England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Birmingham Civil Justice Centre Priory Courts 33 Bull Street Birmingham B4 6DS
		20th April 2012

1. MR JUSTICE SINGH: In this claim for judicial review the claimant challenges the decision of the defendant housing authority dated 31st May 2011. By that decision the defendant refused to accept as being valid an application for housing under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996 which concerns homelessness. The defendant declined to accept that the application made on behalf of the claimant by her solicitors dated 12 May 2011 was a valid application.
2. Permission to bring this claim for judicial review was granted on 15 September 2011 by His Honour Judge Davis QC, the Recorder of Birmingham, sitting as a Judge of the High Court.
3. The factual background is that the claimant had to leave her home in Slough in 2009 as a result of domestic violence which she suffered at the hands of her husband. Because she had family in Birmingham she went there.
4. On 13th January 2010 the defendant accepted that it owed a housing duty towards the claimant. On 14 January 2010 the defendant made her and her children an offer of accommodation. However, the claimant declined to accept that offer because she felt that the accommodation on the 12th floor of a tower block would be unsuitable for her and her young children.
5. On 19th January 2010 the defendant decided that it had discharged its duty to the claimant by reason of her refusal. On 12th February 2010, in a review decision, the defendant upheld its decision that it had discharged its duty owed to the claimant.
6. In her witness statement before this court the claimant states as follows:

"7. Throughout the period of the review I continued to reside with my children at my grandmother's house. I had applied to go onto the Council's waiting list for accommodation and an agreement was reached between myself and my grandmother that myself and my two children could stay with her in her three bedroomed property for an indefinite period - until I was offered accommodation from the Council's waiting list. I did not consider myself to be homeless during the time spent with my grandma as the living situation was fine.

8. However, in November 2010 there was an unexpected breakdown in the relationship between myself and my grandmother which led to my grandmother requesting me to leave her home. This led me to apply as homeless to the Council."

In consequence the claimant applied to the defendant authority for accommodation as a homeless person and filled in a form on 25 November 2010. In that form, at section 5, she stated that the address where her homelessness occurred was the address where she and her children had been living with her grandmother in Birmingham.

7. At section 19 of the form, in response to the question:

"Is your homelessness due to DV [domestic violence] and/or harassment?"

The claimant answered "no".

8. On behalf of the claimant it has been submitted that that can clearly be contrasted with the reason why she became homeless in 2009, which clearly was to do with domestic violence, which is why she had left Slough for Birmingham.
9. Returning to the form which the claimant completed in November 2010, section 21 asked the question:

"What is the main reason for homelessness?"

The claimant's answer was by the reference number 02. That is a reference to the standard form reason being "other relatives or friends no longer willing/able to accommodate".

10. On behalf of the claimant it is submitted that that can be contrasted with the reason which would have have been applicable in 2009, which has the reference number 04, and is "breakdown of relationship with partner - domestic violence".
11. In response to a question at section 26 of the form headed "Interview Report", the following appears:

"There was some argument and my nan told me to leave the property. She said she cannot accommodate me and my children any longer. My children attend school in Castle Vale."

That statement was certified by the claimant to be true and complete.

12. Later in the form, at question 29, which relates to any requirement for temporary accommodation, in answer to the question: "Are you able to remain at your current accommodation tonight?" The claimant ticked a box saying "No". Further, when asked to give reasons in the form, why she did not have anywhere to stay that night the claimant answered "Nowhere to go". I have been informed that in fact ever since that date the defendant has secured temporary accommodation for the claimant and her children.
13. On 14 December 2010 the defendant refused the application in a letter signed by Sherilyn Hibbert, a homeless officer with the defendant authority. In that letter the defendant said that the claimant's case had been investigated by a review officer in a letter dated 12 February 2010, who had concluded that the property offered to the claimant was suitable for her housing needs and that it was reasonable for her to accept.
14. The letter noted the claimant had not exercised her right of appeal to the County Court. The letter then continued:

"On 25/11/2010 you approached Birmingham City Council seeking advice or assistance in obtaining accommodation. You state that you were homeless from 29 William Cook Road, Birmingham B8 2HS due to being asked to leave by your grandmother ... due to overcrowding and arguments.

