QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
London WC2A 2LL
B e f o r e :
MRS JUSTICE SWIFT DBE
|THE GOVERNMENT OF LATVIA||Defendant|
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Miss C Powell (instructed by the CPS) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
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"Notice of an appeal under this section must be given in accordance with the Rules of Court before the end of the permitted period, which is seven days starting with the day on which the order is made."
The Practice Direction to CPR Part 52 provides in paragraph 22.6A that the appellant's notice must be filed and served before the expiry of seven days, starting with the day on which the order is made. Thus, it reflects the terminology of the statute.
"When the period specified by the Rules or a Practice Direction or by any judgment or court order for doing any act at the court office ends on a day on which the office is closed, that act shall be in time if done on the next day on which the court office is open."
That provision was raised in argument on the appellant's behalf in Barcys, but it was apparently conceded that it did not apply directly because the time limit in question is statutory rather than a time limit under the Rules or under the Practice Direction, a judgment or a court order. The court in Barcys seems to have proceeded on the basis of that concession.
"So I am prepared to hold that when a time is prescribed by statute for doing any act and that act can only be done if the court office is open on the day when the time expires, then if it turns out in any particular case that the day is a Sunday or other dies non, the time is extended until the next day on which the court office is open."
That line of reasoning would appear to be in line with the way I have suggested the matter might also be analysed by reference to the current Civil Procedure Rules, to which section 26(4) makes reference - subject, of course, to the question whether, if a notice of appeal can be filed by fax, there is no need for the court office to be open and the reasoning of Lord Denning, as applied in Aadan, can be said not to bite.
18. Barcys is authority for the proposition that time for service cannot be extended. Mucelli came down against dispensing with service on the facts of that case when no attempt had been made to serve the notice within the time limit, and to dispense with the requirement of service would have been an unacceptable circumvention of the statutory time limit. The same reasoning applies here, and in my view there is nothing in the circumstances of the case that would warrant what would be a highly exceptional exercise of discretion in the appellant's favour.