was decided that Aishley be left at the family home, being brought up by her grandparents and (after they died) by Seema Kapoor and by the appellant. According to a statement of Deepak, the appellant promised that Aishley would be returned to her parents when the appellant himself married. As for Seema Kapoor, she had no children of her own and the indications are that she became very attached to Aishley.
12. In due course Aishley was sent to the local school, where the appellant then taught. Her registration indicated that her parents were named as Seema and Surinder Kumar (whom Seema had by now married). When Deepak in due course discovered this, he was most unhappy and caused the registration to be rectified.
13. On the appellant's own marriage on 18 March 2006, the family all attended. Deepak asked the appellant to return Aishley to him and Jyoti, now that the appellant had married. This did not happen. Instead it appears that Seema and Aishley disappeared for a while, prompting a police complaint. In due course, custody proceedings were commenced by Deepak and Jyoti on 25 April 2006. It was in the course of these proceedings that Seema and Surinder were to claim that an adoption procedure for Aishley, made in the presence of relatives and friends, had been carried out in January 2002.
14. The evidence on this seems to have been somewhat confused. At all events, one aspect was that a sister – Mrs Rajni Kohli – made an affidavit saying that Aishley had not been adopted by Seema. That was dated 12 October 2006. However, by affidavit dated 13 October 2006 (that is, the following day on the face of it) Mrs Kohli then said that Aishley had been adopted by Seema. She was subsequently to seek to explain these contradictions by saying that she had signed two documents in blank on separate occasions, on the separate requests of Deepak Kapoor and the appellant; and that they must have caused them to be filled in thereafter.
15. It is sufficient to say that there is an amount of evidence – relating to the circumstances and the period of time in which Aishley was looked after by Seema and the appellant; the enrolment of Aishley at the school; the events of 2006 and 2007 as set out in Deepak's and Jyoti's statements; and the apparent involvement of the appellant in the legal proceedings in India – to indicate that the appellant was strongly supportive of the position of Seema and Surinder concerning Aishley.
16. As to Seema's departure for Heathrow, with Aishley, in December 2007 it is accepted that there is clear prima facie evidence that the relevant applications were deliberately falsified. For instance, the passport – and application filled in to obtain it – issued on 5 July 2007 relating to Aishley (G2339146) contained a false date of birth; and false birth certificates were used for the purpose. Whether the appellant was himself party to that falsification, however, is hotly disputed.
17. The appellant had himself, it may be noted, been involved in a previous passport offence. In 2001 he had applied in India for a passport, failing to disclose the existence of a previous passport. He had received an administrative penalty, by way of fine for that.
18. An extradition request was issued on 14 October 2011. After some delay, the appellant was arrested on 17 May 2012 and initially granted bail, subject to conditions. The proceedings themselves, for all sorts of reasons, became remarkably protracted: and there were numerous ineffective hearings before the (lengthy) final hearing before the District Judge. It appears that in the meantime Surinder Kumar has been convicted in India of conspiracy to abduct and conspiracy to falsify passport documents.

The Legal Framework

19. As I have said, this was a Part 2 case (in respect of which India is not a designated country for the purposes of s.84). It was accepted that the formal procedural requirements were satisfied at the time of the hearing.
20. For present purposes, the relevant sections are these:

"82. Passage of time

A person's extradition to a category 2 territory is barred by reason of the passage of time if (and only if) it appears that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him by reason of the passage of time since he is alleged to have committed the extradition offence or since he is alleged to have become unlawfully at large (as the case may be).

….

84. Case where person has not been convicted

(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section he must decide whether there is evidence which would be sufficient to make a case requiring an answer by the person if the proceedings were the summary trial of an information against him.

(2) In deciding the question in subsection (1) the judge may treat a statement made by a person in a document as admissible evidence of a fact if—

(a) the statement is made by the person to a police officer or another person charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders, and

(b) direct oral evidence by the person of the fact would be admissible.

