England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		19 March 2015

1. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: This is the substantive hearing for judicial review of the decision of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, permission having been given to judicially review the Secretary of State by HHJ Anthony Thornton QC sitting as a judge of the High Court on 13 March 2014.
2. Permission had been refused on paper by HHJ Cotter QC sitting as a judge of the High Court on 29 August 2013. The reason for the refusal by Judge Cotter was that the claimant had an alternative remedy, namely an out of country right of appeal.
3. The permission that was granted by Judge Thornton was limited to a challenge upon the claims being certified as unfounded.
4. The claim was originally made on 7 March 2013. For a while Mr Owusu was represented by immigration advisers Linga & Co. Thereafter, he was represented by the immigration specialists Turpin & Miller solicitors. Most recently, since 19 February of this year, he has been acting in person.
5. I mention that previous representation because, although he now acts in person, Mr Owusu has had the opportunity and the benefit of advice from immigration specialists and a great deal of the documentation presented to this court on behalf of the claimant has been presented through those offices.
6. The decision that is being challenged was made on 4 February 2013 and, amongst other documents, I have before me that detailed decision letter, the statement of grounds for judicial review, the Secretary of State's grounds of resistance and skeleton arguments on behalf of both the claimant and the defendant.
7. Mr Owusu, acting in person, did not present his skeleton argument until this morning but I had the opportunity to read it before he addressed me orally and I have taken the opportunity over the short adjournment to consider his skeleton argument again.
8. I also have before me the decisions of Judge Cotter and Judge Thornton. I have had the opportunity to consider in detail the bundle filed on behalf of the claimant and the defendant, as well as various of the authorities that have been presented to me.
9. In summary, the claimant is a citizen of Ghana. He was born on 22 May 1968. He has told me in oral submissions that he left for Libya when he was about 15 years old. I understand that both his mother and father are deceased.
10. He says he returned to Ghana in or about 1996 and it was then that the incidents took place, which I will return to, when he says that he was involved with a princess who had already been betrothed to a prince. His relationship with her resulted in a pregnancy and, in due course, birth of a son. He says as a result of that relationship he had to flee Ghana, arriving, he says, in the UK in 1997.
11. He has never had leave to be in the United Kingdom and, on his case, he was living clandestinely in this country, albeit he says he was known by others, including his church, from 1997.
12. On 20 April 2012 he made an application for indefinite leave to remain on the basis that he had been resident in the UK for over 14 years. That application was refused on 12 November 2012 on the ground that he had been unable to provide sufficiently convincing evidence to support his contention that he had been in the country since 1997. That decision letter of 12 November 2012 was incorporated in full in the decision letter of 4 February 2013 and, amongst other things, provided as follows:
13. "You claim to have arrived in the United Kingdom on 2 February 1997, however you have not provided any evidence of the date or method of your entry into the United Kingdom."
14. The letter of 12 November, incorporated in the decision of 4 February, goes on to deal with various matters. What is said is that it is considered that the claimant had failed to provide evidence of a sufficient standard or quantity that he had resided continuously in the United Kingdom for 14 years. That conclusion was reached on the basis of a number of matters, including the payslips that had been provided. They were dated between 1997 and 2006 and indicated that he had been employed at a number of companies during that period. It has been noted that the payslips were crumpled in an apparent attempt to make them look old.
15. The evidence concerning self-employment in the construction industry provided a UTR (Unique Tax Reference) number. That linked with confirmation from HMRC on 19 July 2007 but that appeared to be the first reference of the claimant being recorded as self-employed in the construction industry, the first return being issued in 2007/2008. On that basis, it was considered that the claimant had submitted false documentation in support of his claim to have resided in the United Kingdom continuously since 1997.
16. Further, it was noted that the claimant had provided a medical card showing his registration date as 15 May 1997 but that card itself was in a format that did not come into circulation until 2003, some six years after the date that was put forward. The card also referred to a PCT, primary care trust, whilst primary care trusts did not exist in 1997.
17. On the basis of that evidence, the conclusion was reached that there was not sufficient evidence to confirm continuous residency in the United Kingdom from 1997 as claimed and that falsified evidence had been submitted in support of his claim.
