QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
B e f o r e :
MR JUSTICE SILBER
| R (ALI ZAKI MOUSA and others)
|- and -
|SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE
James Eadie QC, Philip Havers QC and Kate Grange (instructed by The Treasury Solicitor) for the Defendants
Hearing dates: 11 December 2012, 29-31 January and 22 March 2013
Crown Copyright ©
President of the Queen's Bench Division:
This is the judgment of the court
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
(i) The origin of the allegations
(ii) The Al-Skeini litigation
i) Al Skeini (4 August 2003), Salim (5 November 2003), Shmailawi (10 November 2003) and Muzban (24 August 2003). All of these had been killed by a military patrol or during a security operation.
ii) Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, a 15 year old, drowned on 8 May 2003 to whom we refer at paragraph 158 below.
iii) Baha Mousa who was killed while in custody of the armed forces on 14 September 2003.
(iii) The Report of Brigadier Aitken
(iv) The Baha Mousa inquiry
(v) The Al Sweady inquiry
(vi) The establishment of IHAT
i) Those issued by Provost Marshal (Army) set out the way in which IHAT would operate in investigating allegations of mistreatment by the armed forces.
ii) Those issued by the Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy at the Ministry of Defence established the Iraq Historic Allegations Panel (IHAP) to take forward the result of enquiries made by IHAT – see paragraph 85 below.
(vii) The course of the earlier proceeding in AZM (No 1)
i) Was IHAT sufficiently independent?
ii) Was a public inquiry needed because of the wider systemic issues?
(viii) The reform of IHAT
i) On 1 May 2012, the Provost Marshal (Navy) issued terms of reference to IHAT. Its objective was to:
"Investigate as expeditiously as possible those allegations of mistreatment by HM Forces in Iraq allocated to it by the Provost Marshal (Navy), including those matters set out at paragraph 6-8 below: in order to ensure that those allegations are, or have been investigated appropriately".
The matters set out were:
"6. The IHAT shall investigate all the judicial review claims relating to abuse of Iraqi civilians by British service personnel in Iraq during the period from March 2003 to July 2009 issued or notified by way of a pre-action protocol letter as at 30 April 2010. Other cases of alleged mistreatment notified to the Secretary of State after this date will be considered on a case-by-case basis and may be subject to investigation by the IHAT. The PM(N) will direct the Head of IHAT as to any additional allegations that should be investigated by IHAT.
7. Additionally the IHAT is to investigate the specific cases which the United Kingdom now has an obligation to investigate following the judgment in July 2011 of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Al-Skeini.
8. The IHAT is also to review the report of the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry by Sir William Gage, in order to assess whether more can be done to bring those responsible for the mistreatment of Baha Mousa to justice."
ii) In September 2012, the Ministry of Defence agreed a protocol on the provision of information from IHAT to the Ministry of Defence; we refer to this at paragraph 88 below.
(ix) The further judicial review proceedings
i) As reconstituted IHAT was not sufficiently independent;
ii) Even if IHAT was independent, it was inevitable that a public inquiry would be necessary and it should be established immediately.
i) Were IHAT and the arrangements associated with it sufficiently independent?
ii) What arrangements had been made by IHAT to investigate the cases relating to deaths of Iraqis whilst in the custody or under the control of the British Armed Forces? Were the arrangements compliant with the duties of the State to investigate deaths?
iii) Are the arrangements made by IHAT to investigate the cases relating to alleged violations of Article 3 compliant with the investigative duties of the State?
ISSUE I: WERE IHAT AND THE ARRANGEMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH IT SUFFICIENTLY INDEPENDENT?
(1) The evidence
i) Statements from Louise Thomas, the officer manager in the Media Review Team (a term we explain at paragraph 99 below) from February to July 2012. She was called to give oral evidence and cross examined.
ii) Statements from Mr Shiner of Public Interest Lawyers who has devoted his enormous energy, skill and time to these and related proceedings.
iii) Extensive documentary materials which were largely the result of disclosure by the Secretary of State.
i) Peter Ryan, a senior civil servant at the Ministry of Defence, who is the Director of Judicial Engagement Policy.
ii) Brigadier Nicholas Davies, the Commander of the Joint Force Intelligence Group; he explained the role of the Joint Forward Interrogation Team deployed to Iraq.