(3) In deciding whether to treat a statement made by a person in a document as admissible evidence of a fact, the judge must in particular have regard—

(a) to the nature and source of the document;

(b) to whether or not, having regard to the nature and source of the document and to any other circumstances that appear to the judge to be relevant, it is likely that the document is authentic;

(c) to the extent to which the statement appears to supply evidence which would not be readily available if the statement were not treated as being admissible evidence of the fact;

(d) to the relevance of the evidence that the statement appears to supply to any issue likely to have to be determined by the judge in deciding the question in subsection (1);

(e) to any risk that the admission or exclusion of the statement will result in unfairness to the person whose extradition is sought, having regard in particular to whether it is likely to be possible to controvert the statement if the person making it does not attend to give oral evidence in the proceedings.

(4) A summary in a document of a statement made by a person must be treated as a statement made by the person in the document for the purposes of subsection (2).

(5) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the negative he must order the person's discharge.

(6) If the judge decides that question in the affirmative he must proceed under section 87.

….

87. Human rights

(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section (by virtue of section 84, 85 or 86) he must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42).

(2) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the negative he must order the person's discharge.

(3) If the judge decides that question in the affirmative he must send the case to the Secretary of State for his decision whether the person is to be extradited."

21. So far as the charges were concerned, the District Judge formulated them in this way, in paragraph 5 of his judgment:

"5. The Charges

Firstly abducting a child from India and the express control of the High Court there involving the acquisition of a passport using false details (specifically date of birth and parentage). India submits this is a conspiracy to abduct a child contrary to s.1 or 2 Child Abduction Act 1984 as this involves someone connected to the child i.e. Seema (aunt) and Rasjesh Kapoor (uncle). The offences carry a 7 year maxima in the UK as does the corresponding Indian penal provision.

Secondly obtaining the passport itself by a false date of birth and particulars of parentage in the application form if committed in the UK would offend s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1936 (expressly relating to passports) which carries a 2 year maxima as again does the corresponding Indian offence.

Thirdly obtaining false birth certificates one date giving Aishley as born 15/9/00 the other 15/12/00 (true date being 14/8/99) to facilitate the passport application, given the context, is also an offence contrary to s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1936 or s.25(1) Identity Cards Act 2006 which carries a 10 year maxima.

Fourthly failing to disclose a previous passport of his own in the application dated 28/6/01 would be contrary to s.36 Criminal Justice Act 1936."

The Judgment of the District Judge

22. The principal argument before the District Judge – as before us – was whether the respondent had established a sufficient prima facie case for the purposes of s.84 (1) of the 2003 Act.
23. In this regard, the respondent had relied principally on the affidavit of Superintendent Upasak, with numerous accompanying statements attached (including statements to the police made by Deepak and Jyoti).
24. It seems that, in order to show a prima facie case of complicity on the part of the appellant in the falsified passport applications, the respondent had sought to adduce evidence to the effect that it was the appellant's own handwriting on the relevant application forms. In this regard one of the lengthy statements of Deepak made to the Indian police had contained (in a statement of 26 January 2010) the following passage:

"I have been shown scanned copies of the passport application and other connected documents in respect of issuance of passport to Seema Kapoor and identify the signatures of Seema Kapoor at Page No. 2, 5, 8, 9, 14, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30 and 31. The passport application in the name of Seema Kapoor and other connected papers have been filled in by my younger brother Rajesh Kapoor and I identify his writings.

I have also been shown scanned copies of the passport application in the name of Aishley and identify the signatures of Seema Kapoor at page No. 9 of 15 and 4 of 7. The passport application in the name of Aishley have also been filled by my brother Rajesh Kapoor which I identify."

In a subsequent statement taken by the police on 21 February 2013, Deepak confirmed that the appellant had written letters to him and he had also seen him write and sign documents when they had stayed together.

