England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		3 February 2009

1. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: This is a renewed application by Mr Salmon for permission to apply for judicial review, permission having been refused on the papers by Mr Justice Pitchford on 7 October 2008. The application is in relation to a decision by Mr Justice Keith on 13 May 2008 where he refused permission to appeal.
2. The background to this matter is that the claimant was involved in proceedings concerning the execution of trust and leasehold property in Wellesley Road, West London. The proceedings commenced in the Barnet County Court in 2004. It was transferred to the Central London Civil Justice Centre thereafter. The case was heard by His Honour Judge Levy QC in April 2005. Mr Salmon makes the point that he felt he was not given a fair trial during those proceedings.
3. Mr Salmon appealed to the Court of Appeal in relation to this matter. Apparently the case was heard in two tranches. The Court of Appeal ordered a transcript of the judgment of His Honour Judge Levy which apparently took a long time to obtain. The approved judgment finally came through. Mr Salmon took the view, on reading that transcript, that it had been heavily revised, covering up - Mr Salmon says - many mistakes made by the judge. Indeed, he sat down and listened to the tape of the proceedings and the transcript. He estimates that about 25 to 33 per cent of the judgment was altered, covering up the judge's mistakes.
4. Mr Salmon raises an issue of conduct of the judges, both His Honour Judge Levy and also in the Court of Appeal. The first complaint that is made - and this is all part of the background, it is said - is as to the first hearing in the Court of Appeal, where Mr Justice Longmore indicated that Mr Salmon was not going to have leave to appeal because "the United Kingdom has a good record in human rights" and thus it was not deciding the case on the merits. There was a second hearing - to deal with the technical aspects of the appeal - in front of Lord Justice Mummery. Again complaint is made that Lord Justice Mummery said he did not want to hear about the human rights grounds raised by Mr Salmon.
5. Mr Salmon makes specific complaint - which he says can be heard on the tape of the proceedings in the County Court - where it is said that His Honour Judge Levy at the end of the second day retired, left court but then came back into court and spoke to counsel who was representing the opposing party against Mr Salmon about what points he should raise in legal argument.
6. In February 2007, Mr Salmon commenced proceedings in Brentford County Court against HM Government, Department of Constitutional Affairs and others, seeking declarations and damages under the Human Rights Act arising out of breaches of his rights occurring during the earlier proceedings. There was a hearing before a district judge who transferred the case to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court on 21 September 2007. Master Eyre was the judge who was seised of the matter. Mr Salmon says that he submitted his application to Master Eyre, who said at the time that he was very busy and that he would look at the papers and get back to Mr Salmon. Mr Salmon said he then received a judgment by post striking the claim out. That decision was made on 26 November 2007 when Master Eyre ordered that the claim should be struck out.
7. The claimant then appealed to the High Court. He was unable to get a transcript of Master Eyre's decision because there had been no hearing. Permission was refused on the papers by Mr Justice Sullivan. This application was renewed before Mr Justice Keith in an oral hearing.
8. On 13 May Mr Justice Keith refused him permission to appeal.
9. Mr Salmon seeks permission to review the decision of Mr Justice Keith, as noted, permission having been refused on the papers by Mr Justice Pitchford. The grounds for the application are manifold. Thirteen defendants have been served. The reason for the number of defendants is that Mr Salmon has decided that it is appropriate to name everyone he has had any contact with in relation to the proceedings, in essence, to ensure that he caught the right defendants. The defendants are Mr Justice Keith, Mr Justice Sullivan, Master Eyre, the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court, the Directorate of the Judicial Office, HMS Court Service, the Ministry of Justice, the Lord Chief Justice, the Lord Chancellor, the Secretary of State for Justice, Treasury Solicitor, the Attorney General, the Crown and finally the United Kingdom, the High Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights.
10. The essence of Mr Salmon's claim is breach of his human rights, in particular Article 6. His motivation, Mr Salmon says, is not money but that judges are covering up for each other and their conduct is getting swept under the carpet. In essence, he is saying there is not open, transparent and public justice and he sees it as his role to try to see that the Human Rights Act is adhered to in full in the civil courts.
11. In support of that, he relies on the order of Master Eyre, said to be held without a public hearing, the fact that Mr Justice Sullivan refused permission on the papers, the refusal of Mr Justice Keith despite Mr Salmon saying that he had made out his claim. Added to that is the fact of the decision by Mr Justice Pitchford on the papers, the judgment given by Mr Justice Keith (it being said was prepared in advance and thus effectively not taking into account the arguments of Mr Salmon). Mr Salmon also relies on the fact that the district judge transferred the case to the Queen's Bench Division as meaning that the case stood some reasonable prospect of success. I have looked at the papers in this case, including the specific orders and documents referred to, and, as set out beforehand, the submissions that Mr Salmon has made to this court this afternoon.
12. The remedies sought by Mr Salmon are set out in the claim form and are as follows:

(1) Recommendation to Parliament to establish a human rights tribunal independent of both HM Court Service, the Ministry of Justice and the judiciary;

(2) A declaration that the Human Rights Act, Section 9 (1) (a) and (b), is incompatible with Article 6 of the Human Rights Act/European Convention on Human Rights;

(3) Compensation including moral damages;

(4) Full damages as claimed in the proceedings struck out by Master Eyre;

(5) Costs.

13. The first thing to note about this application is that no transcript of Mr Justice Keith's judgment has been provided. Mr Salmon, in his claim form, indicated that he considered the transcript to be of little relevance. He indicated that he could get a transcript but he would prefer, if necessary, to have a tape of the proceedings because - this is the effect of it - he does not trust approved judgments because they are altered to cover up any judge's misdemeanours. The court therefore is deprived of the reasoning of Mr Justice Keith.
14. In coming to my decision I will keep my judgment short. This will enable Mr Salmon to make a note of it to counter his accusations of doctoring should a later transcript be needed. Suffice it to say that judicial review is not the appropriate avenue to challenge the decisions made by members of the judiciary. As Mr Salmon well knows, there are statutory avenues of appeal which exist and which are to be followed. That is the first reason. Secondly, when one analyses what Mr Salmon has said, he has made some serious allegations in relation to the conduct not only of a County Court judge but also of judges of the Court of Appeal. There are also avenues to deal with complaints about judges' conduct if considered appropriate.
15. The first reason is the lack of jurisdiction and this court refuses permission on that ground. Even if this court had jurisdiction, it is quite clear as noted by Mr Justice Pitchford that this claim is, in effect, seeking to resurrect the previous claims. Indeed Mr Salmon, when he made his submissions, set out the chronology of how he came to appear before this court. Judicial review is a discretionary remedy, and in a case such as this, which is seeking to resurrect previous claims in a different form, it is a remedy which a court would not be minded to grant. Moreover - and although Mr Salmon has explained the rationale for so doing - one only has to look at the number of defendants served in this case and the remedy sought, to see that this would not be an appropriate case for judicial review, given its lack of particularity and the widespread ambit of the claim. For those various reasons this renewed application is refused. (Pause)
16. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: What I would like to do, Mr Salmon, is to go through that list I gave you and check to ensure my understanding as to what is linked with what because, although we have six different cases here, from what you have told me today it looks like some of them are linked. The subject matter of them is linked.
17. THE APPLICANT: There is actually one missing. There is Salmon v Bromley County Court which is missing.
18. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: I do not have that.
19. THE APPLICANT: It is C/10864/2008.
20. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: I need not have done the list for you.
21. THE APPLICANT: Bromley County Court and Judge Richardson.
22. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: A decision of Judge Richardson. What was the subject matter?
23. THE APPLICANT: That was again to do with the London Borough of Hounslow and Feltham Magistrates. It was linked to that.
24. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: Because, on the face of it, it looks like you have a lot of different applications.
25. THE APPLICANT: There are only three main threads.
26. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: That is essentially what I am trying to identify because obviously that mitigates it in one sense. Feltham and Bromley are linked, are they?
27. THE APPLICANT: Indeed they are.
28. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: The same subject matter. Is anything else linked? Can you add that one to the end of the list so we are working from the same? It is CO/10864/2008, Mr Salmon v Bromley County Court, a decision of Judge Richardson. It is in relation to the Feltham Magistrates Court. It is connected. That is the council tax.
29. THE APPLICANT: Yes.
30. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: Are there any other of these that is linked to that one?
31. THE APPLICANT: No. It is just those two.
32. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: The ECHR one is Judge Levy.
33. THE APPLICANT: Yes, which is linked to today's.
34. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: Which is linked to today's which is Master Eyre, this one, is it not?
35. THE APPLICANT: Yes.
36. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: So the first one and the last one, a decision of court is not pending any more. I am going to call that (b). Then we have Brentford County Court; that is the Halifax. I have two Brentford County Courts.
37. THE APPLICANT: There are three, the one below.
38. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: Three. I meant to say I have two Brentford County Courts that show the Halifax Bank is the third Brentford County Court - the same subject matter.
39. THE APPLICANT: That is the same proceedings.
40. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: That is the same. That is it. In essence, as you said, there are three different - - - - -
41. THE APPLICANT: Three strands.
42. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: I am waiting for the White Book. (Pause) Whilst you were out this morning did you take the opportunity to look at the Rules on civil restraint orders?
43. THE APPLICANT: No. I was going around the city and there were a few strongholds to bring down.
44. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: The court has power to make a civil restraint order. That, in effect, is an order which restrains a party from any further applications. If it is a limited restraint order then it is in the particular proceedings. If it is an extended restraint order, it is the court saying, in relation to X, Y and Z topic, that you cannot issue proceedings unless you have permission. If it is a general restraint order it is a blanket ban basically on any proceedings, so any subject matter without permission.
