England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		30 January 2008

1. MR JUSTICE WALKER: Two cases have been listed before the court today involving Mr John Pearson. They concern his dealings with the London Borough of Greenwich, which I shall refer to as "Greenwich". Greenwich thought Mr Pearson had misled them.
2. At one stage Greenwich said that Mr Pearson contravened section 111A of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. That section reads:

"111A.-(1)(If a person dishonestly-

(a) makes a false statement or representation; [or]

(b) produces or furnishes, or causes or allows to be produced or furnished, any document or information which is false in a material particular;

[…]

with the view to obtaining any benefit or other payment or advantage under the [relevant] social security legislation (whether for himself or for some other person), he shall be guilty of an offence.

3. […]
4. (3) A person guilty of an offence under this section shall be liable-

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both; or

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years, or to a fine, or to both.

5. Later Greenwich abandoned that assertion. Instead, it said that Mr Pearson contravened section 112 of the same Act. This section reads: -

"112 False representations for obtaining benefit etc

(1) If a person for the purpose of obtaining any benefit or other payment under the relevant social security legislation whether for himself or some other person, or for any other purpose connected with that legislation—

(a) makes a statement or representation which he knows to be false; or

(b) produces or furnishes, or knowingly causes or knowingly allows to be produced or furnished, any document or information which he knows to be false in a material particular,

he shall be guilty of an offence.

6. The first case listed before us today, CO/6822/2007, is an application for judicial review. For reasons, which I shall explain, it is not necessary to go into the details of that application. It was concerned with the question whether the District Judge, having permitted amendment of the information so as to assert an offence under section 112 rather than section 111A, ought to have stated a case for this court in that regard.
7. The amended information alleging an offence under section 112(1) asserted that on 10 May 2005 Mr Pearson, in an application for Council Tax Benefit, with a view to obtaining benefit or other advantage under the social security legislation, made a false statement or representation knowing it to be false, namely that he owned only one property, whereas as he was then also the registered owner of another property. The case proceeded to trial in the Magistrates' Court on the alleged offence under section 112. This trial took place on 29 March 2007. Mr Pearson was convicted. He asked the magistrates to state a case for appeal to this court. They duly did so.
8. The second case before us, CO/7108/2007, is Mr Pearson's appeal by way of case stated against his conviction of the offence under section 112. What the prosecution alleged reflected the three elements in the offence. The first was a positive act that Mr Pearson falsely stated that he owned only (my emphasis) one property, namely 71 Eglington Road, SE18, whereas he was also the registered owner of a property at 103 Naylor Road, SE15. The second was a mental element, that Mr Pearson knew this statement to be false. The third was a further requisite mental element, that Mr Pearson had made the false representation with a view to obtaining benefit, or other advantage, under the social security legislation.
9. Mr Pearson admitted that he owned both properties. He gave evidence that when he applied for Council Tax rebate in respect of 71 Eglington Road the form asked for addresses of property he owned, but expressly stated that he should not include the home where he lived. He said that 103 Naylor Road was the home where he lived. He added that Greenwich were well aware of this from other dealings he had had with the Council.
10. In the case stated the Justices record their findings. They concluded that Mr Pearson had made a statement in relation to his claim for Council Tax Benefit, which he knew to be false, by omitting to declare the Naylor Road address in any part of the form. The Justices drew attention to certain specific parts of the form. There had been an omission to declare the address at the front of the form in part 1, where the address of the claimant was requested, and in part 5, a part of the form dealing with: "any property you own". The Justices said that Mr Pearson had also omitted to declare his mortgage repayments in relation to the Naylor Road address in part 4 of the form. They added that the form indicated that help and advice was available in completing the form, and that Mr Pearson had made no request for such help or advice. He had signed to say that he fully understood the form and the consequences of making a false statement.
11. In the case stated the magistrates identified three questions for the opinion of this court:

"a. Whether it is correct that a person can be said to have made a false statement with the allegation being that wrong information was positively given by saying that that person omitted to give certain information; and

b. Whether a person can be said to have made a false statement by omitting certain information where no specific place is identified on the relevant form as being the place where that particular information should be placed;

c. Whether the state of knowledge of the recipient of a statement is relevant in determining whether a false statement has been made under section 112(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992."