18. That decision was appealed by the claimant but the claimant did not proceed with his appeal, he instead proceeded with an asylum claim. He says that it was not his choice to deal with matters in that way but that he had been convinced by an officer that it would be more appropriate for him to make an asylum claim and that that would be his best course. He says that he followed that advice.
19. Even if that is correct, it did not, of course, prevent him from challenging the basis upon which the decision had been made as to his long residence. Nor did it prevent him from putting forward further evidence in support of his claim that he had been in the country since 1997. The allegations contained in the refusal letter of November 2012 were quite serious allegations of deliberate attempts to falsify evidence.
20. That first claim brought on the basis of long residence had not been certified but, in due course, in the decision letter of February 2013 the Secretary of State did certify as clearly unfounded both his application for asylum and his human rights application, that application being made on the basis that the claimant says he has Article 8 rights which would be infringed.
21. The issue before this court on the substantive hearing of the application for judicial review is, first, whether the claim for judicial review should be dismissed on the basis that the claimant has an appropriate remedy by having an out-of-country right of appeal. If the out-of-country right of appeal is available and is an appropriate remedy, judicial review would not be available to Mr Owusu. That, the defendant says, is the end of the matter and the decision of the Secretary of State does not need to be considered further in the context of these proceedings.
22. However, as Mr Owusu is in person and it is clearly of great importance to him that he understands that all the issues relating to his case are fully considered, I have taken the view that, regardless of my decision on that first point as to whether judicial review is properly available to him, the substantive matters should be considered: that being whether the decision of the Secretary of State on 4 February 2013 to certify both the claim for asylum and the Article 8 claim as being clearly unfounded were rational decisions that the Secretary of State could properly make on the evidence available.
23. Looking at the authorities, the existence of an alternative remedy is clearly a basis for saying that judicial review is inappropriate. In the case of R (JD Wetherspoon) v Guildford Borough Council [2006] EWHC 815 Admin, Beatson J said:
24. "It is clear that the existence of an alternative remedy may well be a ground for refusing a substantive application."
25. He referred to the case of R v Mansfield DC ex parte Ashfield Nominees Limited.
26. In Lim, an authority that has been referred to both by the claimant and the defendant, (Secretary of State for the Home Department v R (Lim and another) [2007] EWCA Civ 773, Sedley LJ said as follows:
27. "It is well established, as the judge reminded himself, that judicial review is a remedy of last resort, so that where a suitable statutory appeal is available the court will exercise its discretion in all but exceptional cases by declining to entertain an application for judicial review."
28. Then he referred to ex parte Preston and ex parte Calveley. Further, in his judgment he says this:
29. "This argument depends upon the well established principle, not confined to the immigration field, to which I referred earlier in this judgment, that where a statutory channel of appeal exists, in the absence of special or exceptional factors, the High Court will refuse, in the exercise of its discretion, to entertain an application for judicial review. It is, I would add, important in the field of public law that the discretion of the judge as gatekeeper should be exercised with reasonable consistency and predictability so that two individuals with similar claims should not find that one is heard and the other is turned away."
30. The issue I need to consider, therefore, is whether in this case the existence of an out-of-country right of appeal is a suitable remedy. Does it, to use the words of Coulson J in Ali Zahid v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWHC 4290, provide "fair, adequate or proportionate protection"?
31. What the claimant seeks to say is that an out-of-country right of appeal is not as good as an in-country right of appeal. That, of itself, is not sufficient. Of course, an out-of-country appeal is different to an in-country appeal. That is plainly acknowledged by the Court of Appeal in Lim. Sedley LJ usefully summarised the position as follows:
32. "It is relevant to note what is involved in the difference between in-country and out-of-country appeals. It is not simply that the latter have to be conducted by proxy unless the appellant happens to have access to video link facilities in his or her home country and enough money to make use of them, it is that if the appeal succeeds on the merits the appellant has to return to the UK, assuming that leave has not by then expired at his or her own expense. The only exception to this is that if the AIT holds removal to have been not merely mistaken but unlawful, the appellant, having been removed at public expense, will be brought back at public expense."
33. He goes on later in his judgment to set out that the figures indicate that:
34. "The differential between successful in-country and out-of-country appeals is not great. 18 per cent for in-country appeals, 14 per cent for out-of-country appeals. The undoubted hardship of meanwhile losing one's job, income and home is an inevitable incident of the system laid down by statute and, while distressing, is on no view unusual."
