England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		10th April 2008

1. LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: Chinwe Bernadette Izegbu appeals against the findings of a Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal, dated 1st May of 2007. She appeals both against the findings that she was guilty of all but one of the charges brought against her and she appeals against the penalty of striking off and also the order of costs. She represented herself before the Tribunal.
2. We can deal very briefly with the costs order first. She was ordered to pay three fifths of £55,000. Mr Cadman, who represents the Law Society, has very fairly drawn our attention to the decision in Merrick v The Law Society [2007] EWHC 2997 (Admin). He concedes that the Disciplinary Tribunal did not have regard to her means as required by that decision. He accepts that in so far as the order of costs is concerned, the matter should be remitted to the Disciplinary Tribunal to determine what is the appropriate order of costs in the light of the principles set out in Merrick.
3. The appellant is not present. We decided at the outset of the hearing today that we would not grant any further adjournment and I now give reasons for reaching that conclusion. On 4th April 2008 the appellant wrote to the Administrative Court Office, asking for an adjournment. She said that as far back as October 2007 she had spoken to counsel and asked him to represent her. She has attached correspondence about that. There is a letter dated 3rd October to a Mr Marc Beaumont in which she sends him all the appeal documentation. She points out in the letter that the she had made an attempt at drafting grounds of appeal but asks him to perfect them. She expresses her belief that the decision of the Tribunal was perverse. It is clear from the attached email correspondence that Mr Beaumont was not prepared even to look at the papers unless he was put in receipt of funds. He refers to a fee required by him to look at the papers. Having looked at the papers, he would then, so he wrote, give the appropriate fee for conducting the appeal. In an email dated 10th March 2008 to Mr Victor Izegbu, who is a consultant surgeon and who is the elder brother of the appellant, Mr Beaumont asked for a fee of £1,750 plus VAT to read the "voluminous file of papers and to meet your sister to discuss the case". He then says that he cannot at this stage say what it would cost to represent her at the hearing.
4. According to an email dated February 29th 2008, the appellant was saying that she would prefer to give Mr Beaumont the bankers draft in person at the time of the proposed meeting, an offer Mr Beaumont rejected. By Monday 3rd March Mr Beaumont was telling her that the original date for the meeting had now been lost. He said, however, that he would offer a date on receipt of the funds. No money ever appears to have been paid. Mr Beaumont then accepted the instructions of a co-appellant, Mr Samuel Okoronkwo. It is clear there would have been a conflict of interest if he had sought to represent both Mr Okoronkwo and the appellant.
5. In her letter of 4th April, she asks for an adjournment so that she can find someone to represent her on the appeal. In my view she has not taken the necessary steps to ensure that she is legally represented before us. She failed to pay the money which Mr Beaumont was requesting. When this case was listed on Tuesday, she did not attend. We asked her to be told that we would adjourn the hearing until today and that in the meantime we would continue with the appeal of Mr Okoronkwo. We asked that she be invited to attend. She has not communicated, as far as we are aware, either with the Administrative Court Office or with Mr Cadman, who represents the respondent on this appeal. Also in her letter she asks us if we are minded to proceed with the hearing in her absence, then to consider her written submissions and allow the appeal.
6. I, for my part, find it unfortunate that the appellant has not attended the appeal. Notwithstanding her absence, we have spent some time this morning with Mr Cadman going through her skeleton argument and asking for various comments from Mr Cadman. We therefore turn to the merits of this appeal.
7. The appellant has presented to the court a 92 page skeleton argument. It is a discursive and rambling document. It cites a huge number of authorities, the large majority of which are of no assistance at all. It is difficult to extract from that document what her grounds of appeal really are and that difficulty is compounded by a repetition throughout the document. Unfortunately, she has not spent the time to get the document into a sensible order so that it can be easily followed by this court. Notwithstanding that, we have done our best to understand her complaints.
8. Her grounds of appeal start with a remarkable submission, namely that the authenticity of the judgment is in doubt because it does not have a signature on it. There is no merit in that ground at all. There can be no doubt that the findings with which we are concerned are the findings of the panel chaired by Mr Spooner, whose name appears on the last page of the document. I turn then to the grounds of appeal, which may be found at page 8 of the skeleton argument. There are 19 of them:

(1) The tribunal erred in law.