45. The purpose of it is if the court feels - they used to be called vexatious litigants in the old days, it has changed - the claimant has made too many applications that have been considered totally without merit and are using up the court's time unnecessarily, court time being very precious and public funds being very precious. It does not mean that you will not be able to bring proceedings. The effect of it is that a judge has to look at the proposed application or claim, and decide whether you are to have permission to bring it. Say you were run over or something as you walked out of the Royal Courts and you wanted to bring an action, a personal injury claim, against the person who caused the accident, a judge will look at it, look and see that it is a claim that the court thinks has substance and will give permission and the claim will go through in the normal course of events. Say you had a limited order - that you were bringing the same claim again - the judge would say no, you cannot issue this claim. That is the effect of the order and there is a right of appeal. That is the effect of it.
46. The essence so far as you are concerned and your task, I suppose, is to put forward reasons why this court - because the court has the power to do it of its own motion and, as you said you were warned yesterday by His Honour Judge McKenna that the court was going to raise this, it is up to you to make whatever submissions you want, which you said you want to deal with today and not to deal with them on Friday - should not make such an order. That is as best as I can summarise the effect of it.
47. THE APPLICANT: Once again, it is a total taint of my basic human rights which have not been respected throughout all of these various affairs that have been listed.
48. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: One works under a disability in one sense because I have not gone into the merits of the cases because that is not my function. My function is to look at the number of claims; what the judges have said about them and you will see that in the boxes quite a few of them are ticked as being without merit; look at the history of it all and make a decision. I appreciate you are saying this is a breach of your human rights. I have to operate on the basis that here are these decisions made. It is as if you had a conviction. I would have to operate on the basis that the conviction by the jury was correct. I could not go behind their decision when deciding to sentence you. I could not say, "Ignore the fact that they have convicted you, I won't sentence you." I have to proceed from the basis of these applications which have been refused. Some of them have been ticked as being totally without merit. That is where I am starting from.
49. THE APPLICANT: We are coming from different cultures.
50. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: We are coming from different angles. Forget cultures because you have no idea what culture I come from.
51. THE APPLICANT: I mean the culture of justice as opposed to the culture of law.
52. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: They are not necessarily mutually exclusive. That is where the court is coming from. In a sense what you need to do is - perhaps working on that basis - say to me, "Look, this is why I think you don't need to make this order."
53. THE APPLICANT: Quite honestly, I think you do need to make the order because I am going to continue bringing proceedings in this country until the Human Rights Act is actually properly implemented by the civil courts. If you want to try to restrain me from doing my loving duty because I am not in any way vexatious, I am doing this out of love for this country, love for my fellow man and love for God whose authority we all sit under here.
54. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: It boils down to this, if I can put it quite bluntly, you are going to pursue any case you want to if you think it is right and just to do so whatever the subject matter might be. Is that putting it too strongly?
55. THE APPLICANT: No, no. I am not interested in pursuing whatever case I want to. I am working out of a moral imperative that I see that there is a big problem in this country with judges bringing forth even corrupt judgments because I have met quite a few people in my trips to this wonderful building who have had some very interesting stories to tell me. I am not as extreme as them. I am not as angry as them. My motivation is purely to see a good, caring and protecting justice system in this country with good, loving, conscientious judges who want to get to the bottom of a problem and see society transformed into something better by the justice system rather than just closing the doors on those who want to change it. Because we all need to be shaken up sometimes, me included. So the court cases that I would bring, if I were ever to bring any, would be very specific and they would only be with that motivation unless obviously there were some kind of civil circumstances which arose to do with my work or something like that.
56. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: What I am trying to understand from you - and it is a relevant consideration - is whether you are saying that you are intent on bringing cases or you may be compelled to bring cases on other subject areas. Three strands we have identified. You do not, from what I understand, seem to be saying that you are confining yourself to doing that.
57. THE APPLICANT: No. I am not. I am not limiting myself in any way. I feel that God's work has to be done in the justice system in this country because there are some big problems in the civil justice system which thankfully the Lord brought to my attention in the case of Judge Levey. And I will not rest until change is brought that means no one else has to suffer the same injustice that I suffered and until such a time as a straightforward, proper interpretation of the Human Rights Act and the European Convention on Human Rights in the terms it is written is adhered to by the civil courts in this country. My motivation is very clear, very precise, very direct, very particular. I hope that has made my position clear so that they know. If you have any other questions.
58. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: I do not think it can be clearer. (Pause) They have not got a copy of an order. I need to have that brought to court because I am going to make an order for reasons I am going to give.

