Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
| THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF DK
|- and -
|SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Julie Anderson (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 18th & 19th June 2014
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE HADDON-CAVE:
Grounds of challenge
(1) First, the Secretary of State failed lawfully to consider, or apply, her policy in Chapter 55.10 Enforcement Guidance and Instructions ("EIG") (regarding the detention of persons with serious mental illness that cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention), both at the outset of detention and thereafter at the time of periodical reviews.
(2) Second, the Secretary of State breached Articles 3 and 8 ECHR and s 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) in respect of the Claimant's detention because the Claimant was suffering at the time from a serious mental illness of which the Secretary of State was, or ought to have been, aware and failed to take the steps reasonably available to her, by either providing suitable treatment or releasing the Claimant from detention.
Administrative Court list
"The Administrative Court seeks to make speedy decisions about the legality of administrative decision-making. The Administrative Court is heavily listed and should not become clogged up with what are, in reality, claims only for damages for wrongful detention within the jurisdiction of the Queen's Bench or County Court. The procedures of the Administrative Court are, in any event, not best suited to determine contested historic events where disclosure and cross-examination of witnesses may be necessary."
'First period' of detention
'Second period' of detention
Immigration detention of the mentally ill
"55.10. Persons considered unsuitable for detention
Certain persons are normally considered suitable for detention in only very exceptional circumstances, whether in dedicated immigration accommodation or prisons. Others are unsuitable for immigration detention accommodation because their detention requires particular security, care and control.
In criminal casework cases, the risk of further offending or harm to the public must be carefully weighed against the reason why the individual may be unsuitable for detention. There may be cases where the risk of harm to the public is such that it outweighs factors that would otherwise normally indicate that a person was unsuitable for detention.
The following are normally considered suitable for detention in only very exceptional circumstances, whether in dedicated immigration detention accommodation or prisons:
- Unaccompanied children and young persons under the age of 18 (see 55.9.3 above).
- The elderly, especially where significant or constant supervision is required which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention.
- Pregnant women, unless there is the clear prospect of early removal and medical advice suggests no question of confinement prior to this (but see 55.4 above for the detention of women in the early stages of pregnancy at Yarl's Wood).
- Those suffering from serious medical conditions which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention.
- Those suffering from serious mental illness which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention (in criminal casework cases, please contact the specialist mentally disordered offender team). In exceptional cases it may be necessary for detention at a removal centre or prison to continue while individuals are being or waiting to be assessed, or are awaiting transfer under the Mental Health Act.
- Those where there is independent evidence that they have been tortured.
- People with serious disabilities which cannot be satisfactorily managed within detention.
- Persons identified by the competent authorities as victims of trafficking (as set out in Chapter 9, which contains very specific criteria concerning detention of such persons).
If a decision is made to detain a person in any of the above categories, the caseworker must set out the very exceptional circumstances for doing so on file."
(1) When interpreting and applying Chapter 55.10 it was essential to keep firmly in mind the purpose of the policy, which was to ensure compliance with the requirements of immigration control (especially in the context of the removal of FNOs where that was accorded a particular importance by the statutory policy of Parliament reflected in the automatic deportation regime and that of the Secretary of State) but prevent treatment that was inhumane .
(2) A purposive and pragmatic construction was required "[i]n the light of the purpose of immigration detention identified above, that is enabling lawful removal pursuant to an effective immigration policy, the policy seeks to ensure that account is taken of the health of the individuals affected and (save in very exceptional circumstances) to prevent the detention of those who, because of a serious mental illness are not fit to be detained because their illness cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention" .
(3) The phrase "suffering from a serious mental illness which cannot be managed satisfactorily within detention" must not be dissected but considered as a whole.  and .
(4) The policy exception in Chapter 55.10 does not apply simply because a person has a diagnosis of a mental illness that is regarded as 'serious' , ,  and . In LE (Jamaica) the claimant had a long established condition of Paranoid Schizophrenia (which had rendered him unfit to plead to criminal charges) but the policy was not engaged as the condition was one that could be managed satisfactorily in detention.
(5) The 'threshold for applicability of the policy' is that the mental illness is serious enough to mean it cannot be managed satisfactorily in detention. 