During our telephone conversation on the 14/12/10 you advised that since leaving your accommodation at 23 Walker Crescent, Slough ... SL3 7GB, you confirmed that you have been residing at your grandmother's address on a temporary basis.

In reaching my decision I have taken into account whether there has been a relevant change in your circumstances. I am not satisfied that there has been a relevant change in your circumstances, as you have confirmed that you have been residing at your grandmother's address on a temporary basis....

I therefore do not believe there has been a relevant change in fact since your Review Decision dated 12th February 2010. I consider that the information provided requesting a new homeless application has already been considered and fully addressed in your Review Decision Letter. I therefore consider that the original discharge duty decision dated 19th January 2010 still stands."

The letter informed the claimant that she could request a review within 21 calender days of receipt of that letter.

15. The claimant then did seek a review and in support of that application she made a statement dated 7 January 2011. So far as relevant she said this:

"My reasons for moving to Birmingham from the last settled address ... was that I was subject to domestic violence from my ex husband. I felt very fearful for the safety of myself and my 2 children. I felt vulnerable as I had no family in the area that I could receive support from. I felt that due to not having support as I was going through a difficult time I needed to be near to my family in Birmingham. This is why I came to Birmingham as my support was there. It was agreed with my nan that she will be able to accommodate me and my 2 children.

The relationship worked well with my nan until the 25/11/10 where she no longer could accommodate me. This is when my situation changed and found myself and my children to be homeless. "

In the same statement the claimant said:

"The initial application for homeless I made on the 27/10/09 was due to me fleeing domestic violence from the last settled address in Slough. Although my nan agreed for me to stay with her, I was advised to complete the homeless application.

On 19/1/10 I refused the offer of accommodation that was made to me on that homeless application of 27/10/09. I felt very isolated with the officer as it was on the 12th floor and felt that I would not be able to cope in a flat on the 12th floor with two children....

My nan was about to accommodate and our relationship worked well. I received a lot of support from my family in my time of need. As my circumstances did change due to arguments that started around November 10 and my nan asked me to leave. This is why I had to make a homeless application as my circumstances were different as she could no longer accommodate me ..."

16. The review decision by the defendant authority was issued on 15 March 2011. In a letter signed by Ashley Clarke, a homeless review officer. So far as relevant that letter stated:

"You have stated in your review submitted on 7 January 2011, that your Grandmother agreed she would accommodate you when you came to Birmingham. I do not consider this a relevant fact. You came to Birmingham on 5 October 2009, and approached your local Neighbourhood Office 10 days later as homeless. An appointment for you to complete a homeless application was then made for 27 October 2009. I am satisfied from the above information that your move to Birmingham, and the arrangement to stay with your Grandmother was only temporary. Your extended stay with your Grandmother was then enforced following Birmingham City Council's discharge of duty once you refused an offer of accommodation. You remained with your grandmother for a further 9 months, were the relationship had reached a point where she no longer willing to accommodate and consequently asked you to leave, prompting a second homeless application form.

On 14 December 2010 you spoke to Cherilyn Hibbert of the Homeless Team, and it was confirmed your circumstances were the same as your previous application as you were still residing at your Grandmother's on a temporary basis. I am satisfied there are no new facts to consider on your new Homeless Application that render your circumstances different from your previous application. The facts of your circumstances are that you and your two children were homeless from your Grandmother's at the time of your previous review decision, and on your most recent homeless application, you are still homeless from your Grandmother's where you have been residing temporary.

I am satisfied that your current circumstances and reasons for homelessness have previously been assessed, and subsequently you were made an offer of accommodation under section 193 of the 1996 Act. A review of the decision to discharge duty was conducted by an independent Review Officer, who determined the offer of accommodation was suitable for you to accept, and the decision was made to Uphold the Discharge of Duty. You have re-approached as Homeless, and I am satisfied the facts of your second application are indistinguishable from the original application."