35. He found, in the circumstances of that case, that neither aspect of the case makes it exceptional.
36. The out-of-country appeal is a remedy that has been provided by legislation and the concerns that were apparently expressed by Judge Thornton in giving permission to take this matter to a substantive hearing with respect to the potential lack of a video link or access to a video link is not something, as I understand it, that the claimant is actively pursuing. It does not seem to me in any event, particularly in light of Lim, to be something that would make it exceptional. The out-of-country appeal does, in my judgment, give fair, adequate and proportionate protection for the claimant.
37. The point Mr Owusu makes with respect to having changed course and proceeded with an asylum and Human Rights Act application, which he says means he lost his in-country right of appeal because of the long residence claim decision having been withdrawn by the Secretary of State, does not seem to me to take his case any further. The points with respect to the refusal of that long residence claim are, as I have already said, still within the body of the decision challenged on 4 February 2013.
38. The claimant has never been prevented from challenging the conclusions reached by the Secretary of State and it was always open to him, and has remained open to him, to set out why he might say that the Secretary of State was wrong to reach the conclusion she did which is that he had relied upon falsified documents to support his claim. The claimant has not proceeded to challenge the Secretary of State's decisions on that basis and, so far as the Secretary of State was concerned, she was dealing with the claims that the claimant was proceeding with, namely the asylum claim and the human rights claim. It was those claims that, after a detailed and lengthy asylum interview, she concluded were clearly unfounded and certified them as such.
39. There is nothing, in my judgment, which would prevent the claimant from being able to raise all the points that he would wish to raise by way of an appeal in an out-of-country appeal rather than an in-country appeal.
40. In those circumstances, there is no basis for judicially reviewing the decision of the Secretary of State. Mr Owusu has his remedy which is a fair, adequate and proportionate one. There is nothing exceptional within this case which renders the out-of-country appeal as unsuitable. The asylum and human rights claims were certified as unfounded and the claimant has every right to raise his points with respect to those pursuant to the appeal process available to him.
41. Despite having come to that conclusion, as I indicated at the beginning of this judgment, it seems to me appropriate to deal with the substance of the points raised by the claimant. Some of those points leach into the argument as to whether the out-of-country right of appeal is fair, adequate and proportionate but I should make it very clear that the fact that the claimant says he is fearful of persecution in Ghana does not mean that an out-of-country right of appeal is inappropriate. Such argument is plainly circular. Failed asylum claims that are certified as clearly unfounded have that right to an out-of-country appeal. It could not be right that a person who has such an asylum claim could then argue that an out-of-country appeal would be inappropriate because of that fear of persecution. It would drive a coach and horses through the legislative structure.
42. Dealing with the substance of the claim that the decision to find the asylum or, as it should properly be referred to, humanitarian protection, claim and the Article 8 human rights claim were clearly unfounded, unreasonable, irrational or otherwise unlawful.
43. So far as the legislation is concerned, and as set out by Lord Phillips in the case of R (L) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 25, section 115.1 provides that the decision maker will:

(1) consider the factual substance and detail of the claim;

(2) consider how it stands with the known background data;

(3) consider whether in the round it is capable of belief;

(4) if not, consider whether some part of it is capable of belief;

(5) consider whether if eventually believed in whole or in part it is capable of coming within the convention.

44. As Lord Phillips says, the test for the Home Secretary is an objective one. It is not dependent upon the Home Secretary's view but upon criteria which a court can readily reapply. A claim is either unfounded or it is not.
45. Lord Justice Auld in R (Bagdanavicius and another) v the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWCA Civ 1605 said as follows:
46. "The threshold for certification in each case is much the same, namely that if the claim cannot on any legitimate view succeed it is clearly unfounded."
47. The finding that a claim is clearly unfounded can only therefore be challenged on the basis that it is irrational. Quite plainly, if a court considers that the claim is not unfounded then the decision of the Secretary of State must be irrational.
48. Lord Phillips in ZT Kosovo v the Home Secretary [2009] UKHL 6 said as follows:
49. "It follows that a challenge to the Secretary of State's conclusions of the claim as clearly unfounded is a rationality challenge. There is no way that a court can consider whether her conclusion was rational other than by asking itself the same question that she has considered. If the court concludes that a claim has a realistic prospect of success when the Secretary of State has reached a contrary view, the court will necessarily conclude that the Secretary of State's view was irrational."
