England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		11 November 2010

1. MR JUSTICE TREACY: Marcin Wozniuk brings an appeal pursuant to section 2(6) of the Extradition Act 2003 against the decision of District Judge Zani made on 28 July 2010 sending Mr Wozniuk to Poland on an European extradition warrant inter alia to serve sentences of two years eight months for robbery, witness intimidation and burglary which had been imposed by the Polish Court. Section 2(6) of the Extradition Act shows that in the case of a conviction, as opposed to an arrest warrant, the information which must be provided includes, "Particulars of the conviction". That is a requirement by reason of section 2(6)(b).
2. Article 8 of the Council of Europe Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and surrender procedures between member states provides, so far as is relevant:

"Content and form of the European arrest warrant. (1) The European arrest warrant shall contain the following information set out in accordance with the form contained in the annex: ... (c) evidence of an enforceable judgment, an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect coming within the scope of Articles 1 and 2."

3. This appeal concerns the asserted lack of sufficient particulars in relation to the appellant's conviction. The warrant issued in this case shows the following matters.

At (b):

"Decision on which the warrant is based ... enforceable judgment: in the District Court in Bialystok dated November 9, 2004 in case III K 4443/04."

At section (c):

"Indications on the length of the sentence ... In the District Court in Bialystok, case III K 4443/04, two years and eight months of custodial sentence ... Remaining sentence to be served: In the District Court in Bialystok, case III K 4443/04, 207 days of custodial sentence."

At paragraph (d), amongst other things, the following is to be found:

"The judgment that ordered his sentence is in full force and is not default judgment. When summoned to serve the remaining sentence imposed after the court revoked his conditional early release he failed to appear to the penal institution, which resulted in the issuance of a wanted notice on him as a fugitive from justice."

At paragraph (e), "Offences", the following appears:

"In the District Court in Bialystok, case III K 4443/04 a cumulative judgment was entered, including the conviction in case III K 1662/00 of the District Court in Bialystok for the following ..."

And then two offences alleged to have been committed on 25 February 2000 are set out with accompanying particulars. Those are the offences of robbery and witness intimidation. Then:

"And in case III K 1818/01 of the District Court in Bialystok for the following: Count III ..."

Then an offence of burglary alleged to have been committed on April 17 2000 is more fully particularised.

4. Cases III K 1662/00 and III K 1818/01 have been incorporated into the cumulative judgment entered under the reference case III K 4443/04.
5. The warrant, therefore, demonstrated to this appellant the date, place and details of the three offences, together with the identity of the victims and the fact that two of the cases were committed by him in concert with another named person. However, if the warrant fails to comply with the requirement of section 2(6)(b) in relation to particulars of conviction the warrant will be void ab initio. See Office of the King's Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2005] 3 WLR 1079.
6. I note that part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003 transposed into UK national law the Council Framework decision of 13 June 2002 relating to European arrest warrants and surrender procedures between member states. The purpose of the legislation and, indeed, of the Council Framework Decision, was to remove complexity and potential delay in extradition procedures. It introduced a new simplified system designed to avoid complexity and delay and unnecessary elaboration. At the same time, a balance has to be maintained with the need for a sufficiently adequate description to inform the target of the warrant so that he can consider whether any bars to extradition apply.
7. In Dabas v the High Court of Justice in Madrid, Spain [2007] UKHL 6, their Lordships' opinions clearly support the proposition that the wording of the 2003 Act provisions in relation to the European arrest warrant must be construed purposively in the context of the Framework Decision. It is, however, well established that strict compliance with the terms of the Act is important.
8. I have been referred to the decision of this court in Sandi v the Craiova Court, Romania [2009] EWHC 3079 (Admin). In giving judgment in that case Mr Justice Hickinbottom observed at paragraph 25:

"As a matter of plain English the phrase, 'Particulars of the conviction', does not necessarily require the same level of detail in respect of the underlying charges imported by the words of section 2(4)(c)."

At paragraph 29 and at the beginning of paragraph 30 there is a passage which is particularly relied on by Mr Cooper on behalf of the appellant:

"It is, therefore, understandable that, as section 2(6)(b) requires, the warrant must inform the person sought to be extradited of the details of the relevant conviction. [30] Those details must, of course, include, for example, the court and date of the conviction."

