England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		2 December 2014

1. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: This is an appeal by Wiltshire Council by way of case stated against the decision of the South East Wiltshire Magistrates' Court on 13 May 2013 not to make a liability order against Mr Michael Piggin in respect of what was said to be unpaid council tax in relation to 55 Harnham Road in Salisbury. The sum in question was £1,849.24. The relevant period was 1 July 2011 to 2 November 2012.
2. Mr Piggin has appeared before me representing himself. He responds to and opposes this appeal. The South East Wiltshire Magistrates' Court does not appear. In the case stated in the concluding paragraph they indicate that "they do not contest this matter and accept the submissions made by the Appellant." That may be their view, but it does not necessarily follow it will be mine. The court must judge the matter entirely on its merits.
3. Before identifying the facts found by the magistrates, the cases on either side considered by them, and the extent to which, if at all, they departed from appropriate legal principles, I should note that Mr Piggin's view, expressed if I may respectively say so with conciseness and no little eloquence, was that the Salisbury magistrates were not there simply to engage in an administrative function. They were there to dispense justice.
4. They were faced with a position where Mr Piggin was arguing that he was not liable for the council tax, but he was not saying that no council tax was payable. Rather, the council tax was payable by a trust. The trust had offered to pay the council tax. The Council had refused to accept payment from the trust. Mr Piggin says, perhaps with some justification, that the trust was ready to pay. Therefore, Wiltshire Council were not at any risk of any loss of revenue. In those circumstances, Mr Piggin argues the dispensing of justice meant that the Magistrates' Court were entirely correct in reaching the view that they did.
5. Accepting the fundamental basis of all of that, I nonetheless must apply the law as Parliament has enacted it. Of course, the same applies to the South East Wiltshire Magistrates' Court. That is the basis upon which Wiltshire Council appeal. Should it be that the law requires me to find that the magistrates acted without jurisdiction, it must follow that their decision will have to be overturned, whatever the more fundamental merits of the underlying position. That is because a Magistrates' Court can only act, it being a creature of statute, within the jurisdiction given to it by Parliament.
6. So what were the facts found by the magistrates in relation to this case? They found that Mr Piggin was the non-resident registered owner of the relevant address, 55 Harnham Road, Salisbury. They found that council tax was as a matter of fact outstanding in the relevant sum for the relevant period. They found as a fact that Mr Piggin was a trustee of a trust known as MC Trust, a trust that existed for the benefit of his children and in particular related to 55 Harnham Road. The magistrates found that the trust was the beneficial owner of that address.
7. They noted that there was a Valuation Tribunal process in train. They noted also that other Local Authorities -- in relation to I assume other addresses -- were prepared to accept council tax liability on the part of MC Trust rather than any named person. They finally found that there was no dispute, but that all procedural matters had been complied with by Wiltshire Council.
8. The Council's case, as set out in the case stated, was that Mr Piggin was the registered owner of the address. Council tax was as a matter of fact outstanding. Mr Piggin therefore was liable to pay the council tax for the relevant period. In those circumstances, the court's only option was to make a liability order against the Respondent.
9. The Council indicated that it would refuse to send a bill addressed to MC Trust as the body responsible for paying council tax. Perhaps slightly bizarrely, the Council's position they would as a matter of fact accept payment from the trust and provide a receipt to the trust, but they insisted that the Respondent to this appeal, Mr Piggin, was the person in respect of whom the liability order should be made.
10. Mr Piggin's case was that the trust was the liable party as the beneficial owner. He argued he had disposed of his freehold interest in the land. He provided evidence showing that other Local Authorities billed MC Trust for council tax in relation to other properties. He argued that in all of the circumstances it was unreasonable for the court to make a liability order against him.
11. The Magistrates' Court found that MC Trust was the owner of 55 Harnham Road, Salisbury. They were of the opinion that the Council should have billed MC Trust and accepted the payment that had been offered. They accepted the argument put by Mr Piggin that it was unreasonable to make a liability order against him in all of those circumstances.
12. They further found that in the event that the Valuation Tribunal found against Mr Piggin and ordered that Mr Piggin was the person liable to pay council tax, then a further application for a liability order could be made in relation to the same period.
13. The three questions on which the opinion of this court was sought were, first, did the Magistrates' Court have jurisdiction to decline to make the liability order sought, taking into account the arguments put by Mr Piggin? In other words, was the issue one over which they had any jurisdiction given that section 16 of the 1992 Act and regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations appeared to indicate that such issues were solely for the determination of the Valuation Tribunal.
14. The second question they posed was whether in the event that the court did have jurisdiction they were correct to determine that Mr Piggin was not liable to pay council tax given that he was the registered proprietor. I say in parentheses that this question does not appear to me to be an appropriate question for this court to consider. The crucial issue is jurisdiction.
15. Third, given that the Magistrates' Court refused to make a liability order, could another Magistrates' Court at some point in the future consider a further application for a liability order in relation to the same period if the Valuation Tribunal found against Mr Piggin? As I say, it is the first and third questions that really arise for consideration in this case.
16. The Council's argument is that the matter is really determined by a combination of section 16 of the 1992 Act and regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations. Section 16 provides as follows:

