Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
| The Queen of the application of HH
|- and -
|City of Westminster Magistrates Court
|- v -
|Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa (on behalf of the Italian Judicial Authorities)
|- v -
|Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic, Genoa (on behalf of the Italian Judicial Authorities)
|- and -
X, Y and Z (through the Official Solicitor, their Litigation Friend
Mr John Hardy QC and Mr Ben Lloyd (instructed by the CPS) for the Respondent
Mr Alun Jones QC and Mr John Jones (instructed by Wainwright & Cummins) for the Claimant and 1st Appellant
Mr Ian Wise QC and Mr Steven Powles (instructed by Wainwright & Cummins) for the 2nd Appellant
Mr Hugo Keith QC and Ms Caoilfhionn Gallagher (instructed by The Official Solicitor) for the Interested Parties (by written submissions)
Hearing dates: 8 December 2010 and 7 April 2011
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Laws:
"(b) the statement referred to in subsection (5) and the information referred to in subsection (6)".
S.2(5) and (6) provide:
"(5) The statement is one that—
(a) the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is alleged to be unlawfully at large after conviction of an offence specified in the warrant by a court in the category 1 territory, and
(b) the Part 1 warrant is issued with a view to his arrest and extradition to the category 1 territory for the purpose of being sentenced for the offence or of serving a sentence of imprisonment or another form of detention imposed in respect of the offence.
(6) The information is—
(b) particulars of the conviction..."
"(3) The person [sc. arrested under a Part 1 EAW] must be brought as soon as practicable before the appropriate judge.
(5)If subsection (3) is not complied with and the person applies to the judge to be discharged, the judge must order his discharge."
"(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section... he must decide whether the person was convicted in his presence.
(2) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the affirmative he must proceed under section 21.
(3) If the judge decides that question in the negative he must decide whether the person deliberately absented himself from his trial.
(4) If the judge decides the question in subsection (3) in the affirmative he must proceed under section 21.
(5) If the judge decides that question in the negative he must decide whether the person would be entitled to a retrial or (on appeal) to a review amounting to a retrial.
(6) If the judge decides the question in subsection (5) in the affirmative he must proceed under section 21.
(7) If the judge decides that question in the negative he must order the person's discharge.
(8) The judge must not decide the question in subsection (5) in the affirmative unless, in any proceedings that it is alleged would constitute a retrial or a review amounting to a retrial, the person would have these rights—
(a) the right to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he had not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so required;
(b) the right to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him."
"(1) If the judge is required to proceed under this section... he must decide whether the person's extradition would be compatible with the Convention rights within the meaning of the Human Rights Act 1998.
(2) If the judge decides the question in subsection (1) in the negative he must order the person's discharge."
"(1) This section applies if at any time in the extradition hearing it appears to the judge that the condition in subsection (2) is satisfied.
(2) The condition is that the physical or mental condition of the person in respect of whom the Part 1 warrant is issued is such that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite him.
(3) The judge must—
(a) order the person's discharge, or
(b) adjourn the extradition hearing until it appears to him that the condition in subsection (2) is no longer satisfied."
"(1) On an appeal under section 26 the High Court may—
(a) allow the appeal;
(b) dismiss the appeal.
(2) The court may allow the appeal only if the conditions in subsection (3) or the conditions in subsection (4) are satisfied.
(3) The conditions are that—
(a) the appropriate judge ought to have decided a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;
(b) if he had decided the question in the way he ought to have done, he would have been required to order the person's discharge.
(4) The conditions are that—
(a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing;
(b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the appropriate judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;
(c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person's discharge.
(5) If the court allows the appeal it must—
(a) order the person's discharge;
(b) quash the order for his extradition."
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society... for the prevention of disorder or crime..."
"[t]here may be a s.25 submission on her behalf. But for this development I would have ordered extradition against both today".
And so the case was further adjourned to 7 April 2009, when an addendum report from a psychiatrist, Dr Meats, was before the judge which indicated that HH could not understand proceedings in court, could not travel otherwise than in an ambulance, and could not look after herself or her children on her own. The doctor also stated that further court appearances would exacerbate her condition, and it was possible that continuing uncertainty was aggravating and prolonging that condition. DJ Evans expressed himself not satisfied with Dr Meats' reports. The Crown Prosecution Service on behalf of the Genoese prosecuting authority (as I understand it, at the judge's invitation) subsequently themselves instructed a psychiatrist, Dr Joseph, of whom I will have more to say. The case was further adjourned to 5 May 2009.