iii) Commander Craig Moran, the Provost Marshal of the Navy.
iv) Lieutenant Commander Stephen Hawkins, the officer in charge of the Royal Navy Police at IHAT.
v) Ex-Detective Chief Superintendent Geoff White, the Head of IHAT from 6 September 2010 to 7 September 2012; his successor from 19 November 2012, ex-Detective Chief Superintendent Mark Warwick, the former head of a Special Investigative Unit in the police.
vi) Members of IHAT: John Birch (a Senior Review Officer), Neil Kelly (a Deputy Senior Investigating Officer), John Hanna (a civilian investigator), Philip Rickard (a civilian investigator), James Butler (a Royal Navy Police Officer assigned to IHAT), Christopher Edgell, Ian Stewart and Mark Willdigg (civilian members of the media review team at IHAT), Sharon Brady (intelligence analyst), Clive Strong (former Deputy Senior Investigating Officer), Mark Wight (Staff Officer Grade 2 Secretariat) and Sgt Andrew Bird (media review office manager).
Lieutenant Commander Hawkins and Mr Birch were called to give evidence and cross examined.
(2) The status of IHAT
(3) Contentions of the claimants that IHAT was not independent
i) No armed force police force ("service police") should be engaged in investigative functions of this kind; it was in reality self investigation.
ii) The three service police forces worked closely together. This meant that the Royal Navy Police could not carry out an effective independent investigation.
iii) The Royal Navy Police had been directly engaged in operations in Iraq.
iv) The Royal Marines Police had been directly engaged in Iraq.
v) The Royal Navy and Royal Marines had been involved to a significant extent in the Joint Forward Interrogation Team (often referred to as JFIT) in respect of whom there were substantial allegations of serious misconduct, including unlawful interrogation techniques.
vi) Royal Navy Police had been involved in policy and training in relation to interrogation and detention which would be subject to the investigation.
vii) IHAT did not have sufficient independence to make decisions independently of the Executive or the hierarchy of the British armed forces.
viii) In relation to gathering material in relation to systemic issues, IHAT had failed to identify or analyse any systemic issues. There were no proper arrangements for reporting systemic issues.
ix) The statements of Louise Thomas showed that IHAT was in fact conducting its investigation improperly.
(4) The Royal Navy Police, the independence of service police investigations and joint service working
(5) The direct involvement of the Royal Navy Police in Iraq
(6) The direct involvement of the Royal Marines Police in Iraq
(7) The involvement of the Royal Navy and Royal Marines in the Joint Forward Interrogation Team
i) Of the 124 interrogators at the Joint Forward Interrogation Team, 24 were personnel of the Royal Navy or the Royal Marines. We accept that they were, as Mr Fordham QC submitted, 'embedded' in the Joint Forward Interrogation Team's policies and training;
ii) The Royal Navy provided four of the seventeen Commanding Officers including an officer identified as SO40 in the Baha Mousa inquiry. He was the first commander who was deployed from the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre at Chicksands, Bedfordshire to Camp Bucca (see pages 685 and 723 of volume 2 of the report of Sir William Gage's Baha Mousa inquiry). It is also clear that the officer commanding was a naval officer at the time of various incidents or allegations of mistreatment and unlawful interrogation techniques such as hooding - for example at the time of the ICRC Report of February 2004, when concerns were raised over the interrogation techniques being used, even though no criticism was made of physical mistreatment (see paragraph 31 of the Report).
(8) Royal Navy Police involvement in policy and training in relation to interrogation
(a) The Review of Service Police Investigations: October 2004
(b) Masters of Arms at the Defence Intelligence and Security Centre, Chicksands
(c) Training in conduct after capture
(d) Our findings of fact on the involvement in training and policy.
(9) Charging and prosecution: the power or influence of the Executive and the armed forces hierarchy
(a) The necessity of independence in investigations and prosecution decisions
(b) The arrangements in place to ensure independence
(c) The work done by IHAT
(d) The death cases
(10) The arrangements for reporting systemic issues: the role of the Executive
(a) The role of IHAT and IHAP
(b) The reporting to the Ministry of Defence
(c) The review by the Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy
(d) The status of the work done by the Directorate
(e) Provision of information to the public
i) IHAT would establish a website (expected to be operational in the summer of 2013) in order to keep the public informed of its work, but in a manner which would not prejudice its investigations or any prosecutions. It would publish some information about progress and it would at the conclusion of its work publish its final closing report.
ii) IHAT would keep the complainants (including the claimant in these proceedings) informed of progress and of decisions made.
iii) The Ministry of Defence would publish annually on its website information about systemic issues identified and steps taken. It was anticipated that the first report would be published in December 2013.