17. The letter ended by informing the claimant that she had a right of appeal to the County Court on a point of law and if she wished to appeal she must do so within 21 calender days of being notified of that decision. I have been informed that there was an appeal made for "protective reasons". However that appeal has been stayed by the County Court pending the outcome of the present claim for judicial review.
18. As I have already said, on 12 May 2011 the claimant's solicitors made a further application under Part 7 of the 1996 Act on her behalf. In that application they said that it was based on new facts/facts which the authority failed to consider during the course of the previous homeless "investigation". The letter said:

"The Authority has failed to investigate, to date, our client's occupation at her grandmother's house and in particular whether that period of occupation was sufficient to give rise to a new incidence of homelessness. No consideration was given as to the nature of our client's occupation or of the agreement entered into with our client and her grandmother sufficient to assess whether Mrs May had occupied premises at William Cook Road as settled intervening accommodation. Similarly, our client is plainly asserting that her eviction from her grandmother's was not anticipated. Our client's occupation of William Cook Road did not come to an end at the end of any agreed term but due to sudden and unforeseen circumstances. No investigation has been made in relation to these facts and in relation to whether our clients eviction from her grandmother's constitutes a supervening element sufficient in itself to create a new incidence of homelessness. Your further investigations are required to encompass these issues and also deal with any new facts arising from the current homelessness."

In the concluding paragraph of that application it was said on the claimant's behalf:

"You are required to investigate this homeless application. The duty under Section 184 has been triggered."

19. As I have mentioned the defendant authority refused to regard that application as being a valid one in its Decision Letter of 31 May 2011, which is the subject of the present claim for judicial review. In that Decision Letter the defendant said:

"It is therefore evident that the Review Officer has considered whether [her] stay at her grandmother's equated to a change to the facts of her case. The Review Officer also considered whether the Homeless Officer was right in her approach in this matter. There has been no change in facts."

The letter later continued:

"I asked Mrs May about her reason for homelessness. Mrs May stated that it was the same reason as highlighted on her previous homelessness application. To clarify this important point, I asked Mrs May if anything had changed, or whether her circumstances and the facts of her case were exactly the same. Mrs May stated her reason for homelessness was the same as before, and that her circumstances were exactly the same. This information clearly contradicts the contents of your letter dated 12 May 2011."

20. Before continuing with my citation from the Decision Letter I should note that that account of the facts is in dispute. I should also note that there is no direct evidence before the court, for example in a witness statement by the author of the letter, Caroline Darling, a homeless officer, with the defendant authority, as one would normally expect in a claim for judicial review after permission has been granted. I will continue with my citations from the Decision Letter:

"As you are aware, if there is no change in facts of an applicant's case, and the reasons for homelessness remain the same as a previous homelessness application, we are not obliged to accept a new homeless application....

After considering both of Mrs May's homelessness applications, and after confirming with Mrs May that the application dated 12 May 2011 is based on exactly the same facts as her first homeless application dated 27 October 2009 (and the subsequent application dated 25 November 2010), I must advise you that we do not consider there has been any change in the facts of your client's case, and we will not be accepting the homeless application dated 12 May 2011."

21. The claimant's solicitors responded on 14 June 2011, amongst other things to dispute the assertions of fact to which I have already referred. Despite a pre-action protocol letter being sent on the same date, the defendant authority declined to change its decision by a letter dated 27 June 2011. That is what has necessitated the present claim for judicial review.
22. There is no dispute as to the relevant legal framework or principles which are applicable to a case of this kind. It is not necessary for present purposes to cite many provisions from Part 7 of the Housing Act 1996. Section 184 of that Act provides as follows:

"(1) If the local housing authority have reason to believe that an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness, they shall make such inquiries as are necessary to satisfy themselves—

(a)whether he is eligible for assistance, and.

(b)if so, whether any duty, and if so what duty, is owed to him under the following provisions of this Part."