i. "A person may appeal to a valuation tribunal if he is aggrieved by -

(b) any decision of a billing authority that a dwelling is a chargeable dwelling, or that he is liable to pay council tax in respect of such a dwelling; or

(c) any calculation made by such an authority of an amount which he is liable to pay to the authority in respect of council tax."

17. There is no doubt that this case concerns Mr Piggin's grievance as to whether he is "liable to pay council tax." Therefore, his contention appears to fall squarely within section 16. It follows that he may appeal to a Valuation Tribunal. As a matter of fact, he did just that. As already noted, the appeal was still awaiting hearing at the time of the hearing before the Magistrates' Court. I now know that it has reached a conclusion. I have not seen the decision of the Tribunal. It is not relevant to my consideration of this case to see the decision at all and I have not done so.
18. Regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations states as follows:

i. "Any matter which could be the subject of an appeal under section 16 of the Act may not be raised in proceedings under this part."

19. The proceedings to which the regulation relates are enforcement proceedings before a Magistrates' Court.
20. In the hearing in the Magistrates' Court, Mr Piggin argued that he was not liable for the outstanding council tax because the property was owned by a trust. Thus, the argument is his argument before the lower court fell clearly within the scope of section 16(1). Therefore, by virtue of regulation 57 this was a matter that could have been determined by way of an appeal to the Valuation Tribunal and was not in those circumstances a matter that could be raised by way of defence in proceedings in the Magistrates' Court.
21. This court has considered that issue on at least two previous occasions. The decision in R (on the application of John Stuart Salmon) v Feltham Magistrates' Court [2008] EWHC 3507 (Admin) supports the argument raised by the Appellant in this case. The decision in Mahendra Shah v London Borough of Croydon [2013] EWHC 3657 (Admin) supports the argument put by Mr Piggin. In particular, it supports the argument that it would in essence not be fair to bar Mr Piggin for raising these matters before the magistrates.
22. Miss Harrison on behalf of the Appellant in this case accepted before me that neither decision is binding on me. When Andrews J made her decision she apparently was not referred to the case of Salmon, but it is not suggested that the decision in Shah was per incuriam for that reason. It follows that I am in a position to reach the view that I think is appropriate bearing in mind the words of the statute and the regulation.
23. I conclude that regulation 57(1) of the 1992 regulations establishes clearly and unequivocally that the substantive merits of the billing authority's decision in terms of the chargeability of the dwelling, which is not this case, or the liability of the individual, which is this case, those matters are matters for the Valuation Tribunal. They "may not be raised" in the enforcement proceedings.
24. Mr Piggin is in general terms entirely correct. A Magistrates' Court is there to dispense justice, but a Magistrates' Court has jurisdiction in particular cases depending upon the extent of that jurisdiction as provided by statute. In this case, the statute is entirely plain. The substantive issues are to be raised before the Tribunal. They may not be raised in the enforcement proceedings.
25. It follows that the magistrates in this case made an error in law in permitting Mr Piggin to raise the issue to argue it and then to find in his favour. They simply did not have the jurisdiction to do so. That disposes of the substantive part of the appeal.
26. The magistrates went onto say even if they were wrong, the local council would be able to return to the court to seek a further liability order in the event that the Tribunal found against Mr Piggin. That again, with respect, must be an error of law.
27. If they had made a clear finding in relation to the application for a liability order in respect of a particular period on one date, they could not reverse that finding on another day. They would be, to use a legal term, res judicata. Leaving aside legal terms so that it is understandable to any person -- and I say this given Mr Piggin is unrepresented -- a Magistrates' Court like any other court cannot make one decision one day and another decision another simply because of some change of circumstance.
