England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		10th March 2009

1. LORD JUSTICE GOLDRING: On 15th April 2006 Mrs Perinpanathan's daughter, who was 15, was stopped at Heathrow Airport. She was carrying some £150,000 in cash. The cash was detained by the police on the basis that there were reasonable grounds to suspect it was intended for use in unlawful conduct, namely terrorism. On 13th December 2007, following a two day hearing at Westminster Magistrates' Court, the Justices declined to order forfeiture of the cash. The interested parties had failed to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the intention was to use the cash for unlawful purposes. This application for judicial review is in respect of the Justices' refusal to order the costs of the hearing against the second interested party.

The Relevant Statutory Provisions

2. The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, section 240 and following set out the applicable provisions:

"240. General purpose of this Part

(1) This Part has effect for the purposes of --

(a) enabling the enforcement authority to recover, in civil proceedings before the High Court or Court of Session, property which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct,

(b) enabling cash which is, or represents, property obtained through unlawful conduct, or which is intended to be used in unlawful conduct, to be forfeited in civil proceedings before a magistrates' court or (in Scotland) the sheriff.

(2) The powers conferred by this Part are exercisable in relation to any property (including cash) whether or not any proceedings have been brought for an offence in connection with the property.

241. 'Unlawful conduct'

(1) Conduct occurring in any part of the United Kingdom is unlawful conduct if it is unlawful under the criminal law of that part.

(2) Conduct which --

(a) occurs in a country outside the United Kingdom and is unlawful under the criminal law of that country, and

(b) if it occurred in a part of the United Kingdom, would be unlawful under the criminal law of that part

Is also unlawful conduct.

(3) The court or sheriff must decide on a balance of probabilities whether it is proved --

(a) that any matters alleged to constitute unlawful conduct have occurred, or

(b) that any person intended to use any cash in unlawful conduct.

242. 'Property obtained through unlawful conduct'.

(1) A person obtains property through unlawful conduct (whether his own conduct or another's) if he obtains property by or in return for the conduct.

(2) In deciding whether any property was obtained through unlawful conduct --

(a) it is immaterial whether or not any money, goods or services were provided in order to put the person in question in a position to carry out the conduct,

(b) it is not necessary to show that the conduct was of a particular kind if it is shown that the property was obtained through conduct of one of a number of kinds, each of which would have been unlawful conduct . . .

294. Seizure of cash

(1) A customs officer or constable may seize any cash if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that it is --

(a) recoverable property, or

(b) intended by any person for use in unlawful conduct.

(2) A customs officer or constable may also seize cash part of which he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be --

(a) recoverable property, or

(b) intended by any person for use in unlawful conduct

if it is not reasonably practicable to seize only that part.

(3) This section does not authorise the seizure of an amount of cash if it or, as the case may be, the part to which his suspicion relates, is less than the minimum amount.

295. Detention of seized cash

(1) While the customs officer or constable continues to have reasonable grounds for his suspicion, cash seized under section 294 may be detained initially for a period of 48 hours.

(2) The period for which the cash or any part of it may be detained may be extended by an order made by a magistrates' court or (in Scotland) the sheriff; but the order may not authorise the detention of any of the cash --

(a) beyond the end of the period of three months beginning with the date of the order,

(b) in the case of any further order under this section, beyond the end of the period of two years beginning with the date of the first order.

(3) A Justice of the Peace may also exercise the power of a magistrates' court to make the first order under subsection (2) extending the period.

(4) An application for an order under subsection (2)--

(a) in relation to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, may be made by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise or a constable,

(b) in relation to Scotland, may be made by the Scottish Ministers in connection with their functions under section 298 or by a procurator fiscal

and the court, sheriff or justice may make the order if satisfied, in relation to any cash to be further detained, that either of the following conditions is met.

(5) The first condition is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash is recoverable property and that either --

(a) its continued detention is justified while its derivation is further investigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected, or

(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected have been started and have not been concluded.

(6) The second condition is that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cash is intended to be used in unlawful conduct and that either --

(a) its continued detention is justified while its intended use is further investigated or consideration is given to bringing (in the United Kingdom or elsewhere) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected, or

(b) proceedings against any person for an offence with which the cash is connected have been started and have not been concluded.