"The only reason I am being asked to leave the case is to give the defence a second crack of the whip, as I found both defendants fled Italy in breach of their bail, and maybe another District Judge might be persuaded to give a judgment more favourable to PH and HH."
DJ Evans indicated also that he had not yet seen the new EAW for HH. He acknowledged that that would involve fresh extradition proceedings, but
"[w]here the contest involves the same issues of fact, it will be contrary to justice for evidence to be called again, and the fact that the same District Judge deals with the new warrant does not imply that the DJ is biased."
"She did give evidence and I found her an untruthful manipulative witness."
Then under the heading "HH [sc. HH]'s Health":
"44... Z was conceived after HH's arrest on the accusation EAW. FH [sc. PH] told me in evidence this was unplanned. It must remain an open question whether Z's conception was (irresponsibly and selfishly) intended to provide a useful argument in support of HH and FH's opposition to the extradition request.
45. At the extradition hearing held on 20th February 2009, HH was able to give coherent (albeit untruthful) evidence. She was not suffering from any significant ill-health."
The judge proceeded to summarise HH medical history, referring to the reports of Dr Nabavi, Dr Joseph and Dr Meats. I should cite this reference to Dr Joseph's conclusion, which as I shall show DJ Evans was to accept:
"51. In Dr Joseph's opinion HH did suffer an acute stress reaction after her attendance in court on 20.02.09, but as at May 2009 she was not suffering from any mental disorder of a nature or degree, which might prevent her from being extradited. The psychiatrists at the Mental Health Unit thought her symptoms were consistent with anxiety and had excluded any other form of mental illness, for example psychosis or a depressive illness."
Then at paragraph 58:
"Both Drs Nabavi and Joseph gave evidence in court. I found Dr Joseph's evidence rejecting Dr Nabavi's conclusion that HH was suffering from PTSD and co-morbid Depressive and Anxiety Disorders quite compelling. However, perhaps the label to be attached to a condition is not so important. What is important is a determination of HH's medical suitability for extradition and on that topic there was no agreement. Both doctors held to their opinions. Having reflected on their evidence and having considered all the other relevant evidence I have come to the following conclusions:
(1) HH only became unwell on 20.02.09.
(2) She is not suffering from any mental illness which is susceptible to treatment in a mental hospital. She is not suffering from PTSD and/or co-morbid Depressive and Anxiety disorders. She does not have any medical complaint which is conventionally treatable.
(3) Her condition appears to have been self-induced, and might very easily resolve itself just as quickly as it manifested itself.
(4) It is in the interests of HH and FH to do everything they can to exaggerate HH's condition and the adverse impact extradition might have on their children.
(5) I accept that HH has a condition, a real condition and she is not putting it on only when she is in public, but I am not convinced it is as severe as she would like me to believe or as Dr Nabavi suggests. Nevertheless her hysterical response to this extradition request would seem to be her method of dealing with her situation.
(6) For all the reasons discussed above, and because I consider her a manipulative dishonest witness I have concluded that she and FH are the classical fugitives from justice. I do not believe a word of HH's allegations of mistreatment in Italy. Those (false) allegations were influential in Dr Nabavi's reasoning in coming to his stated opinion. Notwithstanding Dr Nabavi's views... I wonder whether HH might unconsciously produce false and grossly exaggerated symptoms... There is some evidence, which I am inclined to accept, that HH is aware of situations when it is in her interests to exaggerate her symptoms. That suggests to me that she is much more aware of circumstances around her than is apparent. She can, to a certain extent, decide whether to disengage or refuse to engage.
(7) I think we can all remember a certain Mr Saunders's miraculous recovery from Alzheimer's disease. I have little doubt that HH would recover quickly if not extradited. Similarly once she appreciates that the 'game is up' and that she will be extradited, then such a realisation could also assist in her speedy recovery.
