QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
THE HON. MR. JUSTICE BURNETT
| THE QUEEN ON APPLICATION OF:
(1) VITALIY ZAPOROZHCHENKO
(2) IULIA REDYA
|- and -
|WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES' COURT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE
David Josse QC and Joel Smith (instructed by Tuckers Solicitors) for the Second Claimant
Clair Dobbin (instructed by the Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State
Hearing dates: 15 December 2010
Crown Copyright ©
The Hon. Mr. Justice Burnett :
"(1) This section applies if–
(a) the appropriate judge sends a case to the Secretary of State under this Part for his decision whether a person is to be extradited;
(b) within the required period the Secretary of State does not make an order for the person's extradition or discharge.
(2) If the person applies to the appropriate judge to be discharged, the judge must order his discharge.
(3) The required period is the period of 2 months starting with the appropriate day.
(4) If before the required period ends the Secretary of State applies to the appropriate judge for it to be extended the judge may make an order accordingly; and this subsection may apply more than once."
Section 102 of the 2003 Act defines 'appropriate day' for the purposes of, inter alia, section 99. It provides:
"(1) This section applies for the purposes of sections 93 and 99 if the appropriate judge sends a case to the Secretary of State under this Part for his decision whether a person is to be extradited.
(2) If the person is charged with an offence in the United Kingdom, the appropriate day is the day on which one of these occurs–
(a) the charge is disposed of;
(b) the charge is withdrawn;
(c) proceedings in respect of the charge are discontinued;
(d) an order is made for the charge to lie on the file, or in relation to Scotland, the diet is deserted pro loco et tempore.
(3) If under section 97(3) or 98(2) the Secretary of State defers making a decision until the person has served a sentence, the appropriate day is the day on which the person finishes serving the sentence.
(4) If section 126 applies in relation to the request for the person's extradition (the request concerned) the appropriate day is–
(a) the day on which the Secretary of State makes an order under that section, if the order is for proceedings on the other request to be deferred;
(b) the day on which an order under section 180 is made, if the order under section 126 is for proceedings on the request concerned to be deferred and the order under section 180 is for the proceedings to be resumed.
(5) If section 179 applies in relation to the request for the person´s extradition, the appropriate day is–
(a) the day on which the Secretary of State makes an order under that section, if the order is for proceedings on the warrant to be deferred;
(b) the day on which an order under section 180 is made, if the order under section 179 is for proceedings on the request to be deferred and the order under section 180 is for the proceedings to be resumed.
(6) If more than one of subsections (2) to (5) applies, the appropriate day is the latest of the days found under the subsections which apply.
(7) In any other case, the appropriate day is the day on which the judge sends the case to the Secretary of State for his decision whether the person is to be extradited."
"My Lords, Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 entitles a tenant of business premises, whose tenancy has been terminated by notice given to him by his landlord in accordance with the provisions of that Act, to apply to the court for a new tenancy. By section 29(3) the application must be made "not less than two nor more than four months after the giving of the landlord's notice." In the instant case the respondent landlord's notice was given on September 30, 1978; the appellant tenant's application to the court for a new lease was made on January 31, 1979. The only question in this appeal is: Was that one day too late?
The registrar and the judge of Grantham County Court both thought that it was too late. They dismissed the tenant's application on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. In the Court of Appeal opinion was divided. Stephenson and Templeman LJJ agreed that it was one day too late; Bridge LJ thought that it was just in time: and leave was given by that court to appeal to your Lordships' House.
My Lords, reference to a "month" in a statute is to be understood as a calendar month. The Interpretation Act 1889 says so. It is also clear under a rule that has been consistently applied by the courts since Lester v. Garland (1808) 15 Ves.Jun. 248, that in calculating the period that has elapsed after the occurrence of the specified event such as the giving of a notice, the day on which the event occurs is excluded from the reckoning. It is equally well established, and is not disputed by counsel for the tenant, that when the relevant period is a month or specified number of months after the giving of a notice, the general rule is that the period ends upon the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month, i.e. the day of that month that bears the same number as the day of the earlier month on which the notice was given.