(6) 'Satisfactory management' involves considerations such as the medication required and whether 'demonstrated needs' can or cannot be provided by the place of detention. The Court noted that OM (Nigeria) at  shows that some of those suffering significant adverse effects of mental illness may be managed appropriately in detention, the views of the experts were divided but the Court of Appeal found that the balance of expert advice was that her illness could be managed appropriately in detention . It is noted that in OM there were expert reports in much stronger terms than in this case that stated that the treatment needed by OM was not available in detention and that her mental health was deteriorating significantly as a result of detention so she was unfit to be detained (and lacked capacity to act). Whilst the responsible clinicians did not provide 'expert reports' in the same way as those procured by claimant representatives, the Court considered the views expressed in the medical papers to the effect that the needs for satisfactory management of OM's mental health were met in detention and the Court of Appeal accepted the approach of the responsible clinicians.
(7) The Secretary of State was generally entitled to rely on the responsible clinicians where reasonable enquiries had been made and the requirements of Chapter 55.10 were considered where applicable, so long as there was not a total abdication of the Secretary of State's own responsibilities to the clinicians. .
(8) For the purposes of the decision in Das, the Court did not decide whether 'satisfactory management' involved facilitating the possibility of recovery but at  the Court 'strongly doubted' that this was the correct approach as:
- this was unlikely to be the intention of the policy given its purpose
- it was unlikely to be the natural construction of the words used
- it was inconsistent with the established jurisprudence of the higher courts
- it was impractical given the variance of treatment available in the community
- it was inconsistent with the context of the purpose of removal from the UK as soon as possible
(9) Where the threshold for applicability was met and a serious mental illness could not be managed satisfactorily in detention so the policy applied – the 'very exceptional circumstances' test was a demanding one. It was not met by the mere fact of liability for circumstances' test was a demanding one. It was not met by the mere fact of liability for removal and the refusal to repatriate voluntarily. It could be met by circumstances such as the detainee posing a serious risk of harm to the public or the anticipated period of further detention being short. It required an assessment of where on the 'spectrum' of seriousness the case fell (that spectrum including those with no record of offending right through to the most serious terrorism cases). ."
Evidence or assumptions?
The Tameside issue
(1) First, a Tameside duty to inquire was triggered whenever "there was a real (as opposed to a fanciful or insubstantial) possibility that an immigrant facing removal was suffering from serious mental ill-health which could not be satisfactorily managed while in detention" (per Sales J in R (Das) v. SSHD (supra) at ).
(2) Second, Sales J laid down a general test in Das for the application of Tameside in this context which still held good and which was supported by passages in the Court of Appeal in R (Das) v. SSHD (supra) , in R(S) v. SSHD  EWHC 2120 (Admin) , and in R(S) v. SSHD  EWHC 2748 (Admin) [183-186].
(3) Third, there was a continuing Tameside duty which arose at every monthly review required by Chapter 55.8 EIG.
(4) Fourth, the threshold at which the Tameside duty was engaged was lower than the threshold at which the policy at Chapter 55.10 EIG applied to the individual.
(5) Fifth, once there was a 'real possibility' that an individual fell within the policy, no reasonable decision-maker could apply the policy without obtaining 'up-to-date psychiatric evidence'.
(6) Sixth, at all material times the Secretary of State failed to make sufficient inquiries in the present case at to the Claimant's condition.
(1) First, no general legal test was developed by Sales J in Das in the context of Chapter 55.10 EIG, nor is any appropriate.
(2) Second, even if Sales J purported to formulate a general test, any such test did not survive the Court of Appeal which set his decision aside.
(3) Third, in any event, on the facts of the Das case, an orthodox application of Tameside plainly required the Secretary of State there to consider a psychiatric report raising mental heath issues since one was in the actual possession of the UKBA at the time of the detention decision.
(4) Fourth, there was no Tameside or other public law breach in this case.
Classic Tameside principles
"99. A public body has a duty to carry out a sufficient inquiry prior to making its decision. This is sometimes known as the 'Tameside' duty since the principle derives from Lord Diplock's speech in Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside MBC  AC 1014, where he said (at page 1065B): "The question for the court is, did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?".