(8) I found Dr Joseph's evidence the more compelling, and I accept his opinion as summarised in paragraph 51 above. Effectively there is no medical reason which renders it inappropriate to effect HH's extradition and it would not be oppressive to order it."
"63. To return both HH and FH would have a dramatically adverse impact on the family unit... The worst case presented to me is that Z would be put up for adoption and X and Y would be fostered, but that might not necessarily mean keeping them together. Such an outcome would be deeply unfortunate for parents and children alike.
64. Applying Norris I have to consider the family unit as a whole and regard each child a victim. The circumstances here are exceptional. It is rare that both parents are sought for extradition, which if granted, would effectively orphan three young children. I have to decide whether the consequences of the interference with article 8 rights is exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition. Such a consideration also requires an assessment of the seriousness of the offending in Italy. These are grave offences...
66. I accept it is not in the interests of the children for them to be separated from either parent and all the more so from both parents...  Separation from both parents will have a profound effect on the children's physical and emotional health and may lead to multiple problems for the children in the future..."
However the District Judge concluded:
"70. I am satisfied that to order the extradition of both HH and FH would be compatible with their Convention rights taking into consideration not only their individual rights and those of each of their children, but also their collective rights. I recognise this will tear apart the H family and leave young children without either of their parents."
JUDICIAL REVIEW: S.4(3) OF THE 2003 ACT
S.2 NOT COMPLIED WITH?
"The [EAW] shall contain the following information set out in accordance with the form contained in the Annex..."
There follow seven heads of information of which two are:
"(c) evidence of an enforceable judgment, an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect...;
(d) the nature and legal classification of the offence..."
Box (d) of the form contained in the Annex is in these terms:
"Decision rendered in absentia and:
- the person concerned has been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered in absentia,
- the person concerned has not been summoned in person or otherwise informed of the date and place of the hearing which led to the decision rendered in absentia but has the following legal guarantees after surrender..."
Mr Jones submits that this information is not to be found in HH's EAW, and s.2(6)(b) must be read as requiring that to be done, given that the 2003 Act has to be interpreted "as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the Framework Decision in order to attain the result which it pursues": see Louca v German Judicial Authority  UKSC 4, paragraph 5.
"Judgment of conviction issued: declared unlawfully at large on 15.3.05
She was duly defended by a personally appointed defence lawyer in the course of the criminal proceedings and by a Court appointed lawyer in the enforcement phase".
For HH to be declared unlawfully at large she must have been notified of the proceedings, as was later confirmed by the Italian authorities. In my judgment the form of the EAW in her case both complied with s.2 of the 2003 Act and was fully in conformity with the purposes of the Framework Decision.
"... It is recognised though that the consequence of succeeding on this point [sc. obtaining a discharge on the accusation EAW] will, no doubt, be the issuance of a new conviction EAW in relation to the [outstanding charge] which will, no doubt, fall to be determined on the basis of [the s.25 and Article 8 issues already before the court]."
And at paragraph 47:
"[The accusation EAW]... is plainly invalid... For the reasons given at para 8 above if the Appellant succeeds on this point the consequence will inevitably be a re-run of the arguments presented above. It is for that reason that the Appellant invites the court to determine this matter on the Convention arguments [sc. on ECHR Article 8] outlined above."
PROCEDURE ADOPTED BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE
"This ruling is a continuation of the written ruling I gave on 25 March 2009."
Mr Jones says this was illegitimate. The proceedings on the accusation EAW came to an end when HH was discharged in relation to it. The proceedings on the conviction EAW were separate and autonomous. Thus HH was entitled to decide afresh whether or not to give evidence in those proceedings.
HH'S MENTAL CONDITION
"(a) an issue is raised that was not raised at the extradition hearing or evidence is available that was not available at the extradition hearing;
(b) the issue or evidence would have resulted in the appropriate judge deciding a question before him at the extradition hearing differently;
(c) if he had decided the question in that way, he would have been required to order the person's discharge."
"[H]er presentation was due to a current life situation rather than a mental illness. She was therefore deemed not suitable for the primary care team, and equally the Crisis Resolution/Home Treatment Team did not feel their input had been of any benefit. It was agreed that HH would be discharged back to her GP with a view that counselling from MIND could be an additional support."
