QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand London WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF GENERAL MEDICAL COUNCIL | Claimant | |
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DR PLAVELIL ABRAHAM GEORGE | Defendant |
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Ms Margaret Bowron QC (instructed by Messrs Weightmans LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
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(1) The court has the power and the duty to consider whether any extension of time beyond the initial period set by the GMC is appropriate. Under the scheme, this exercise in decision making is to be performed by the court as the primary decision-maker.
(2) The court has the power to determine that there should be no extension or that there should be the extension sought by the GMC or some lesser extension. In an appropriate case, the judge also has a power under section 41A(10) to terminate the suspension or to shorten the current period of suspension.
(3) The criteria to be applied are the same as for the original interim order under section 41A(1), namely the protection of the public, the public interest and the practitioner's own interests. The court can take into account such matters as the gravity of the allegation, the nature of the evidence, the seriousness of the risk of harm to patients, the reasons why the case has not been concluded and the prejudice to the practitioner if an interim order is continued.
(4) The onus of satisfying the court that the criteria are met falls on the GMC. The relevant standard is the civil standard.
(5) The judge must reach his decision as to whether to grant an extension on the basis of the evidence on the application, which will have been examined with care.
(6) The power to grant an extension and the power to make the orders set out in section 41A(10) represent the limit of the court's express powers in relation to interim measures. Parliament has not given the court power to determine in the first instance whether an interim suspension order or conditional order should be made. It has clearly taken the view that the GMC is better placed than the courts to decide such matters.
(7) It is not the function of the judge under section 41A(7) to make findings of primary fact nor is there any threshold test to be satisfied before the court can exercise its power of extension.
(8) The evidence on the application will include evidence as to the opinion of the GMC and the IOP or the Fitness to Practise Panel as to the need for an interim order. Appropriate weight will be given to that. All that is required is that the court should give that opinion such weight as in the circumstances of the case it thinks fit.
(9) Finally, the function of the court is to ascertain whether the allegations made against the medical practitioner, rather than their truth or falsity, justify the prolongation of the suspension.
Are there any other matters?