23. Under section 193 of the 1996 Act a local housing authority may have a duty to secure accommodation for an applicant but that duty can come to an end in the various circumstances which are set out in that section. In the present case because the claimant refused the offer of accommodation which had been made to her, she fell within subsection (5) of section 193. The duty therefore ceased in relation to the claimant. However, it is important to note the provisions of subsection (9) of section 193, which states:

"A person who ceases to be owed the duty under this section may make a fresh application to the authority for accommodation or assistance in obtaining accommodation."

24. It is common ground before me that there is no limit in principle to the number of applications which can be made under that subsection.
25. The principles which are applicable to such successive applications have been set out authoritatively in two decisions that were cited by the parties in the present case. The first is R (Harrow London Borough Council) ex parte Fahia [1998] 1 WLR 1396. The main opinion in the House of Lords was given by Lord Browne-Wilkinson, with whom the other members of the Appellate Committee agreed. The facts of that case can be briefly taken from the headnote:

"In March 1994 the applicant and her six children were evicted from their rented accommodation and she applied to the local authority for accommodation as a homeless person. Pending the determination of her application, the local authority provided them with temporary accommodation at a guest house. In June 1994 the authority refused her application on the ground that, although she was homeless and in priority need, she was homeless intentionally. The applicant continued to live at the guest house for a further year and paid the weekly rent of £514 with the housing benefit that she received. In July 1995 the authority informed her that the rent payable at the guest house was higher than other comparable rents and that therefore her housing benefit would be reduced to £250 per week.

The proprietor of the guest house informed the applicant that she would have to vacate her rooms if she did not pay the full rent. In August 1995 she applied again to the local authority for accommodation as a person threatened with homelessness. The authority refused to consider the application and make fresh enquiries pursuant to section 62 ..."

(Of the then Housing Act 1985, which is the equivalent to section 184 of the 1996 Act.) They did so on the ground, amongst others, that they have made non statutory inquiries. They were satisfied that there was no material change since the determination of the application in 1994 and therefore the decision that the applicant was intentionally homeless still stood.

26. In the opinion of Lord Browne-Wilkinson it is important to quote from pages 1401G to 1402F:

"The problem is this. When a local authority, having discharged their statutory duties in relation to one application for accommodation, then receive a second application from the same applicant, are they bound in all circumstances to go through the whole statutory inquiry procedure and provide interim accommodation or is there a 'threshold test' which the second application must satisfy if it is to be treated as an application under the Act?

It is Harrow's case that a person making a second application must demonstrate a change of circumstances which might lead to the second application being successful and it is for the local authority to decide whether that test has been satisfied ...

I have sympathy with Harrow's case on this point but I am unable to extract from the statutory language any sufficient justification for the suggested short cut. Under section 62 the statutory duty to make inquiries arises if (a) a person applies for accommodation and (b) 'the authority have reason to believe that he may be homeless or threatened with homelessness.' It is established that requirement (a) is not satisfied if an application purports to be made by someone who lacks the capacity to do so ... Moreover when an applicant has been given temporary accommodation under section 63 and is then found to be intentionally homeless, he cannot then make a further application based on exactly the same facts as his earlier application ... But those are very special cases when it is possible to say that there is no application before the local authority and therefore the mandatory duty imposed by section 62 has not arisen. But in the present case there is no doubt that when Mrs Fahia made her further application for accommodation she was threatened with homelessness. Moreover in my judgment her application could not be treated as identical with the earlier 1994 application. She was relying on her eviction from the guest house which, for one year, she had been occupying as the direct licensee of the guest house proprietor, paying the rent for that accommodation. She was reimbursed the amount of the rent by way of housing benefit but the fact was that she had occupied premises as a licensee for a year. It is impossible to say that there has been no relevant change in circumstances at all.

In the circumstances, I agree with the judge and the Court of Appeal that there was no short cut available to Harrow by way of so-called 'non statutory enquiries'."