(2) Tribunal's decision was made in an Unreasonable Manner (Irrationality).

(3) Their decision was contrary to the principles of Natural Justice.

(4) The tribunal's decision was perverse.

(5) The tribunal's decision wrongly relied on the evidence of a witness who himself was convicted by the tribunal itself for making a false statement in an application form to enable him qualify as a Solicitor (false statement by Mr Okoronkwo to enable him enrol as a Solicitor).

(6) The tribunal wrongly relied on the evidence of the said Mr Okoronwko who, a High Court Judge had said was not a credible witness and whom the High Court Judge believed gave false evidence to the Court.

(7) The decision of the tribunal was wrong as it failed to take into account documentary evidence of the Appellant in reaching its decision, but instead placed reliance on hearsay evidence.

(8) The tribunal erred in that it misunderstood the facts of the case, getting facts and dates confused and mixed up and made wrong inaccurate findings.

(9) The tribunal's decision was oppressive.

(10) Their decision was made by a partial and bias tribunal.

(11) The decision of the tribunal was based on likelihood, conjecture, guesswork and semantics, instead of on hard evidence and the reasons given for the decision of the tribunal (35(a) and 35(b)) are evidence of this, the said reasons being unsubstantiated, unfounded, tardy, baseless and a flagrant abuse of power.

(12) The tribunal erred in applying the wrong Burden of Proof, basing their wrong findings of dishonesty on the 'balance of probability' instead of on proof beyond reasonable doubt or instead of basing their finding on the 'Twinsectra doctrine' which defines what such a serious finding should entail (ie knowingly, and/or consciously ie a deliberate and intended act to mislead).

(13) The penalty imposed was draconian, striking off the Appellant in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights.

(14) The penalty of 'striking off' imposed was unfair and disproportionate, 'striking off' the Appellant whilst, on the converse, imposing a fine on the Co Respondent who was also brought before the tribunal for similar allegations (C1-C6 above) when facts are similar and arising from similar circumstances.

(15) The Costs penalty was excessive unfair and disproportionate, imposing £33,000 fine on her, in respect of a 3 month period that her firm was open whilst imposing a £5,000 penalty on the said Co Respondent, whose firm was open for a period of nearly one year.

(16) The Tribunal erred in refusing to allow the Appellant to be heard in answer to the allegations against her and in refusing to give her the opportunity to challenge the proportion of costs awarded against her.

(17) There was Procedural Impropriety in the Disciplinary process and proceedings brought before the tribunal.

(18) The Retrospective Effect of Rule Changes (Retrospective Effect of the Fee Sharing Amendment Act 2003.)

19. The tribunal erred in criticising the way in which she gave her evidence as she did give evidence honestly and in good faith."

9. Before looking at those grounds in any detail, I turn to the charges against her. They are set out at page 2 of the findings:

"1. That with regard to the firm Jonathan & Co the books of accounts were not properly written up contrary to the Solicitors Accounts Rules;

2. That with regard to the firm Alberts she breached Practice Rule 7, Solicitors Practice Rules 1990 in that she agreed to share professional fees other than as permitted by that rule;

3. That she entered into a sham agreement under which she was held out as and purported to act as principal of a firm of solicitors by the name of 'Alberts' when the reality was that Alberts was an instrument by which a non-solicitor, Mr Okoronkwo, purported to practice as a solicitor and/or improperly controlled a solicitor's practice;

4. That she thereby permitted Mr Okoronkwo to be held out as a solicitor;

5. That she permitted bank accounts described as a solicitor's bank accounts to be held and controlled by a non-solicitor;

6. That monies received were not paid into a properly designated client account;

7. With regard to the firm Alberts the books of accounts were not properly written up contrary to the Solicitors Accounts Rules."

The only charge which was not found proved was number 4. I make no reference hereafter to that charge.

