QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(Sitting as a Deputy Judge)
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THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF RAJASEKARAN | Claimant | |
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | Defendant |
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Ms Parishil Patel and Miss N Greaney (instructed by Treasury Solicitor) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
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Crown Copyright ©
The facts
"Given the current situation in Sri Lanka it seems to me the court should consider whether it was appropriate for the defendant to certify this case as clearly unfounded."
The issue
The law
"The decision-maker will –
1. consider the factual substance and detail of the claim.
2. consider how it stands with the known background data.
3. consider whether in the round it is capable of belief.
4. if not, consider whether some part of it is capable of belief.
5. consider whether, if eventually believed in whole or in part, it is capable of coming within the Convention.
"Must be approached in a way that gives full weight to the United Kingdom's obligations under the ECHR."
Lord Bingham adopted a similar test; namely, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the allegation must clearly fail. Lord Hutton drew attention to the fact that in considering the question whether the claim was manifestly unfounded, the Secretary of State should have regard to the fact that the onus rests with the applicant to show that there are substantial grounds for believing that if removed he would face a real risk of mistreatment contrary to Article 3.
Country of origin guidance
"Dr Smith, at paragraph 121 of his second report, identified this as a risk element noting that the appellant in this case had been detained on suspicion of being an LTTE member and then released on bail. Dr Gunaratna went [on] further to state that it was very likely the Sri Lankan Government would have a record of the appellant firstly because he had been arrested and jumped bail, and secondly because Sri Lankan Government records would state he was a member or supporter of the LTTE.
210. From our assessment of the background evidence, we find that it is of vital importance, in the assessment of each Sri Lankan Tamil case, to establish an applicant's profile, and the credibility of his background, in some depth. For example if the appellant was not credible as to his background from the north or the east, which left a situation where he could be a Tamil from Colombo who had little or no involvement with the LTTE, there could be, based on the reality of the assessment of his predicament, little risk (or almost certainly not risk at the level of engaging either Convention."
In respect of bail jumping, at paragraph 212 the tribunal said:
"The background information provided to us here indicated that those who had jumped bail would be at a real risk of being detained either at the airport or if they later come in contact with the Sri Lankan authorities. In Professor Goode's specific report on the appellant, he deals with this issue. He noted in this case that the appellant was taken (in Colombo) and subsequently released on formal bail. He notes this as a 'relatively unusual aspect' of the appellant's account. (We agree for reasons we set out below). He stated that it appears to be far more common practice, especially outside Colombo, to release a detainee without the requirement of a bail bond although generally through the payment of a bribe, not least because it is only in very rare cases the detainee will ever have been produced in court. He states that in any case the available evidence does not support the contention that the detainee's release of itself indicates the authorities have no continuing interest in him. He considers that it cannot be concluded that release without charge or without the payment of a bribe precludes subsequent detention and notes a report from the Swiss Refugee Council in that regard. He submits that the issue is one of logic that having detained persons in Sri Lanka there is a practice and routinely re-arresting and re-detaining people on the basis of obtaining confession evidence by torture. This evidence appears to be supported by Dr Smith and Dr Gunaratna."
The tribunal continued at paragraph 214:
"The situation however, in respect of those who have not been to court and may have been released after the payment of a bribe we do not consider falls into the same category. Much will depend on the evidence relating to the formality of the detention (or lack of it) and the manner in which the bribe was taken and the credibility of the total story. If the detention is an informal one, or it is highly unlikely that the bribe or 'bail' has been officially recorded, then the risk level to the applicant is likely to be below that of a real risk. The respondent contends that a detention by the authorities, when there is a suspicion of bail jumping or escape from detention, would lead to harassment only, and not maltreatment rising to the level of persecution, or a breach of the humanitarian protection or Article 3 thresholds. While we would agree that there may well be situations where Tamils, with little or no profile related to the LTTE, or other 'terrorist' groups, could be briefly detained and harassed, as no doubt happens in round ups in Colombo and elsewhere, we consider it illogical to assume that an escapee, from Sri Lankan government detention, or a bail jumper from the Sri Lankan court system, would be merely 'harassed' given the climate of torture with impunity that is repeatedly confirmed as existent in the background material from all sources. We consider, (as we think it does in the appellant's particular case), that the totality of the evidence may point to a real risk, in some cases, of persecution or really serious harm when a recorded escapee or bail jumper is discovered, on return to Sri Lanka."