27. More recently, the principles established in Fahia were considered by the Court of Appeal in Rikha Begum v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [2005] 1 WLR 2103. The lead judgment in that case was given by Neuberger LJ (as he then was) who has of course unrivalled experience in this field. In his discussion of the relevant principles relating to successive applications under Part 7 of 1996 Act, Neuberger LJ said this at paragraph 39:

"The effect of the reasoning of the House of Lords in Fahia is that, at least under Part III of the 1985 Act, on receipt of what purports to be an application, an authority are bound to make inquiries, if they have reason to believe that the applicant is or may be homeless, unless the purported application can be shown to be no application . The only relevant basis upon which a purported subsequent application may be treated as no application, according to Fahia at p 1402, appears to be where it is based on 'exactly the same facts as [the] earlier application'.That is a rather different formulation from the 'material change of circumstances since the original decision'..."

Neuberger LJ then proceeded to examine the possible distinction between the two tests or approaches in more detail to identify the differences between them. At paragraph 46 he said:

"Accordingly, in order to check whether a subsequent purported application is based on 'exactly the same facts' as an earlier application, the authority must compare the circumstances as they were at the time when the earlier application was disposed of (ie when it was decided or when the decision was reviewed) with those revealed in the document by which the subsequent application is made (any other associated documentation). This should prove less onerous on the authority, and should involve less delay and uncertainty for the applicant, than if the comparison was with the circumstances as they are discovered after inquiries by the authority to be after receipt of a subsequent application."

In passing I should note that at paragraph 45 Neuberger LJ had also made the observation that the circumstances of the subsequent application must, at least in the absence of unusual facts be taken to be those revealed by the document by which the subsequent application was made.

28. On behalf of the claimant it has been stressed before me that these passages are important because they emphasise that what had been disproved in Fahia as "non-statutory inquiries" should not take place. It is submitted on behalf of the claimant that the relevant facts supporting her fresh application were set out in the application and in her application for a review dated 7 January 2011 and that the defendant authority should not have taken into account or at least placed as much reliance as it did on what may have been said in a conversation on 12 May 2011.
29. Returning to the judgment of Neuberger LJ in Rikha Begum, he said at paragraph 49:

"... it is clear as a matter of ordinary language that, once there is a genuine and effective application, and once the authority are satisfied that the applicant is or may be homeless, or threatened with homelessness, the operative part of section 183 is engaged, and the 'following provisions' become effective. Those provisions include section 184(1), which plainly obliges the authority to make inquiries in relation to the matters identified in paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. So far as paragraph (a) is concerned, eligibility is governed by section 185. As to paragraph (b), the potential duties consist of an interim duty, set out in sections 188 to 189, and final duties, set out in 190 to 193."

At paragraph 50 of his judgment Neuberger LJ said:

"I consider that there is no room to imply a further requirement which has to be satisfied, such as establishing a material change of circumstances since the refusal of an offer of accommodation pursuant to an earlier application, before the clear words of sections 183 and 184 can take effect. Any such implication faces insuperable difficulties in light of the decision, but also the reasoning, in Fahia. A person seeking to imply words into a statutory faces a difficult task: it is a course which can only be justified in clear and unusual circumstances. Where the implication involves imposing a further requirements, over and above express requirements imposed by the legislature, the task is, in my view, particularly difficult."

30. At paragraphs 51 and 52 Neuberger LJ said that quite apart from the difficulty in light of the reasoning of the House of Lords in Fahia, which he described as a difficulty of principle, he considered that there were other problems of a more practical nature. At paragraph 53, Neuberger LJ concluded that:

"The notion that a purported subsequent application would be an application for the purposes of section 183, unless it was based on precisely the same facts as an earlier application when that earlier application was finally disposed of, largely (although I accept, no completely) avoids these problems. Such an interpretation is consistent with the reasoning in Fahia... it involves implying very little, if anything into section 183(1), and nothing into any other provision of the 1996 Act. It does not cut across 139(9). It could be said to involve a non-statutory inquiry with some concomitant delay. However, that inquiry would simply involve a comparison of the subsequent purported application with the already established facts applicable at the time the earlier application was disposed of.

Accordingly, it would be a simple inquiry and any consequent delay would, at least normally, be very slight. Further, as Lord Browne-Wilkinson implied in Fahia, one would expect it to be a relatively rare case where the facts of the two applications would be 'exactly the same.'"

