England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		12 February 2013

1. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: This is an appeal against the decision of District Judge Riddle given on 19 November last ordering the appellant's return to Latvia to stand trial for 20 offences involving robbery and violence, theft and assault, all of which were allegedly committed in 2005. The appellant himself was born on 26 September 1988, and so was 17 when the offences were allegedly committed. He came to this country, apparently, in 2007, but there is evidence that he was spoken to by the police on several occasions during 2005, according to information dated 22 November 2012, which Mr Fidler unfortunately did not see until yesterday. I am not quite sure how that occurred and it is indeed most unfortunate. It would seem that it was the responsibility of the respondent, presumably because the information was obtained by the respondent, to have served it on the appellant's solicitor, but I do not go into who was to blame, I simply record that it is, in the circumstances, most unfortunate.
2. A number of matters were raised before the District Judge. In fact there were three grounds. There was an argument as to whether the warrant specified the various offences properly. It is clear that it did and that it sets out 20 offences. It is divided under three sub-headings because of the slightly different nature of the offences under each of the sub-headings, but it clearly sets out the 20. Secondly, it was submitted that it would be unjust or oppressive to order return because of the passage of time since the offences were committed. I will come back to that in a moment because the third matter was that it was argued, and this is a matter raised on the appeal, that he would be tried as an adult, whereas, had he been tried in Latvia when he was still under 18, he would have been tried on the basis that he was not an adult. That point is clearly one which is unarguable because the allegation was that it was a breach of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights to try him as an adult. How anyone could have thought that that argument had any possible validity is, I am afraid, beyond me.
3. That leaves the question of oppression due to delay. The District Judge dealt with the matter in this way:

"The alleged offences occurred in 2005. The defendant says he came here in 2007. The arrest warrant has no current address but was issued in December 2009 and the EAW was issued in 2010. It has taken the intervening time to locate this defendant. I see no reason to believe that the Latvian authorities have not been diligent. There is no evidence that any trial would be unfair because of the passage of time. The facts relied on by the defendant's representatives, and they have not been conceded by the CPS or cross-examined, amount to moving to the UK in 2007, having a child and obtaining employment. At the most this amounts to hardship."

I should add that Article 8 was not relied on before the District Judge and it has not been relied on in the appeal.

4. In the information given by the Prosecution Office, it is said that the appellant was informed that he must not leave Latvia. Furthermore, Mr Fidler points out that he was convicted in this country, in Northampton, in 2009 and it is said that his whereabouts should have been appreciated at least by then. Nothing appears to have been done for some two years or more since that. He wishes to take instructions from his client as to whether it is correct that he knew that he should not leave Latvia, because of course, if he did know, then he would not be entitled to rely on the lapse of time because he would have been a fugitive from justice, but, as I say, as it seems to me, whether or not he was a fugitive from justice, the District Judge was correct in deciding, as he did, I should make it clear, that the further information was not before the District Judge. The respondent had made an application for an adjournment to obtain this information, which was known to be on its way, but the District Judge refused it, no doubt taking the view that he could deal with the matter properly on the information that was already available to him.
5. Mr Fidler has asked for an adjournment to enable him to take instructions. I have indicated, as is clear from this judgment, that, in my view, whatever instructions he is able to take could not conceivably result in material which could be put forward which had any chance of resulting in a successful appeal. However, since it is right that Mr Fidler should at least have the opportunity of seeing whether there is anything, I propose to direct that this dismissal order be not put into effect for 14 days. If within that period of 14 days Mr Fidler puts in writing submissions which he must serve on the court and on the Crown Prosecution Service, then those submissions will be put before me on paper and I will decide whether any further hearing is needed. If I decide it is not, the order will then come into effect. If nothing is heard for 14 days, then the order will come into effect in any event.
6. I hope, Mr Fidler, that you will notify the court in any event.
7. MR FIDLER: Yes, I will, in any event. I will absolutely. Yes, I am grateful.
8. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: That I think is the best I can do.
9. MR FIDLER: I am grateful my Lord.
10. MR JUSTICE COLLINS: All right, and you can have the usual order.
11. MR FIDLER: I am grateful, my Lord. Thank you very much.