(f) The Secretary of State's reasons for not establishing an immediate public inquiry into systemic issues
(11) The allegations of Louise Thomas as to the way in which IHAT in fact operated
(a) The statements made by Louise Thomas
i) Despite the decision of the Court of Appeal in AZM (No. 1) six members of the Royal Military Police were still employed at IHAT in May and June 2012.
ii) The matrix devised by Mr John Birch for grading instances of unacceptable behaviour during interrogation was not being correctly applied by the Royal Military Police working at IHAT; they would not view behaviour as unacceptable where it clearly was. Some of the Royal Navy Police had the same attitude towards behaviour. Many examples were given.
iii) There were missing recordings. IHAT staff were not concerned to find out why they were missing or to pursue other obvious gaps in the evidence. Her own attempts to find them were blocked. The missing recordings were significant.
iv) The logs kept of the review of the recordings were of poor quality.
v) The culture at IHAT was incompatible with her own work ethic; many of the employees were ex-policemen who had lost their enthusiasm for their work. They spent time surfing the internet or doing nothing. Many were cynical as to the process and the allegations made.
vi) She concluded that IHAT was not a genuine investigation intended to provide justice to the victims, but a face-saving exercise.
(b) The position of the claimants at the hearing on 11 December 2012
(c) Our findings on the evidence
(a) The independence of service police investigations and prosecutorial decisions
(b) Direct involvement in Iraq, the development of policy and training
(c) Independence of IHAT's investigative and prosecutorial function
(d) The discharge of the lessons learnt function.
ISSUE 2: WHAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE BY IHAT TO INVESTIGATE THE CASES RELATING TO DEATHS OF IRAQIS WHILST IN THE CUSTODY OR UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE BRITISH ARMED FORCES? WERE THE ARRANGEMENTS ADEQUATE?
(1) The original focus of IHAT
i) Rhadi Nama and Abdul Jabbar Mossa Ali: The review concluded that, in the case of two (the deaths at Camp Stephen, Basra of Rhadi Nama on 8 May and of Abdul Jabbar Mossa Ali on 13 May 2003 whilst in the custody of the 1st Battalion, The Black Watch), the investigation by the Royal Military Police had been inadequate and further investigation by IHAT was required. That decision was made on 11 April 2011. Mr White stated that significant progress was being made in the case of Ali as a result of the finding of further documents and the taking of statements. As the same sub-unit was involved in both deaths, the progress on Ali was likely to assist on the case of Nama. We return to progress in the investigation of these deaths at paragraphs 134.v) and 134.vi) below.
ii) Tanik Mahmood: He had been detained by Australian Special Forces and was in the custody of the RAF whilst being transported as a prisoner of war in a helicopter on 11 April 2003. IHAT concluded that the investigation was inadequate. This was reported to the Provost Marshal (RAF) and the RAF police have re-opened the investigation.
Work on the other Article 2 cases had not been commenced because of the constraint on resources. As we have set out at paragraph 25, by March 2013 only 50 of the required 94 civilian investigators had taken up employment at IHAT.
(2) The number of death cases
(3) The position of IHAT in relation to death as explained to us
(a) The nature of reviews of investigations of deaths
(b) The cases in relation to which detailed information was available
i) Tanik Mahmud: He was one of the three to whom Mr White referred: see paragraph 128.ii) above. The RAF Police are conducting the investigation; details were provided to us, but it is not appropriate to set them out in view of a possible prosecution. We return to this death at paragraph 166.
ii) Uday (Atheeer) Kareem Khalif: He was shot and killed at a petrol station at Basra. His death was investigated in 2003; one soldier was reported to the Prosecuting Authority for prosecution for murder. The prosecution was discontinued. The investigation was referred to IHAT on 30 October 2012; records have been retrieved. The review is awaiting allocation to the Review Team as and when capacity allows. We return to his death at paragraph 166.