However, the judgment continues in the following way. At paragraph 31:

"The requirement for particularisation must be placed in the context of a legislative scheme designed to eliminate undue complexity ... The requirement of particularisation must not be unduly onerous on the requesting authority."

At paragraph 33:

"The appropriate level of particularity to satisfy section 2(6)(b) will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In relation to how far a warrant has to go in terms of particularity I echo Dyson LJ's caution in Von der Pahlen at paragraph 22: It would be unwise to attempt a prescriptive answer to that question, nor do I seek to do so."

Then at paragraph 34:

"However, adopting a purposive approach in a conviction warrant case the requested person will need to have sufficient details of the circumstances of the underlying offences to enable him sensibly to understand what he has been convicted of and sentenced for and to enable him to consider whether any bars to extradition might apply.

"In the light of that and having regard to article 8(1) of the Framework Directive I consider that it will almost always be necessary for a conviction warrant to contain the number of offences for which the requested person has been convicted and some information about when and where the offences were committed and the requested person's participation in them, although not necessarily in the same level of detail as would be required in an accusation warrant. Furthermore, common sense dictates that it is likely that more particulars will be appropriate in more complex crimes such as fraud than in crimes such as simple theft. However, there is no formula for appropriate particularisation, each case will depend upon its own facts and circumstances."

9. Having regard to those observations and having regard also to the need to consider the wording of the 2003 Act purposively in the context of the Framework Decision, I do not consider that the date of the conviction needs necessarily to be spelt out in order to satisfy the requirement that, "Particulars of the conviction", be included in the warrant. If there is sufficient other information contained in the warrant which enables the fact and circumstances of conviction to be ascertained then the legislation will be satisfied. Moreover, the court in Sandi was not focusing on the issue of what constituted adequate particulars of a conviction in relation to whether a date needed to be specified, the court was considering what details, if any, of the underlying conduct needed to be set out. In addition, the court was considering a simple conviction and not a cumulative judgment as here. I consider that it would be wrong to treat Sandi as laying down some inflexible rule that the date of a conviction must always be specified. The question of particularity must be considered in the light of the circumstances of the individual case. I have also had regard to the decision of this court in Carl Antonio Hall v The Government of Germany [2006] EWHC 462 (Admin) at paragraph 21 where Richards LJ said this:

"Like Tuckey LJ in Pinto, I do not think it necessary for a warrant slavishly to follow the language of the statute, but in my view it must contain the substance of the information required by the statute. If it fails to do that it is not a valid part 1 warrant ... One must approach with a degree of caution the suggestion that a broad and generous construction is to be adopted in a case where one is concerned with a set of very specific provisions laying down, in clear terms, the matters that have to be included in a warrant."

10. In the present case the warrant identifies an enforceable judgment relating to case III K 4443/04. That is a judgment of an identified district court in Poland relating to these offences and that enforceable judgment is dated 9 November 2004. It identifies the sentence imposed and the time remaining to be served. It confirms that the sentence imposed by way of the judgment was to have immediate rather than suspended effect; see the words, "full force not default judgment". It confirms that the appellant failed to appear on the due date in order to serve the remainder of his sentence after revocation of his conditional release from custody. In addition, the warrant identifies case III K 4443/04 as a cumulative judgment involving convictions for three identified offences which are fully particularised. True it is that there is no date on the warrant expressly identifying the date on which those convictions were recorded against the appellant in the sense of an admission of guilt to the court or a finding of guilt by it. However, a purposive approach must be taken and unnecessary technicality avoided.
11. In my judgment, the reality is that the requirement to give, "Particulars of conviction", pursuant to section 2(6)(b) is satisfied by the totality of the information in the warrant. This appellant, reading the warrant, would know clearly what he had been accused of, what he had been convicted of, what he was sentenced to and when and by which court. He would also know why it was that a warrant had been issued for him. The foundation for this European arrest warrant was the enforceable cumulative judgment and that, in my opinion, was sufficiently particularised in the warrant by reason of the matters which I have already identified.

In coming to this conclusion I have also had regard to the recent decision of Silber J in Ficuta v Trial Court of Piatra, Neamt (A Romanian judicial authority) neutral citation [2010] EWHC 2644 (Admin).

12. In those circumstances and for those reasons I hold that the warrant satisfied the statute in providing sufficient particulars of conviction and accordingly I dismiss this appeal. Thank you both for your helpful, if belated, skeletons.