100. The following principles can be gleaned from the authorities:(1) The obligation upon the decision-maker is only to take such steps to inform himself as are reasonable.(2) Subject to a Wednesbury challenge, it is for the public body, and not the court to decide upon the manner and intensity of inquiry to be undertaken (R(Khatun) v Newham LBC  QB 37 at paragraph , per Laws LJ).(3) The court should not intervene merely because it considers that further inquiries would have been sensible or desirable. It should intervene only if no reasonable authority could have been satisfied on the basis of the inquiries made that it possessed the information necessary for its decision (per Neill LJ in R (Bayani) v. Kensington and Chelsea Royal LBC (1990) 22 HLR 406).(4) The court should establish what material was before the authority and should only strike down a decision by the authority not to make further inquiries if no reasonable council possessed of that material could suppose that the inquiries they had made were sufficient (per Schiemann J in R (Costello) v Nottingham City Council (1989) 21 HLR 301; cited with approval by Laws LJ in (R(Khatun) v Newham LBC (supra) at paragraph ).(5) The principle that the decision-maker must call his own attention to considerations relevant to his decision, a duty which in practice may require him to consult outside bodies with a particular knowledge or involvement in the case, does not spring from a duty of procedural fairness to the applicant, but from the Secretary of State's duty so to inform himself as to arrive at a rational conclusion (per Laws LJ in (R (London Borough of Southwark) v Secretary of State for Education (supra) at page 323D).(6) The wider the discretion conferred on the Secretary of State, the more important it must be that he has all relevant material to enable him properly to exercise it (R (Venables) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  AC 407 at 466G)."
Sales J and CA in Das
(1) First, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to consider whether the policy in Chapter 55.10 EIG applies to the case of an individual whose detention is being considered.
(2) Second, the threshold for applicability of Chapter 55.10 EIG is that the mental illness must be serious enough to mean that it cannot be satisfactorily managed in detention. Satisfactory management meant considering matters such as the medication being taken, the facilities at the detention centre and whether the detainee's demonstrated needs are such that they can or cannot be provided in detention. Beatson LJ highlighted the case of R(OM) v. SSHD  EWCA Civ 909 which showed that some of those suffering from significant adverse effects from mental illness may be managed appropriately in detention (CA ).
(3) Third, where Chapter 55.10 EIG does apply, there is a high hurdle to overcome to justify detention i.e. the "very exceptional circumstances" test. The balancing exercise described in R (Anam) v. SSHD  EWHC 2496 (Admin) - included, in the case of foreign national prisoners ("FNP"), taking into account the risk the FNP posed to the public (CA ).
(4) Fourth, whether or not the policy in Chapter 55.10 EIG is strictly engaged, as part of the operation of the Hardial Singh principles, particular care is needed in assessing whether to detain a person known to have a mental illness, i.e. consideration as to whether particular arrangements will be needed for the detainee's welfare and to monitor for deterioration (CA ).
(5) Fifth, the Secretary of State is not entitled to abdicate her statutory and public law responsibilitites to the relevant health authorities or clinicians in the way deprecated by Singh J in R (HA (Nigeria)) v. SSHD  EWHC 979 (Admin) at  and  (CA ).
(6) Sixth, whilst it was not necessary to determine the issue in the present case, it was doubtful that the framers of Chapter 55.10 EIG meant that a detainee's mental illness could not be satisfactorily managed in detention unless specific treatment which could improve the detainee's condition was made available in detention (CA ).
Findings of facts in Das
"42. Having adopted a policy regarding detention of persons suffering from serious mental ill-health, the Secretary of State was in my view under a public law obligation to take reasonable steps to give practical effect to that policy, bearing in mind the importance of the objective which it was designed to promote (namely, the humane treatment of individuals who suffer from serious mental ill-health). That means that if there was a real (as opposed to a fanciful or insubstantial) possibility that an immigrant facing removal was suffering from serious mental ill-health which could not be effectively managed while in detention, the Secretary of State had an obligation to take reasonable steps to inform himself sufficiently about the relevant circumstances so as to be able to make an informed judgment whether the policy would have application or not in that individual's case: see Secretary of State for Education and Science v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council  AC 1014, 1065B per Lord Diplock ("…did the Secretary of State ask himself the right question and take reasonable steps to acquaint himself with the relevant information to enable him to answer it correctly?").