iii) Sayeed Shabram (Shabrab): We consider his death at paragraph 160 below.
iv) Ahmed Jabber Kareem Ali: He was a 15 year old boy who was detained by Iraqi police on 8 May 2003. It is alleged that he had been transferred to the British armed forces and forced into the Shatt Al Basra Canal and drowned. The death was investigated by the Royal Military Police and was the subject of a court martial of four soldiers for manslaughter in 2006. All four were acquitted. The review by IHAT is ongoing. It had been delayed because of the turnover of personnel. It was anticipated that the report on this case would be available by the end of 2013. We return to his death at paragraph 159 below.
v) Abdul Jabbar Mossa Ali: He was one of the three to whom Mr White referred – see paragraph 128.i) above. The reinvestigation had started in September 2011, but it had encountered several problems. Although the archive search was completed by March 2013, there was a significant amount of further work required, including interviewing Iraqis; the family was represented by Public Interest Lawyers who had requested that the family not be contacted directly. It was hoped the investigation would be complete by the end of 2013. We return to this death at paragraph 166.
vi) Rhadi Nama: He was one of the three to whom Mr White referred – see paragraph 128.i) above. The problems and the time scale were similar to those of Abdul Jabbar Mossa Ali. We return to this death at paragraph 166.
vii) Naytham Jabir Ati Al-Mayahi: After being hit by gun fire in Um Qasr on 23 March 2003, he was taken to a British military medical facility; his family say he was last seen by them after being placed in a British military helicopter and flown away. This investigation is being conducted without prejudice to the Secretary of State's contention that his death does not fall within the territorial scope of the Convention; one likely possibility is that he died of his gunshot wounds.
viii) AJ Khalif: He was detained at a British Army Vehicle check point on 7 August 2003; he was detained and when being transported in a military vehicle, it was involved in an accident. He was injured. He was subsequently found dead on the roadside; he had been shot. The matter was not investigated by the Royal Military Police although he had been under the control of the British armed forces. IHAT has reviewed this case but has not yet decided on whether an investigation is required.
ix) Baha Mousa: The matter is being investigated to see if any of those responsible for his death can be brought to justice.
x) Sabiha Khudur Talib: She died on 15 November 2006 during a search of her house by British armed forces when shooting broke out. She and her son were shot. Her son was killed; she was taken to a British medical facility but certified dead on arrival. Her body was found either by the side of the road or in a British Army body bag. There was no contemporary investigation. IHAT is reviewing the death.
i) Nadheem Abdullah: He died on 11 May 2003. The Judge Advocate General decided there was no case to answer on 3 November 2005. We will consider this case in greater detail in paragraph 155 below.
ii) Hassan Abbad Said: He died on 2 August 2003. This is another case which we consider in detail at paragraph 154 below.
(3) The State's Duty to investigate deaths
(a) The nature of the issue
(b) The common law duty to investigate deaths in custody
"There is a great responsibility on the police or prison authorities to ensure that the citizen in its custody is not deprived of his right to life."
"It is the duty of the coroner as the public official responsible for the conduct of the inquests, whether he is sitting with a jury or without, to ensure that the relevant facts are fully, fairly and fearlessly investigated. He is bound to recognise the acute public concern rightly aroused when deaths occur in custody. He must ensure that the relevant facts are exposed to public scrutiny, particularly if there is evidence of foul play, abuse or inhumanity. He fails in his duty if his investigation is superficial, slipshod or perfunctory." (Emphasis added.)
"The purposes of such an investigation are clear: to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others."
The purposes of an inquiry into deaths during a military operation are discussed in more detail in Keyu & others v Foreign Secretary  EWHC 2445 (Admin) at paragraphs 136-175.
(c) The duty under Article 2 of the Convention
"Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of the court following his conviction of a crime for which the penalty is provided by law."
"there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State …The essential purpose of such an investigation is to secure the effective implementation of the domestic laws safeguarding the right to life and, in those cases involving State agents or bodies, to ensure their accountability for deaths occurring under their responsibility …" (paragraph 163).