10. The facts as found by the Tribunal are conveniently set out in paragraphs 5 to 19 of the findings:

"5. Ms Izegbu was born in November 1965 and admitted as a solicitor on 3rd June 1996. Mr Preedy was born in January 1969 and admitted as a solicitor on 2nd November 1998. Mr Okoronkwo was born in October 1961 and called to the Bar in July 2002.

6. Ms Izegbu was a salaried partner in the firm of Jonathan & Co from 19th February 2003 until 14th April 2003. She had previously been an assistant solicitor with this firm. At the time Ms Izegbu became a partner with Jonathan & Co, the Law Society was conducting a forensic investigation into the firm. A Report was concluded on 20th May 2003 and deficiencies were found in the firm's books of account.

7. On 14th April 2003 Ms Izegbu set up practice purportedly as a sole principal but really in a form of partnership with Mr Okoronkwo under the style of Alberts Solicitors at 205 Wardour Street, London, W1. The firm of Jonathan & Co had previously carried on practice from this address. The terms under which Ms Izegbu joined the firm of Alberts were set out in a letter to her from Mr Okoronkwo dated 30th April 2003. This letter began '...I am pleased to offer you employment...' and went on to set out the usual terms under which an employer employs an employee. Mr Okoronkwo and Ms Izegbu also on 30th April 2003 set out the terms of their purported partnership in a document entitled 'Practising Arrangement'. This document provided that:-

'3. Mr Okoronkwo proposes to use his resources to set up a new law firm to be called Alberts Solicitors.

4. Miss Izegbu proposes to take employment with Alberts solicitors as a principal solicitor to fulfil the necessary requirements of the Law Society for law firms on terms annexed hereto.

5. Mr Okoronkwo will work as a consultant to the firm.

6. The firm shall appoint partners as necessary in the future in pursuance of its business objectives.'

8. In accordance with this Practising Arrangement, it was Mr Okoronkwo who provided the capital and he had the contractual right to appoint Partners. He was the lynchpin and driving force in the practice. He owned the lease on the Wardour Street premises and he opened the firm's bank account and he was sole signatory. The bank account initially was called 'S Okoronkwo t/a Alberts Solicitors' but this was an acknowledged error on the bank's part. Mr Okoronkwo kept the files in his office. He was not a solicitor but the practice was effectively controlled by him and likewise he controlled Ms Izegbu's role in the firm.

9. The arrangement between Ms Izegbu and Mr Okoronkwo ended at the beginning of September 2003. Ms Izegbu left Alberts following a disagreement with Mr Okoronkwo. Ms Izegbu had discovered, while Mr Okoronkwo was away from the office on holiday at the end of August 2003, that Mr Okoronkwo proposed to bring another solicitor, Mr Al-S, into the practice on a salary significantly higher than her own. Ms Izegbu learned of Mr Al-S's proposed salary on finding a letter from Mr Okoronkwo to Mr Al-S dated 9th August 2003.

10. Ms Izegbu confronted Mr Okoronkwo about her discovery on 1st September 2003, his first day back in the office. Mr Okoronkwo did not want Ms Izegbu to leave the practice because she was at that time its sole solicitor. Mr Okoronkwo offered Ms Izegbu, among other things, a pay rise and the outcome of their negotiations, which lasted all day, were jointly noted on a copy of Ms Izegbu's original letter of engagement dated 30th April 2003.

11. At the close of business on 1st September 2003 Mr Okoronkwo believed that he and Ms Izegbu had reached agreement as to terms on which Ms Izegbu would remain at Alberts. Ms Izegbu however later had second thoughts and that night she returned to the office and removed all the client files. Ms Izegbu on 2 September 2003 faxed a letter dated 29th August 2003 to The Law Society which read:-

'Dear Sirs

RETIRING FROM PRACTICE - ALBERTS SOLICITORS

Reference the above.

Please note that the Sole Principal in the above named firm has made a decision to retire from practice and accordingly, close the firm down.'

The Tribunal concludes that this letter was not sent to the Law Society earlier than 2nd September 2003 when Ms Izegbu faxed a copy to the Law Society's Customer Applications & Enquiry Team. Ms Izegbu requested confirmation of receipt and this was provided to her confirming 2nd September 2003.

