England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		27 October 2010

1. MR JUSTICE IRWIN: In this case it is alleged by the Polish Government that this appellant took part in offences dealing with illicit DVDs, CDs and so forth, manufactured and sold in breach of copyright over a period ending in June 2003. After that time he was arrested and, it is said by the Polish authorities, admitted the offences. He was summoned to appear in court in Poland but fled to Britain in 2005.
2. On 10 March 2009 a European Arrest Warrant was issued. It was transmitted to the Serious Organised Crime Agency, the designated authority under the legislation. It certified the warrant as being in proper form on 10 October 2009. On 17 November the appellant was arrested under the authority of the warrant.
3. There was an initial hearing in November but the full extradition hearing proceeded on 26 May 2010. District Judge Purdy made a written note of the reasons for his judgment that is two pages long, and I will not attempt to read it out. It is available to all parties. It is sensible to summarise the conclusions reached by the district judge. First, the family has been in the United Kingdom since 2005; secondly, the appellant knew at all stages that proceedings were outstanding; thirdly the requirements under the warrant are all fulfilled or in order; fourthly under our law a clear presumption exists that extradition obligations with Poland must be honoured; fifthly,

"Given a complete absence of detail as to who may, in 2010, wish Piotr Stepkowski ill or indeed his family if he - and, should they so choose, they - return to Poland, I cannot possibly discharge this request. The Polish authorities are presumed [to be] willing and able to provide a reasonable degree of protection."

With those words the District Judge found against the appellant on the Article 3 point on two bases. First, there was no modern evidence of any contemporary threat; secondly, the Polish authorities must be presumed to be able to provide a reasonable degree of protection against the threat even if it exists.

4. The District Judge went on to say that he had considered the appellant's private life for the purpose of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In that regard he considered the effect of Norris v United States of America [2010] UKSC 9, where the Supreme Court observed, as must be common sense, that extradition almost always brings genuine anxiety and disruption to family life. It can only be in the most extreme circumstances that effects of that kind would mean that extradition was disproportionate.
5. Mr Stepkowski is not assisted by lawyers but he has clearly thought carefully about what to say. He has submitted a written skeleton argument to this court. There is a single mention in there of the fact that he is "determined by the fact that we are hiding from gangsters who are threatening my family". That is all that is advanced in pursuance of the Article 3 point which itself was the only ground advanced before the District Judge. Mr Stepkowski has given no detail of the threat and no reason why the district judge was wrong to conclude there was no modern threat, and, even if there was, the Polish authorities must be trusted to give adequate protection.
6. I conclude there is no basis for showing or holding the District Judge's decision wrong in respect of Article 3.
7. As to Article 8 and private life, the skeleton argument does give more detail and that has been reinforced by Mr Stepkowski orally to me, saying, "I don't want to go back. My family is the most important thing, and they are here." I fully understand that in human terms, but again there is nothing in the circumstances set out in the skeleton argument or in the documents provided to me which is exceptional.
8. For these purposes I fully accept Mr Stepkowski is leading a respectable life in England, that his family are settled, that he is trying to contribute to this community both in his work and in helping others unfortunate enough to have suffered from alcoholism. I accept all of that, but it is not sufficient to cross the very high threshold which our law requires. Indeed, it is normal for extradition to disrupt private life. With some human regret therefore, I must conclude that there is no basis in respect of Article 8 to show that the District Judge's decision was wrong. Therefore this appeal must fail.
9. From the appellant's point of view it is to be hoped that he will attend the court in Poland and a suspended prison sentence rather than immediate prison sentence will be the result. If it is, then he will at that stage be able to resume his private life in this country.
10. I note for his future relevance that he has been intelligent and courteous in the way he has conducted this appeal.