In respect of that I should draw attention to the interview of the claimant in respect of his first detention from the continuation sheet. He was asked:
"Q. What date were you released on your second occasion?"
A. I was arrested on 31st and released after three weeks.
Q. What month?
A. January 2001.
Q. Were you ill-treated during your second detention?
A. I was beaten, asked why I did not come and sign. Q. How many times were you beaten?
A. I was beaten on the whole day I was arrested."
"The background evidence on the issue of scarring has fluctuated. Up until the time of the ceasefire it was generally accepted as something which the Sri Lankan authorities noted and took into account both at the airport and on detention and in strip searches of suspected Tamil LTTE supporters. Their perception that it may indicate training by the LTTE, or participation in active warfare, was self-evident, and simply was 'good' policing, as appeared to be suggested by the Inspector General of Police in his discussions with Dr Smith. On the same logic it was also valid to conclude that the impact of scarring was of far less interest during the period 2002 - late 2005 while the ceasefire agreement was having some effective impact. ...
We agree with the comments in Dr Smith's report, that the issue of scarring was considered by the police to be a very serious indicator of whether a Tamil might have been involved in the LTTE. However, on the evidence now before us we consider that the scarring issue should be one that only has significance when there are other factors that would bring an applicant to the attention of the authorities, either at the airport or subsequently in Colombo, such as being wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant or a lack of identity. We therefore agree that the COIR remarks that it may be a relevant, but not an overriding, factor. Thus, whilst the presence of scarring may promote interest in a young Tamil under investigation by the Sri Lankan authorities, we do not consider that, merely because a young Tamil has scars, he will automatically be ill-treated in detention."
The tribunal considered risk profiles for Tamils at paragraph 227:
"Our assessment of the various risk factors above has highlighted that each case must be determined on its own facts. It may be that in some credible cases one of these individual risk factors on its own will establish a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return by the Sri Lankan authorities for Sri Lankan Tamils who are failed asylum seekers from the United Kingdom. For those with a lower profile, assessed on one or a combination of the risk factors we have noted however, such as this appellant, their specific profiles must be assessed in each situation and set against the above non-exhaustive and non-conclusive, set of risk factors and the volatile country situation. As can be noted, several factors, such as being subject to an outstanding arrest warrant, or a proven bail jumper from a formal bail hearing may establish a much higher level of propensity to risk than various other factors. In this situation therefore, the assessment exercise is a much larger and more detailed one than may have been the situation up to 2002 and certainly during the period of the cease fire agreement. The current worsening situation in Sri Lanka requires serious consideration of all of the above factors, a review of up to date country of origin information set against the very carefully assessed profile of the appellant."
They concluded at paragraph 234:
"Tamils make up over 10% of the population of Colombo. Despite evidence of some forms of discrimination, the evidence does not show they face serious hardships merely because they are Tamils. As a result, other considerations apart and subject to individual assessment of each applicant's specific case, it cannot be argued that, even if he faces serious harm in his home area, as a general presumption it is unduly harsh to expect a Tamil to relocate to Colombo, or that it would be a breach of Article 3 to expect him or her to do so, or that doing so would put him or her at real risk of serious harm entitling them to humanitarian protection.
236. Other issues which require careful evaluation involve the previous attention paid to the appellant by the Sri Lankan authorities. Questions of whether the appellant has been previously detained and for how long will be significant, as will the reasons for the detention. A short detention following a round-up may be of little significance; a longer detention as a result of a targeted operation will be much more significant. The question of release and how that came about may be important. It should be recognised that the procurement of bribes is a common occurrence in Sri Lanka and that the release following payment of a bribe is not necessarily evidence of any continuing interest. Care should be taken to distinguish between release following the payment of a bribe and release following the grant of bail. Care should be taken in the use of language here. Release on payment of a bribe, and release on bail with a surety could be confused. Both forms of release follow discussions about, and possibly payment of, money. The evidence is that the police in Sri Lanka do, in appropriate circumstances, grant bail. In this particular case bail was granted by a court. If the Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant has jumped bail (and that would include failing to report under a reporting condition), it is necessary to assess the reason for which bail was granted in the first place. Not every young, male Tamil who is arrested will have been so arrested because of sectarian activity. As in any other society a proportion will have committed, or been suspected of committing more mundane criminal, and often minor, offences."