43. In my judgment, the Secretary of State breached this obligation of inquiry at the outset of the second period of detention. His officials in the decision-making unit at the UKBA knew that there was in existence a psychiatric report in respect of the Claimant (Dr Sharma's report) which might well have a bearing on the question whether she was suffering from serious mental ill-health and whether she could properly be taken into detention. However, they failed to obtain Dr Sharma's report from the judicial review team, as I find they could and should have done. They thereby failed to take reasonable steps open to them at the time to inform themselves properly about those issues.
44. In my view, that failure extended throughout and affected the whole of the second period of detention. The significance placed on Dr Sharma's report on behalf of the Claimant was re-emphasised when it was sent to the decision-making unit on 22 November 2011, but no-one in the unit reviewed it for the purposes of assessing whether it was right to continue to detain the Claimant; nor did they seek to pass it on to the medical staff at the detention centre to assist them in their assessments of the mental health of the Claimant. There were significant indications from what the Claimant said and did when she was first detained and from what was found in her possession (medication and letters for psychiatric appointments) that her mental health could be a serious issue. The Secretary of State would be looking to the medical staff at the detention centre for on-going assessment of the Claimant's mental state, and in the circumstances ought to have provided them with relevant information in his possession which was so clearly germane to that assessment as Dr Sharma's report, which might have a bearing on their advice back to him. (Incidentally, I note that - although this was not known to the officials in the decision-making unit - there were remarks in the medical notes in respect of the Claimant during her detention making it clear that the medical staff would have liked more background information about the Claimant: they had unsuccessfully sought to obtain her medical records from her GP).
45. I consider that this failure of inquiry by the Secretary of State so undermined the proper application of his policy as to render the whole of the second period of detention of the Claimant unlawful. "
Sales J and Beatson LJ's orthodoxy
"However, where (unlike the present case) the Secretary of State through the UKBA officials has conscientiously made reasonable inquiries as to the physical and mental health of the person who is being considered for detention, has obtained such reports of clinicians who had previously treated the person as have been made available, and considered the implications of the policy in Chapter 55.10 for the detention of that person, leaving aside cases in which there has been negligence by the clinicians at the detention centre, she should generally be entitled to rely on the responsible clinician: see, albeit in the context of the European Convention of Human Rights, R (P) v. Secretary of State for Justice  EWCA Civ 701 at -."
The Claimant's case fails on an orthodox view of Tameside
The Claimant's case fails on the facts
Breach of Rule 34
(1) On the facts, no Rule 34 examination of the Claimant took place within 24 hours of his arrival in detention at IRC Harmondsworth. He was seen by a nurse during his health care induction but was not examined by a GP. But for a brief examination by a GP on 31 December 2010 when he was prescribed medication for gastritis, the Claimant was not seen by a GP in Harmondsworth until 28 April 2011 and was not examined by a psychiatrist from Harmondsworth until 20 August 2011.
(2) On the law, a failure to provide the Rule 34 examination itself renders the detention unlawful because a breach of Rule 34 of the Detention Rules 'bears on' the detention and renders the detention unlawful: per Burnett J in R (EO) v SSHD  EWHC 1236 (Admin) (who declined to follow Haddon-Cave J in R (Belkasim) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 3109 (Admin)).
Analysis – the law
Analysis – the facts
"53. In the light of the Secretary of State's acceptance of the materiality of Rule 34, the conclusion dictated by Lumba is that if an immigration detainee, in the absence of good reason, is not medically examined within 24 hours of his arrival at a detention centre, his detention thereafter will be unlawful. That is not to say that there is scope for a multiplicity of actions against the Secretary of State on this narrow ground. There is no reason to suppose that Rule 34 medical examinations are not usually conducted within 24 hours. Because the legality of detention is concerned with compliance with the Secretary of State's policy (and not with a direct breach of the Rule) a good reason for non-compliance would save the legality of detention. The Rule 34 examination is, in the context of a decision to detain, but a stepping stone to a Rule 35 report. If no Rule 35 report were raised when a medical examination did take place (albeit late) then it would follow that the decision to detain would have been the same."
