England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		24/04/2012

Mr Justice Wyn Williams:

Introduction

1. On 11 July 2011 HH Judge Rennie and two Magistrates, sitting at the Crown Court at Lewes, dismissed the Claimant's appeal against a number of convictions which had been recorded against her in the Magistrates' Court for a number of offences pursuant to the Animal Welfare Act 2006. The prosecution had been brought by the First Interested Party, RSPCA, and it was that body which resisted the Claimant's appeal at the Crown Court.
2. On 1 August 2011 the Claimant submitted an application to the Crown Court to state a case so that she could appeal to this court by way of Case Stated. The next day, 2 August 2011, the Claimant was notified that her application had been refused. The application was considered by HH Judge Rennie who refused it stating:-

"There is no need for me to state a case, as I have already spelt out my reasons during the trial. In my view this proposed application is without merit."

3. On 2 November 2011 the Claimant instituted proceedings for judicial review of the refusal to state a case. I considered the issue of permission on the papers and directed an oral hearing for reasons which are explained in my order of 19 January 2012.
4. The Claimant's application to the Crown Court to state a case was supported by detailed grounds. They are to be found in paragraph 8 of the application.

The challenge to the decision of the judge

5. The first four grounds all relate to section 31 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. That section is in the following terms:-

"(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 127(1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 a Magistrates' Court may try an information relating to an offence under this Act if the information is laid –

a) before the end of the period of 3 years beginning with the date of the commission of the offence, and

b) before the end of the period of 6 months beginning with the date on which evidence which the prosecutor thinks is sufficient to justify the proceedings comes to his knowledge.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section 1(b) –

a) a certificate signed by or on behalf of the prosecutor and stating the date on which such evidence came to his knowledge shall be conclusive evidence of that fact, and be a certificate stating that matter and purporting to be so signed, shall be treated as so signed unless the contrary is proved."

6. The first two grounds relied upon by the Claimant assert that the Crown Court was wrong to conclude that the RSPCA was empowered to issue a certificate pursuant to section 31(2); further it should have concluded that it was not open to the RSPCA to institute proceedings outside the 6 month time limit specified in section 127 Magistrates' Court Act 1980.
7. These grounds cannot succeed in the light of the decision of this court in Lamont Perkins v RSPCA [2012] EWHC 1002 (Admin).
8. Ground 3 alleges that the certificate issued did not comply with section 31(2). Section 31(2) requires that the certificate must be signed by or on behalf of the prosecutor and, further, specifies that the certificate must state the date on which such evidence came to the knowledge of the prosecutor as would be sufficient to justify proceedings.
9. This point was taken before the Crown Court. In a ruling given at the commencement of the appeal HH Judge Rennie explained:-

"So far as the certificate itself is concerned, it was produced by Michael Flower and is headed: "Prosecutor's certificate". We agree that it does contain the required section 31 ingredients as to the date upon which sufficient evidence to justify proceedings came to his knowledge, namely, 26 October 2008 and it is signed by him."

10. Miss Howe submits that the certificate was invalid because it did not specify the date when the prosecutor (as opposed to Mr Flower) had the requisite knowledge. In my judgment, however, properly interpreted, this certificate is to be treated as specifying that the prosecutor, through Mr Flowers, had the requisite knowledge on the date specified in the certificate. There is no realistic prospect, in my judgment, that any different conclusion would prevail after a full hearing and I would refuse permission on this ground.
11. Miss Howe next complains that the certificate was not valid because it was not dated and, in any event, it was not served with the summons but, rather, it was served a long time after the summons was issued.
12. There is no statutory requirement that the certificate should be dated. Further there is no statutory requirement that the certificate should be served at the time the information is laid or a summons issued. Further there is no reason to suppose that such requirements are to be implied within section 31. I accept Mr Jenkins' submission that there is no rule in law that the prosecution must serve with, and at the time of laying the information, any certificate that it later proposes to rely upon to demonstrate compliance with the relevant statutory provision that extends the usual time limit for bringing proceedings before the Magistrates' Court.
13. The fifth ground upon which the court was asked to state a case related to the information which was laid against the Claimant. It was neither dated nor signed and Ms Howe submits that it was invalid in consequence.
14. I accept Mr Jenkins' submission that there is no requirement that an information should be signed by the informant or dated. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedures Rules to that effect and there is nothing in the Magistrates' Court Act 1980 to that effect.

The issue on costs

15. HH Judge Rennie was also asked to state a case in relation to the decision of the Crown Court to direct that the Claimant should pay to the RSPCA the sum of £10,000 towards its costs. The learned judge refused this application.
16. In my judgment there is potential substance in the Claimant's argument that the Crown Court erred in law in directing that the Claimant should pay the sum of £10,000 towards the costs of the RSPCA. I have studied the transcript of the proceedings in order to ascertain the basis upon which the court thought it appropriate to make such an order and, at least arguably, the court failed to address matters which were highly material to whether or not an order for costs should be made. In my judgment the application to state a case in respect of the costs order was neither unreasonable nor frivolous and, accordingly, the learned judge should have acceded to the application.
17. I appreciate that, technically, the hearing on 21 February was convened as a permission hearing. However, we have the benefit of full argument, both oral and written. In these circumstances it seems to me to be appropriate to treat the hearing on 21 February 2012 as a "rolled up" hearing of the application for judicial review. On that basis I would grant the Claimant an order directing the Crown Court to state a case in respect of its order as to costs but, otherwise, refuse permission to apply for judicial review.

Other issues

18. I appreciate that during the course of oral submissions Miss Howe sought to broaden the approach which she wished to take in relation to the grounds other than those relating to the order for costs. For example, she sought to argue that a summons should never have been issued at all because the information had been laid "out of time". Following the hearing, she sent an email to the Administrative Court Office in which she asked that we should consider the decision of the Divisional Court in R v West London Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Klahn [1979] 1WLR 933 which, it was submitted, supported that submission. The email referred to other authorities, in addition. However, it seems to me that it is appropriate to confine the Claimant to the points which were raised before the Crown Court and which were made in support of the original application to state a case. The application for an order compelling the Crown Court to state a case was made at the very cusp of the time limit for bringing such an application. In my judgment, it is not in the interests of justice to permit the Claimant to broaden the scope of her proceedings so long after the hearing in the Crown Court.
19. I should also record that in oral submissions, Ms Howe seemed disposed to suggest that she wished to impugn decisions of the Crown Court which were made in consequence of submissions which she advanced at the close of the prosecution case. This point was never taken when these proceedings were issued but even if there are elliptical references to the point in the application to state a case the Claimant's legal advisers have failed to provide to this court a transcript of the ruling or rulings made by the court at the conclusion of the evidence adduced on behalf of RSPCA. In the absence of such a transcript it is simply impossible to discern whether any identifiable errors of law were made by the Crown Court.

Conclusion

20. To repeat, and in summary, I would direct that the Crown Court should state a case in respect of its order that the Claimant should pay RSPCA the sum of £10,000 towards its costs but otherwise refuse this application for judicial review.

President of the Queen's Bench Division:

21. I agree. An issue of some potential importance may arise in relation to the proper approach to the making of an order for costs and the defendant's ability to pay within a reasonable time.