12. On the appeal Mr Bhavin Patel appears on behalf of Mr Pearson, as he did below.. He notes that the magistrates' findings did not take issue with contentions on the part of Mr Pearson that he had left the box for "Your address" in part 1 of the form blank; that he omitted the Naylor Road address in part 5 of the form because that part of the form instructed "do not include the home where you live", and that Greenwich was aware that Mr Pearson resided at the Naylor Road address from other dealings it had had with Mr Pearson.
13. Mr Patel's essential submission is that the relevant form did not, at any point, require provision of details of all the addresses of an applicant, and it was up to the Council to ensure that its form was clear and adequate in terms of the inquiries it wished to make. Thus the focus is on the factual element of the offence: whether there was evidence on which a court could reasonably find that the positive act alleged by Greenwich in fact took place.
14. There has been no appearance on behalf of Greenwich, nor has Greenwich provided any observations in writing to the court. In those circumstances I shall examine the material before the court in order to consider, as best I can, whether there is sufficient in the case stated to answer Mr Patel's submission.
15. At the outset it may be noted that the amended information did not specify precisely how Mr Pearson represented that the only property he owned was Eglington Road. It would have been better if the information had been more specific in that regard. However, it seems to me that it was open, in all the circumstances, to Greenwich to assert that Mr Pearson's lodging of the form, when taken as a whole, conveyed an inaccurate account. The question raised by the case stated is substantially whether the evidence was capable of making good that assertion.
16. The crucial document was the form signed by Mr Pearson. It has been produced as an exhibit to the case stated. The first matter relied on by the magistrates concerns the front page where the form asked for a name and address. Here Mr Pearson gave the address, 71 Eglington Road. I do not think that complaint can be made of this. That was the address of the property for which he was seeking Council Tax Benefit. The omission of the Naylor Road address was not, in my view, capable of amounting to a false statement that he owned only one property in that regard. Moreover, as I shall explain when examining part 5 of the form, when the form is taken as a whole Mr Pearson made it clear that 71 Eglington Road was not his residential address.
17. Next the magistrates referred to part 1 of the form. Here, however, the magistrates accepted in paragraph 6 of the statement of case that it was possible that Mr Pearson had, as he contended, left this part blank, and that the Eglington Road address was filled in by a member of Greenwich's staff. In those circumstances, to my mind, it is clear that Greenwich had not proved that Mr Pearson did anything other than leave the box blank, and thus had not shown any positive conduct by Mr Pearson sufficient to be capable of amounting to the making of a false statement.
18. The third matter relied on by the magistrates was part 5 of the form. Here the wording used by Greenwich in the form was clear. The form stated expressly that in part 5 details were not to be included of the home where Mr Pearson lived. In those circumstances his omission of the Naylor Road address was not, in any sense, the making of a false statement. On the contrary, it complied with the instruction given in the form. What Mr Pearson did was to include the Eglington Road address. To my mind, that put Greenwich on clear notice that Mr Pearson did not live at Eglington Road, and if that gave rise to any desire on the part of Greenwich to have more information, then it was open to Greenwich to seek that information.
19. The fourth matter referred to by the magistrates is a finding that there was a failure to include mortgage repayments in relation to the Naylor Road address in part 4 of the form. Part 4 required the entry of certain information as to the amount of mortgage payments. It may be that Mr Pearson did not include the full amount of his mortgage repayments. In that regard, it may be that the form was, as a matter of fact, false. That was not, however, the charge which Mr Pearson faced. The charge was that he represented that he owned only one property. Part 4 of the form was entirely silent as to the number of properties in respect of which payments were made. I cannot identify in part 4 of the form anything said by Mr Pearson that constituted a representation that he only owned one property.
20. Finally, the magistrates referred to the signature of the form without making any request for help or advice. For my part, I cannot see how this is material to the question whether Mr Pearson in fact made a false statement.
21. For all these reasons, in my view, the appeal should be allowed. I would answer question (a) "A false statement or representation will be made if the defendant, on the occasion in question, by words or conduct or both, when taken as a whole, conveyed an inaccurate account. Whether an omission renders a statement or representation inaccurate will depend upon the overall effect of the defendant's words or conduct when taken as a whole." In the circumstances that I have described, it seems to me that questions (b) and (c) do not call for any answer by this court.
22. I turn to the application for judicial review. This can be dealt with shortly. In the light of the court's indication of its conclusion in relation to the appeal, Mr Pearson has indicated that he withdraws his application for judicial review. That matter accordingly does not arise for consideration any further today.
23. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by my Lord. The order in relation to that will include the quashing of the conviction, the conditional discharge, and the order for costs imposed in the Magistrates' Court will thereby lapse. I also agree with the course proposed in relation to the application for judicial review.

Mr Patel, thank you very much.

MR PATEL: Thank you my Lord, I think the only matter is legal aid taxation.

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Yes, legal aid was granted by Sullivan J. Yes, you may have an order for assessment.

MR PATEL: Thank you, my Lord.

MR JUSTICE WALKER: Do you seek an order for costs against Greenwich on the appeal?

MR PATEL: Yes, my Lord.

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Mr Patel, was Mr Pearson represented at the Crown Court, or was he in person?

MR PATEL: In the Magistrates' Court he was represented, yes.

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: He was, by solicitors or council?

MR PATEL: By myself.

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: On legal aid or privately?

MR PATEL: It was on legal aid.

LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: We will simply make the order for your legal aid assessment. We infer from what you tell us that Mr Pearson is not out of pocket if we make that order. As between the various public authorities who might conceivably foot the bill, on this occasion we will let the legal aid authority take the bill and, of course, Greenwich will have to now foot their own bill for the hearing for the magistrates, because Mr Pearson is relieved of that order for costs. Thank you very much.