28. So it follows that the decision made by the magistrates was outside the jurisdiction of the magistrates and it must be quashed. The appropriate course is to remit the application of the Wiltshire Council for a liability order against Mr Piggin to the South East Wiltshire magistrates whether sitting at Salisbury or somewhere else for the decision to be reconsidered. Whether the magistrates at that point decide to proceed even if there is some appeal process in train in relation to the Tribunal proceedings or whether they decide to adjourn the matter until all applications in the Tribunal have been concluded will be a matter for them.
29. It doubtless would have been sensible on 13 May 2013 for the magistrates at that point to have adjourned any consideration of liability to await the outcome of what were then extant First-tier Tribunal proceedings. Insofar as any appeal process remains in train when the magistrates come to consider it again, then doubtless they will consider it sensible to await the conclusion of that appeal process. That is a matter for them to judge. All that I determine is that the decision they made on 13 May 2013 was out with their jurisdiction.
30. MISS HARRISON: My Lord, I do not know if you have a costs schedule.
31. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: I do not.
32. MISS HARRISON: One was prepared in the matter. I believe it was sent to the court. I know Mr Piggin has a copy.
33. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Have you got a copy for me?
34. MISS HARRISON: I do. (Handed).
35. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Thank you very much.
36. MISS HARRISON: My Lord, the grand total comes to £3,182. I confirm that that does not relate to any costs of the last hearing.
37. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No.
38. MISS HARRISON: There was no order for costs as far as the last hearing is concerned and the adjournment was at our request.
39. I will leave the matter at my Lord's discretion.
40. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Yes, I see.
41. Mr Piggin, first of all, please sit down.
42. THE RESPONDENT: Sorry.
43. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Leaving aside the merits of whether you should be ordered to pay costs at all, do you have anything particular to say about the various amounts? If it is of any help to you, a total bill of just over £3,000 for proceedings in the High Court strikes me as relatively modest.
44. THE RESPONDENT: I have no view, my Lord. I --
45. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No.
46. THE RESPONDENT: I have no experience of such --
47. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No, no.
48. THE RESPONDENT: -- and I -- I --
49. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Well, this matter I can tell you. Leave aside whether I should make any order at all, the amount of time they have spent on it, the level of fee earner that has been asked to do it and the amount counsel has charged for coming here today -- and it is only today, it is not last time -- all of those seem to me to be, by the standards of other similar cases, relatively modest.
50. Now, do you have anything to say about whether the Council should get anything knocked off their costs or indeed get no costs at all for any other reason?
51. THE RESPONDENT: Well, firstly, my Lord, could I say that at the last hearing -- I forget the name of the judge -- but the order is in the bundle and it is ordered that there is no costs.
52. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Well, that is why there is no application for the costs of that hearing in here. I think that is --
53. THE RESPONDENT: I was under the impression that counsel was asking for the costs of the previous hearing to be --
54. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No, she has said it expressly.
55. THE RESPONDENT: I apologise then for misunderstanding.
56. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No, it is quite all right.
57. Wait a minute. Let me just --
58. THE RESPONDENT: The order was to reschedule the hearing until today, my Lord.
59. MISS HARRISON: My Lord, it is page 17 of 34 of Mr Piggin's submissions.
60. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Right. Well, I am looking at Simler J's short judgment at paragraph 9:

i. "As far as today is concerned and any costs are concerned, I am going to say no order given the lateness of the application and despite the fact that you were ready to go ahead."