R U L I N G

59. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: This hearing is dealing with consideration of the imposition of a civil restraint order in respect of Mr Salmon who appeared yesterday before His Honour Judge McKenna, sitting as a Deputy High Court judge, who dealt with a number of renewed applications for permission to appeal. The judge indicated to Mr Salmon that the court would consider the imposition of a civil restraint order in the future.
60. The case was listed today for the final outstanding application for renewed application for permission which this court has refused. This court offered Mr Salmon the opportunity to deal with the issue of the civil restraint order on Friday, having set out a list of the applications which the court was apprised of so that he could make any submissions he wished in relation to the course of action the court may take. Mr Salmon, having had that offer made to him, indicated that he was happy to deal with this matter today and was in a position to deal with this matter today so this hearing has now proceeded to consider the issue.
61. The court handed Mr Salmon a list of six judicial review applications. Mr Salmon, very frankly and helpfully, acknowledged that there was a seventh case not on the court list which has been added now to the list. I am going to go through the list identifying the issues to which they relate. As agreed by Mr Salmon, there are three different strands identified in this list of applications all of which have been dismissed, four at least of which have been dismissed and marked to be totally without merit.
62. The first batch: there are two in the first group. Number CO/8418/2007 - Salmon v Feltham Magistrates' Court and London Borough of Hounslow - was a challenge to the decision of the magistrates' court to issue a liability order for non-payment of council tax. Related to that is [a matter numbered] CO/10864/2008 against Bromley County Court, the decision of Judge Richardson which related to the aforementioned claim (the Feltham Magistrates' Court claim).
63. The second batch has two cases: number CO/6485/2008 is against the European Court of Human Rights, challenging the refusal of the Court of Appeal to grant permission to appeal against the decision of His Honour Judge Levy QC. Permission was refused twice; number CO/7396/2008 is the case that this court has recently dealt with. That case was against Mr Justice Keith and thirteen others which challenged the decision of Mr Justice Keith not to give permission to appeal an order of Master Eyre in relation to property, the same subject matter as the other case.
64. There then followed three cases against Brentford County Court. Number CO/10831/2007 challenges a decision to set down for trial proceedings against Mr Salmon by the Halifax Bank for recovery of a debt owed allegedly to the bank. This was refused twice and marked "totally without merit". Linked to it - number CO/9330/2008 - was a matter against Brentford County Court challenging the order of 3 July 2008 of District Judge Jenkins in relation to proceedings brought by the Halifax. Permission was refused twice and marked "totally without merit". The third one is a different subject matter - number CO/10865/2008 - against District Judge Bosco (?), sitting at Brentford County Court, and five others which challenged the Land Registry charging order of 8 October 2008 in relation to some property. Permission was refused twice and marked "totally without merit".
65. The law is, and Mr Salmon accepts, that the court has power to make a civil restraint order. CPR 3.11 is headed "The Power of the Court to make civil restraint orders". It sets out -

"A practice direction may set out -

(a) the circumstances in which the court has the power to make a civil restraint order against a party to proceedings;

(b) the procedure where a party applies for a civil restraint order against another party; and

(c) the consequences of the court making a civil restraint order."

66. The commentary to the White Book under CPR 3.11 indicates that a court may make a civil restraint order on its own initiative. The relevant Practice Direction is 3PD.4, and the court is looking at the making of a general civil restraint order for reasons which will be set out shortly. But essentially paragraph 4.1 gives a judge of the High Court the power to make such an order against a person who persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate. Paragraphs 4.1 and 4.2 state:
67. "4.1 A general civil restraint order may be made by –

(1) a judge of the Court of Appeal;

(2) a judge of the High Court; or

(3) a designated civil judge or his appointed deputy in a county court

where the party against whom the order is made persists in issuing claims or making applications which are totally without merit, in circumstances where an extended civil restraint order would not be sufficient or appropriate.