(7) An application for an order under subsection (2) may also be made in respect of any cash seized under section 294(2), and the court, sheriff or justice may make the order if satisfied that --

(a) the condition in subsection (5) or (6) is met in respect of part of the cash, and

(b) it is not reasonably practicable to detain only that part.

(8) An order under subsection (2) must provide for notice to be given to persons affected by it . . .

298. Forfeiture

(1) While cash is detained under section 295, an application for the forfeiture of the whole or any part of it may be made --

(a) to a Magistrates' Court by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise or a constable,

(b) (in Scotland) to the sheriff by the Scottish Ministers.

(2) The court or sheriff may order the forfeiture of the cash or any part of it if satisfied that the cash or part --

(a) is recoverable property, or

(b) is intended by any person for use in unlawful conduct.

(3) But in the case of recoverable property which belongs to joint tenants, one of whom is an excepted joint owner, the order may not apply to so much of it as the court thinks is attributable to the excepted joint owner's share.

(4) Where an application for the forfeiture of any cash is made under this section, the cash is to be detained (and may not be released under any power conferred by this Chapter) until any proceedings in pursuance of the application (including any proceedings on appeal) are concluded.

299. Appeal against forfeiture

(1) Any party to proceedings in which an order is made under section 298 for the forfeiture of cash who is aggrieved by the order may appeal --

(a) in relation to England and Wales, to the Crown Court,

(b) in relation to Scotland, to the Court of Session,

(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, to a county court.

(2) An appeal under subsection (1) must be made within the period of 30 days beginning with the date on which the order is made.

(3) The appeal is to be by way of a rehearing.

(4) The court hearing the appeal may make any order it thinks appropriate.

(5) If the court upholds the appeal, it may order the release of the cash . . .

302. Compensation

(1) If no forfeiture order is made in respect of any cash detained under this Chapter, the person to whom the cash belongs or from whom it was seized may make an application to the magistrates' court or (in Scotland) the sheriff for compensation . . . "

3. The relevant provision regarding costs is section 64 of the Magistrates' Court act 1980. That provision provides:

"Power to award costs and enforcement of costs

(1) on a hearing of a complaint, a Magistrates' Court shall have power in its discretion to make such order as to costs --

(a) on making the order for which the complaint is made, to be paid by the defendant to the complainant;

(b) on dismissing the complaint, to be paid by the complainant to the defendant,

as it thinks just and reasonable . . . "