61. So that is you acknowledging her decision on that date in relation to that hearing.
62. MISS HARRISON: Absolutely. In any event, I do not think the costs for that hearing would have been added. I do not think we would have considered it appropriate considering it was our application.
63. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Yes. Well, anyway --
64. MISS HARRISON: Yes.
65. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: -- you would not have got it because Simler J told you that you could not have it.
66. MISS HARRISON: Absolutely.
67. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Right.
68. Well, let me ask you, Miss Harrison. It is not particularly fair on Mr Piggin. Given that costs are discretionary throughout --
69. MISS HARRISON: Yes.
70. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: -- I must look at the wider picture.
71. The Council in this case have taken throughout what I have found to be a perfectly rational and sensible view of what it is for a Magistrates' Court to determine and what it is for a Tribunal to determine. But certainly to the Magistrates' Court, and this is what they found, Mr Piggin was saying, "Look, I will pay. The trust will pay. You will get your money."
72. Why should Mr Piggin have to foot the bill for this appeal when in terms of what money the Council were going to get they were going to get it anyway?
73. MISS HARRISON: Certainly, my Lord, until Mr Piggin mentioned earlier that the offer had been made to provide the money in cash, that was something I was not aware. I was aware that there had been offers to pay, but the Council were concerned that if that did not materialise, that because the liability order would be against the wrong person there would be difficulties in enforcement.
74. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Well, you offered views as to what the court should have done.
75. MISS HARRISON: Yes.
76. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: There is Mr Piggin making the offer. Why did not the Council say to the court, "Well, here is the offer. We will adjourn these proceedings for a month to see if this money is forthcoming and then if it is, well, these enforcement proceedings frankly will be academic. I mean, we may not agree that MC Trusts are liable, but what does it matter? We have got our cash."
77. MISS HARRISON: Yes. Certainly, my Lord, that is a course of action that could have been taken. I was not at the Magistrates' Court.
78. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No, I am not suggesting you were.
79. MISS HARRISON: I do not know what efforts were made to resolve the situation or what conversations were had.
80. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Well, the magistrates found --
81. MISS HARRISON: Yes.
82. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: -- that there had been an offer made. So we must assume that the magistrates --
83. MISS HARRISON: Yes.
84. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: -- did that on the basis of either Mr Piggin telling them or the council representative telling them or some document being put in front of them. There must have been something that permitted them to make that finding.
85. MISS HARRISON: Yes.
86. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Anything else?
87. MISS HARRISON: I have nothing further to add, my Lord.
88. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: No, all right. Thank you very much.
89. THE RESPONDENT: My Lord --
90. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Yes.
91. THE RESPONDENT: -- may I say something, please?
92. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Yes, of course you may.
93. THE RESPONDENT: After the Magistrates' Court hearing, I immediately wrote on behalf of the MC Trust as trustee saying, "This is what has been determined by the court. Send me a bill to the MC Trust or to Michael Piggin trustee. It has to have something to do with trust for accounting purposes and to show that I am completely at arm's length from any trust transaction," and I did say that it -- on receipt of the bill it would be paid in full within 7 days.
94. Look, I don't mean to go over things, but at the hearing on the -- in May at Salisbury Magistrates' Court I drew the cash out of the trust to make payment. Salisbury -- Wiltshire Council said, "We can't make payment", and I said, "Well, if the court orders it I will go straight to Wiltshire Council cash office in Salisbury and within the hour make the payment", and still Wiltshire Council refused. They have refused to issue a bill and they have refused to accept payment.
95. Now, under those circumstances, any loss they have incurred is notional because they were still be paid the council tax, my Lord. It's never been in dispute that council tax is due and the council tax shall be paid, but Michael Piggin cannot pay it because Michael Piggin is impecunious and lives on a pittance. That hasn't always been the case and that's why it's particularly difficult having to live the way I do.
96. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Mr Piggin --
97. THE RESPONDENT: So I --
98. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Mr Piggin --
99. THE RESPONDENT: Sorry.
100. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: Can I interrupt? I am not going to order you to pay the costs --
101. THE RESPONDENT: Thank you.
102. MR JUSTICE WILLIAM DAVIS: -- for the reasons I have been discussing with Miss Harrison, but I need to make a short ruling to that effect. All right.
103. Application is made today for costs in the sum of £3,182. I have no hesitation in concluding that that bill of costs in theory is entirely appropriate. It is if anything modest by the standards of modern bills of costs in this court.
104. However, whether I award costs in any given case is a matter of discretion and a matter to be considered given the overall conduct of the parties, not just in relation to the immediate proceedings, but in relation to any surrounding circumstances.
105. In this case, Wiltshire Council plainly have succeeded on what might be termed the jurisdictional point. They were always going to succeed. However, the jurisdictional point only arises because the Council were not prepared to accept payment of council tax from somebody other than Mr Piggin himself. If they were dubious about whether they would get their money, the simple remedy was to adjourn the enforcement proceedings for some short period pending the payment by MC Trust or whichever other account holder it was relevant of the sum due. If it had then been paid, the Council would have had no sensible basis upon which to pursue the enforcement proceedings.
106. In those circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that they have succeeded on the jurisdictional point, it seems to me that it would not be right to require Mr Piggin to pay the costs of these proceedings when the whole process could have been avoided by some common sense being exercised at a much earlier stage.
107. Yes. Thank you very much indeed.