At paragraph 60 of his judgment Neuberger LJ did accept the possibility that the subsequent application document purporting to reveal new facts may in fact disclose facts which are not new or at best or are "fanciful or trivial". However, leaving such cases aside, at paragraph 61 he concluded that even though factual assertions may turn out to be inaccurate or insufficient for the applicant's purposes on investigation, the authority must still treat the subsequent application as a valid application because that is what it is in light of the reasoning of the House of Lords in Fahia. In particular, he said:

"... I do not consider that in such a case the authority would be entitled to investigate the accuracy of the alleged new facts before deciding whether to treat the application as valid, even where there may be reason to suspect the accuracy of the allegations. Such an investigation would in my view, fall foul of the manifest disapproval in Fahia of non-statutory inquiries. Even if an investigation to decide whether the application is valid is expected to be short and simple, it seems to me that it would transgress that disapproval, as well as running into the other difficulties I have referred to, based on the wording and structure of Part VII of the 1996 Act."

31. Furthermore it is common ground before me that the approach which this court should take on a claim for judicial review to such questions is to assess the decision of the local housing authority on the ground of irrationality. As is the case frequently in claims for judicial review, defendants may have to take decisions as to what the facts of a case are.
32. In respect of such decisions of fact it is well known that, leaving aside unusual situations where factual questions may be a condition precedent for the exercise of a public law power, the general position is that the court cannot by way of judicial review interfere with the conclusion of a defendant authority, simply on the ground that it disagrees with it. As is well-known a claim for judicial review does not lie by way of appeal against a public authority's decision, still less does it permit the court to substitute its own view of the merits of a case for that of a defendant authority to which a function has been entrusted by Parliament.
33. The defendant has impressed upon me, in a succinct skeleton argument, that the test for irrationality is a stringent one. For example, in the classic case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Co-operation [1948] 1 KB 223 at 229, Lord Greene MR said that a decision would be as it has subsequently become known as Wednesbury unreasonable if it was "so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority".
34. On behalf of the claimant the main submission which is made before me is that no reasonable housing authority, properly directing itself, could have concluded that the circumstances of the second homelessness application in the present case were "exactly the same" as when the claimant first applied having moved from Slough to Birmingham.
35. As it is put at paragraph 39 of the claimant's skeleton argument, which is equally and impressively succinct as the defendant's:

"No authority acting rationally and properly directed in law could decide that the Claimant's further application for assistance, precipitated by homelessness caused by the breakdown by the Claimant's relationship with her grandmother, was identical to her first application which was precipitated by her fleeing Slough as a victim of domestic violence."

36. On the other side of the argument it has been eloquently submitted on behalf of the defendant authority that it was within the range of reasonable judgments open to a defendant, to reach the conclusion that the circumstances were indeed exactly the same as earlier. At paragraph 22 of the defendant's skeleton argument it is submitted that:

"At the date of a third application as homeless the claimant was asserting that she could no longer occupy her grandmother's home and was therefore homeless. That was the precise same reason for homelessness as was asserted at the date of her first application although the claimant had fled domestic violence in Slough. She was living temporarily with her grandmother but asserted she could not continue to do so. Likewise, at the date of the second application the reason for homelessness was the same. There is simply no change of the fact."

At paragraph 23 of the skeleton argument it is submitted that:

"If in so far as the claimant asserts that the date of her first application she was 'homeless at home' at her grandmother's but made actually homeless by the date of her second application, it is submitted being homeless in a unit of accommodation is identical to being homeless from that same unit. This is a conclusion which on any sensible analysis cannot be said to be perverse."

