England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		28 April 2009

Mr Justice Munby :

1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State against the decision of the Care Standards Tribunal dated 24 July 2008 in relation to a person I shall refer to as BP: BP v The Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families [2007] 1127.PC, [2007] 1128.PVA, [2007] EWCST 1128(PVA).
2. On 4 June 2007 the Secretary of State had written to BP to inform him of his provisional inclusion on both the Protection of Children Act list (the PoCA list) and the Protection of Vulnerable Adults list (the PoVA list). On 14 August 2007 the Secretary of State wrote to BP confirming his inclusion on both lists. On 20 September 2007 BP appealed to the Tribunal.
3. On 24 July 2008 the Tribunal (Mrs Carolyn Singleton, Chairman, Mr Ron Radley and Mr John Williams) directed that BP's name should remain on the PoCA list but that his name should be removed from the PoVA list. The Secretary of State appeals against the latter direction. There is no appeal by BP.

The background

4. The facts are set out in appropriate detail in the Tribunal's decision, a public document which can be consulted by anyone who wishes. I can accordingly be brief.
5. In 2006 BP was convicted at the Crown Court, having pleaded guilty to two offences of making an indecent photograph or pseudo photograph of children contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1999. One photograph, found in his computer, was described as a girl "not in any sense undressed but … in a highly provocative posture, with her legs apart." The other image, found on a floppy disk, "shows a boy on his back with his legs apart, naked and his genitals fully exposed."
6. Although not convicted in relation to any of these other matters, the evidence before the Tribunal also established that forensic examination of BP's computer and a number of floppy discs had revealed somewhere between 70 and 223 indecent images of children and in excess of 3500 still and moving images of underage girls and boys in gymnastic wear or swimwear – though not all of these were still viewable. It also revealed that BP had searched the internet using such terms as "boys gymnastic videos," "ls-magazine" (an on-line magazine which hosts nudity and erotic images of children) and "boys." BP had also subscribed to, though apparently not downloaded anything from, a newsgroup, "Alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.mclt," whose articles are concerned with indecent images of children ("mclt" apparently standing for "my collection of Lolita teens").

The Tribunal's decision

7. The hearing before the Tribunal took place on 7, 8 and 9 July 2008. Its decision, as I have said, was given on 24 July 2008.
8. Unsurprisingly, the Tribunal sought to explore with BP the reasons why he had acted as he did. Its decision needs to be read in full; here I draw out only some of the most salient points.
9. Referring to the image of the girl, BP was asked whether he had had a line in his head when he downloaded it as to what was acceptable and what was not. He responded that he may have done but felt it was not across the line. He did not judge the image as indecent. He recalled the picture but did not recall saving it. It made him feel better when he looked at it because it is a positive picture. He thought it depressing that people saw the picture as having a sexual connotation. He commented "I pleaded guilty but it is hard for me to come to terms with it." In relation to the 3500 images he said that he had been searching for material on boys' gymnastics because he had been trying to organize such an event for his Cub pack.
10. Asked why he had searched for boy-related websites, BP explained that he had been feeling a bit down and had been looking for something positive. He remembered the boys in his Cub packs as being a positive thing in his life. He denied deliberately seeking out images of boys with sexual overtones to make himself feel better, but in response to the question "Was there a sexual or close to sexual interest?" he replied "With hindsight it was an odd thing to do. I am embarrassed and annoyed about it. I feel stupid now." He did not see the images as sexual. He told the Tribunal that he felt he has an emotional congruence with children. He recognized his misjudgement but did not see it as misconduct. When asked if there may have been a subliminal attraction to the children depicted, he responded that it was part of the emotional congruence he felt. In some ways it helped him to improve his own positive attitude. Mr Ozin asked, "Perks you up when you feel low?" BP replied "Yes." He agreed that as a coping mechanism it is not a very good one but said "What's inappropriate? Inappropriate for whom?"
11. It was against this background that the Tribunal had to reach its decision. In relation to the question of his suitability to work with children, the essence of the Tribunal's reasoning is to be found in the following extracts from paragraphs [34]-[36] of its decision:

"[34] … The Tribunal was not satisfied, on balance, that the Appellant accepted, in full measure, responsibility for his misconduct. The scheduled evidence in the bundle appeared to be various attempts by the Appellant to explain that he had pleaded guilty to two offences when, in fact, he felt he should not have. His oral evidence was inconsistent. In cross- examination he stated that he stood by his guilty pleas but then went on to state that it was not misconduct, it was misjudgment. The Appellant cannot have it both ways. The facts are that he is convicted of those offences and the Tribunal cannot go behind those convictions to revisit the facts.