12. Mr Okoronkwo meanwhile, on the evening of 1st September 2003, was introduced by a mutual acquaintance to Mr Preedy. Mr Preedy at this time was a partner in two other practices, Van Eaton of Temple Avenue, London, EC4 and Develmi & Co of Lewisham High Street, London, SE13. Mr Preedy and Mr Okoronkwo agreed that Mr Preedy should join Alberts purportedly in partnership with Ms Izegbu. Mr Okoronkwo and Mr Preedy later recognised that Mr Okoronkwo, notwithstanding the terms of the Practising Arrangement dated 30th April 2003, had no authority to make such an appointment. However, Mr Preedy at that time believed that Mr Okoronkwo did have such authority and that Ms Izegbu was a principal of Alberts.

13. On 2nd September 2003 Ms Izegbu did not attend for work at Albert's offices. Mr Okoronkwo made enquiries as to her whereabouts and, on discovering the removal of all client files, also made enquiries as to what had become of the files. He learnt that Ms Izegbu did not intend to return to Alberts and that she had the firm's files. When the latter were not returned, Mr Okoronkwo began legal action on his own account against Ms Izegbu in order to recover the files. This action was heard on 7th September 2003 and Ms Izegbu was ordered to return the files. This she did.

14. Mr Preedy on arrival at Alberts on 2 September 2003 soon realised that the manner in which Alberts had been operating did not in a number of respects comply with The Law Society's rules, in particular the Solicitors Accounts Rules. Mr Okoronkwo had relied upon Ms Izegbu to advise him of The Law Society's Rules and was willing to make such changes as Mr Preedy advised in order to meet the Rules. The first significant change made was in respect of the terms of the Practising Arrangement between Mr Okoronkwo and Mr Preedy. This document was dated 5th September 2003 although it was plain from its preamble, referring to discussions in September and October 2003, that it was in fact signed at a later date. The Tribunal concluded that while the document should have been correctly dated, there was no dishonest intention behind the wrong date. This Practising Arrangement, a copy of which was sent to Mrs V Hather of the Law Society in November 2003, provided a different financial structure from that between Mr Okoronkwo and Ms Izegbu and, under clause 25, all the firm's profits and losses accrued to Mr Preedy as principal of the firm. Mr Preedy admitted in evidence that he had made no enquiries into the books of account before agreeing to join the firm but on arrival ensured the appointment of a book-keeper and changed the bank account arrangements so that he became primary signatory to the client bank account.

15. Mr Okoronkwo contacted The Law Society in early September 2003 to inform the latter of the changes in Alberts: by fax on 2 September 2003 to advise of the arrival of Mr Preedy with effect from that date and, by telephone call on 5 September 2003, to advise of Mr Al-S's arrival with effect from 15th September 2003. There then followed an exchange of correspondence between Mrs V Hather and Mrs C Gripton of the Law Society and Messrs Preedy and Okoronkwo as to the then set up of Alberts. The Tribunal finds that Mr Preedy was open with the Law Society in what he said about Alberts and its set up.

16. The Law Society sent Mr Smith of the FIU to inspect the books of account of Alberts. Inspection began on 29th September 2003. It was on this date that Messrs Okoronkwo and Preedy learned from Mr Smith of the fact that Ms Izegbu had closed the firm of Alberts earlier that month. Mr Smith took the view that the firm which Mr Preedy had joined on 2 September 2003 was a new firm which for the purpose of his Report was styled 'Alberts 2' and the original firm of Alberts became 'Alberts 1'.

17. Both Mr Okoronkwo and Mr Preedy were largely cooperative with Mr Smith in his inspection. However, some of the documents requested by Mr Smith were never provided to him. Indeed it was only during the course of the hearing that Mr Okoronkwo produced the bank statements for Alberts 1. The inspection resulted in a Report dated 23rd December 2003. It was found that the books of account had not been properly written up and that Mr Okoronkwo had been sole signatory to the bank account. Clients' monies had been received (eg £25,000 from a Mr O for representation in criminal proceedings) and should have been paid into a client bank account. No such account had existed within the firm. Furthermore Mr Okoronkwo had effective control of the firm's accounting records. The Law Society, as a consequence of Mr Smith's findings, resolved to intervene to close the practice. Mr Okoronkwo and Mr Preedy took steps to resist this and obtained an injunction. A further forensic investigation into Alberts (now Alberts 2) was then carried out by Mr Clemo of the Law Society whose report was dated 8th June 2004.