50. The claimant's asylum or humanitarian protection claim can be summarised as follows: These are the incidents of 1996 that the claimant referred to in his oral submissions, saying that was a time when he had returned from Libya. What he says is that he had a secret relationship at that time with a princess or a sacred priestess from a neighbouring tribe. The princess' father discovered that relationship. It was a relationship which was disapproved of because the princess was already betrothed to another, a prince, and the claimant himself did not have royal blood.
51. As a result of the relationship with the claimant, he says that the prince ended the relationship which gave rise to a conflict between the prince' community and that of the king and his daughter. As a result of that, there was unrest and disturbance against the king.
52. What Mr Owusu says is that, in order to appease the Gods and no doubt to quell disapproval, it was decided that Mr Owusu and the princess should be killed. As a result, Mr Owusu assisted the princess to flee to Togo. She was pregnant with Mr Owusu's son and she gave birth to him in June of 1997. She entered into another relationship and the son was, at the request of Mr Owusu, taken back to Ghana.
53. Mr Owusu himself says he fled Ghana but his father was taken into custody and died in custody. He says his two sisters were killed by the king's guardsmen with a warning that he too could be killed.
54. Mr Owusu, says that he fears that on return to Ghana he too could be killed as a result of the relationship that took place some 17 or 18 years ago.
55. The Secretary of State considered the asylum claim on the basis that Mr Owusu was able to substantiate his factual case, albeit that it appears that some enquiries were undertaken which did not necessarily support that factual case.
56. In the detailed decision letter of 4 February, the basis of the claim was set out in full and consideration was given to whether there was sufficiency of protection. Details are set out in the letter with respect to the availability of internal protection within Ghana, both so far as the security forces are concerned and with respect to the police. The claimant in his claim did not seek to say that he had been directly harmed or threatened but said that he had fears that he would be. He had not sought the protection of either the security forces or the police.
57. The decision letter sets out in detail the basis upon which the Secretary of State came to the conclusion that there was sufficiency of protection and it makes it clear that the claimant could have, but had not, taken steps to approach the authorities or give them any opportunity to provide protection for him. It was also noted that the events had taken place at the time of the decision, some 15 years ago, and that there had been no reprisals against his son or against his cousins who lived in Ghana.
58. Further, the Secretary of State in the decision letter sets out in detail the opportunity to relocate internally. Again, detail is given there with respect to the ability of the claimant to return and live in a different area to where he had previously lived. The claimant continues today in his oral submissions to say that that is not possible, in that, he says, everyone knows everyone else. That is not a credible stance for him to take, particularly where there is a population of some 25 million.
59. In my judgment, looking at the decision letter in the context of the appropriate test, it is clear that there cannot be any basis for challenging the decision of the Secretary of State as being either irrational or not reasonable in a Wednesbury sense. It is not, in my judgment, open to a legitimate challenge.
60. So far as the Article 8 claim is concerned, it is, as has been said by counsel on behalf of the Secretary of State, a notably weak claim. It was brought on the basis that, at the time of the application, he had a partner of less than a year's duration which was not a cohabiting partnership. That relationship, the claimant has said freely today, does not continue. He does not have a relationship of that nature and has not had such a relationship since he was released from detention.
61. The only other claim is with respect to a half-brother who, I am told, resides in the UK. That in itself would not be sufficient to give rise to an Article 8 claim.
62. The decision letter sets out in detail the decision making process that the Secretary of State engaged in when coming to the conclusions she did. The right test was applied and the claimant fails to satisfy either appendix FM or 276 ADE and, in my judgment, having read the decision letter, the principles that are set out by Sales J. (as he then was) in the case of Nagri have been properly followed.
63. The claimant contends before me that he doesn't have any roots in Ghana, given the period of his absence. It is difficult to give any weight to those submissions in light of his own case that his son, on his own case, is living in Ghana, that he knows the person the son is living with and, although his close family, his parents and sisters, he says are now deceased, he has previously said that there are cousins who live in Ghana.
64. The earlier relationship which has now ended and the existence of a half-brother living in the UK do not, as I have said, come close to establishing an Article 8 claim.
65. There are no compelling circumstances that outweigh the public interest in deportation and removal is a proportionate response in this case.