4.2 Unless the court otherwise orders, where the court makes a general civil restraint order, the party against whom the order is made –

(1) will be restrained from issuing any claim or making any application in –

(a) any court if the order has been made by a judge of the Court of Appeal;

(b) the High Court or any county court if the order has been made by a judge of the High Court; or

(c) any county court identified in the order if the order has been made by a designated civil judge or his appointed deputy.

without first obtaining the permission of a judge identified in the order;

(2) may apply for amendment or discharge of the order provided he has first obtained the permission of a judge identified in the order; and

(3) may apply for permission to appeal the order and if permission is granted may appeal the order."

68. The effect is that permission will be needed of a judge identified in the order to bring proceedings in the High Court or any County Court.
69. As can be seen from the summary of the applications that have been brought by Mr Salmon, there have been not only a number of applications but a number of applications in relation to different subject matters, most of which have been declared to be totally without merit. The court does not need to go into any further details.
70. The court had in mind originally the imposition of an extended civil restraint order on the basis that these claims identify certain common threads and issues that are being relitigated. However on inquiry Mr Salmon has made it very plain that he is not limiting himself in any way, and I quote part of what he said, "God's work has to be done. The Lord has brought to my attention deficiences in the civil justice system and I won't rest until others don't suffer the same injustices and the civil courts adopt a proper interpretation and adhere to the Human Rights Act." His motivation, he says, is very direct and very particular. The last few lines were not a direct quote but were as best as I could get it down when Mr Salmon was speaking. His motivation is that he wishes to see a good, caring, conscientious system of judges rather than judges who close the door on those who wish to avail themselves of a fair criminal justice system.
71. Indeed when inviting Mr Salmon to make his representations as to why this court should not make an order, Mr Salmon said in response, "You do need to make the order as I am going to make these applications." He described his crusade (I use the word "crusade" although it had been used by Mr Salmon earlier today) as his "loving duty" which he intends to carry out and therefore he says the court should indeed make an order.
72. It is for those reasons that the court takes the view that an extended civil restraint order could not deal with the issues raised by what Mr Salmon has said because the court would, in effect, have to guess and speculate as to what the next cause of action might be.
73. I am quite satisfied from what I have read and what I have seen that this is a proper case in which to make a general civil order. I intend to make such an order. (Pause)
74. Mr Salmon, I do not want to start scribbling myself. My writing is appalling. I am asking the associate if he is going to fill it in for me. You will see the form; it has a penal notice at the head of it. In other words, you have to comply with it. The effect of it is, as I have already explained, if you want to issue a claim you have to apply for permission first to issue it. Do not just issue it because then you will be in contempt of the order. It is, in essence, an additional screening. Do not just issue the application and get it sealed. Bring it to the court if you do have a claim - and I am not encouraging it - you wish to bring. What will happen is - there is some guidance for people who are subject to these orders - instead of me reading out bits from the White Book, they will give you a copy of that to go with this. It has in it the date of the order which is today; the name of the judge, me; the person against whom the order is made, you; that the judge has considered the case of its own initiative; and upon hearing you and reading the court documents, the order is made. It says you have to obtain the permission of - what I will say is - a nominated judge. It is not a specific judge. It will be a nominated judge who is authorised to sit in the Administrative Court. So it could be one of thirty-something others.
75. THE APPLICANT: Thank you. This does not affect my right to be able to get transcripts and things like that.
76. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: No. This is actually bringing a claim. If you wanted to get a transcript of something that is - - - - -
77. THE APPLICANT: And making interlocutory applications.
78. MRS JUSTICE DOBBS: That you would have to check on. I think you need to double-check on that because it is making an application. It is issuing any proceedings which an interlocutory application is issuing proceedings of a sort. So anything like that, ask permission. Getting a transcript, I cannot see that is a problem.
79. Then "it is further ordered" - I do not need to make any further order. The order will remain in effect until you can make an application for permission to amend or discharge the order but you have to give notice. The other party is only the court. You would have to give notice to the court. That application is determined without a hearing. It says it all in the document. There will be no order for costs because there was no other party involved. You will see a copy of it but that is essentially what the thing is. (Pause)
80. We are running not at full steam in the courts at the moment because of the transport problems so the associate is saying it is better if he can send it out to Mr Salmon. (To court associate) Will you ensure that the guidance is also sent? (To applicant) I think that is it, Mr Salmon, for the time being.
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