In all these circumstances I prefer the third explanation I have canvassed: an extreme reaction to the extradition proceedings.
"It is important, in my view, that the court should keep its eye firmly on the statutory question posed by section 25. The question is not whether the appellant is suffering from a psychiatric disorder with or without the added disadvantage of low intelligence; it is whether, by reason of his mental condition it would unjust or oppressive to extradite him."
I apprehend that if I am right, and HH's behaviour pattern is a reaction to circumstance, not a mental illness, it is perhaps more likely to be resolved once these proceedings are over than if the reverse were the case. At all events, on all the evidence it does not appear to me that her mental condition is such that it would be oppressive to extradite her. That is not to say that I would have found the other way had I concluded she was suffering from a mental illness. Though I have no concrete evidence of the state of psychiatric resources in Italy, it is of course a civilised State and fellow signatory to the ECHR. There is every reason to presume that she would be properly looked after.
ECHR ARTICLE 8
"63... The worst case presented to me is that Z would be put up for adoption and X and Y would be fostered, but that might not necessarily mean keeping them together...
67... Separation from both parents will have a profound effect on the children's physical and emotional health and may lead to multiple problems for the children in the future...
70. I am satisfied that to order the extradition of both HH and FH would be compatible with their Convention rights... I recognise this will tear apart the H family and leave young children without either of their parents."
"10.6 Although there are variations in the circumstances that would follow in the different scenarios, it is inevitable that separation from one or both parents would cause the children intense and long lasting distress. Such a lengthy separation could be thought of as akin to a death, which is a traumatic and devastating loss for any child... The children may manifest reactions in a variety of ways, but it can be expected that both the older children may exhibit denial, disbelief, anger and sadness along with some behavioural change in activity levels and attention. Once X and Y are told, these circumstances are likely to cause immense anxiety and psychological panic as they will be facing what for most children is the worst nightmare imaginable.
10.8... Separation from their father would be acutely emotionally distressing for all the children, and their responses would be likely to vary in severity depending on what other losses followed his departure, for example, if a foster placement was not in the same area this could necessitate a change of school...
10.11 To be suddenly faced with the departure of both parents, and a move to live with strangers is one of the most catastrophic events to befall any child, and represents a massive emotional and psychological challenge...
10.12 The departure of both parents, even for children with some resilience, is likely to be an overwhelmingly painful experience, and their immediate reactions may be very similar to bereavement: over activity, profound sadness and distress, withdrawal and regression, anger and defiance, poor sleeping and eating, and a deterioration in their school performance. Alternative carers will need to be sensitive to any changes in their behaviour..."
Dr Pettle has produced an addendum report dated 24 March 2011. It shows that all three children have progressed well in various respects (paragraphs 2.1.5, 2.1.6, 2.2.2), though X and Y have had some difficulties (2.3.2, 2.3.4). They – X and Y – have shown considerable resilience but are now showing signs of strain not apparent last year (3.1.1; 3.1.2 (X), 3.1.3 (Y)). Overall Dr Pettle confirms (paragraph 3.1.8) the opinions expressed in her principal report.
"Is the public interest in honouring extradition treaties such as to require, in any extradition case, that an appellant must show 'striking and unusual facts' or reach 'a high threshold' if his article 8 claim is to succeed?"
The phrases in quotation marks were taken from earlier cases. Lord Phillips (with whom all the other members of the court agreed) reviewed the authorities in Strasbourg and this jurisdiction. I may go directly to his conclusions:
"52. It is of critical importance in the prevention of disorder and crime that those reasonably suspected of crime are prosecuted and, if found guilty, duly sentenced. Extradition is part of the process for ensuring that this occurs, on a basis of international reciprocity. It is instructive to consider the approach of the Convention to dealing with criminals or suspected criminals in the domestic context. Article 5 includes in the exceptions to the right to liberty (i) the arrest of a suspect, (ii) his detention, where necessary, pending trial, and (iii) his detention while serving his sentence if convicted. Such detention will necessarily interfere drastically with family and private life. In theory a question of proportionality could arise under article 8(2). In practice it is only in the most exceptional circumstances that a defendant would consider even asserting his article 8 rights by way of challenge to remand in custody or imprisonment – see R (P) v Secretary of State of the Home Department  EWCA Civ 1151,  1 WLR 2002, para 79, for discussion of such circumstances. Normally it is treated as axiomatic that the interference with article 8 rights consequent upon detention is proportionate.
