England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		30 April 2012

Mr Justice Keith:

1. Judgment in this appeal was handed down on 12 March 2012. The court's judgment dealt with nine of the thirteen offences to which the five warrants for Mr Vörös' extradition to Hungary related. A final order could not be made on the appeal, because it was for the Hungarian authorities to decide which of the four remaining offences they wished to prosecute Mr Vörös for, bearing in mind that (a) the offence in EAW2 was the same offence as the fourth offence in EAW5, and (b) the first offence in EAW4 was the same offence as the first offence in EAW5. The Hungarian authorities were given until 16 April 2012 to notify the Administrative Court Office which of the four offences he was to be prosecuted for.
2. Two communications have been received from the Hungarian authorities since then. The language of both of them is a little difficult to follow, but their effect, I think, was to confirm that Mr Vörös would not be prosecuted for all four offences. He would only be prosecuted for two of them, but which two he would be prosecuted for and which two would be dropped had not yet been decided. That was because the prosecuting authority which would be making that decision had not yet been identified, and Mr Vörös' presence was required before any decision as to which prosecuting authority would be making the decision could be made. No reason was given for that, but that fact, as well as the fact that one of the prosecuting authorities has said that Mr Vörös needed to be questioned before any decision could be made about which offences he was to be prosecuted for, suggest that Mr Vörös' extradition is still being sought in respect of the four offences, for the purpose of conducting an investigation to decide which two of these offences he should be prosecuted for. In the light of the decision in Asztaslos (referred to at [27] in the court's previous judgment), that means that the request for Mr Vörös' extradition in respect of the four offences is still not being made for a legitimate purpose, and the effect of that is that the warrants (to the extent that they relate to the four offences) are not valid warrants within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.
3. Mr Sternberg contends that this reasoning places far too much weight on the fact that Mr Vörös needs to be questioned in Hungary before a decision can be made about which of the four offences he should be prosecuted for and which should be dropped. To quote from his written submissions:

"… it is established by authority that the process of prosecution may allow for questioning of the requested person to occur after surrender or for the investigation, as part of the prosecution process to continue (R (Miguel Meizoso-Gonzales) v Juzgado de Instruccion Cinco de Palma de Mallorca [2010] EWHC 3655 (Admin), Paschayan v Government of Switzerland [2008] All ER(D) 68 (Mar), [2008] EWHC 388 (Admin)). The fact that there may be a phase in prosecution which includes questioning, does not mean that extradition is not sought for the purpose of prosecution."

All of that may be so, but there is a difference between further questioning and investigation taking place as part of the prosecution process, and such questioning and investigation taking place in order to decide whether someone should be prosecuted for a particular offence. There is no getting away from the fact that Mr Vörös' extradition is sought for four offences, when no decision has been made about which of those offences he is to be prosecuted for.

4. There is no doubt that the effect of the court's previous judgment was fully explained to the Hungarian authorities. Mr Sternberg has frankly said that it is no "secret" that the Hungarian authorities have been asked to elect which of the duplicate offences they wish to proceed with. I respect, of course, the fact that they think that it is premature for them to be put to their election before Mr Vörös is returned to Hungary and can be questioned there. I can also see how the default position might have been that in the absence of an election by the Hungarian authorities over which offences Mr Vörös would be prosecuted for, he should be extradited only for the less serious pair of offences, i.e. those for which the maximum sentence is five years' imprisonment. But our law does not permit someone's extradition where the offences for which he is to be prosecuted have not been identified, and I see no alternative but to give effect to how the court's previous judgment concluded in [31], namely that "if [the Hungarian authorities] decline to make that election now, [Mr Vörös] may not be extradited for any of those four offences."
5. For these reasons, Mr Vörös may not be extradited to Hungary for any of the four offences. In the light of the court's previous judgment, the order which the court makes is that Mr Vörös' appeal is allowed to the extent that the five offences for which Mr Vörös may not be extradited to Hungary are the offence in EAW1, the offence in EAW2, the first offence in EAW4 and the first and fourth offences in EAW5. The parties are agreed that in the circumstances Mr Vörös' costs of the appeal should be the subject of a public funding assessment, and that those costs should be paid out of central funds.