18. Messrs Okoronkwo and Preedy's application to the High Court to stop the Law Society's intervention was heard by Mr Justice Rattee on 30th July 2004. The application was dismissed and Mr Justice Rattee passed comment that he did not find either Mr Okoronkwo or Mr Preedy an 'entirely honest and frank witness'. Mr Justice Rattee did not hear evidence from Ms Izegbu because she was not called by the Law Society.

19. Mr Okoronkwo meanwhile had passed the requisite examination to transfer from the Bar and on 24th February 2004 applied to the Law Society to be admitted as a solicitor. The application form asked whether he was 'currently subject to investigation by the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors or any other regulatory body?'. Mr Okoronkwo answered 'no'."

11. At paragraph 34, the Tribunal states that it heard a significant amount of evidence over six days. The Tribunal accepted the various reports that were before it. At paragraph 35, the Tribunal reaches the conclusion that the evidence of the appellant is wholly unreliable and unconvincing. They describe her as "evasive when tested in cross-examination and at times inconsistent". For example, she denied that she had ever met Mr Al-S but then admitted that she had. In two areas, the Tribunal find that she was dishonest and gave evidence which was intended to mislead the Tribunal. Those are to be found in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 35, to be found at page 10 of the judgment:

"(a) Ms Izegbu sought to take advantage of a typing error in a page on the Law Society's current website relating to the date on which Rule 7 of the Solicitors Practice Rules 1990 was amended to permit capital in a solicitor's practice to be provided by a non-solicitor. The webpage states April 2003. The evidence of Mr Mercer of the Law Society, which the Tribunal accepted, was that the change was not made until April 2004. Ms Izegbu however stated in her evidence to the Tribunal that she had been advised of the change by a Law Society member of staff whom she had telephoned for advice in April 2003 prior to setting up the practice arrangement with Mr Okoronkwo. Ms Izegbu alleged that she would not have gone into partnership with Mr Okoronkwo had she not received this advice. Given that this change was not effective until 2004, no such telephone advice could have been given. Ms Izegbu alleged she had made a file note of her conversation but at no stage produced a copy of that note. The Tribunal concluded that Ms Izegbu's evidence in this respect was deliberately untruthful.

(b) Similarly the Tribunal concluded that her evidence in respect of the time when she made manuscript amendments to a copy of her letter of engagement dated 30th April 2003 to be deliberately untrue. Mr Okoronkwo said in evidence that the amendments had been made during the course of negotiations as to terms on which Ms Izegbu would stay with Alberts on 1st September 2003. Ms Izegbu said she had not sought to negotiate new terms with Mr Okoronkwo on 1st September 2003 but had spent the day explaining to him that she had closed the practice. She said that the manuscript amendments she had made on that letter had been made at or around the date of the letter. This seemed to the Tribunal to be inherently unlikely and the Tribunal preferred the evidence of Mr Okoronkwo. Both Ms Izegbu and Mr Okoronkwo said their discussions lasted all day. This suggests much was discussed and this is consistent with negotiations as described by Mr Okoronkwo. It is not consistent with Ms Izegbu's assertion that she told Mr Okoronkwo that Alberts had been closed. Moreover, the date on which Ms Izegbu's letter dated 29th August regarding closure of Alberts 1 was faxed to the Law Society was the day after the meeting, namely 2nd September 2003."

12. In paragraph 39 and following, the Tribunal goes on to deal with the particular allegations. In paragraph 39 the Tribunal found that the first allegation was proved and stated:

"39. the Tribunal finds that Ms Izegbu was a Partner of Jonathan & Co from 19th February 2003 to 14th April 2003. Her name was shown as a Partner on Jonathan & Co's notepaper and she was held out to be a Partner by the firm. The Tribunal accepts the evidence of Mr Smith and the findings in paras 83 - 102 of his report that the accounts were not in accordance with the Solicitors Accounts Rules."