'Imputation' of public law errors to the Secretary of State
'Imputation' of knowledge to the Secretary of State
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS OF FACT
(1) First, the evidence and opinion of Dr Burrun is to be preferred to that of Dr Robinson and Dr Basu, viz. whilst the Claimant's condition may have included depression, a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia is doubtful. As Dr Burrun pointed out, HMP Bullwood Hall treated the Claimant for depression with possible psychotic symptoms not for a psychotic disorder.
(2) Second, at no stage was the Claimant's mental condition such that it could not be satisfactorily managed in detention and, therefore, Chapter 55.10 EIG was never engaged. It is noteworthy that even Dr Basu accepted that the pharmacological management of the Claimant's condition could have been satisfactorily managed in detention (see his report dated 26 June 2013).
(3) Third, at all material times the Claimant's mental condition was in fact adequately managed in detention, viz. the Claimant was given regular GP appointments and his prescriptions adjusted (see Dr Burran's report).
Dr Robinson's report of 9 July 2011
Dr Burrun's examination on 20 August 2011
"Mr K reported to be suffering from depression since 2008. DK reported feeling better since restarting tablet Olanzapine 5 mg daily on the 07.07.11. DK reported that the voices were less intense and less frequent. … He said that his appetite varies and he has been sleeping properly. He denies harbouring any feelings of self-harm or harm to others. He denied experiencing any psychotic symptoms and objectively there was no evidence of DK responding to any kind of internal stimuli. DK said that he had bail hearing on 21.08.11. He was happy to continue taking his prescribed medication and he was offered One to One Counselling session with the Psychiatric nurse as well as further Psychiatric clinic follow up."
Dr Basu's first and second reports 19 October 2011 and 16 April 2013
Public and private law proceedings
The Claimant's medical records
"[D] was appropriate throughout the assessment, he maintained good eye contact and was able to answer questions concisely. There was no evidence of response to psychotic phenomena, no was there evidence of thought disorder, insertion, ideas of reference or bizarre beliefs. His emotions and behaviour were congruent to the situation and no concerns were raised.
[D] is due for release in six weeks and I have advised him to remain on his medication until he can speak to his GP about reducing it. He agreed with this.
There was no evidence for any further input from In-Reach; for closure."
Ground 1: unlawful detention: issues to be determined on the evidence
'First period' of detention: 12 December 2010 to 19 May 2011
Was the detention lawful?
(i) Claimant's 'real possiblity' test
"DK is 38 and 10 months of age, believed to be in good health, apart from some mental health issues that a Doctor confirmed he was suffering from in 2008. In 2010 he was suffering from depression, but there is nothing to indicate that DK is not well at present."
(ii) 'Duty to obtain 'independent' psychiatric report'
(iii) 'Failure to pass on information'
Confidential medical information
(iv) 'Failure to act on information at medical screening'
(v) 'Failure to conduct a Rule 34 examination'
(vi) 'Failure thereafter to consider the Claimant's mental illness, or obtain further information'
Detention in any event
"In this instance there was no evidence upon which I could have concluded that the Claimant was suffering from a serious mental illness that could not be managed satisfactorily at HMP Bellwood or an IRC. Furthermore, on submitting the IS91RA (Risk Assessment Form), to the prison and requesting that all adjudications be listed, I was aware that any serious medical issues that could not be managed by immigration detention would have been relayed back to the Home Office to take further action in terms of assessing the Claimant's suitability for continued detention. I have reconsidered the position when making this statement and I confirm that even in the light of all the information now relied on with hindsight, the exclusionary policy in Chapter 55.10 would not have been applied without substantiating evidence available to me."
Dr Burrun's evidence
Mr K has been diagnosed to be suffering from Depression since 2008 following a break up of a relationship for which he was receiving treatment in the community. He gives no past history of any intervention by Secondary Mental Health services nor has he had any past Psychiatric Admission.