[35] … Regardless of the material which he disputes was his responsibility, he has displayed an interest, particularly in young boys, which, in the view of the Tribunal goes beyond the merely professional. The fact that he has in excess of 3000 images of young children, admittedly none of them indecent, is something which sits uneasily with the Tribunal. That, coupled with the emotional congruence with children that the Appellant describes is something which indicates an inability to remain professionally detached. In fact it indicates rather the reverse. That, in addition to his convictions is something which must impact on public confidence. In CN v Secretary of State the Tribunal stated "We cannot underestimate the importance we attach to public confidence. When the Tribunal considers the question of unsuitability, it must look at the factual situation in the widest possible context."

[36] In the case of BP, he shows a lack of insight both as to what he has done and the impact on the children in question. That lack of insight is a cause for concern. He does, however, seem to accept that his internet browsing operated as a comfort mechanism and that, with the benefit of hindsight, it is neither an appropriate nor effective way of coping."

12. The Tribunal accordingly concluded that BP was unsuitable to work with children and that his name should remain on the PoCA list.
13. The Tribunal then turned to consider, in paragraphs [38]-[40] of its decision, the question of his unsuitability to work with vulnerable adults. I should set out this part of the Tribunal's decision in full:

"[38] Unsuitability to work with Vulnerable Adults

The Tribunal considered that the Appellant had demonstrated an unhealthy interest in children. As stated above, that interest goes far beyond the professional. However, the Tribunal did not consider, on balance, that the Appellant is a risk to vulnerable adults or unsuitable to work with them. What evidence there is goes to his interest in children alone and the Tribunal did not consider there was reason to believe that that was likely to extend to vulnerable adults.

[39] The Tribunal acknowledged that the Appellant clearly had qualities which enabled him to be a very successful and inspirational organizer and that those qualities could easily transfer to dealing with the adult population. Indeed, his last post had demonstrated that.

[40] On balance, the Tribunal did not consider the Appellant is unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults. His name should be removed from the PoVA register forthwith."

The subsequent proceedings

14. In accordance with the relevant Regulations, BP sought a review of the Tribunal's decision. On 21 August 2008 the Tribunal (Mrs Singleton) refused his application. He has not sought to take the matter any further.
15. The Secretary of State also sought a review. That was also refused by Mrs Singleton on 21 August 2008. She gave the following reasons:

" … Paragraph 38 of the decision sets out the reason for the decision. The Appellant's interest was solely directed towards children. That was a significant factor as far as the Tribunal was concerned. The fact that the Respondent does not agree with the Tribunal is not a ground for the decision to be reviewed.

… The question of the Appellant's unsuitability to work with vulnerable adults was considered as a separate issue by the Tribunal, as the law requires. It is not a foregone conclusion that, if an appellant is found to be unsuitable to work with children it must follow that he is also unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults. That is not what the law states. There will be, and have been, cases where that is the final outcome but each case must be considered separately. All the points raised in Counsel's submission to the Tribunal were considered. However, the fact that the Appellant's interest had been solely directed towards children was significant. The Tribunal concluded that, on balance, the Appellant was not unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults. This ground amounts to the fact that the Respondent disagrees with the Tribunal's decision. However, the Tribunal is entitled to reach its own conclusions from the evidence presented to it and has done so and explained the reasons for that conclusion."

The appeal

16. The Secretary of State's notice of appeal to this court was filed the same day, on 21 August 2008. On 16 October 2008 the Secretary of State applied for a stay of the Tribunal's decision in relation to the PoVA list pending determination of the appeal. A stay was granted by Foskett J on 22 October 2008.
17. The appeal came on before me on 1 April 2009. Mr Paul Ozin appeared on behalf of the Secretary of State, as he had before the Tribunal. BP appeared in person. Both had filed skeleton arguments. At the end of the hearing I reserved my judgment, which I now hand down.