The Facts: more detail

4. They are helpfully set out in the grounds of the interested parties. The daughter had some £153,000 in Sterling and dollars. The claimant went to Heathrow to meet her daughter from the flight. The daughter was interviewed on the day of arrest. She made a number of what are described as "material assertions". The claimant had given her the money at the airport on 23rd April 2006 which she then took to Singapore on a flight that day. She stated that her mother, the claimant, ran a foreign exchange business. When asked whether she travelled alone to Singapore she confirmed that she had. She did not mention there had been any intention that she would be accompanied. She was asked whether she had touched the cash when it was packed and confirmed that she had not dealt with it. She said that she was going to meet her uncle in Singapore. He was going there from Sri Lanka, where she was going to stay for two days before returning to the United Kingdom. She was to give the money to her uncle for the use of a foreign exchange company called Aramex International. In the event that her uncle did not show up at the airport, she was to meet a friend of her uncle called Mr Habib. She did not know what Mr Habib looked like. When she arrived in Singapore she was refused entry because her passport was not valid for the requisite six months.
5. The claimant was also interviewed. She said, among other things, that she had been self-employed, dealing in money exchange since 1986. She had packed her daughter's bag with the money which was taken to Singapore and had placed in the bag documents showing that the money had come from three money service bureaus. She appeared to state that her daughter had collected some of the cash on the previous Saturday. She thought that her daughter's airline ticket cost £479. She stated that the money was being transferred on behalf of three different money service bureaus, namely: £27,358 on behalf of the Anglo-Asian Mini Mart UK; £46,000.14 on behalf of Abby Exchange Limited (AEL); and the remainder from a man named Manivan, who ran a bureau called Mummys. All the money had been collected from the money bureaus in Sterling. She had changed some of it into Euros and dollars due to the fact that she did not have enough cash flow.
6. The claimant said that she had originally expected her daughter to travel to Singapore with a friend named Ruben Krischner, but this arrangement did not proceed because they arrived a bit late at the airport and the ticket was too expensive. The claimant said she was unable to travel to Singapore herself. She had previously transferred funds using a company called Linkafax, but around three weeks before the money was seized that company had stopped transferring money. She had not used a bank transfer because of the charges that would be incurred in doing so. The seized cash was to be passed to a company called Aramex International in Singapore. It was to be exchanged for Indian or Sri Lankan rupees. The cash would be sent to India or Sri Lanka for transmission to the intended recipients. It was to be exchanged in Singapore because the exchange rate was better in that country.
7. In a subsequent interview, the claimant said that she charged £100 to her customers, on top of the other charges which she incurred of £250. Her profit margin, it seems, would therefore be between £100 and £200.
8. In June 2006 two of the money transfer businesses mentioned by the claimant provided records, including details of the original senders of the money and the intended recipients of the cash. Subsequently, so did the third.
9. The police obtained various statements. They included statements from the owner of Mummys, the owner of one of the other bureaus, AAMM, indeed the owners of all three money exchange bureaus. There was also a statement from the First Secretary of the Sri Lankan High Commission in London. It provided a list of authorised currency dealers in Sri Lanka. It confirmed that it is a criminal offence in Sri Lanka to act without authorisation as a foreign exchange dealer or money remitter, and that any person arriving in Sri Lanka with the equivalent of 10,000 US dollars is required to declare this fact to the authorities. Neither the claimant nor Aramex appeared on the list, although there was a company called Armex Money Changers on the list.
10. There was a statement from somebody called Durrani, the Managing Director of Link FX, who confirmed that his company had regularly transferred funds to Aramex on behalf of the claimant. He said that the claimant was a long standing customer who transferred about £10 million every year. He confirmed that he had received legal advice from his lawyers to cease transactions which were destined for Sri Lanka and had told the claimant of this in April 2006. He said that he would have charged £382.50 to change the £153,000.
11. The police also relied upon a paper which spoke, among other things, of the funding methods of the LTTE group in Sri Lanka. Those methods included intimidation of Sri Lankans living in the United Kingdom.
12. There was also a statement by a police officer to the effect that the owner of Mummys had been stopped in November 2003. He was with his brother. His brother told the police officers who had stopped them that he had fought for the Tamil Tigers but now feared them because he had left their organisation.
13. The claimant's evidence was served in advance. It consisted of a single document, namely a statement. There was also, prior to the hearing, evidence which analysed the documents provided by Mummys, the money transfer business which it was alleged provided the majority of the seized cash.
14. As this is not a case stated, the court does not have detailed reasons for the Magistrates' decisions. However, both parties agree that there are clear indications of their reasoning as far as costs are concerned. Mr Mullins, who was counsel for the second interested party, made a note to this effect:

"We have had a two day hearing. We have listened very carefully. Mr Durrani was very useful as a witness as he was able to give us the structure of the money changing business. We were asked by the prosecution (sic) to infer that money was destined for LTTE. We find no direct evidence of a link and so draw no such inference. Application dismissed and money to be returned forthwith with interest.

No order for costs on the basis that the application was reasonably made."

15. The legal advisor's notes, such as they are, indicate that the court had drawn to its attention the case of City of Bradford Metropolitan District Council v Booth, CO/3219/99. The note of the legal advisor stated that "18 months, police still had money. We say costs should follow the event", and the justices ruled that "No costs awarded. Case properly brought by the police".
16. It is agreed before this court that we should approach the case on the basis that the Justices' decision was the product of their application of Bradford, a decision to which I shall very shortly come.

