England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
DIVISIONAL COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2
		1st February 2007

1. MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON: This is an appeal by way of case stated by Mr Kenneth Crossley against his conviction on a charge of common assault by Justices for the area of Redbridge sitting at Barkingside on 30th June 2006. The challenge to the conviction is on the basis that the charge which was laid against the appellant was bad for duplicity.
2. The charge was one of assault by beating. There was in addition a further charge of criminal damage. The charges are recited in paragraph 1 of the case as follows:

"On the 24th day of January 2006, two charges were preferred by The Crown Prosecution Services against the appellant ... that, firstly, between 20th January 2006 and 24th January 2006 without lawful excuse did destroy/damage a mirror, clock and lamp to the value of £150 belonging to Louise Sheppard intending to destroy such property or being reckless as to whether such property would be destroyed. Secondly, that between 20th January 2006 and 23rd January 2006 [at an address specified] he did assault Louise Sheppard by beating."

3. Paragraph 2 of the case sets out the facts found by the Magistrates' Court:

"(a) Louise Sheppard (the Complainant) had been in a relationship with the Appellant;

(b) A verbal argument commenced between the Complainant and the Appellant on Saturday 21st January 2006 whilst returning to the home address of the Complainant;

(c) On arrival at the home address the argument continued and at some stage during the late evening the Complainant attempted to leave the address. As a consequence the Appellant then attempted to kick a bag out of the complainant's hand in the course of which he kicked and stamped on her left hand causing slight bruising;

(d) The Complainant then ran upstairs followed by the Appellant who then proceeded to kick her in the rib area and throw a plastic Lucozade bottle at her.

(e) Throughout the assault the Appellant verbally abused and threatened the Complainant. The complainant remained with the appellant that night without further incident. We heard evidence from the complainant that she did not go to the police for fear of retribution.

(f) The Complainant remained with the Appellant during Sunday 22nd January 2006. The Complainant did not go to the police at this stage as she was fearful of the Appellant and that he would damage her car.

(g) On 23rd January 2006 after the Appellant had left, the Complainant contacted him asking him to leave the property. The Appellant upon his return again threatened the Complainant. The Complainant then left the address.

(h) The Complainant was later contacted by the appellant at her friends' address by telephone on a number of occassions. On one occasion the Complainant heard items being smashed in the background. Further threats were made by the Appellant in the course of these calls.

(i) On 24th January 2006 police were called. The appellant was found near the property and was walked back to the address. In the property the following items were found damaged, one mirror, one clock and one lamp. We concluded that the Appellant did damage the above property."

4. As I have said, the appeal relates to the charge of assault by beating and is based on the contention that the charge was duplicitous. The facts found by the Magistrates, to which I have referred, reflect the evidence given by the complainant. She gave evidence as to an assault by beating taking place on a single occasion. It is true that the charge gave a range of dates, that is to say between 20th January and 23rd January 2006. The charge might be criticised as being vague. It may have been better if it had said "on a day between 20th January 2006 and 23rd January 2006" rather than leaving a range, as it was stated. But vagueness is not duplicity.
5. There having been, on the evidence of the complainant, which was accepted by the Magistrates, an assault by beating on a single occasion, no question, in my judgment, can arise of this charge having been duplicitous. In those circumstances, the appeal must fail. In any event it is clear, in my judgment, that there was no prejudice caused to the appellant in this case. The nature of the charge against him and the events which were the subject of scrutiny appeared from the complainant's evidence. It was inevitable that that evidence ranged over a period of three days, having regard to the fact that there were two charges, one relating to the damage to the property, which was discovered at the end of the period in question, and one relating to assault, which took place at the beginning of the period in question.
6. In those circumstances, in my judgment, the first question contained in the case stated, which is:

"... were we [the Magistrates] correct in concluding that the charge was not bad for duplicity or bad for quasi-duplicity and as a consequence the conviction was justified."

I would answer affirmatively. In those circumstances, it seems the second question does not arise.

7. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: I entirely agree. It follows that the appeal is dismissed.
8. Mr Arnold?
9. MR ARNOLD: I am grateful, my Lord. The appellant has the benefit of a legal aid order. I wonder if that might be assessed.
10. LORD JUSTICE MAURICE KAY: Yes.