In paragraphs 40 to 42, the Tribunal found allegations 2 and 3 proved. Those three paragraphs state:

"40. Ms Izegbu knew from the outset that the Mr Okoronkwo would control the firm. He owned the lease of the premises; could appoint partners; was responsible for the bank accounts and administration of the practice. He could agree fees with clients (eg Mr O) and received clients money. Ms Izegbu was an employee as was plain from the letter of engagement dated 30th April 2003. She was remunerated by the Mr Okoronkwo under the PAYE system.

41. The Tribunal finds that, under the terms of the Practice Arrangement dated 30th April 2003, profits over and above Ms Izegbu's salary of £26000 and bonus were to belong to Mr Okoronkwo. Mr Okoronkwo was not a qualified solicitor and as such the agreement to share professional fees was in breach of Rule 7 in force at the material time.

42. It could not be said on the facts as found that Ms Izegbu was the principal of the firm and Mr Okoronkwo, her employee. As has already been said, the Tribunal finds Ms Izegbu's evidence that she contacted the Law Society in April 2003 to ensure that she was not in breach of Rule 7 to be dishonest. The Tribunal finds as a fact that she did not speak to the Law Society at that time. Although she claims to have made a note of the telephone conversation, no note was ever produced."

In paragraph 44, allegation 5 was found proved. The Tribunal stated:

"44. Mr Okoronkwo signed all cheques and Ms Izegbu was not a signatory to the accounts. Ms Izegbu admitted in evidence that she had nothing to do with the accounts and the files were in Mr Okoronkwo's office. Ms Izegbu did nothing to exercise control over these and allowed Mr Okoronkwo to deal with all financial matters and indeed expected him to do so."

In paragraph 45 they found allegation 6 proved and the Tribunal stated:

"45. There was no properly designated client account and there was no office account held by a solicitor. Monies received from a client, Mr O, were paid into the firm's office account. These sums were said to have been paid in respect of an agreed fee. However, there was no evidence of an agreed fees structure or of any bill having been sent to the client and the payments should have been made into a client account."

As far as allegation 7 is concerned, it is noted that the appellant admitted the allegation and the Tribunal found it proved on her admission.

13. In paragraph 62, the Tribunal gave its reasons for the penalty of striking off. The Tribunal said:

"62. The Tribunal has found that Ms Izegbu lied to it in her evidence. It warned her of the perils that lay ahead should she continue down this path. Ms Izegbu ignored the warning and continued to give evidence that could not be true. This was an act of blatant dishonesty and the appropriate penalty for such conduct is that she be struck off the Roll."

14. In her skeleton argument, Ms Izegbu complains at page 11 and elsewhere of the Tribunal's finding that the appellant closed her firm because she learnt that another person had been offered a higher salary than she was offered. It was her case that she had closed the firm in the public interest. In my view, the Tribunal were right to find on the material that she had closed the account. She closed the practice because of the offer that was made to that other person. In any event, the gravamen of the case against the appellant was what happened in April of 2003.
15. On 14th April 2003 there was a meeting at 205 Wardour Street, attended by the appellant and Mr Okoronkwo. That led to a letter dated 30th April of 2003, significant parts of which are set out by the Tribunal in paragraph 7 of its findings, which I have already quoted in full. On 14th April 2003, Mr Okoronkwo, using paper with a heading "Alberts Solicitors", wrote to the Law Society telling them that "we have recently set up in Practice at our above named address under the name of Alberts solicitors". The letter states:

"The sole Principal of the firm would be our Ms Chinwe Izegbu ... who is now nearly seven years p.q.e. It is hoped that additional partners would shortly join the firm."

The letter went on to ask the Law Society to register the practice. There then followed on 23rd April a letter addressed to Mr Samuel, asking a number of questions. Those questions were answered in a letter dated 26th May of 2004. The letter sets out the name of the insurance company, the fact that the firm will be holding client monies and in paragraph 7, in answer to the question "Please give full names and Law Society numbers ... for any partners joining the new firm", the answer was:

"At present the firm employs the following lawyers.