The legal framework

18. I need not rehearse the relevant statutory framework in any detail. It suffices for present purposes to refer to what the Tribunal said in paragraphs [4] and [5] of its decision:

"[4] Thus there are three elements that the Tribunal has to consider in relation to these appeals. Firstly, there is whether or not the Appellant has been guilty of misconduct. Secondly, whether that misconduct has harmed or placed at risk of harm a child or vulnerable adult. Thirdly, whether the Appellant is unsuitable to work with children or vulnerable adults. If the Tribunal is not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, on any of these elements, it must allow the appeal. Otherwise it must dismiss the appeal. There is no discretion.

[5] In this case the Respondent's evidence was in respect of children. As a matter of law, if the Tribunal is satisfied in respect of children, for the purposes of the PoVA listing the elements of misconduct that harmed a child or put a child at risk of harm are deemed to be proved. It is not necessary for the Respondent to prove misconduct that harmed or risked harm to a vulnerable adult. However, the question of unsuitability in respect of the PoVA listing must be considered separately."

19. No-one has suggested, or could suggest, that this is other than an entirely accurate statement of the relevant law.

The Tribunal's jurisprudence

20. The Tribunal's jurisprudence on the point with which I am concerned is set out in CN v Secretary of State [2004] 398.PC, [2004] 399.PVA, [2004] EWCST 398(PC), at paras [32]-[33]. The Tribunal (His Honour Judge David Pearl, President, Mr Ken Coleman and Ms Linda Redford) said this:

"[32] Mr Moffatt submitted that there were two reasons why Mr CN was unsuitable to work with adults. He relied first of all on the report prepared by Dr Wilcox. We have already stated that we found Dr Wilcox's Report and evidence of limited value. The second reason given by Mr Moffatt is the effect that allowing the appeal would have on any service to which Mr CN might seek to apply; it would undermine confidence in any such service. Ms Sleeman submits that there is no evidence of any misconduct in relation to vulnerable adults (which of course is not relevant because of s 92(4) Care Standards Act 2000), that there is no evidence of any risk to vulnerable adults, and that the Appellant in any event has learnt his lesson, and that public confidence need not be achieved only by preventing him from pursuing his profession. It is suggested that a regulation of his work, such as the caution that has been annotated to the register for a period of one year by the Health Professions Council on 3rd February 2005, is an appropriate way in which the community can be protected.

[33] Mr CN is a speech and language therapist. It is not only children who require treatment, and those adults requiring treatment are necessarily vulnerable. We do not think that a person who remains on the PoCA list for the reasons we have set out above should be removed from the PoVA list. Society has a legitimate interest in ensuring that those who are considered unsuitable to work with children are not given positions of trust in relation to vulnerable adults. This is not to say that we consider that a vulnerable adult would be at risk of harm by Mr CN. But the Act does not require such evidence, and it is sufficient to satisfy the test in section 86(3)(b) read with section 92(4) of the Care Standards Act 2000 that he is unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults by virtue of the misconduct which placed a child at risk of harm. We agree with Mr Moffatt that the public confidence in the speech and language therapy service would be undermined if it became known that Mr CN was employed to work with vulnerable adults, given the fact that he was barred from working with children as his name was on the PoCA list. We do not wish to say that it will always inevitably follow that an appeal under section 86 will be bound to fail in the event of the appeal under s 4 of the Protection of Children Act being dismissed. Each case will be decided on its own facts, and context will be all important. In this case, however, in the sensitive area of speech and language therapy, we have formed the view that the continuation of his name on the PoCA list makes him unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults."

21. Earlier, at paragraph [29], the Tribunal had said this when considering CN's inclusion on the PoCA list:

"We cannot underestimate the importance we attach to public confidence. When the Tribunal considers the question of unsuitability, it must look at the factual situation in the widest possible context. It … is our view that it is the clear intention of Parliament that the language of the Act requires us to take a broad view having regard to the degree of risk posed by the Appellant, but also to acknowledge that the public at large and those who entrust their children into the hands of professionals have a right to expect, indeed to demand, that such people who are placed in such important positions of trust working with children "in a child care position" are beyond reproach."

22. Much the same was said by the Tribunal (His Honour Judge David Pearl, President, Dr Frada Eskin and Mr Peter Sarll) in MB v Secretary of State [2005] 512.PC, [2005] 513.PVA, [2005] EWCST 512 (PC), at paras [28]-[29]. This was a case involving a residential social worker at a children's home. The Tribunal said this:

"[28] It is of course essential that those who are considered unsuitable to work with children are not given positions of trust in relation to vulnerable adults. This is not to say that we consider a vulnerable adult would be at risk of harm by MB. But the law does not require such evidence. It is sufficient to satisfy the test in s 86(3)(b) read with s 92(4) of the Care Standards Act 2000 that she is unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults by virtue of the misconduct which placed a child at risk of harm. We believe that public confidence in the provision of services to vulnerable adults would be undermined if it became known that MB was employed to work with vulnerable adults, given the fact that she was prohibited from working with children.