"On the basis of this evidence, the Court therefore finds that, in the context of Tamils being returned to Sri Lanka, the protection of Article 3 of the Convention enters into play when an applicant can establish that there are serious reasons to believe that he or she would be of sufficient interest to the authorities in their efforts to combat the LTTE as to warrant his or her detention and interrogation.
134. In respect of returns to Sri Lanka through Colombo, the Court also finds that there is a greater risk of detention and interrogation at the airport than in Colombo city since the authorities will have a greater control over the passage of persons through any airport than they will over the population at large. In addition, the majority of the risk factors identified by [the] AIT in LP will be more likely to bring a returnee to the attention of the authorities at the airport than in Colombo city. It is also at the airport that the cumulative risk to an applicant arising from two or more factors will crystalise. Hence the Court's assessment of whether a returnee is at real risk of ill-treatment may turn on whether that person would be likely to be detained and interrogated at Colombo airport as someone of interest to the authorities. While this assessment is an individual one, it too must be carried out with appropriate regard to all relevant factors taken cumulatively including any heightened security measures that may be in place as a result of an increase in the general situation of violence in Sri Lanka."
The court continued at paragraph 136:
"This evidence on procedures and facilities at the airport must also be placed alongside the AIT's finding on the availability of lists of failed asylum seekers to the Sri Lankan authorities, which was based on the British High Commission's letter of 24 August 2006 and the evidence that scarring has been used in the past by the authorities as a means of identifying Tamils who will be of interest to them. The Court notes the AIT's finding, in the light of that evidence, that 'failed asylum seekers are processed relatively quickly and with no difficulty beyond some possible harassment' but it considers that at the very least the Sri Lankan authorities have the technological means and procedures in place to identify at the airport failed asylum seekers and those who are wanted by the authorities. The Court further finds that it is a logic inference from these findings that the rigour of the checks at the airport is capable of varying from time to time, depending on the security concerns of the authorities. These considerations must inform the Court's assessment of the risk to the applicant."
The court went on to consider the particular facts in that case (and paragraph 142 follows the approach in LP), saying that the court will assess the strength of the applicant's claim to be at real risk as a result of the accumulation of the risk factors identified in LP, or that it will do so in the light of its own observations:
"In particular, the court underlines first, the need to have due regard for the deterioration of the security situation in Sri Lanka and the corresponding increase in general violence and heightened security, and second, the need to take a cumulative approach to all possible risk factors identified by the applicant as applicable to his case."
The court continued at 144:
"The Court also accepts the assessment of the AIT that scarring will have significance only when there are other factors that will bring the applicant to the attention of the authorities such as being wanted on an outstanding arrest warrant or a lack of means of identification. However, where there is a sufficient risk that an applicant will be detained, interrogated and searched, the presence of scarring, with all the significance that the Sri Lankan authorities are then likely to attach to it, must be taken as greatly increasing the cumulative risk of ill-treatment to that applicant. 145. The Court recognises that it has been over ten years since the applicant was last detained by the Sri Lankan army. However, the Court considers that the greatest possible caution should be taken when, as in the applicant's case, it is accepted that a returnee has previously been detained and a record made of that detention. As the AIT found in LP, such a record may be readily accessible to airport authorities, meaning the person in question may become of interest to the authorities during his or her passage through the airport. Where there is a likelihood this will result in delay in entering the country, there is clearly a greater risk of detention and interrogation and with it a greater risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. Equally, in light of its observations ... , the Court finds the passage of time cannot be determinative of the risk to the present applicant without a corresponding assessment of the current general policies of the Sri Lankan authorities. Their interest in particular categories of returnees is likely to change over time in response to domestic documents developments and may increase as well as decrease. In the Court's view, it cannot be excluded that on any given date if there is an increase in the general situation of violence then the security situation in Sri Lanka will be such as to require additional security at the airport. The Court also recalls its findings, notably that computerised records are available to the airport authorities. Given that it is undisputed that the applicant was arrested six times between 1990 and 1997, that he was ill-treated in detention and that it appears a record was made of his detention on at least one occasion, the Court considers that there is a real risk that the applicant's record will be available to the authorities at the airport. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that on any given date the security situation in Sri Lanka would be such as to require additional security at the airport and that, due to his risk profile, the applicant would be at even greater risk of detention and interrogation."