"The obligation to comply with the United Kingdom's Article 2 obligation continues "even in difficult security conditions including in the context of armed conflict" as in the present cases. Therefore even in those circumstances, "all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation is conducted into the alleged breaches of the right to life": Al Skeini (paragraph 164).
i) The investigation must be public and accessible to the victim's family. In Al Skeini, the Grand Chamber held in respect of the claim of the fifth applicant in those proceedings and a claimant in these proceedings (the father of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali who died in the circumstances described in paragraph 134.iv) above) that there should be: -
"an independent examination, accessible to the victim's family and to the public, of the broader issues of State responsibility, for the death, including the instructions, training and supervision given to soldiers undertaking tasks such as this in the aftermath of the invasion". (paragraph 174)
ii) The investigation must encompass broader issues such as planning. In Al Skeini, it was pointed out that although the essential purpose of an Article 2 investigation was to ensure the accountability of State agents or institutions for death occurring under their responsibility:
"The investigation should also be broad enough to permit the investigating authorities to take into consideration not only the actions of the State agents who directly used lethal force but also all the surrounding circumstances, including such matters as the planning and control of the operations in question, where this is necessary in order to determine whether the State complied with its obligation under Article 2 to protect life" (paragraph 163)
iii) The investigation must include "lessons learned" following the identification of wider or systemic issues. Lord Bingham in Amin at paragraph 31 stated in a passage, which was applied by Maurice Kay LJ in AZM (No.1) at paragraph 12, that the purpose of an Article 2 investigation was:-
"to ensure so far as possible that the full facts are brought to light; that culpable and discreditable conduct is exposed and brought to public notice; that suspicion of deliberate wrongdoing (if unjustified) is allayed; that dangerous practices and procedures are rectified; and that those who have lost their relative may at least have the satisfaction of knowing that lessons learned from his death may save the lives of others."
(4) The relationship between investigative duties and criminal prosecution.
i) We accept, as is contended by the Secretary of State, that a properly conducted criminal process may be the most effective way of discharging the State's investigative duty: McKerr v United Kingdom (2002) 34 EHRR 20 (134).
ii) If prosecution is a realistic possibility, then account must be taken of the risk of the fairness of a subsequent criminal trial being prejudiced by disclosures during an Article 2-compliant investigation. In many cases, this will mean delaying the public part of the investigation until it has been determined whether prosecution is a realistic possibility.
iii) The prospect of a prosecution might enable relevant witnesses to refuse to testify because of the privilege against self–incrimination and so impede an investigation with the consequence that an effective inquiry must therefore await the end of a prosecution or a decision not to prosecute.
i) Cases where there will be no IHAT investigation and so no prospect of any further prosecution ("Category 1 cases").
ii) Cases where there has been a previous prosecution and IHAT is now investigating or about to investigate with a view to considering whether there should be a prosecution ("Category 2 cases").
iii) Cases where there has been no previous prosecution and IHAT is now investigating or about to investigate whether there should be a prosecution ("Category 3 cases").
Each requires separate consideration.
(i) Category 1 cases
i) He died on 2 August 2003 when he was among a group stopped by British forces because they were accompanying a car carrying what was perceived to be mines. Mr Said ran off and he was then pursued by two soldiers, Trooper Williams and Corporal Blair, before being shot dead by Trooper Williams. Following a Royal Military Police investigation, Trooper Williams' commanding officer dismissed a charge of murder against Trooper Williams and in consequence it was not possible for allegations against him to be dealt with by Court Martial.
ii) The matter was, however, referred to the CPS. After the case had been reviewed by the Metropolitan Police, a decision was made by the CPS to prosecute Trooper Williams on the charge of murder. The case against Trooper Williams depended on whether he had an actual perception of danger at the time when he shot Mr Said and caused his death. Trooper Williams had consistently maintained that in the moment of crisis he believed that Corporal Blair's life and his own life were at risk. The CPS considered that there was no realistic prospect of conviction. The Crown offered no evidence and a formal verdict of not guilty was returned.
(ii) Category 2 cases
i) what further progress has been made in investigating the death of each of those who fall in this category;
ii) when a decision will be made as to whether a prosecution will be brought in respect of each of these cases.
Plainly, for reasons which we explain at paragraph 182, the Director of Service Prosecutions ought to have the determinative role; the court therefore would be grateful for his views.
(iii) Category 3 cases
(iv) The situation if there is no prosecution
(5) Discharging the duty under Article 2
(i) The nature of the task in the present cases.