The Argument

17. The issue can shortly be encapsulated. Mr Yeo, who has argued the case with conspicuous skill on behalf of the claimant, submits that in applying the practice set out in Bradford, the Justices erred. Costs should have followed the event. The claimant, in other words, should have had her costs. The interested parties submit that the Justices were right in their approach. They were entitled to make the costs order which they did and it should stand.
18. I now turn to the case of Bradford. It concerned the Council's refusal to renew Mr Booth's private hire operator's licence because, so it was claimed, he had broken a condition. An appeal to the Magistrates by Mr Booth succeeded. His application for costs on the basis that they should follow the event also succeeded. A fundamental issue was whether the Justices were right to make such an order.
19. Following argument, and having been referred in particular to a licensing appeal in which the police unsuccessfully opposed a justices' on-licence (that was the case of R v Totnes Licensing Justices ex parte Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall [1990] 156 JP 587) and a case in which the police unsuccessfully opposed the grant of a firearms licence (that was the case of the Chief Constable of Derbyshire v Goodman and Newton, Divisional Court unreported, 2nd April 1998). Lord Bingham CJ, said this:

"23. I would accordingly hold that the proper approach to questions of this kind can for convenience be summarised is three propositions:

24. (1) Section 64(1) confers a discretion upon a Magistrates' Court to make such order as to costs as it thinks just and reasonable. That provision applies both to the quantum of the costs (if any) to be paid, but also as to the party (if any) which should pay them.

25. (2) What the court will think just and reasonable will depend on all the relevant facts and circumstances of the case before the court. The court may think it just and reasonable that costs should follow the event, but need not think so in all cases covered by the subsection.

26. (3) Where a complainant has successfully challenged before justices an administrative decision made by a police or regulatory authority acting honestly, reasonably, properly and on grounds that reasonably appeared to be sound, in exercise of its public duty, the court should consider, in addition to any other relevant fact or circumstances, both (i) the financial prejudice to the particular complainant in the particular circumstances if an order for costs is not made in his favour; and (ii) the need to encourage public authorities to make and stand by honest, reasonable and apparently sound administrative decisions made in the public interest without fear of exposure to undue financial prejudice if the decision is successfully challenged."

20. In the present case, it is clear the Magistrates, as additional factors, took into account the honesty, reasonableness and soundness of the decision to apply for an order for forfeiture. Mr Yeo, as I have indicated, submits they were wrong to do so. The Lord Chief Justice, in using the words he did in Bradford, emphasised that the decision only related to administrative decisions. The ratio of Bradford can be discerned from its facts, submits Mr Yeo. It was a licensing decision. The authorities referred to within it were licensing decisions of one sort or another. There is a distinction between such decisions and one such as taken in the present case. In a licensing decision, the local authority takes an administrative decision. The person affected by that decision has the right of an appeal to a court. If the local authority ran the normal costs risks, it would have to take that into account in deciding whether or not to oppose that person's appeal. In a marginal case, it might not. That would not be in the public interest. That requires that the local authority stands by its decision and lets it be tested in court. That, submits Mr Yeo, was what the argument in Bradford was all about. It is critical to the decision in that case. There is nothing in Bradford which suggests as wide an application of its principle as is contended for by the interested parties.
21. Mr Yeo has to deal with the case of R (on the application of Victoria Ebbnie v Chief Constable of Surrey Police [2008] EWHC 166. Mrs Ebbnie was arrested at the airport with some £7,000 in cash. The case had a chequered history. An application for forfeiture was eventually withdrawn. Bradford was drawn to the Magistrates' attention. They made no order for costs. Davis J, at paragraph 1.6 in the copy of the decision which I have, said this:

"1.6. Both Mr Turner on behalf of the applicant and Mr Morley on behalf of the respondent before me agree that the decision in Booth was in point and properly fell to be considered and that the Magistrates were required to have regard to it in deciding how to exercise their discretion in this case. Mr Turner placed particular reliance on (i) of what the Lord Chief Justice had said, referring to the financial prejudice to Ms Ebbnie if no order for costs was made in her favour because she had not had the benefit of legal aid. Mr Morley on the other hand placed particular emphasis on what was said in (ii) on the need to encourage public authorities to stand by honest, reasonable and apparently sound decisions made in the public interest without fear of exposure to undue financial prejudice if the decision was successfully challenged.

1.7. The first question of law sought to be raised on the case stated is this:

'Were the Justices wrong to apply the test in Bradford Metropolitan District Council v Booth when they were considering such costs as were fair, just and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case as were brought to their attention by the appellant?'

