England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		1 December 2010

1. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: Mr Wilson-Campbell appeals against the decision of District Judge Tubbs at the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court on 17 August 2010 to order his extradition to Spain on a European Arrest Warrant which alleges that he played a significant part in 2008 in the storage of 800 kilograms of cannabis in Spain and in arranging for its transport to the United Kingdom and its distribution there.
2. This arrest warrant led to the appellant's arrest on 10 June 2010. It contained considerable detail of the conduct alleged to constitute the offence. On the face of this warrant, there was no ground for disputing its validity and no ground of appeal, save a possible point on delay, could have been raised. The argument before District Judge Tubbs centred around the existence and use made of an earlier European Arrest Warrant issued by the same judicial authority in Spain and relating to the same criminal conduct.
3. This first warrant was issued on 4 February 2010 by the judicial authority, was also certified by the designated authority for the United Kingdom (the Serious and Organised Crime Agency), and had led to the appellant's arrest on 14 March 2010. There was a hearing in relation to that extradition warrant on 4 May 2010 before District Judge Zani, which led to the appellant's extradition being ordered on 13 May 2010. On 18 May, the appellant lodged a notice of appeal against that decision. The following day (19 May 2010) that warrant was withdrawn and this court was invited to and did discharge Mr Wilson-Campbell on that warrant.
4. The sequence of events which led to that was this. On 13 April 2010, the second arrest warrant had been issued. On 19 April it was faxed in Spanish from the Spanish judicial authority to SOCA. It was translated into English on 4 May 2010, or at least a faxed translation was sent on 4 May 2010, and it was certified by SOCA on 17 May 2010. It is necessary under the Framework Decision for the warrant to be translated into English, and it is necessary under the Extradition Act 2003 for it to be certified by SOCA. Thereafter, as described, the first warrant had to be withdrawn and Mr Wilson-Campbell's discharge followed.
5. It is to be noted that the certifying of the second warrant preceded the lodging of the appeal by one day. However, it is the issuing as well as the timing of the second warrant which led to the appellant's contentions before District Judge Tubbs.
6. Although at various times the appellant has represented himself, the essential point being made before District Judge Tubbs and in grounds of appeal here, is that the sequence of events which I have described reveals an abuse of process or, at the very least, reasonable grounds for believing that an abuse of process has occurred such as to require the District Judge to seek information from the requesting authority about why what has happened, happened. In particular, Miss Hill, who then appeared for the appellant, had submitted to District Judge Tubbs that the failure by SOCA to certify the new warrant until 17 May, led to the inference that the CPS had advised SOCA not to certify the second warrant until that date, and complicity by the judicial authority in such a decision showed that there had been an abuse of process.
7. It cannot be contended that the CPS is not entitled to advise the issuing judicial authority about strengths and weaknesses in a warrant with which it is dealing. It cannot be said that the two warrants are in conflict because they relate to the same conduct, although it is perfectly clear that the first warrant, as was pointed out in the hearing before District Judge Zani, describes the criminal conduct in distinctly short form, and in distinctly short form by comparison with the way it is described in the second warrant.
8. Mr Steen, who has appeared on behalf of Mr Wilson-Campbell today, puts his case in a simple but straightforward way. He submits that the history shows that the issuing judicial authority was prepared to have him arrested on the first warrant, to force him to undergo the extradition procedures through to the hearing before District Judge Zani, and having absorbed his time and expense and caused delay through that process, then abandoned it in favour of the second warrant. He submits that that sequence of events compels the conclusion that the judicial authority knew that, in proceeding on the first warrant, it was at all times proceeding on what it knew to be an invalid warrant, and that the subsequent issue of the second warrant and the steps taken to give effect to it were an abuse of the process of the court.
9. I start, in dealing with that submission, by acknowledging that Mr Steen has come to the case late, Mr Wilson-Campbell having represented himself for a number of weeks after two firms of solicitors declined further to act for him. He has simplified, clarified and presented the arguments as well as they could possibly be put, and he has done so at short notice given the very recent issue yesterday of a representation order in favour of his solicitors.
10. The first reason why I reject those submissions, however, is that the abuse of process jurisdiction in extradition cases, though undoubtedly it exists, is one to be exercised with considerable care and caution. The court must start from the premise that the judicial authorities of an EU member state act with all the good faith that the judicial authorities of the United Kingdom deploy. It cannot be said that there was any misrepresentation of the evidence or of the case against Mr Wilson-Campbell in either warrant, or that there has been some failure to validate the warrants or comply with requirements of the warrants in a way which made it obvious that they should not be proceeded with. This is not a case that can be compared to one in which an issuing authority knows that, for example, it has no evidence upon which it can proceed, yet misleads the court about what the state of the evidence is. Any asserted invalidity in a warrant through want of particulars is plain for all to see. This is not an instance where it can be said the judicial authority could have kept something back from the court in relation to the validity of the warrant. There is no basis for a conclusion that the sequence of warrants was designed to divert or delay the court or Mr Wilson-Campbell, or to cause him expense in a way which would make it more difficult for him to contest the extradition. The delay is not such as could possibly affect his ability to defend himself upon extradition.
11. The way in which sequences of arrest warrants can be issued as each predecessor fails has been identified. In Louca v Public Prosecutor, Bielefeld, Germany [2009] UKSC 4; [2009] 1 WLR 2550, it was not thought that the fact of sequential warrants, albeit that each followed the withdrawal of the other, was a basis upon which the final warrant could be regarded as an abuse. That issue was simply not argued. In my judgment, there is no possible inference that the issuing of the second warrant when it was issued, and the process of dealing with it before it was served on the appellant, amounted to an abuse of process. The obvious inference to be drawn, although there is no direct evidence of this, is that the judicial authority was or became aware of a potential weakness in the first warrant relating to the degree of particularity in the description of the facts alleged to constitute the criminal conduct, and took precautionary steps, which took it time to get into place, and when it got them into place, it decided to proceed on that second warrant notwithstanding the success which it had achieved before District Judge Zani.
12. If that is the obvious inference to be drawn, as in my judgment it is, there is no basis for saying that such a procedure is capable of constituting an abuse of process, and no further enquiries could have been called for. Mr Steen submits that, as an alternative, the sequence of events, and the time it has taken since an original warrant was, he says, issued in 2008 for the arrest of his client, could be seen as giving rise to a ground of appeal under section 11(1)(c) of the 2003 Act, namely that extradition was barred by the passage of time. This is not a point as such that was raised before the District Judge, but in any event, there is no basis for saying that the total passage of time from 2008 is one which can amount here to a bar. There is no evidence of prejudice.
13. Likewise, section 14, namely that it would be unjust or oppressive to extradite Mr Wilson-Campbell by reason of passage of time, affords no remedy here. The principal point in relation to abuse relates to a very short period, which is neither oppressive nor prejudicial. I am entirely satisfied that there is no basis for the "dark inferences", as Mr Steen described them, to be drawn.
14. For those reasons, this appeal is dismissed.
15. I am grateful to you, Mr Steen.
16. MR STEEN: My Lord, I am most grateful. My Lord, I think I should ask for an assessment for legal aid.
17. MR JUSTICE OUSELEY: Yes, you may have a detailed assessment of your publicly funded costs.
18. MR STEEN: Thank you.