(a) Establishing the facts
(b) The very serious nature of the allegations
"143… I find that there were two main causes of death. Firstly, Baha Mousa had been made vulnerable by a range of factors, namely: lack of food and water, the heat, rhabdomyolysis, acute renal failure, exertion, exhaustion, fear and multiple injuries. Both stress positions, which are a form of exertion, and hooding, which obviously must have increased Baha Mousa's body temperature, contributed to these factors. Secondly, against the background of this vulnerability, the trigger for his death was a violent assault consisting of punches, being thrown across the room and possibly also of kicks. It also involved an unsafe method of restraint, in particular by being held to the ground in an attempt to re-apply plasticuffs. The combination of both causes was necessary to bring about Baha Mousa's death; neither was alone sufficient to kill him"
(c) Systemic abuse and lack of training
(d) The responsibility of the command
(ii) Is IHAT discharging that task?
(a) Failure to deal with the decision to prosecute
"it is crucial in cases of deaths in contentious situations for the investigation to be prompt. The passage of time will inevitably erode the amount and quality of the evidence available and the appearance of a lack of diligence will cast doubt on the good faith of the investigative efforts, as well as drag out the ordeal for the members of the family".
and in Al-Skeini at paragraph 167:
"While there may be obstacles or difficulties which prevent progress in an investigation in a particular situation, a prompt response by the authorities in investigating a use of lethal force may generally be regarded as essential in maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts".
"The amount of time taken to resolve some of the cases with which this report is concerned has been unacceptable. ... The court martial in connection with the death of Ahmed Jabber Kareem did not convene until September 2005, 28 months after he died; by that time, three of the seven soldiers who had been accused of his murder had left the Army, and a further two were absent without leave. In most cases, it is inappropriate for the Army to take administrative action against any officer or soldier until the disciplinary process has been completed, because of the risk of prejudicing the trial. When that disciplinary process takes as long as it has taken in most of these cases, then the impact of any subsequent administrative sanctions is significantly reduced – indeed, such sanctions are likely to be counterproductive. Moreover, the longer the disciplinary process takes, the less likely it is that the chain of command will take proactive measures to rectify the matters that contributed to the commission of the crimes in the first place."
(c) Accessibility to the public
(d) Accessibility to the family of the deceased
(e) Examination of systemic abuse and training
"an accumulation of identical or analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous and inter-connected to amount not merely to isolated incidents or exceptions but a pattern or system". (Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-1980 2 EHRR 25 at paragraph 159).
(iii) Should a single and overarching public inquiry be ordered?
(a) Should there be a single public inquiry?
"56. The authorities' obligation is not, of course, absolute: it is not indeed to be interpreted as imposing an impossible or disproportionate burden, bearing in mind, among other factors, the unpredictability of human conduct and the operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources: Keenan v United Kingdom 33 EHRR 38, 957-958, para 89; Akdogdu v Turkey, para 45; Renolde v France, para 82" and later
"77 The Secretary of State is concerned about the financial implications of having to hold an independent investigation in cases of attempted suicide. His concern is entirely proper, as the European Court has recognized in the judgments cited in para 56 above. His anxieties may have been fuelled, however, by an impression that, whenever article 2 requires an independent investigation to be set up, that investigation has to have all the bells and whistles of the full-blown public inquiry described by the Court of Appeal in R (on the application of D) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  3 All ER 946 - sometimes called a "type D inquiry". Nothing could be further from the truth."
(c) The person who would conduct the inquiry
(e) Implementation of lessons learnt
(f) Margin of appreciation
"There must also be a margin of appreciation for the Secretary of State to decide when to hold and when not to hold a public inquiry. The resource implications can be considerable"
(iv) Should there be an investigation into the deaths by a process based on a coroner's inquest?
(a) Material considerations
(b) A case by case approach
(c) The inquisitorial process
(d) Legal representation
i) Enable the families and friends of the deceased Iraqis to watch the hearings by video link.
ii) Permit evidence to be given by Iraqis by video link; we can see no reason for bringing such witnesses to the UK.
iii) Have hearings open to anybody who wishes to watch developments.
(f) The report provided
(g) Supervision of the process and accountability
ISSUE 3: ARE THE ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY IHAT IN RESPECT OF THE CASES RELATING TO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 3 COMPLIANT WITH THE INVESTIGATIVE DUTIES OF THE STATE?