Finally at 147 the court said:
"The Court has taken note of the current climate of general violence in Sri Lanka and has considered cumulatively the factors present in the applicant's case. It also notes its finding that those considered by the authorities to be of interest in their efforts to combat the LTTE are systematically exposed to torture and ill-treatment. There is a real risk that the authorities at Colombo airport would be able to access the records relating to the applicant's detention and if they did so, when taken cumulatively with the other risk factors he has relied upon, it is likely the applicant would be detained and strip-searched. This in turn would lead to the discovery of his scars. On this basis, the Court finds that these are substantial grounds for finding that the applicant would be of interest to the Sri Lankan authorities in their efforts to combat the LTTE. In those circumstances, the Court finds that at the present time there would be a violation of Article 3 if the applicant were to be returned."
"Although the country guidance has not been sought regarding this aspect of the appeal, we need also to address the issue of the risk to returnees from the authorities. We have been asked in particular to give our view on whether the second of the risk factors identified in LP applies to Miss AN, namely whether she has a 'previous record as a suspected or actual LTTE member or supporter.' Much energy was initially expended on the question whether the CID at the airport have computers or not, but as Professor Good observed, even id the CID do not, the Immigration Service certainly does, and when incoming passengers are being checked, a 'Stop List' and a 'Watch List' on the computer will alert the immigration officer to anyone in whom the CID would have an interest. The Tribunal in LP accepted that this is so, and found that the appellant in that case would be on the computer record because he had been formally brought before a court and had been granted bail before absconding. He therefore came within the fourth of the risk categories, namely 'bail jumping'. We note also that the head of the CID told a Home Office [commission] in 2002 that photographs of wanted persons were not available at the airport, but that their names were on the computer.
106. The background evidence clearly supports the existence of a centralised national database accessible by the security services. The National Intelligence Bureau is said to have records going back ten years or even longer, and to have had a central database since 2004. Although there is a lack of computer facilities in the north of the island, paper records are sent south and are transferred onto the computer database. The question for us then is not whether, as in the case of the LTTE, the database exists at all, but who would be on the database. In his oral evidence, Professor Good did not venture to surmise who was likely to be stopped at the airport, save those for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, although in his written report he expressed the view that the authorities have every incentive to maintain official records of suspects who have been arrested, even if they have subsequently been released without charge. Dr Smith was less cautious, asserting that the central database contains the names of all those who have ever been detained and subsequently released as 'unacquitted suspects.'
107. We think that Dr Smith has allowed himself, as he did with the LTTE database, to slip from the idea that it would be useful to have certain information on a database to a prediction that the information must be on a database. We think it intrinsically unlikely that everyone who has ever been detained by the authorities in the course of the Sri Lankan conflict, or at least in the last 10-15 years, is now on a computer database which is checked by the Immigration Service when failed asylum seekers arrive at the airport, and is checked by the police or army when people are picked up at road-blocks or in cordon-and-search operations. The evidence suggests, on the contrary, that the database is far narrower than that. When Tamils are picked up in Colombo the authorities want to know why they have come and what they are doing, if they are not long-term residents of the city. There are no reports of people being detained and perhaps sent to Boossa camp at Galle because they were once held for questioning in Jaffna or Batticaloa years before. As for arrivals at Bandaranaike International Airport, the 'Watch List' and the 'Stop List' clearly contain the names of people who are 'seriously' wanted who (to use a phrase of Mr Justice Collins) by the authorities. Equally clearly, the evidence does not indicate that they contain the names of everyone who has ever been questioned about possible knowledge of, or involvement in, the LTTE. The majority of Sri Lankan asylum seekers coming to this country claim to have been detained at some time by the authorities, but there are no reports of any being detained at the airport on return because they were once held for questioning years ago and then released."