(a) Ms Chinwe Bernadette Izegbu, a solicitor... Her start date is 6th May 2003 and her status within the firm is Principal Solicitor.

(b) Mr Samuel Nwabueze Okoronkwo, a barrister having the Honourable Society of Gray's Inn No 5948. His start date is 6th May 2003 and his status within the firm is Consultant."

In paragraph 8, in answer to the question requesting information about any partners joining the new firm, it is stated that:

"Save as stated at sub-paragraph 7(a) above no new partners have joined the firm. Miss Izegbu ceased to be a partner with her previous firm on 10th April 2003."

16. We are told by Mr Cadman today that that letter would have been dealt with by someone in the registration department of the Law Society. Such a person would not normally look at the answers in any great detail, provided the appropriate information appeared to have been given. The person concerned was satisfied by what information she had received and she wrote a letter on 14th May stating that the firm of Albert Solicitors was now registered.
17. It is right to say at this point that from the outset of the case Mr Cadman, on behalf of the Law Society, made it clear that he was not alleging dishonesty. He told us that he had made it clear to the Panel that he was not alleging dishonesty because it was the view of the Law Society that they could not prove to the requisite standard the subjective aspect of dishonesty. For my part, I find that a somewhat strange position to adopt in the light of the allegations. It seems clear that what was being alleged was that the appellant was entering into a sham agreement, knowing that the Law Society rules prevented her from entering into the arrangements to which I have just referred and in particular in the letter of April 30th. Nonetheless, that was the view that Mr Cadman took. As we have seen, in fact, the Panel reached the conclusion that she was dishonest, having regard to the evidence that she gave.
18. Given the documents to which I have just made reference, the findings on charges 2 and 3 were inevitable. In her statement for the Tribunal, the appellant's case was that she was in fact the sole practitioner, she was in fact running the firm and it was her firm. Not surprisingly, given the documents to which I have made reference, the Tribunal reached the conclusion that that was not the case. Quite extraordinarily, during her evidence she went further. She, on the findings of the Tribunal, pretended that she had received the authorisation of the Law Society to act as she did under a new rule. That new rule, as is demonstrated in the findings, came into force in April 2004. What seems clear is that some time in 2006 the appellant looked at the website and there was a typographical error on the Law Society website dating the amendment to rule 7 on the Solicitors' Practice Rules to April 2003. Armed with that, she, so the Tribunal found, invented a conversation with the Law Society to the affect that she was entitled to do that which she was doing.
19. For the reasons given by the Tribunal, this was clearly a lie. The decision to amend Rule 7 was not made until December 2003. She could not have even found in 2003 any such amendment because, as I say, the amendment did not come into force until 2004. She also seeks in her skeleton argument to argue that the 2004 amendment was somehow retrospective. That, as Mr Cadman submits, is obviously wrong.
20. It is said that the findings of the Tribunal were findings which no reasonable tribunal could reach. I remind myself that this is a rehearing and not a review, albeit that we do not hear the evidence afresh. In my view there can be no doubt at all that the appellant did, as the Tribunal found, breach Practice Rule 7 by agreeing to share professional fees other than as permitted by the rule and that she entered into a sham agreement under which she was held out and purported to act as principal of a firm of solicitors by the name of Alberts when in reality Alberts was no more than an instrument by which Mr Okoronkwo, a non-solicitor, purported to practice as a solicitor and improperly controlled a solicitors' practice.
21. That deals with allegations 2 and 3. In her skeleton argument, the appellant says that she was not guilty of the first allegation, namely that which related to the books of account of Jonathan & Co, because she had repeatedly asked for the documentation for the accounts and had not been shown them. As Mr Cadman points out, under the Rules a partner, and she was a partner, is responsible for the accounts and cannot excuse any failure to keep the accounts properly by saying that she was refused access to them. In my view, allegation 1 was again amply proved.
