QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
London WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE NICOL
HIS HONOUR JUDGE MICHAEL STOKES QC
|NEWCASTLE CROWN COURT||Defendant|
WordWave International Limited
A Merrill Communications Company
165 Fleet Street London EC4A 2DY
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7404 1424
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Ms K Dunn (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) appeared as an Interested Party
Crown Copyright ©
"1. Without impugning the NG verdicts, the learned Judge found that the Appellant had brought the prosecution upon himself, given the Prosecution Draft Opening (8.2.10) and the Exhibits referred to.
A. This twin and his Co-Defendant brother Alexander, set up Global Marketing Corporation Ltd. This eventually accrued £1,591,854.60 on which no tax was paid and in respect of which no accounts were filed.
B. This company and websites which they were both involved in setting up, were used as bogus means of setting up tip sheets in respect of the American Stock Market.
C. In particular, they gave advice based on invented story-lines eg. in the names of 'Michael Cohen' or 'Prof Finn' which in turn were based on a false address in Leeds and later in Whitley Bay.
D. This Defendant held shares in the Company and his name and details were used repeatedly on the websites.
E. As to the nature and extent of his involvement with this company and websites, cp [sic] that of his twin brother, this was never entirely clear save that it was substantially less than that of his brother.
2. By inference, the Defence had also misled the Police and Prosecution into thinking the case against him was stronger than it was:
A. Given this Defendant's mainly 'No Reply' interviews on 3.4.09 & 12.7.10 [See also Ashenden and Jones v UK (2011) ECHR 1323.]
B. Further at no stage was there any Defence Statement from this Defendant. (The PCMH was held on 10.3.11, with a four week Trial listed for 7.11.11)."
"1. Is this Appeal by way of Case Stated NOT a matter 'relating to a trial on Indictment', so that as such there IS jurisdiction to Appeal?
2. If the Court has jurisdiction to review this, was the Crown Court justified in refusing the Appellant his reasonable Defence Costs out of Central Funds?"
"This is quite a different criterion from such as would govern the discretion whether or not to make any of the orders for costs which may be made under s.3(1)(a) or s.4(1) of the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973. The exercise of that discretion is intimately related to the conduct of the trial; indeed, it may be said to be an integral part of the trial process".
"It is in any event clear, I apprehend, that certain orders made at the conclusion of a trial on indictment are excluded from judicial review as relating to trial on indictment; not because they affect the conduct of the trial, but rather because they are themselves an integral part of the trial process. This is obviously true of the verdict and sentence. It is equally true, according to the provisional view that I expressed in In Re Smalley of certain orders for the payment of costs made under the Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1973 ...
An order that the prosecutor pay the whole or any part of the costs of an acquitted defendant under s.(4)1(b) is not appealable, nor is any decision under s.3(1) either to make or to refrain from making an order for payment of costs out of central funds in favour of the prosecution or the defence. The common characteristic of all decisions made by the Crown Court under these provisions is that the court is exercising a discretion in the light of what it has learned in the course of a trial as to the nature of the case, both for the prosecution and the defence and in the light of the conduct and outcome of the trial itself: see guidance given by the Practice Direction (Costs: Acquittal of Defendant)  1 WLR 1383. It follows that all such decisions are so intimately bound up with the trial process that they must be treated as an integral part of it and thus must be considered as made in the exercise of the Crown Court's jurisdiction 'relating to trial on indictment' and accordingly are not subject to judicial review."
"I am satisfied that a legal aid contribution order, like any other order with regard to costs which the Crown Court may make at the conclusion of a trial on indictment, is an integral part of the trial process and thus belongs to the court's 'jurisdiction relating to trial on indictment' and is not subject to judicial review."
"Since 1987 this court has proceed on a case by case basis in the light of the guidance given by Lord Bridge [in Smalley and Sampson]. We were referred to the most recent cases in the procession. Thus, the court has held that an order granting or refusing a stay on the ground of abuse of process does not affect the conduct of a trial on indictment: Reg v Norwich Crown Court ex parte Belsham  1 WLR 54; that an order granting or refusing an application to quash an indictment for want of any jurisdiction does not affect the conduct of such a trial: Reg v Manchester Crown Court ex parte Director of Public Prosecutions  1 WLR 693), and that an order made in dismissal proceedings under s.6 of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 is not made as an integral part of the trial process: Reg v Central Criminal Court ex parte Director of the Serious Fraud Office, The Times, 8 September 1992."
"[Counsel] pointed out that had the judge had occasion to rule on and grant the application for a stay then a subsequent order for costs would not have been an integral part of the trial because by hypothesis the stay would have prevented there being any trial: see ex parte Belsham  1 WLR 54, 63. That must be right in this court. The same must now be so where the order follows the quashing of an indictment for want of any jurisdiction: compare the Manchester Crown Court case  1 WLR 693.
In the present case the recorded verdicts in favour of the defendants have, by virtue of section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, "the same effect as if the defendant[s] had been tried and acquitted on the verdict of a jury". The section confirms the conclusion which is reached by a consideration of whether what here occurred within the ordinary meaning of the word 'trial' extended as it is in order to cover the process where a defendant pleads guilty on arraignment ... it plainly does not so fall."
"For my part ... I can see no difference in principle between a Crown Court judge's refusal to make a costs order in favour of the defendant, when ordering a stay for an abuse of process or when entering a verdict of not guilty under s.17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 or at any stage of the proceedings. In each case, it seems to me that such an order, like an order made at the end of the trial as in ex parte Meredith relates to trial on indictment. The decision of the Divisional Court in Reg v Wood Green Crown Court ex parte DPP cannot, in my view, survive the overruling by the House of Lords in Re Ashton of the Divisional Court's decision in ex parte Belsham and the other authorities which were fundamental to the reasoning in the Wood Green case."