During his detention at Harmondsworth IRC Mr K was seen by the Psychiatric Nurse and he was also regularly seen in the GP clinic when the dose of his antidepressant medication Tablet Citalopram was gradually increased from 10 mg daily to 40 mg daily. He was reported restarting on Tablet Olanzapine 5 mg daily in April 2011 which was subsequently increased to 10 mg daily.
Mr K presentation has been inconsistent as although at times he has been reporting to hear the voice of his late father, objectively he has not been observed to be responding to any kind of internal stimuli. He has been reported to be interacting well with officers on the wing and observed to be socialising appropriately with other detainees at all times.
It is my opinion that Mr K treatment for his depression has been appropriately managed within the health care setting of Harmondsworth IRC. Transfer to hospital under Section 48/49 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (amended 2007) was not necessary.
I have considered the diagnosis given in the reports commissioned by Mr K represetatives. I do not concur with the conclusions of the reports to the effect that any potential condition of Paranoid Schizophrenia was not managed satisfactorily in detention. Paranoid Schizophrenia is not an uncommon condition, in particular amongst the prison population. It is a mental disorder that is managed satisfactorily regularly across prisons and in detention centres. I have considerable professional experience in the diagnosis and management of Paranoid Schizophrenia including in the detention context. The facilities available in a detention context are sufficient to manage the condition though they may not include all the possible specialist therapies that would be available in Psychiatric hospitals.
In my opinion, his is the type of case where diagnosis may legitimately vary as it was, at best, a doubtful case given Mr K presentation on a day to day basis where he was observed to be interacting appropriately in normal location with other detainees and officers. Mr K was also observed to be attending to all his activities of daily living appropriately.
As the medical notes (including medical notes from HMP Bullwood Hall) indicate, Mr K was treated for Depression with possible Psychotic Symptoms (NOT FOR PSYCHOTIC DISORDER) as there were many indicators consistent with this diagnosis rather than Paranoid Schizophrenia. Mr K was treated with the appropriate medication and his mental state regularly reviewed and monitored during his stay in detention. Throughout his period of detention, Mr K denied experiencing any suicidal intent or any plans of ending his life including when he was seen by me. Mr K was not a native English speaker and so sometimes expressed himself in an idiosyncratic way but I do not consider that his presentation was ever genuinely bizarre, disorientated or distracted during our interactions. There was no reported attempts at self-harm whilst he was in detention or any conduct of concern that would trigger an ACDT. Whilst it is right that Mr K reported hearing his late father's voice this seems to have occurred mostly while he was falling asleep at night which indicates that they are more likely to be pseudo hallucinations or hypnogogic hallucinations rather than psychotic in nature. There were no objective evidence [sic] that Mr K was observed to be responding to any kind of internal stimuli or the voices telling him to harm himself or others.
Mr K did not present as having any greater level of anxiety due to situational stress than is normal for a person whose immigration status is uncertain. There was no evidence that detention in itself was causing or materially worsening any mental illness either from a fair reading of the contemporaneous objective evidence or based on my interaction with Mr K."
Admissibility of Dr Basu's third report
Would the Claimant have been detained in any event?
Were there exceptional circumstances justifying detention in any event?
'Second period' of detention: 19 May 2011 to 21 October 2011
(ii) 'Inaccurate' fax of 20 May 2011
(iii) 'Failures to pass on information to Harmondsworth IRC'
(iii) 'Failures to pass on information to Harmondsworth IRC was public law error'
Stage 2 questions
Further late evidence
Ground 2: claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA)
UPON HEARING Leading Counsel for the Claimant and Junior Counsel for the Defendant on 18 June 2014
IT IS ORDERD THAT:
1. The Claimant's claims are dismissed.
2. The Claimant (if so advised) shall file written submissions on permission to appeal (if any) within 5 working days; the Defendant to file any submissions within 2 working days thereafter.
3. Permission to appeal to be determined on the papers.
4. The Claimant to pay the Defendant's costs subject to the costs protection provisions of the Access to Justice Act 1999, s 11 and associated regulations (by virtue of 6 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Consequential, Transitional and Saving Provisions) Regulations 2013/534).
5. Detailed assessment of the Claimant's publicly funded costs.
The Hon. Mr Justice Haddon-Cave
10 October 2014