66. The asylum claim and Article 8 claim are clearly unfounded and this was a rational and reasonable decision on the part of the Secretary of State.
67. Consequently, taking into account all the matters that have been set out both in writing and in oral submissions, I must conclude that the claimant has an appropriate remedy by reason of his out-of-country right of appeal and that this judicial review application should fail for that reason. Nonetheless, even if I am wrong about that, the certification of the asylum/ humanitarian protection claim and Article 8 claim as both being clearly unfounded were neither irrational nor unreasonable decisions for the Secretary of State to make and the judicial review claim would fail on this basis as well.
68. MISS BRAM: I am grateful, my Lady. The principal question that remains from my perspective is costs.
69. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Yes.
70. MISS BRAM: I see you have got a copy of the statement of costs in front of you. A copy was sent to Mr Owusu by email yesterday and he has been provided with another paper copy before court this morning.
71. The Secretary of State does claim all of her costs in this matter. As you can see, the bottom line is that they amount to a little over £9,000.
72. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Yes.
73. MISS BRAM: I should make clear that the £9,000 reflected in this costs schedule includes the £640 previously ordered by HHJ Cotter when he refused permission on paper. That £640 has not been paid by Mr Owusu so we can either deduct that from this or we can replace the previous order with a new order on costs.
74. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: When Judge Thornton gave permission to take the matter further, he didn't set aside that order?
75. MISS BRAM: No, he didn't set aside that order. The costs were in the case at that time.
76. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Right. Well, I think, whatever the position might be on costs, then it seems to me appropriate that the simplest way of dealing with it is simply to say whatever that figure might be that it is to include the £640 that had already been ordered.
77. So far as costs are concerned, they are obviously not insubstantial. They include attendance at this hearing?
78. MISS BRAM: They do. This is a case in which there has been a total of three hearings. In addition to the permission hearing in front of HHJ Thornton there was a previous permission hearing adjourned due to an administrative mix up of the court's, neither party's fault. So my costs, I think you are looking at the box at the bottom of page 2, my costs in relation to 7 April and 16 May relate to the two permission hearings.
79. 20 June relates to the detailed grounds which I drafted, so that will have been a substantial cost saving because my hourly rate is almost a third of that of those instructing me. Then there is some further very limited work plus today's hearing.
80. My submission is that, overall, this case has been litigated with the efficiency and economy one expects from the Treasury Solicitor. The hourly rates are extremely modest, including, I regret to say, counsel's hourly rate.
81. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Which is a standard rate.
82. MISS BRAM: A standard rate, my Lady. The overall figure of £9,000 is, in my submission, difficult to break down into component parts that are in any way unreasonable. Of course, I am happy to answer further questions.
83. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: The issue that concerns me slightly is with regard to the permission hearings, as you have said the -- well, one of those effectively you lost because he got permission and one of those was a difficulty, I assume, of over-listing and therefore not -- I appreciate costs were incurred but not costs that were incurred by reason of any fault on the part of the claimant.
84. MISS BRAM: Yes, or indeed the defendant in relation to the first hearing.
85. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: No, I appreciate that.
86. MISS BRAM: In relation to the second hearing, of course it is right that permission was granted after a full hearing by HHJ Thornton. But as it has turned out the claim has not ultimately been successful. The risk of being successful at a permission hearing but being ultimately unsuccessful on the substance must, in my submission, logically fall on the unsuccessful party.
87. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Yes. Okay. Let me hear what Mr Owusu has to say.
88. You will appreciate that what the Secretary of State is saying is that it has cost them to be represented, or for her to be represented in these proceedings and that you have lost on your claim. Therefore she should be entitled to her costs. She is saying that those costs are slightly in excess of £9,000, including the original acknowledgement of service.
89. MR OWUSU: My Lady, before I comment on that, I want you to have a look at this before I comment on that. They gave me something which I didn't have the first time about my application that I raised. It is here. That they got it. She said they haven't got anything, so I want you to have a look, the date they have it. When I came out, I challenged, that is why I said the people who knew me sent to me and I sent to the home office. They said they didn't have anything like that.
90. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: So you are not dealing with costs, you are actually dealing with the substance of my judgment, is that --
91. MR OWUSU: Yes, my Lady.
92. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Have you shown that to counsel for the Secretary of State, what you have got in your hand?