55. I reject Mr Sumption's contention that it is wrong for the court, when approaching proportionality, to apply a 'categorical assumption' about the importance of extradition in general. Such an assumption is an essential element in the task of weighing, on the one hand, the public interest in extradition against, on the other hand, its effects on individual human rights. This is not to say that the latter can never prevail. It does mean, however, that the interference with human rights will have to be extremely serious if the public interest is to be outweighed.
56. The reality is that only if some quite exceptionally compelling feature, or combination of features, is present that interference with family life consequent upon extradition will be other than proportionate to the objective that extradition serves. That, no doubt, is what the Commission had in mind in Launder (1997) 25 EHRR CD67, 73 when it stated that it was only in exceptional circumstances that extradition would be an unjustified or disproportionate interference with the right to respect for family life. I can see no reason why the District Judge should not, when considering a challenge to extradition founded on article 8, explain his rejection of such a challenge, where appropriate, by remarking that there was nothing out of the ordinary or exceptional in the consequences that extradition would have for the family life of the person resisting extradition. 'Exceptional circumstances' is a phrase that says little about the nature of the circumstances. Instead of saying that interference with article 8 rights can only outweigh the importance of extradition in exceptional circumstances it is more accurate and more helpful, to say that the consequences of interference with article 8 rights must be exceptionally serious before this can outweigh the importance of extradition. A judge should not be criticised if, as part of his process of reasoning, he considers how, if at all, the nature and extent of the impact of extradition on family life would differ from the normal consequences of extradition.
60. Mr Hermer's submissions (Mr Hermer QC appeared for Liberty as intervener) did not recognise any difference between extradition and expulsion or deportation. I did not find them either realistic or helpful.
64. When considering the impact of extradition on family life, this question does not fall to be considered simply from the viewpoint of the extraditee. On this subsidiary issue also I reject Mr Perry's submission to the contrary. This issue was considered by the House of Lords in the immigration context in Beoku-Betts v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKHL 39;  AC 115. After considering the Strasbourg jurisprudence the House concluded that, when considering interference with article 8, the family unit had to be considered as a whole, and each family member had to be regarded as a victim. I consider that this is equally the position in the context of extradition.
65. Indeed, in trying to envisage a situation in which interference with article 8 might prevent extradition, I have concluded that the effect of extradition on innocent members of the extraditee's family might well be a particularly cogent consideration. If extradition for an offence of no great gravity were sought in relation to someone who had sole responsibility for an incapacitated family member, this combination of circumstances might well lead a judge to discharge the extraditee under section 87 of the 2003 Act."
Applying the law to the facts, Lord Phillips said this:
"82. In a case such as this it is the exception that proves the rule. One has to consider the effect on the public interest in the prevention of crime if any defendant with family ties and dependencies such as those which bind Mr Norris and his wife was thereby rendered immune from being extradited to be tried for serious wrongdoing. The answer is that the public interest would be seriously damaged. It is for this reason that only the gravest effects of interference with family life will be capable of rendering extradition disproportionate to the public interest that it serves. This is not such a case."
"90... In R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator  2 AC 323, para 13, [Lord Bingham] said that, while there were substantive differences between expulsion and extradition, the Strasbourg court had held the Soering principle to be potentially applicable in either situation: Cruz Varas v Sweden (1991) 14 EHRR 1, para 70. Lord Steyn said in para 33 that, while the purpose of the two procedures was different, in the context of the possible engagement of fundamental rights under the ECHR the Strasbourg court has not in its case law drawn a distinction between cases in the two categories. I would apply that approach to this case.