25. In addition the police had obtained a statement from a Mr Paropkar Singh on 29 January 2010. He had been a teaching colleague of the appellant at Dasuya and had been shown the passport applications; and he too had identified the appellant's handwriting on them. Subsequently Mr Paropkar Singh died. It seems that under Indian law his written statement thereafter was not admissible evidence. The police then obtained a further statement from Mr Amrik Singh, who also had been a teaching colleague of the appellant. Mr Amrik Singh had previously made statements (in connection with the issue of the invalid registration of Aishley at the school in Dasuya) which among other things stated that he knew the appellant's handwriting and was "fully acquainted with it", having seen it many times. He was subsequently shown the passport papers by the police. By statement of Amrik Singh taken by the police, endorsed RO + AC ("Read over and accepted as correct") and signed by a police inspector on 23 February 2013 it was stated that these applications had been filled in by the appellant.
26. However the appellant then himself instructed solicitors in India to approach Mr Amrik Singh. The upshot was that Mr Amrik Singh made an affidavit dated 10 April 2013 now saying that he had not identified the writing or signatures as those of the appellant on the passport applications. He said that he had only been asked to identify photographs of the appellant (although quite why the police would, in the light of Mr Paropkar Singh's death, have wished to speak to Mr Amrik Singh only for that purpose is unclear). Unusually for such cases, Mr Amrik Singh gave oral evidence at the hearing before the District Judge (Mr Singh apparently being, for this purpose, in an internet café in India). He broadly maintained that denial: indeed at stages he seemed to suggest he had made no such statement to the police at all. He repeated that he had not identified the appellant's handwriting on the forms.
27. Although the respondent had instructed the government forensic service in India, that service had stated that, in the absence of originals, it could not give an opinion as to the handwriting on the passport applications.
28. The submission to the District Judge was that the quality of the evidence on handwriting was such that no jury could properly be left to convict by reference to it. As to that the District Judge, after reviewing the arguments, said this:

"I admire the unbridled assault the defence has maintained on this point. On any view Amrik Singh's pointed denial of confirming handwriting on the application forms is a significant concern. However Deepak, the aggrieved father certainly but not disqualified because of that, can confirm the writing of his brother. A trial venue is in my judgment the only one suitable to resolve these very real issues. There is in my judgment prima facie evidence as asserted by India on all charges pursued. Prima facie is just that and to go further, even in the context of an outright assertion from a witness to this court, is to trespass on the exclusive preserve of a trial court, the more so given mutual trust principles that underpin extradition treaty obligations – see Lord Brown (at para 35) Government of Trinidad & Tobago v Gomes and Goodyer [2009] UKHL 21."

29. The Judge then went on to reject the grounds of appeal by reference to s.82 and s.87 of the 2003 Act and abuse of process; and accordingly sent the case to the Secretary of State under s.87 (3) of the 2003 Act.