"It is noted that your client has not been charged with any offence by the Sri Lankan authorities and was released after his periods in detention. Furthermore he was not detained because of his work as a teacher for the LTTE. When your client's claim was rejected by the French authorities he returned to Sri Lanka and did not claim to have encountered any problems with the Sri Lankan authorities on his return. Although he continued to work for the LTTE as a teacher."
And at paragraph 21:
"It is therefore considered that the Sri Lankan authorities would not have an interest in your client when he is returned to Sri Lanka."
On bail jumping, paragraph 24, the Secretary of State refers to part of the judgment of Collins J in Thangeswarajaj [2007] EWHC 3288, and in particular the frequency of bribes being paid in the context of custody release. The Secretary of State goes on in paragraph 25:
"In view of the fact that your client was at least on one occasion released as the result of a bribe and stated that he had no problems with the authorities upon his return in 2002, it is considered that this factor does not apply to your client."
On scarring at paragraph 30 the defendant says:
"As noted above, it is not accepted that the Sri Lankan authorities would have any record of your client. It is therefore considered that, this factor alone would not place him at risk."
The defendant deals with the risk of detention, saying, at paragraph 41:
"Your client will possibly be identified as a failed asylum-seeker who is returning to London by the authorities at Colombo airport when it is not considered the information about indicates that failed asylum seekers per se face any great difficulty on return the evidence indicates that it is when there is an outstanding warrant there is a real risk -- is there a real risk of detention. There is no evidence that there is an outstanding warrant for your client's arrest indeed as previously stated he was released without charge from his two periods of detention.
42. No evidence has been supplied to indicate that the authorities would now have any adverse interest in your client beyond the initial immigration screening."
At paragraph 50 the defendant concluded:
"Whilst some of the LP risk factors are applicable to your client, in light of the analysis above (when assessing these factors in line with the judgment in NA), there is no prospect of your client persuading the AIT (on any appeal) that he would face a real risk of ill-treatment from the authorities upon his return to Sri Lanka."
In respect of the current situation in Sri Lanka, at paragraph 62 the defendant says:
"Concern has been raised over recent abductions and disappearances within Colombo. Reports have implicated the Sri Lankan security services in several instances, with the re-emergence of enforced disappearances being linked to the introduction of new Emergency Regulations in August 2005. It is considered that due to the still relatively small number of abductions that have taken place in the Colombo area since 20 August 2006, together with the professional background of many of those abducted, with either high informatory or financial value, that the vast majority of the Tamil population in Colombo are not at real risk of abduction in Colombo.
63. Furthermore it is noted that there have been some violent incidents in Sri Lanka recently in 2008. On 6 August 2008, it was noted that 24 civilians were killed in the past month during the proposal to extend emergency. The death of persons including two children and seven women injured in an Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) triggered parcel bomb explosion. Furthermore on 1 September 2008, the BBC reported that civilians living in the LTTE-held areas were urged by the outfit to construct bunkers in all places as Safety Mechanism. The Government announced the Ministry of Defence had taken 'swift measures to establish a safe corridor' to enable passage of civilians in the LTTE-held territory in the north.
64. Although it is accepted that the general security situation has deteriorated as a result of heightened conflict between the Government and LTTE, it is equally clear that the main incidents of insecurity continued to be reported in the northern and eastern districts. Your client would be removed to Colombo in the South of Sri Lanka and not to the North or East area. It is considered that the periodic large-scale cordon and search security operations in Colombo in recent months that have led to the typically brief arrest of persons to establish their identity, do not establish a real risk of arrest, detention and ill-treatment for the general Tamil populace in Colombo. There is no evidence to suggest that your client would be at risk in Colombo.
65. It is not accepted that this evidence changes the position. For the reasons stated above, it is not considered that your client fears persecution from either the Sri Lankan authorities or the LTTE or that his removal to Sri Lanka would breach his rights under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights."
Submissions
Consideration