91. The fact remains however that the cases in which an argument of the kind that Mr Sumption sought to present will succeed are likely to be very few. I agree with Lord Phillips that the reality is that it is only if some exceptionally compelling feature, or combination of features, is present that the interference with the article 8 right that results from extradition will fail to meet the test of proportionality. The public interest in giving effect to a request for extradition is a constant factor, and it will always be a powerful consideration to which great weight must be attached. The more serious the offence the greater the weight that is to be attached to it. As against that, those aspects of the article 8 right which must necessarily be interfered with in every case where criminal proceedings are brought will carry very little, if any, weight; Massey v United Kingdom (Application No 14399/02) (unreported) given 8 April 2003, p 12. Separation by the person from his family life in this country and the distress and disruption that this causes, the extent of which is bound to vary widely from case to case, will be inevitable. The area for debate is likely to be narrow. What is the extra compelling element that marks the given case out from the generality? Does it carry enough weight to overcome the public interest in giving effect to the request?"
Then at paragraph 93, considering the facts of the case, Lord Hope stated that "[t]he only circumstance which strikes me as not inherent in every extradition process is the delay", but in the result could "see no grounds for making an exception in this case".
"[I]n what circumstances is it permissible to remove or deport a non-citizen parent where the effect will be that a child who is a citizen of the United Kingdom will also have to leave?"
"For our purposes the most relevant national and international obligation of the United Kingdom is contained in article 3(1) of the UNCRC [sc. the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989]:
'In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.'
This is a binding obligation in international law, and the spirit, if not the precise language, has also been translated into our national law. Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places a duty upon a wide range of public bodies to carry out their functions having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. The immigration authorities were at first excused from this duty, because the United Kingdom had entered a general reservation to the UNCRC concerning immigration matters. But that reservation was lifted in 2008 and, as a result, section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 now provides that, in relation among other things to immigration, asylum or nationality, the Secretary of State must make arrangements for ensuring that those functions 'are discharged having regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom'.
Lady Hale indicated (paragraph 25) that the Strasbourg court expects national authorities "to apply article 3(1) of UNCRC and treat the best interests of a child as 'a primary consideration'". She proceeded (paragraph 26) to cite Australian authority in line with this, and emphasised (paragraphs 30 ff) the "particular importance" of nationality "in assessing the best interests of any child". The core of her reasoning, if I may say so, is to be found in paragraph 33:
"We now have a much greater understanding of the importance of these issues in assessing the overall well-being of the child. In making the proportionality assessment under article 8, the best interests of the child must be a primary consideration. This means that they must be considered first. They can, of course, be outweighed by the cumulative effect of other considerations. In this case, the countervailing considerations were the need to maintain firm and fair immigration control, coupled with the mother's appalling immigration history and the precariousness of her position when family life was created. But, as the Tribunal rightly pointed out, the children were not to be blamed for that. And the inevitable result of removing their primary carer would be that they had to leave with her. On the facts, it is as least as strong a case as Edore v Secretary of State for the Home Department  1 WLR 2979, where Simon Brown LJ held that 'there really is only room for one view' (para 26). In those circumstances, the Secretary of State was clearly right to concede that there could be only one answer."
"46. It is a universal theme of the various international and domestic instruments to which Lady Hale has referred that, in reaching decisions that will affect a child, a primacy of importance must be accorded to his or her best interests. This is not, it is agreed, a factor of limitless importance in the sense that it will prevail over all other considerations. It is a factor, however, that must rank higher than any other. It is not merely one consideration that weighs in the balance alongside other competing factors. Where the best interests of the child clearly favour a certain course, that course should be followed unless countervailing reasons of considerable force displace them. It is not necessary to express this in terms of a presumption but the primacy of this consideration needs to be made clear in emphatic terms. What is determined to be in a child's best interests should customarily dictate the outcome of cases such as the present, therefore, and it will require considerations of substantial moment to permit a different result."
"21… [T]he learning, here and in Strasbourg, shows that the public interest in giving effect to bilateral extradition arrangements possesses especially pressing force because of its potency (a) in the fight against increasingly globalised crime, (b) in the denial of safe havens for criminals, and (c) in the general benefits of concrete co-operation between States in an important common cause."
These citations describe the importance of the extradition process. But they do not articulate a qualitative difference between deportation and extradition such as might explain why, if it be so, it takes a more pressing Article 8 case to override the latter than the former. Mr Hardy's contrast between what is domestic and what is international (or universal) will not on its own suffice.