Submissions and disposition

(1) Prima facie case to answer

30. Mr Josse submitted that the Judge's conclusion under s.84 (1) was wrong.
31. It seems to me that the evidence of Deepak and the first statement of Mr Amrik Singh was in principle capable of being admissible evidence on the issue of the handwriting. They knew the appellant's writing. They were purporting to identify that writing on the passport applications: cp. Archbold (2015 ed) 14-84 – 14-87. But Mr Josse maintained that, by modern standards and where there was no supporting expert handwriting evidence, this evidence was too tenuous to enable such a conclusion properly to be drawn.
32. He focused particularly on the retraction statement of Mr Amrik Singh. He said that there had thereafter been no positive rebuttal evidence by the police inspector who had purportedly taken the original statement; and there was, he said, no reason to reject Mr Amrik Singh's final evidence.
33. Mr Josse placed considerable reliance on the decision of the Divisional Court in Shankaran v The Government of the State of India [2014] EWHC 957 (Admin). In that case, a crucial factual averment – that the appellant had sent or received an email under the name "Vic Branson" – had been the subject of one short statement (the third) given to the police by a man who had given two previous statements which had said nothing on the point. Subsequently, that witness made an affidavit denying any receipt of an email from the appellant using the name "Vic Branson" and professing ignorance as to why the police should have attributed such a statement to him (the witness). The court, referring to R (Alves) v Governor of Pentonville Prison [1993] AC 284, accepted that a full retraction of evidence might not rob it of all of its probative value and weight: paragraph 40 of the judgment. There was noted the argument of counsel in that case that the issue arising in that case was not so much one of "retraction" evidence as "clarification" of the scope and limits of the witness's direct knowledge, thereby permitting further analysis of the criteria contained in s.84(3) of the 2003 Act: paragraph 41 of the judgment. The conclusion of the court, in the circumstance of the case, was that the third statement was "far too slender a basis for founding this case": paragraph 44 of the judgment. So too, by analogy, in the present case, submits Mr Josse.
34. I do not agree. The respondent's case on this point was not founded solely on Mr Amrik Singh's original statement. That was one aspect (and it may be noted that the District Judge clearly cannot have thought that Mr Amrik Singh's oral evidence had entirely disposed of that particular point). But it was not the only aspect. There was also the direct evidence of Deepak, the appellant's brother. Moreover the candidates for completing the applications were, realistically, very limited – and Deepak could, indeed, reasonably be expected also to know at least Seema's writing, as well as the appellant's. Further, the whole background was relevant and material: that provided ample basis for thinking that the appellant had previously actively assisted Seema with regard to retaining custody of Aishley and had a motive for doing so. In my view, the District Judge was, overall, entitled to take the view that there were "very real issues" which could only properly be resolved by the trial process.
35. I should add that we received elaborate arguments as to the interplay between s.84(2) and s.84(3) and the extent to which double hearsay may, or may not, be admitted for the purposes of s.84(1). Section 84(2) is, it may be observed, not the only route by which evidence may be admitted in extradition cases: see, for example, sections 202 and 205 of the 2003 Act. But where, in Part 2 cases, evidence is sought to be admitted under s.84(2) then self-evidently both requirements of (a) and (b) must be satisfied. That is a self-contained code. If they are satisfied, then the judge, in deciding whether or not to admit ("may"), has regard to the matters set out in s.84(3).
36. Mr Josse submitted that an amount of the respondent's evidence was double hearsay; and we heard a lot of argument about whether or not second-hand hearsay is potentially admissible by this route. Mr Sternberg, for his part, suggested that what is said in Nicholls, Montgomery and Knowles on the Law of Extradition and Mutual Assistance (3^rd ed.) at paragraphs 6.54 and 6.55 is ambiguous and contradictory in this regard. Indeed, Mr Sternberg made the striking submission that s.84(3) is itself a freestanding means or further gateway – independent of s.84(2) – for deciding whether or not evidence is admissible for this purpose. I do not, however, think it necessary in the circumstances of this case to get involved in that debate. Even if some aspects of what was put in by the respondent are double hearsay, this extradition case is not dependent on double hearsay. As I see it, for example, having regard to the provisions of s.84(2), the evidence of Deepak and of Mr Amrik Singh in this case was admissible. It was a matter for the District Judge's discretion and evaluation. I can see no reason, notwithstanding Mr Josse's various objections, to think that the District Judge had wrongly "rolled together" the various provisions or had wrongly evaluated the position on this issue or had reached a conclusion not properly open to him. Moreover, once a prima facie case had been established on admissible evidence that the writing on the false passport applications was that of the appellant that fact, set in the context of the other evidence, supports the conclusion that there was a prima facie case on the first three charges.
37. Overall, therefore, and considering all the points made by Mr Josse, I consider that the District Judge was entitled to conclude, as he did, that there was a prima facie case for the purpose of s.84(1) of the 2003 Act.

Abuse of process

38. I turn next to deal with the submission that there was an abuse of process on the part of the respondent. Mr Josse invoked the principles set out in cases such as R (Government of United States of America) v Bow Street Magistrates Court [2007] 1 WLR 1157, [2006] EWHC 2256 (Admin).
39. Two points are advanced. First it is said that the first statement of Mr Amrik Singh had involved a manipulation on the part of the police: even though the statement (as signed by the inspector and countersigned by a superintendent) was endorsed "RO & AC". In truth, it was said, it had never been agreed by Mr Amrik Singh and he had never made the statements attributed to him. But the District Judge made no such finding. This argument is premised on a factual basis which is very much disputed. It cannot sustain an abuse of process argument at this stage: whatever might be the position that may eventuate at any trial as to this evidence.
40. The second relates to the report of a Dr Anand. The appellant's legal team had commissioned a report from Dr Anand on handwriting (as I have said, the respondent was not itself in a position to rely on any expert forensic evidence to implicate the appellant). That report was dated 13 February 2013. By reference to the passport applications, the conclusion of the report on the disputed writings was that they did not tally with undisputed writings of the appellant which had been provided.
41. The appellant, however, did not seek to rely on this report in the extradition proceedings.
42. It is nevertheless said on behalf of the appellant that there was an abuse of process. The police had put in, in the extradition proceedings, a subsequent statement recording that on 11 March 2013 Dr Anand had said that her report provided to the appellant's lawyers had been accompanied by a letter stating that the opinion could be confirmed only after perusal of the original documents (as opposed to photocopies); and that that letter supplementing the opinion was not attached to the report shown to her. No such letter, however, has since been produced, notwithstanding requests made to the respondent.
43. Given that the appellant, in the extradition proceedings, never sought to rely on the report of Dr Anand it is difficult to see where this can lead for present purposes. The innuendo is (as with the first statement of Mr Amrik Singh) that the police inspector fabricated this statement attributed to Dr Anand. But that could not be resolved at this stage. Such an issue, if there remains one, is for the trial process: compare, for example, the Part 1 case of Symeou v Public Prosecutor's Office [2009] EWHC 897 at paragraphs 33 and 34.
44. In my judgment, the District Judge was justified in rejecting the abuse of process argument.