It is not, I think, entirely appropriate for a question to have been formulated in that way; and certainly it should not be answered by reference to the way it is formulated. Mr Turner and Mr Morley were rightly agreed that Bradford Metropolitan District Council v Booth did not lay down any 'test'. On the contrary, it is the words of statute which should be applied by the Justices. But that said, clearly the Justices were correct here to have regard to the decision in the Booth case and to that extent there can be no difficulty about the approach they adopted.

Mr Yeo emphasises the absence of the word "administrative" within the final sentence of paragraph 1.6. He submits that in that case the respondent was in error in conceding the applicability of Bradford. As there was no argument before Davis J as to its applicability, it is not a decision which this court should follow.

22. Mr Yeo, it is correct to say only very lightly, relies upon a decision of this court in a case called Orton v (1) Truro Magistrates' Court, (2) West Cornwall Magistrates' Court and Devon and Cornwall Constabulary [2009] EWHC 168. There, the appellant succeeded in the Magistrates' and in the Crown Court in respect of money seized from him. He did not obtain his costs. At the hearing before the Divisional Court he represented himself. The respondent was not represented. The respondent put in neither an acknowledgment of service nor skeleton argument. The reasoning of the Crown Court's decision was opaque. Simon J, with whom Maurice Kay LJ agreed, said this in paragraph 9:

"I would have expected the claimant to have been awarded his costs in each case unless cogent reasons were advanced why he should not."

Given the circumstances of the decision in Orton, and as Mr Yeo realistically in effect accepts, it does not seem to me that Orton can be relied upon as any real authority.

23. Mr Yeo submits that there is a substantial difference between administrative decisions such as those to which Bradford applies and proceedings for forfeiture. In forfeiture proceedings, the police have a power to bring those proceedings. They may decide not to. They are effectively the claimants. As a public body bringing proceedings, they do not have particular protection from costs should they lose, he submits. He emphasises that the threshold in such proceedings is low. Such proceedings are the only real basis for someone whose money has been seized to dispute the police case. There is no effective basis for disputing continued detention, the police merely having to show a reasonable suspicion.
24. He makes two further points. A sum as small as £1,000 may be seized. Proceedings may be delayed for up to two years. If after two years the police cannot show the cash is tainted, it is unjust, he submits, for a person to have to pay what may be a large legal bill. In administrative decisions, moreover, he submits, there is a commercial aspect. The person applies for a licence or a firearms certificate. The respondent to an application for forfeiture has no choice.
25. Mr Yeo submits that there are regimes analogous to the forfeiture regime. Firstly, criminal prosecutions, where, particular circumstances apart, the successful defendant receives his costs from central funds. Second, he submits that the case of Grimes v Crown Prosecution Service [2003] EWCA Civ 1814 provides some guidance.

26. Grimes concerned the Crown Prosecution's unsuccessful attempt to show in confiscation proceedings in the Administrative Court that money held by solicitors was not Mrs Grimes'. A confiscation order had been made in earlier criminal proceedings against her husband. Wilson J (as he then was) did not make an order for costs against the Crown Prosecution Service and Mrs Grimes appealed. She argued that CPR 44.3 should have been applied. Costs should have followed the event.

26. It seems that the court's attention may have been drawn to Bradford and the other cases to which I have referred, although there is no specific reference in the judgments to those decisions. The Crown Prosecution Service submission was that it was not like an ordinary failed litigant. It had its public duty to perform. Brooke LJ said there was nothing which made the case out of the ordinary. CPR 44.3 should have been followed and had been applied. Sedley LJ at paragraph 30 said this:

"The reason why the judge did not approach the case in this way [He was there referring to approaching the CPS as an ordinary litigant] as it seems to me, is that he regarded the CPS as having a special litigation position or status. As my Lord has made clear, it does not. What it will have in many cases is an argument on the reasonableness of its stance which derives from the nature of its legal functions and the purpose of confiscation orders. For the rest, and I think contrary to the approach taken by the judge, this proceeding was no different from an interpleader in a judgment creditor's action. The Crown when it comes before the courts of this country does so as a litigant like any other."