[29] We do not consider that it will always inevitably follow that an appeal under s 86 will be bound to fail in the event of an appeal under s 4 being dismissed. As always in this area, context will be all important. But as in the case of CN [2004] 399.PVA, [2004] EWCST 398(PC) (a speech and language therapist), we have formed the view that the continuation of her name on the PoCA list makes her unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults."

23. Finally I should refer to the decision of the Tribunal (Mrs Carolyn Singleton, Nominated Chairman) in David Sladdin v Secretary of State [2007] 1180.PC, [2007] 1181.PVA, [2007] EWCST 1180(PC). Striking out the appeals on the ground that they had no reasonable prospect of success and were misconceived, the Tribunal said this at para [19]:

"The offences of which the Appellant stands convicted are serious and were committed in the recent past. Whether or not the Appellant has a previously unblemished record is irrelevant, given the nature of these offences. No Tribunal, properly directed, could conclude anything other than the Appellant is unsuitable to work with children and vulnerable adults. People who work with either group hold a position of considerable trust. The Tribunal agrees with the comments made in CN v Secretary of State [2004] 398.PC and [2004] 399.PVA, [2004] EWCST 398(PC) "We cannot under estimate the importance we attach to public confidence … the public at large and those who entrust their children into the hands of professionals have a right to expect, indeed to demand, that such people who are placed in such important positions of trust working with children … are beyond reproach." That argument extends also to working with vulnerable adults. In the same case it was stated that "Society has a legitimate interest in ensuring that those who are considered unsuitable to work with children are not given positions of trust in relation to vulnerable adults." Having considered all the evidence the Tribunal does not say that a vulnerable adult would be at risk of harm from the Appellant. However that is not what is required by the Act. It is sufficient that he is unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults by virtue of the fact that he harmed or placed a child at risk of harm by the offences of which he stands convicted."

24. No-one has really questioned the Tribunal's jurisprudence as set out in these authorities, though at one stage during his oral submissions BP did ask rhetorically why the Tribunal should have to consider public confidence, adding words to the effect, why can't the Department take a lead and say that someone is not in fact a risk although the public may think they are? The answer to that is two-fold. In the first place, the issue in a case such as this is, as we have seen, suitability rather than risk. Secondly, however, the Tribunal, in my judgment, is plainly right, and for the reasons it has given, in stressing the vital importance of the issue of public confidence. This does not mean, of course, that the Tribunal is simply to pander to the unreasoned baying of the mob; but it does mean that it is entitled to have regard to matters which are likely to be of concern to ordinary sensible people. For my part I would not wish to question the Tribunal's jurisprudence. In my judgment it is quite plainly correct.

The grounds of appeal

25. The grounds of appeal identify two grounds of challenge:

i) First, it is said that the Tribunal omitted to address why, notwithstanding its findings in relation to the nature of BP's misconduct and his unsuitability to work with children, he was nevertheless suitable to work with vulnerable adults. This, it is said, amounts to giving inadequate reasons for its decision.

ii) Secondly, it is said that, given its findings as to BP's attitudinal problems, the Tribunal should not have concluded that BP was suitable to work with vulnerable adults. It is said that the Tribunal could only have reached the conclusion it did by a misapplication of the relevant law to its own findings.

26. BP sought to widen the ambit of the hearing before me, but the matters I have to decide lie within a very narrow compass. Appeal lies from the Tribunal to the High Court only on a point of law, so there is no scope for me to re-visit the Tribunal's findings of fact insofar as they are based, as they are, on a secure evidential foundation. Mr Ozin confines himself, as his grounds of appeal show, to two narrow issues of law. It is to them, accordingly, that I now turn.
27. At the heart of the appeal is the proposition which Mr Ozin seeks to derive from CN and MB, namely that unsuitability to work with vulnerable adults can, and, indeed, generally will, be inferred from the impact on public confidence of a PoCA listing notwithstanding that the person poses no risk of harm to vulnerable adults.
28. It will have been noticed that the Tribunal made explicit reference in its decision to CN, though not to the passages upon which Mr Ozin particularly relies. But, as his skeleton argument prepared for the purposes of the hearing shows, the Tribunal had also been referred by Mr Ozin to MB. So it cannot be said that the Tribunal arrived at its decision in ignorance of the relevant learning.
29. Mr Ozin builds his argument upon the Tribunal's own assessment of BP, relying in particular on the matters I have summarised in paragraphs [9]-[10] above and on the Tribunal's analysis which I have quoted in paragraph [11] above. He develops his analysis as follows:

i) The Tribunal's findings in relation to the PoCA list are highly relevant to the question of BP's suitability to work with vulnerable adults. Where a person lacks judgement to the degree demonstrated by BP in relation to children, this must raise concerns in relation to his contact with any vulnerable person.

ii) Taken together, the Tribunal's findings show a lack of judgement on the part of BP which is inconsistent with assuming responsibility for vulnerable people. Maintaining proper boundaries in diverse situations is a key prerequisite to working with the vulnerable. Since BP lacks insight and cannot fully accept responsibility for his failings, it is not possible to be confident that he will be able to maintain proper boundaries in dealing with vulnerable adults, particularly those lacking capacity, many of whom, as Mr Ozin points out, can display child-like behaviour and mannerisms.

iii) Given the attitudinal problems which the Tribunal has found that BP has, public confidence would be undermined by BP being permitted to work with vulnerable adults.

30. Against this factual and analytical background, Mr Ozin deploys his argument that the Tribunal erred in law. His essential submissions can, I think, be summarised as follows:

i) On any sensible reading of the relevant paragraphs of its decision, the Tribunal gave only a single reason for its conclusion that it "did not consider, on balance, that [BP] is a risk to vulnerable adults or unsuitable to work with them," namely, as it was put in paragraph [38], that it did not consider there was reason to believe that what it called his "unhealthy interest in children" was likely to extend to vulnerable adults.

ii) In expressing itself in this way the Tribunal:

a) confused the issue of whether BP was a risk to vulnerable adults – a matter which, as it had correctly directed itself in paragraph [5], it did not have to find proved – and the issue of whether BP was suitable to work with vulnerable adults;

b) failed altogether even to address the question of public confidence; and

c) failed to engage with, let alone to apply, its own case-law.

iii) The Tribunal thus erred in law.

31. Elaborating these submissions, Mr Ozin further argued that:

i) The fact that BP has an inappropriate interest in children which is not likely to extend to vulnerable adults is no more an answer to the public confidence and public trust issues raised by the other findings of the Tribunal in his case than it was in corresponding circumstances in CN. On the contrary, the passage from CN which the Tribunal quoted in its decision is, he says, just as applicable to the assessment of suitability in relation to BP's PoVA listing as to the assessment of suitability in relation to his PoCA listing, and the Tribunal erred in law in not recognising this.

ii) It was not enough for the Tribunal to give a single reason for its decision – namely that BP's unhealthy interest had been directed solely towards children – when on its own case law that reason is a bad (or, at any rate, insufficient) reason for concluding that a person is not unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults.

iii) At the very least, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to demonstrate that it had taken into account the potential, in the circumstances, for BP's PoCA listing to undermine public confidence in him in a way which had an impact on his suitability to work with vulnerable adults. It wholly failed to do so. And if its conclusion was that public confidence was not so undermined, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to give some explanation for that conclusion. Here it gave none.

iv) Finally, and in any event, given its factual findings and its evaluation of BP's behaviour, the Tribunal's conclusion that BP was not unsuitable to work with vulnerable adults was, on its own case law, simply wrong as a matter of law.

v) None of the defects in the Tribunal's approach or reasoning were made good when it reviewed its decision. It merely reiterated the single point made in its original decision.

Discussion

32. Mr Ozin mounts a formidable challenge to the Tribunal's decision, and a challenge to which, at the end of the day, BP, in my judgment, had no effective response.
33. I am acutely conscious that I am here being invited to overturn the decision of a specialist tribunal on a point of law and, moreover, a point of law founded upon its own, oft-repeated, jurisprudence. It is to be assumed that a specialist tribunal properly understands its function, knows the relevant law and in understanding and applying the law in its specialised field will probably have got it right; its reasons are to be read with that in mind; and an appellate court must proceed with an appropriate degree of caution: see H (A Child) v East Sussex County Council and ors [2009] EWCA Civ 249 at paras [16]-[17]. And I have very much had in mind the well-known warning uttered by Lord Hoffmann in Piglowska v Piglowksi [1999] 1 WLR 1360 at page 1372:

"The exigencies of daily court room life are such that reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. This is particularly true of an unreserved judgment such as the judge gave in this case but also of a reserved judgment based upon notes, such as was given by the district judge. These reasons should be read on the assumption that, unless he has demonstrated the contrary, the judge knew how he should perform his functions and which matters he should take into account. This is particularly true when the matters in question are so well known as those specified in section 25(2) [of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973]. An appellate court should resist the temptation to subvert the principle that they should not substitute their own discretion for that of the judge by a narrow textual analysis which enables them to claim that he misdirected himself."

Nonetheless I am compelled to agree with Mr Ozin that the Tribunal here fell into the errors he has identified.

34. In short, the Tribunal seems simply not to have addressed what, on the jurisprudence, was always going to be a key and very possibly, though not inevitably, a decisive issue: the question of public confidence. And in my judgment the Tribunal gave wholly inadequate reasons to justify a conclusion which, on the face of it, was so very difficult to reconcile with the relevant case-law, to which, moreover, it failed to direct appropriate attention, that in the absence of any adequate reasons, and there are none, it can only be inferred that the Tribunal misdirected itself in law.
35. In the final analysis, the adequacy of the reasons given by a tribunal will always depend upon the subject-matter and the context. And it is important to remember that the duty to give reasons does not extend to a duty, as it were, to give reasons for the reasons. But however benevolent a reading one gives to the decision of the Tribunal here, it does seem to me, unhappily, to have fallen significantly short of the adequate.
36. The matter can perhaps be tested in this way, by asking the question: Given the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and the importance the Tribunal has always, and appropriately, attached to the question of public confidence, and given its reasons for (correctly) deciding that BP should remain on the PoCA list, why did it decide – what were its reasons for deciding – that he did not need to remain on the PoVA list? One does not, in my judgment, fall into the error identified by Lord Hoffmann in answering the question, as I do, by saying that we simply do not know – and the reason we do not know is because the Tribunal has not told us.

Conclusion

37. For these reasons the appeal succeeds. The question of BP's PoVA listing will have to go back for reconsideration. It is not, in my judgment, a question that I can properly determine myself.
38. Mr Ozin submits, and I agree, that in the light of BP's PoCA listing, and given the regulatory framework, the only live issue is the question of unsuitability in relation to his PoVA listing. In my judgment, that question should be determined on the basis of the factual findings made in relation to the PoCA listing – which do not fall for redetermination – and such additional evidence in relation to BP's suitability to work with vulnerable adults as the Tribunal considers it appropriate to hear.
39. In my draft judgment I suggested that, in all the circumstances, the Secretary of State might feel that it would not be appropriate to seek his costs of this appeal. Mr Ozin confirms that there is no application for costs. The appeal is therefore allowed with no order as to costs.

Postscript

40. The draft judgment was sent to the parties in the usual way on 15 April 2009 with the conventional rubric inviting them to identify any typing corrections or other obvious errors. BP responded by sending me the following missive, which I set out in full, for it provides an illuminating, and on one view concerning, insight into matters which the Tribunal will have to consider when it reconsiders the matter in accordance with my order:

"After the day in court, I really did not expect any different response. I noted the relish upon which you seized upon the falsified evidence against me and then proceeded to treat it as "gospel truth", even though even the tribunal understood its unreliability. This is what I had expected from hungry jurors, but I had hoped for a more balanced approach from a High Court Judge.

I have spent my entire life supporting other people, both adults and children, trying always to act selflessly, knowing my gifts and abilities to create change and tackle social evils. In this way, I am quite the exception, as only few would do what I do, sacrificing themselves for the benefit of others. Perhaps judges meet too many evil people in their lives, that they lack the insight to realise that lasciviousness is often in the beholder's eye, not every piece of evidence is sacrosanct, not every person with a conviction has taken deliberate negative acts, not every law is there to be twisted to their own ends by legal eagles.

I had hoped under the circumstances you would make some attempt to pull apart the rather offensive logic of SOS solicitors, but I guess I can only encourage action and I suppose it is not really your job to do that."

41. BP concluded by asking whether I could advise him what his next course of action is and what defence he needs to draw up. I decline to do so. Judges decide the cases that come before them; they do not give advice to the litigants who appear before them.