(3) Convention rights

45. At the hearing before the District Judge the reliance on Convention rights, for the purposes of s.87, had been extensive. But before us the arguments, realistically, were much more confined. No further reliance was placed on asserted prospects of breaches of Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention if the appellant were removed to India for trial. Nor was any further point pursued about prison conditions in Punjab being such as to constitute a prospective infringement of the appellant's human rights.
46. By reference to Article 3, however, an argument is maintained as to the alleged ill-treatment the appellant is said to be likely to be subjected to in the period when he is escorted from the airport (on any return to India) before being placed in the charge of the High Court in Punjab.
47. An amount of evidence had been adduced in the court below on this, and other issues, relating to the issue of the appellant's ill-treatment on return. But it was accepted that the appellant would come under the jurisdiction (and protection) of the High Court within 24 hours of return when he was taken to Punjab. It is the case that charges have already been laid against the appellant: it is not obvious therefore why any further interviewing (if permissible at all, given that charges have been laid) would be needed. It is speculation to suggest that in those intervening 24 hours the police or Central Bureau of Investigation would engage in ill-treatment of the appellant with a view to ascertaining Aishley's current whereabouts. The District Judge found, on the evidence, that there was no proper basis for concluding that there would be a real risk of breach of Article 3 at the hands of the relevant police authorities. I can see no justification for interfering with that conclusion. No substantial grounds for such a belief were made out.
48. Reliance was also placed on Article 8. The appellant and his wife have established, with their three children, a home in London. The eldest goes to school. They say that, though they have family in India, their families are not in any position to support them there and conditions will be harsh for them (particularly if the appellant is remanded in custody). Further, Mrs Kapoor suffers health problems.
49. Plainly Article 8 is engaged here. Removal will have an obvious impact on all the family, even if they will remain together. But since 2011 the appellant has had an uncertain immigration status on any view. Further, child abduction, as alleged, is a serious matter. Overall, I can see no basis for thinking that the District Judge was wrong to conclude that it would not be disproportionate to order extradition.

(4) Lapse of time

50. Mr Josse made clear that this complaint under s.82 related solely to the passport offence committed in 2001 if taken on its own. He sensibly did not pursue the point if extradition was adjudged to have been properly ordered on the other charges. Since that is the judgment I reach, nothing more need be said about this particular issue.

Other matters

51. There was some debate before us as to whether conspiracy to pervert the course of justice was one of the charges and part of the relevant conduct in respect of which extradition was sought. It certainly is not identified as a charge, as such, in paragraph 5 of the judgment below. We were taken to a selection of the underlying documents in the court proceedings in India; and from those it is not apparent that there is such a charge in respect of which extradition is sought. So there is to be no extradition on a charge of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. That said, I can for myself see no objection – on grounds of specialty or otherwise – to the exploration, in the trial proceedings, of matters relating to the involvement of the appellant in the family proceedings in India (including, for example, the circumstances in which Mrs Kohli's affidavits were obtained): since this conduct seems to me to be an essential part of the context relating to the appellant's alleged involvement in the alleged subsequent child abduction and passport offences.

Conclusion

52. I would for my part dismiss this appeal.

Mr Justice Ouseley:

53. I agree.