27. As it seems to me, Grimes is of limited application in the present context, albeit it generally concerned confiscation. In that case there was no doubt that the applicable general rule was CPR 44.3. That meant that costs normally did follow the event. Here, the applicable section is section 64 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. The court here has had a discretion to make such order as it thinks just and reasonable.

My Conclusion

28. In spite of the attractiveness of Mr Yeo's submissions, I have come to the conclusion that the Magistrates were correct in applying the factors set out by Lord Bingham in Bradford when exercising their discretion under section 64 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. I accept that there is a difference between administrative decisions such as those referred to in Bradford and the present case. The distinction is limited, however. In one case a police officer (at possible risk to someone's livelihood) is saying that the person will not have an on-licence, for example. In the other, he is saying the person will not have his (or in this case her) money returned. In taking both decisions, it is crucial that the police act honestly, reasonably, properly, and on grounds that reasonably appear to be sound. In both cases there is a need to make and stand by honest, reasonable and apparently sound decisions in the public interest without fear of exposure to undue financial prejudice, in one case if the decision is successfully challenged, in the other if the application fails. There is a real public interest that the police seek an order for forfeiture if they consider that on the evidence it is more probable than not that the money was intended for an unlawful purpose. It would be quite contrary to the public interest if, due to fear of financial consequences, it was decided not to seek its forfeiture, but simply return the money. The public duty requires the police to make an application in such circumstances.
29. In short, I have come to the conclusion that while the police's obligation is not on all fours to that which they have in licensing or firearms cases, those situations are sufficiently analogous to suggest that a similar approach should be followed. The rationale lying behind cases such as Bradford, in other words, applies equally to cases such as the present.
30. It seems to me, moreover, that there is a distinction between an award to a successful defendant in criminal prosecutions of his costs from central funds, and an order against the police should an application for forfeiture fail, albeit properly made. In a criminal prosecution no question arises, absent bad faith, of the successful defendant's costs being ordered against the Crown Prosecution Service or the police; the body or bodies which decide whether or not to bring the proceedings.
31. It is necessary too to emphasise the limits of what is said in Bradford. It is not, as Davis J said in Ebbnie (a decision with which it follows I agree) setting out any sort of a test. Bradford merely sets out a series of factors which the court should take into account in the application of section 64 of the 1960 Act. The court, as Lord Bingham said, may think it just and reasonable that costs should follow the event. It is worth too emphasising the words "in addition" which precede subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of Lord Bingham's third proposition.
32. It follows that it should not be thought that those who bring these applications have carte blanche to make applications for forfeiture without any risk of costs being awarded against them. Such applications can result in grave injustice if not made honestly, reasonably, properly and on grounds that are sound. If applications are made inappropriately, the court should not hesitate to make an order for costs against the applicant.
33. In this case, no criticism whatsoever can be made about the decision to bring the forfeiture proceedings. Among other things:

(1) The circumstances in which this substantial amount of cash was seized from a 15-year old girl were unusual and raised suspicion.

(2) No readily explicable reason was apparent for moving it to Singapore.

(3) On the face of it there appeared to be no profit in such a transaction.

(4) Sri Lanka is a destination for funds for terrorism extorted from the Tamil community in the United Kingdom.

(5) One of those whose money was being exported had a close family member who had had terrorist connections.

34. I have concluded that the Magistrates did not err in their approach to the award of costs. They were entitled to make the order they did. This court should not therefore interfere with it.
35. MR JUSTICE SWEENEY: I agree.
36. MR FORTT: My Lord, I apply for an order for costs, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.
37. LORD JUSTICE GOLDRING: Have you any document setting out the costs?
38. MR FORTT: I am afraid we do not have a costs schedule today. The hope is we can agree.
39. MR YEO: I cannot pretend there was not a private interest in the case. However, it has served a public purpose in clarifying the law in relation to that area, a distinction which it was plain from Orton and Ebbnie was an area which needed consideration. Plainly, as your Lordships have heard, these proceedings have had a big detrimental effect upon the claimant in any event financially. We would ask that no order be made for costs.
40. LORD JUSTICE GOLDRING: Thank you, Mr Yeo. Mr Yeo, I am afraid we have to make an order for costs. May I thank you both very much. Mr Yeo, the observations I made were not simply (Inaudible).
41. MR YEO: I am grateful.