37. It has been particularly emphasised at the hearing before me that, so far as the facts known to the defendant authority at all relevant times were concerned, it was entitled reasonably to come to the conclusion that at all material times the claimants circumstances were that she was in "temporary accommodation". That had been the position when she first applied as a homeless person to the defendant authority and it is submitted that that was still the position when she made her further applications which are the subject of the present proceedings.
38. It was submitted that there is no difference, or at least that the local authority was entitled reasonably to come to the view that there is no difference between housing being temporary, in the sense that it may come to an end at some point in the future and it being temporary in the sense that that has in fact now come about.
39. I do not accept that submission on behalf of the defendant. I have come to the clear conclusion that it was irrational for the defendant authority to take the view that the circumstances of the claimant when she made her further application were exactly the same as when she first made an application as a homeless person.
40. On behalf of the defendant, no issue was taken with the the factual assertion made on behalf of the claimant that after the defendant authority's decision that it had discharged its duty to the claimant, on 12 February 2010 an agreement was reached whereby the claimant's grandmother told her that she and her children could stay at the grandmother's house, pending the outcome of the claimant's application for housing on the defendant authority's ordinary waiting list; in other words, outside the context of homelessness applications.
41. That was, as has been submitted on behalf of the claimant, an open-ended commitment. Although the accommodation can be described as temporary, the claimant had a licence from her grandmother. It was temporary, in the sense that it was not permanent. No doubt, both the claimant and her grandmother were hoping and expecting her application for housing in the ordinary way to bear fruit from the defendant authority in due course.
42. However, on any reasonable view, in my judgment, there plainly was an important change in the facts in around November 2010, as the claimant has described in her witness statement in these proceedings. There was a breakdown in the relationship between the claimant and her grandmother. There is all the difference in the world, in my view, between a person knowing that at some point in the future they may have to leave accommodation and a person being told that they will not have somewhere to sleep that night. No reasonable public authority, in my judgment, could come to a different conclusion when asked: are those two scenarios exactly the same or are they different?
43. For the reasons that I have given, this claim for judicial review is granted and I will hear counsel as to appropriate remedies.
44. MR NABI: My Lord thank you very much. Before I address you on (inaudible) your Lordship asked for production of the order in the statutory appeal.
45. MR JUSTICE SINGH: Yes, may I just see that? Yes thank you. Do you need that back?
46. MR NABI: No.
47. MR JUSTICE SINGH: I will leave it on the court file.
48. MR NABI: So far as remedy is concerned, I would seek the remedy as claimed in the claim form at page 10 of the bundle.
49. MR JUSTICE SINGH: So the first order is a quashing order. That would quash the Decision Letter of 31st May 2011. You then asked for a mandatory order. Do I need that?
50. MR NABI: My Lord it may be that the mandatory order is unnecessary but --
51. MR JUSTICE SINGH: I certainly do not need the interim accommodation on I think. I have to say Mr Nabi, normally this court simply quashes an unlawful decision and of course expects that a responsible public authority will act in accordance with the judgment of the court.
52. MR NABI: My Lord I do not intend to press your Lordship to take any other...
53. MR JUSTICE SINGH: Shall I hear what counsel for the defendant has to say about remedies?
54. MISS OSLER: My Lord, we certainly do not resist the first paragraph. As to paragraphs 2 and 3, I simply say while I understand my learned friend (inaudible) in the claim form, they are unnecessary because has (inaudible) has respect for the court's order.
55. MR JUSTICE SINGH: Yes, very well.
56. In the circumstances of this case what I am going to do is to make a quashing order, quashing the defendant's Decision Letter of 31st May 2011 but I will not make any other orders as to remedies.
57. MR NABI: That only leaves the issue of costs. We would seek our costs.
58. MISS OSLER: We cannot resist that.
59. MR JUSTICE SINGH: Very well. I will order that the defendant shall pay the claimant's costs to be the subject of detailed assessment if not agreed.
60. MR NABI: I ought to seek an order for detailed public funding assessment of the defendant's costs--
61. MR JUSTICE SINGH: For the claimant's costs.
62. MR NABI: The claimant's costs, forgive me.
63. MR JUSTICE SINGH: You will have that. Is there anything else? Do you have anything else?
64. MISS OSLER: No.
65. MR JUSTICE SINGH: Thank you very much.
66. Can I thank you both again and those instructing you for the very real assistance which the court has received in this case.
67. MR NABI: Thank you very much.