22. I turn to allegation 5, namely permitting bank accounts described as solicitors' bank accounts to be held and controlled by a non-solicitor. The evidence for that, to be found, if nowhere else, in the letter of April 30th, is quite overwhelming. She complains that the monies which were received from a client called O did not have to be paid into a properly designated client account because they were an agreed fee and therefore could be paid into the office account pursuant to rule 19(5) of the Solicitors Accounts Rules 1998. Her argument on this fails in two respects. First of all, to be an agreed fee it must be a fee agreed with a solicitor and there was no agreement between O and the appellant. Any agreement that there may have been was between O and Mr Okoronkwo. Secondly, the agreement had to be evidenced in writing and before the Tribunal there was no such evidence in writing. During the course of Mr Okoronkwo's appeal, he submitted further documents about this. Even if we were to look at those documents, which we do not feel it necessary to do, they do not deal with the requirement that a fixed fee agreement had to be with the solicitor, which it was not.
23. Insofar as allegation 7 was concerned, as I have already said, she admitted it. There are other complaints made which I shall deal with briefly. She complains there was bias in the Tribunal because, so she thought, Mr Bamford, a member of the Tribunal, appeared to know Mr Cadman. Mr Cadman tells us that he has appeared before Mr Bamford before. He does not know him in any social or professional sense. Complaint is also made about the way that these prosecutions are conducted and says that it is a breach of Article 6. As Mr Cadman points out, this matter has been dealt with by a number of cases. It is sufficient for our purposes to refer only to Holder v The Law Society [2005] EWHC 2023 (Admin) and in particular at paragraph 27.
24. Notwithstanding the absence of the appellant from these proceedings, I have examined the case against her with care. In my view, the evidence was overwhelming and the appeal against the findings must be dismissed.
25. I turn then finally to the sanction of striking off. In the light of the clearly dishonest conduct of the appellant, if for no other reason, the sanction of striking off was fully justified. All in all therefore, I would dismiss this appeal other than the order of costs.
26. MR JUSTICE MADDISON: For the reasons given by my Lord Lord Justice Hooper, I agree that it has been right not to adjourn these proceedings but to hear the appeal in the absence of the first appellant. I also agree that her appeal should be dismissed for the reasons already given, save that the matter should be remitted to the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal for reconsideration of the order in respect of costs to be made against the first appellant.
27. LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: Thank you.
28. MR CADMAN: There is an application for costs against the appellant.
29. LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: Yes. Let us deal with that.
30. MR CADMAN: The appellant has had served on her in advance, prior to Tuesday's hearing, a schedule of costs, which is higher than the costs application I make at the moment, because obviously that was against Mr Okoronkwo and Ms Izegbu which came to a total of £30,000. The costs application, she has seen that. What she has not seen is that obviously I have reduced the application to remove all of Mr Okoronkwo's and it is a figure in total of £18,974 plus dispersals and VAT. I have copies of it to put before you.
31. LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: Of course, in this court we are not concerned with her means because she has decided to bring this appeal.
32. MR CADMAN: The one matter that has not been portioned is in terms of photographing. That is the total amount. Obviously the situation was it was her responsibility as the appellant to lodge the bundle of documents. You will have seen attached to my first skeleton argument correspondence over many months with both respondents, indicating are they going to lodge a bundle, which we eventually did, but all I can say therefore is that that figure is the total photocopying figure. Apart from that, everything else relates to her. The £900 counsels fee relates to her application to have a stay of the order, which I referred to on the first day of the hearing because it was listed in the morning and she then attended in the afternoon and abandoned it.
33. LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: So you are asking for a total of 21,000 and then she has to then pay VAT on it?
34. MR CADMAN: It would obviously assist the Law Society also because, on the basis of the original application, of course we have a bankruptcy proceedings pending against her, so a costs order will follow that.
35. LORD JUSTICE HOOPER: We make an order of costs against the appellant in the sum of £21,045.16 plus VAT. We have the benefit of a schedule of the respondent's costs. Ms Izegbu has not seen that schedule. She has not seen it because she has decided not to attend. This case has involved a considerable amount of work for the Law Society and this appeal in our view was completely misconceived and should never have been brought and it would be wrong for the Law Society therefore not to have the costs associated with defending it.