The corresponding date rule is simple. It is easy of application. Except in a small minority of cases, of which the instant case is not an example, all that the calculator has to do is to mark in his diary the corresponding date in the appropriate subsequent month. Because the number of days in five months of the year is less than in the seven others the inevitable consequence of the corresponding date rule is that one months' notice given in a 30 day month is one day shorter than one month's notice given in a 31 day month and is three days shorter if it is given in February. Corresponding variations in the length of notice reckoned in days occur where the required notice is a plurality of months."
"23. Where, under some legislative provision, an act is required to be done within a fixed period of time "beginning with" or "from" a specified day it is a question of construction whether the specified day itself is to be included in, or excluded from, that period. Where the period within which the act is to be done is expressed to be a number of days, months or years from or after a specified day, the courts have held, consistently since Young v. Higgon (1840) 6 M.&W. 49, that the specified day is excluded from the period; that is to say, that the period commences on the day after the specified day. Examples of such an "exclusive" construction are found in Goldsmiths' Company v. West Metropolitan Railway Company  1 K.B. 1 ("the powers of the company for the compulsory purchase of lands for the purposes of this Act shall cease after the expiration of three years from the passing of this Act") and in In re Lympe Investments Ltd  1 W.L.R 523 ("the company has for three weeks thereafter neglected to pay"). In Stewart v. Chapman  2 K.B. 792 ("a person ... shall not be convicted unless ... within 14 days of the commission of the offence a summons for the offence was served on him") Lord Goddard, C.J., observed, at pp 798-799, that it was well established that "whatever the expression used" the day from which the period of time was to be reckoned was to be excluded.
24. Where, however, the period within which the act is to be done is expressed to be a period beginning with a specified day, then it has been held, with equal consistency over the past 40 years or thereabouts, that the legislature (or the relevant rule making body, as the case may be) has shown a clear intention that the specified day must be included in the period. Examples of an "inclusive" construction are to be found in Hare v. Gocher  2 Q.B. 641 ("if within [the period of two months beginning with the commencement of this Act] the occupier of an existing site duly makes an application ... for a site licence") and in Trow v. Ind Coope (West Midlands) Ltd  2 Q.B. 899 ("a writ ... is valid ... for 12 months beginning with the date of its issue"). As Salmon L.J. pointed out in Trow v. Ind Coope, at p. 923, the approach adopted in the Goldsmiths' Co. case and Stewart v. Chapman can have no application in a case where the period is expressed to begin on the specified date. He observed, at p. 924, that
"I cannot ... accept that, if words have any meaning, `beginning with the date of its issue' can be construed to mean the same as `beginning with the day after the date of its issue.'".
25. The judge held that it was "obvious", from the use of the expression "beginning with the date of the agreement" in article 3(1)(a)(i) of the Order of 1989, that the period of 12 months prescribed by that paragraph included the date of the agreement. In our view he was plainly correct to reach that conclusion. Notwithstanding the submissions advanced on behalf of the plaintiff, we can see no basis on which this court could refuse to apply the reasoning which led the majority (Harman and Salmon L.JJ.) in Trow v. Ind Coope to hold that there is a real difference between a direction that a period of time is to begin with a specified date and a direction that a period is to be reckoned from that date."
" What Lord Diplock described as the corresponding date rule applies, in his Lordship's words, 'when the relevant period is a month or specified number of months after the giving of a notice'. The rule has the effect of excluding from the computation the day on which the notice was given...
 The dependence of the decision in Dodds v. Walker upon the exclusion of the terminus a quo is equally apparent from the speech of Lord Russell of Killowen (p1030):
'My Lords, it is common ground that in this case the period of four months did not begin to run until the end of the date of the relevant service on September 30 – i.e. at midnight September 30/October 1. It is common ground that ordinarily the calculation of a period of a calendar month or calendar months ends upon what has been conveniently referred to as the corresponding date. For example in a four month period, when service of the relevant notice was on September 28, time would begin to run at midnight September 28/29 and would end at midnight January 28/29, a period embracing four calendar months.'
This approach cannot be applied if, by statute, the court is required to count the date on which the relevant event occurred (in present case, the employee starting work) as part of the relevant period."
We agree fully with this reasoning.