93. MR OWUSU: They gave it to me. They know it.
94. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: What is this?
95. MISS BRAM: My Lady, it was a document that was disclosed to Mr Owusu during the course of these proceedings. It is the GCID notes you will be familiar with. It suggests that, as Mr Owusu said in his oral submissions, he did make some kind of further submission, the nature of which is unidentified, in May 2013. As I said earlier, I have no instructions on that and, of course, for the reasons you have given in your judgment that is irrelevant in any event, because the assumption was made in his favour in the asylum decision that the facts were accurate.
96. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Yes. Okay. Do you want to show me those anyway, if you give them to the usher. Thank you.
97. (Document handed)
98. (Pause)
99. Okay, what you are saying is that on 3 May --
100. MR OWUSU: 3 May, I made that application to them.
101. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: -- you made further submissions.
102. MR OWUSU: Further submissions. I challenged them. She said I didn't, when it came out I didn't send anything, I didn't do anything, but I did. The people who know me in the church, they know me, send me documents to send to the home office. If they had come with this maybe the gentleman (inaudible).
103. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Okay. Can I just deal with this point, as you have raised this, and then we will look at the costs point, okay?
104. MR OWUSU: Thank you.
105. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Subsequent to the giving of my judgment in this matter, submissions having been finished before the luncheon adjournment, and, as I say, subsequent to me giving my judgment, Mr Owusu has provided me with a copy of a GCID case record sheet, a document, as I understand it, disclosed to him by representatives on behalf of the Secretary of State. What that indicates on the face of it is that on 3 May 2013, subsequent to the decision made on 4 February, further submissions were provided in-country, in person.
106. Insofar as that is relevant to my decision, I record the fact that I have been shown that. Mr Owusu has said to me again in oral representations subsequent to my judgment that information was given with regard to his being known by his local church.
107. That information does not, in my judgment, make any difference to my decision with regard to this and my decision, even with that further information, does not alter.
108. That can go back to Mr Owusu.
109. (Document returned)
110. Mr Owusu, that then leaves the issue with regard to the costs that the Secretary of State is claiming in light of their defence of this matter.
111. MR OWUSU: My Lady, what I would say about the costs, since I came out, almost two years now, they have asked me not to work. I am not working. I am still (inaudible) so even got me transportation to come here. So a cost like this, I appeal to them to withdraw the costs.
112. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Okay. There is a difference, Mr Owusu, between an order for costs being made and that costs order being enforced. Whether they can actually get their costs or not, whether you have got the money or other means in which to pay those costs, is a matter of enforcement, which is for them. What I have to consider is, as a matter of principle, you having lost in your claim, whether, first of all, they are entitled to their costs and, if they are entitled to their costs, what the level of those costs should be.
113. MR OWUSU: Okay.
114. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: That is my concern.
115. What they are claiming is, including the £640, something just in excess of £9,000. Counsel's fees are modest because of the nature in which there is a set fee counsel is charged out at. They come to slightly under £4,000 of the total. The other costs are calculated on the basis of the fee earners who have been involved at various stages in this matter.
116. Is there anything you wish to say -- beyond that which you have already said, which I understand, your own financial difficulties -- with respect to the principle of a costs order being made or the amount of those costs?
117. MR OWUSU: That is what I said earlier on that. If they could consider, because I don't have it. People feed me. If they ever allow me to work, maybe this would come or I would have paid it myself.
118. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Okay. Thank you.
119. What I am going to order so far as costs are concerned is I am going to order that the claimant is to pay the defendant's costs.
120. So far as counsel's costs are concerned, and I am of course mindful of the relatively low hourly rate that is charged for these matters, I am going to allow those costs in their entirety. That is the two totals of £1,920 and £1,944. In addition to that, without going through the figures in minute detail, I am going to allow the solicitors an additional sum of £3,000. The figure of £640 which has already been ordered by Judge Cotter with respect to the acknowledgement of service I will say shall be in addition to that £3,000. I think that that comes to a total of something in the region of £7,500.
121. MISS BRAM: Yes, my Lady, £7,500.
122. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: If that final figure can be calculated and can be included as part of the order dismissing this claim for judicial review.
123. MISS BRAM: Certainly, my Lady. I will prepare a draft of that order.
124. THE DEPUTY JUDGE: Thank you very much.